INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOLUME 49

1973

Published quarterly for the

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

by the

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

No. 1—JANUARY 1973

No. 2—APRIL 1973

No. 3—JULY 1973

No. 4—OCTOBER 1973

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 49 JANUARY 1973 No. 1

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT 1972*

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DURING the last couple of years Parliament has spent a deal of time discussing the legislative and practical consequences of this country's accession to the European Economic Communities. More than fifty days in both Houses have been devoted to this topic since the beginning of January 1971. Debates in the House of Commons on the Treaty of Accession and the European Communities Bill itself occupied a total of well over 300 hours—and either the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Geoffrey Rippon) or I were on parade throughout, if one does not exclude natural breaks for physical (and intellectual) refreshment. If my arithmetic is correct, over two million words were spoken in the course of those Commons debates and another 400,000 words or so were uttered in the course of the corresponding debates in the House of Lords.

There is, therefore, no shortage of material on which to draw. I intend to discuss what might be called the general part of the subject. I shall try to say something about the nature and sources of Community law; about the impact of Community law upon the general body of law that is the stock-in-trade of British lawyers; about the way in which Community law will come to be handled by British courts, British judges and British lawyers; and, finally, about the possible relationship between Community law and the familiar law-making processes of the British Parliament.

Let me begin by trying to put the whole matter in perspective. Why Community law at all? Before seeking an answer to that question, I should perhaps say that the expression 'Community law' is not strictly confined to measures which have direct effect in the member States. But for convenience I propose to use it here in this narrow sense, except where in the context it necessarily takes on a wider connotation.

Let us remind ourselves of the object of the original treaties of Rome and Paris. They set out, essentially, to establish a Common Market. It is this basically simple economic concept—the establishment of a single market, a single trading area throughout Europe—that is at the heart of the Community. The idea was, and is, that capital, goods, services and people should be free to pass, without let or hindrance, throughout the market area. Goods, services and capital are intended to be freely avail-

* Based upon an address given on October 5, 1972, at a conference organised by Chatham House on the legal implications of British entry into the EEC.

able upon the basis of fair and equal competition and without any restriction, direct or indirect.

The Attorney-General, Sir Peter Rawlinson, explained the legal consequences of this concept when he addressed the Law Society on October 4, 1971:

> If trade barriers are to be eliminated in this way and if there are to be no distortions upon free and equal competition, then certain things follow within the Common Market that is being created. There must be uniform rules operating throughout its area, rules to secure fair play and to prevent, as some might say, the market being 'rigged'. And the operation of those rules must be seen to be impartial. The rules must therefore be seen to be subject to fair and independent control. This uniform code of conduct needs to cover matters which affect the operation of the market. And it needs to extend to those aspects of economic policy or commercial practice which could distort the fair and equal operation of that market.

There are several things that need to be stressed about that quotation. First, I emphasise what Sir Peter Rawlinson pointed out, that the impact of Community law is, by definition, confined to essentially economic matters. This is not to say that its impact is unimportant. But it is to justify our oft-repeated assertion (and here I quote from paragraph 31 of the July 1971 White Paper [1]) that:

> The English and Scottish legal system will remain intact. . . . The common law will remain the basis of our legal system, and our courts will continue to operate as they do at present. . . . All the essential features of our law will remain, including the safeguards for individual freedom such as trial by jury and *habeas corpus* and the principle that a man is innocent until proved guilty. . . .

Next, I emphasise the point made by the Attorney-General that the rules 'must . . . be seen to be subject to fair and independent control'. This is, of course, the foundation of the role of the European Court of Justice, in accordance with the treaties,[2] of securing a uniform interpretation of Community law throughout the Community.

And, finally, I stress the paramount importance that is to be attached to the concept of uniformity in the rules themselves. This emphasis upon the uniformity of Community law is the key to its nature. The architects of the Treaty of Rome were explicit in their intentions. Some of the rules of the market, they decided, could most readily have a uniform effect throughout the market if they were designed to operate directly within the boundaries of each member State. In this way it was intended to avoid the disparities that might arise if Community law had had to be translated and enacted separately for each member State by a series of separate legislatures.

[1] *The United Kingdom and the European Communities* (Cmnd. 4715).
[2] See, *e.g.*, Treaty of Rome, Arts. 164 and 177.

This concept is the key to our understanding of what is meant by 'directly applicable' Community law. It is embodied most clearly (but not exclusively) in the well-known Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome:

> A regulation [that is to say, of course, a regulation made by a Community institution in accordance with its powers as defined by the Treaties] shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member States.

Much of the parliamentary controversy turned upon the way in which this concept is dealt with in the European Communities Act. I was accused of having effected a legislative 'conjuring trick'—and far more and worse besides. But the concept had in fact been spelt out with reasonable clarity by the last government, a number of years ago. For paragraph 22 of the May 1967 White Paper [3] had identified the power of the Community institutions to make instruments which take effect directly as law within the member States as an important novel feature of the European Treaties.

As you can imagine, I was obliged, when we were preparing our legislation, to study a large number of learned (and sometimes not so learned) articles about what we were trying to do. I must confess that the title of one such article, by Professor J. D. B. Mitchell of Edinburgh University, struck me at the time as not only highly intriguing but also as scarcely justified. But Professor Mitchell may have been nearer the mark than I thought when he called his piece (a critique of the 1967 White Paper to which I have just referred) 'What do you want to be inscrutable *for*, Marcia?' [4]

For, even within the last twelve months, at least three distinguished commentators were led to believe that each piece of directly applicable Community law—present and future—would have to be the subject of separate legislative treatment in this country. Sir Derek Walker-Smith, a consistent and generally clear-sighted critic of accession, suggested that we should have to re-enact each directly applicable provision in a United Kingdom statutory instrument. We should need, he then thought, 'to clothe the nakedly supranational reality with a mini-skirt of seeming constitutional propriety'.[5] In November 1971, Professor S. A. de Smith likewise appeared to foresee the necessity for what he described as 'a process of statutory conversion' of directly applicable provisions.[6] Similarly, Lord Diplock, in his Upjohn Memorial Lecture of December 1971,[7]

[3] *Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European Communities* (Cmnd. 3301).
[4] *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 5, p. 112.
[5] *The Times*, July 23, 1971.
[6] 'The Constitution and the Common Market: A Tentative Appraisal', *Modern Law Review*, Vol. 34, p. 604.
[7] Published in *The Law Teacher*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1972.

suggested that it would probably be appropriate for Community regulations (directly applicable, of course) to be 'brought into force as part of our domestic law by statutory instrument'.

* * *

In the result we have followed the other course foreshadowed by Lord Diplock, and provided, as he put it, that 'all Regulations duly made by the appropriate organs of the Community shall have effect as if enacted by Parliament'. This is—although not precisely, for reasons that I shall explain in a moment—the main effect of section 2 (1) of the European Communities Act. Let me remind you of the terms of that vital provision:

> All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom, shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 'enforceable Community right' and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this subsection applies.

You will see the way in which Community law is identified as all that body of law ('rights, powers, liabilities, obligations . . . restrictions . . . remedies and procedures') 'as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom'. The character of directly applicable Community law as a separate and new legal order has thus been identified. Its scope and nature is defined 'in accordance with the Treaties' and thus in accordance with ideas of direct applicability as developed by the European Court of Justice.

The body of law that is thus defined is then to be 'recognised and available in law, and . . . enforced, allowed and followed accordingly'. Thus immediately (but without any transformation or alteration of its separate legal nature) Community law is to be treated as a legal system which our domestic courts are required to apply. It has been separated off from the general body of (indirectly applicable) international law. But it has not been incorporated into or made identical with our own domestic law. Our courts are simply required to give direct effect to Community law according to its own nature, 'in accordance with the Treaties'.

It is important to understand the scope of that legal phrase. It embraces the implications of provisions as diverse as Articles 85, 177 and 192 of the Treaty of Rome, along with those contained in Article 189. Thus, when Article 85 (2) provides that 'Any agreements or decisions prohibited' by Article 85 (1) (as interfering with competition

within the Common Market) 'shall be automatically void', it is prescribing a rule which will be upheld 'in accordance with the Treaties' by our own courts.

It is in the same way that the European Communities Act gives effect to Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides for the optional reference to the European Court of any question of Community law that arises before 'any court or tribunal' within the United Kingdom and the obligatory reference of any such question that arises before any court or tribunal 'against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy'. It is not, of course, necessary for every question of Community law that arises in the lower courts to be referred in this way—but only those on which such a court considers a decision of the European Court is necessary to enable the domestic court to give judgment. But our domestic courts are required to follow the provisions of Article 177 by the terms of section 2 (1) of the European Communities Act, which require 'procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties' to be 'followed accordingly', that is to say, 'in accordance with the Treaties'.

One other important point should be noted. These provisions also give effect to the other 'constitutional innovation' that was identified in the last government's 1967 White Paper [8]—'the acceptance in advance as part of the law of the United Kingdom of provisions to be made in the future by instruments issued by the Community institutions'.

Consistently with what I have just said, I do not accept in its entirety the phrase 'as *part of* the law of the United Kingdom'. Community law retains its own nature. It is for the same reason that I had reservations a moment ago about Lord Diplock's forecast [9] that Community law would have effect 'as if enacted by Parliament'. Certainly it will take effect here *by virtue* of an Act of Parliament. But not 'as if enacted' thereby. The point I wish to underline is the provision that is made for the application within this country of future Community law—that which is '*from time to time* provided for by or under the Treaties'.

At this point, some people might begin to wonder whether there might not, after all, be something in the suggestion that we have been responsible for some kind of sleight-of-hand in achieving as much as I have described by so few provisions in the European Communities Act. I should firmly reject any such suggestion. For we have achieved no more than was foreshadowed by the Lord Chancellor in the last government, Lord Gardiner, when he forecast in the House of Lords [10] 'an enactment applying as law in the United Kingdom so much of the provisions of the treaties and of the instruments made under them as then had direct internal effect as law within the member States and providing that future instruments similarly took effect as law here'.

[8] See footnote 3.
[9] See footnote 7.
[10] 282 H.L.Deb., May 8, 1967, col. 1202.

Of course, it is not only section 2 (1) that serves to achieve the required effect. It is supported by the interpretation and supremacy provisions of section 2 (4), of which I shall have something more to say later. And it is fortified by several thoughts that are embodied in section 3. Most notably, section 3 (1) differentiates Community law from any other brand of foreign law. For any question of Community law that might arise in British courts is to be treated not as if it were a question of foreign law (and therefore a question of fact) but as a question of law —' for determination . . . in accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court '. And the British courts are required by section 3 (2) to take ' judicial notice . . . of . . . any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court '.

I have already explained how all these provisions taken together enable, and indeed require, our courts to apply Community law, as such, in accordance with its own nature. This has the consequence that one cannot and should not equate Community law with delegated legislation. To identify the two concepts would have the effect of obscuring another important aspect of Community law, the fact that ' Community law having direct internal effect is designed to take precedence over the domestic law of Member States ' (the words in which paragraph 23 of the 1967 White Paper [11] described the concept of supremacy of Community law).

Some people have spoken not of a delegation of legislative power to Community institutions but have suggested instead that there has been a ' transfer ', rather than a delegation, of power. This was the expression used by Lord Gardiner when he explained the matter to the House of Lords [12] in these words: ' . . . membership of the communities involves a transfer of legislative and judicial powers in certain fields to the Community institutions and an acceptance of a corresponding limitation of the exercise of national powers in these fields.'

It is in fact probable that even the notion of ' transfer ' is not entirely apt. What has really happened is that Parliament has identified an area within which Community legislative power will operate. Within that area Parliament intends to refrain (as is required by the treaties) from exercising its own legislative power. The legislative area affected in this way is defined as that within which ' in accordance with the Treaties ' Community law is required to prevail.

So much for the central feature of the European Communities Act. I hope I shall not be accused of immodesty if I quote the verdict pronounced upon it, in their perceptive study of it during its passage as a Bill through Parliament, by Professor J. D. B. Mitchell and two colleagues at the Edinburgh Centre of European Governmental Studies:

[11] See footnote 3.
[12] See footnote 10.

> From a legal point of view, the Bill is good. Indeed the draftsmen should be congratulated on producing an artistic piece of legislation which ingeniously achieves the desired results and avoids betraying any of the essential characteristics of Community law. Thus the Government in this has demonstrated proper loyalty to the Communities.[13]

I hasten to make it clear that responsibility for this success (if success it is) was correctly identified by Lord Stow Hill [14] when, in the House of Lords Second Reading debate, he paid tribute to Sir John Fiennes and his team of expert parliamentary draftsmen for having produced a Bill which Lord Stow Hill described as 'a most skilfully drafted, most imaginative and a brave attempt to face up to this really staggering problem'.

* * *

But if 'the Government has demonstrated proper loyalty to the Communities' have we been loyal too to our own British notion of parliamentary sovereignty? Is it indeed possible to combine both loyalties? This is the question which has fascinated the legal writers ever since the great debate began.

Consider for a moment the key provision, to be found in section 2 (4) of the Act. It is there provided that 'any enactment passed or to be passed . . . shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions' of the section. And those 'foregoing provisions' include, of course, the concept of 'enforceable community rights' and so on, whose overriding nature is derived from and defined 'in accordance with the Treaties'.

It should be noted that the provisions I have quoted do not expressly give supremacy or priority to Community law. As Professor J. D. B. Mitchell [15] (and his colleagues) have pointed out:

> . . . such a declaration has, on closer examination, less value than appears on the surface. It could merely provide, as experience has shown, a more precise starting point for argument. Fortified in whatever way it might be, such a declaration does not by itself meet the circular argument that the one thing the 'sovereign' cannot do is to limit for the future its sovereign activities.

What the Act seeks to do instead is to enjoin our courts, in their interpretation of future legislation, to give full effect to the concept of 'enforceable Community rights' which, as defined in section 2 (1) (and the treaties), contains the element of supremacy. The Act does not try to say that Parliament cannot enact legislation which is in conflict

[13] 'Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty and Legislation relating to British Membership', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 9, p. 149.
[14] 333 H.L.Deb., July 25, 1972, col. 1262.
[15] See footnote 13.

with Community obligations. For, as Lord Gardiner told the House of Lords[16]: 'There is in theory no constitutional means available to us to make it certain that no future Parliament would enact legislation to conflict with Community law.'

I know that this 'traditional view', as it is called by the commentators, has been challenged over the years. Amongst others, Sir Ivor Jennings,[17] Professor Heuston,[18] and, in this European context, Professor J. D. B. Mitchell,[19] have all argued that it should be possible, within our constitutional framework, to devise a statutory formulation and machinery that would have the effect of 'entrenching' a given Act of Parliament. The opposing and conventional theory has probably been best argued by Professor H. W. R. Wade[20] and, most recently by a Commonwealth commentator, Mr. F. A. Trindade.[21] And it is that traditional view which has commended itself (for reasons that would take too long to elaborate here) to those responsible for the preparation of the European Communities legislation.

Thus the Act has tried to achieve supremacy of Community law by more conventional and pragmatic means. By means of the provisions to which I have referred, the Act seeks, in any case where a possible conflict can be resolved by applying rules of construction, to regulate the operation of any potentially conflicting United Kingdom legislation by controlling the way in which our courts will construe and apply it. And it is by this same process that the Act seeks to give full effect to 'the principles laid down by . . . the European Court' which our courts are required by section 3 (1) to follow in determining questions of Community law.

In this context people then pose two different questions. Could Parliament, if it chose, repeal the European Communities Act? And, less fundamentally but probably more relevantly, what would be the position if Parliament, either by design or (more probably) by accident, enacted legislation that was clearly in conflict with Community law?

The question of express repeal, in whole or in part, of the European Communities Act has already been the subject of some considered comments in this country—none of them, of course, in any court where the question has actually arisen. The Court of Appeal, in the case brought by Mr. Blackburn in 1971,[22] declined to consider the point.

[16] 282 H.L.Deb., May 8, 1967, col. 1203.
[17] *The Law and the Constitution*, 5th ed. (London: University of London Press, 1959), pp. 151 *et seq.*
[18] *Essays in Constitutional Law*, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens, 1964), pp. 6–31.
[19] See footnote 4.
[20] 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' [1955] *Cambridge Law Journal* 172; 'Sovereignty and the European Communities', 88 *Law Quarterly Review* (1972).
[21] 'Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Primacy of European Community Law', *Modern Law Review*, Vol. 35, p. 375.
[22] *Blackburn* v. *Attorney-General* [1971] 2 All E.R. 1383.

Lord Denning said: 'If Her Majesty's Ministers sign this Treaty and Parliament enacts provisions to implement it, I do not envisage that Parliament would afterwards go back on it and try to withdraw from it. But, if Parliament should do so, then I say we will consider that event when it happens.' In his recent address to the Institute of Public Administration, Mr. Justice Scarman,[23] with similar caution, suspected that 'we may safely leave to the day that it arises the problem of a conflict between a directly applicable rule of the Common Market and a subsequent Act of Parliament'. Lord Diplock, however (in his lecture already quoted [24]), expressed the clear view:

> If the Queen in Parliament were to repeal the legislation which enacted the rules as part of our domestic law without first having given the requisite notice of denunciation of the Convention, this would constitute a breach of international law by the United Kingdom, but the repeal would be nonetheless effective in English law.

And he expressed a similar view in relation to any later United Kingdom statutes that were plainly in conflict with our obligations under the treaties.

I did not go so far when I explained the position, as I saw it, to the House of Commons. But I did endorse the proposition that 'a subsequent United Kingdom statute—even if not designed to pull us out of the Communities—which began with the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 2 . . . of the European Communities Bill, black shall be white" would mean that the courts of this country would give effect to that limited proposition, certainly as the matter now stands'.[25]

But we are very much more likely to discover, as Mr. Justice Scarman put it,[26] that the British 'will not have lost their native taste for compromise and that all three organs of government—Parliament, the executive and the courts—will co-operate to make the new system work'.

In this relationship our courts will, of course, be guided not only by the interpretation provisions of the European Communities Act. They will also follow the rule of interpretation which requires them to construe our domestic law, if possible, in a way that is in line with our international obligations.

Note incidentally that if, nonetheless, a conflict *should* occur between Community law and a United Kingdom statute enacted in the future, our courts have not been given the power (for which some people

[23] 'Law and Administration', *Journal of the Royal Institute of Public Administration*, Vol. 50, p. 256.

[24] See footnote 7.

[25] 838 H.C.Deb., June 13, 1972, col. 1320.

[26] See footnote 23.

have argued [27]) of declaring the later United Kingdom statute invalid. This would, of course, be an entirely novel concept under our constitution. Moreover, in any particular case where conflict did occur, a simple declaration of invalidity of the offending statute might well produce an inappropriate result. How could it for instance distinguish the valid from the invalid when the part that was inconsistent with Community law was almost inseparable from unobjectionable provisions And such a declaration might only make sense if it operated *ab initio*; while I appreciate that an unfavourable decision by a court on a question of *vires* of a particular piece of subsidiary legislation operates retrospectively, a similar process might well prove unworkable for present purposes. All, therefore, that our courts have been required to do is simply to limit the consequences of any United Kingdom statute that does conflict with Community law, though in the case of a future statute any limitation of its consequences would be confined to what is practicable and would not be likely to iron out a conflict which was plainly intentional. We did not believe that we could have done more than this to resolve, in advance, every problem or possible conflict that might perhaps arise in the future. As I said in the House of Commons last June: 'If through inadvertence any such conflict arose, that would be a matter for consideration by the Government and the Parliament of the day.' [28]

Parliament will discharge the important function of enacting from time to time any amendments or repeals of United Kingdom statutes that are necessary to bring them into line with the provisions of Community law. Most of Part II of the European Communities Act is taken up with this task, with bringing our statute book into line with Community law as it has developed to date. And, for the future, it follows (in the words of the 1967 White Paper) [29] 'that within the fields occupied by . . . Community law Parliament would have to refrain from passing fresh legislation inconsistent with that law as for the time being in force'.

* * *

The business of keeping our domestic law in line with our Community obligations will, of course, require us to take account not only of directly applicable Community law but also of indirectly applicable obligations. For it must be remembered that the Community makes law not only by means of directly applicable regulations. Very often the alternative form of Community instrument is used—the directive. A

[27] *e.g.*, Professor J. D. B. Mitchell (see footnote 4) and Mr. F. A. Trindade (see footnote 21).
[28] 838 H.C.Deb., June 13, 1972, col. 1322.
[29] See footnote 3, para. 23.

directive is, in the words of Article 189, 'binding, as to the result achieved, upon each member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods'. Thus it is for each member State to make the changes in its own law that are necessary to give effect to directives.[30]

Clearly, some of the changes in our domestic law that are needed will be effected by ordinary Act of Parliament. Sometimes this will be required because of the importance of the subject. Sometimes it will be convenient because other domestic legislation dealing with the subject in question is also coming before Parliament and it will be sensible to deal with some European legislative changes at the same time.

Other changes in our law, whether to supplement directly applicable law or to give effect to obligations assumed by member States to make changes in their law, will be more appropriately effected by statutory instrument. This is why section 2 (2) of the European Communities Act enables Ministers to proceed by statutory instrument to make provision:

> (a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obligation of the United Kingdom or enabling any such obligation to be implemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed or to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised; or (b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation or rights or the coming into force, or the operation from time to time, of subsection (1) above.

This power, as defined, is a wide one; for section 2 (4) makes it clear that an instrument under section 2 (2) may include 'any . . . provision (of any such extent) as might be made by Act of Parliament'. There are, however, four specific exceptions to this power, set out in Schedule 2; delegated legislative powers under the Act may *not* be used to impose or increase taxes, to operate retrospectively, to create new powers of delegation or to make new criminal offences that would attract serious penalties. And the government explained, during the course of our debates, that what became known as the 'Clause 2 (2) powers'—including the power conferred to amend earlier Acts of Parliament by statutory instrument—would not normally be used instead of primary legislation in relation to matters of major substance.

It is clear that a significant proportion of the legislation, primary and secondary, that will come before Parliament in the future will have a European flavour. I use the expression 'significant proportion', rather than any more alarming phrase, advisedly. For the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation (under Lord Brooke's chairmanship) has already

[30] Note that directives may give rise to rights enforceable by individuals against member States without the interposition of implementing domestic legislation—see *S.A.C.E.* v. *Italian Ministry of Finance* [1971] C.M.L.R. 123.

been considering the scale of the problem. On the basis of last year's legislative output of the European institutions, they accepted that some sixty-five Community instruments would have required some supporting or consequential legislation in the United Kingdom. After taking account of the possibility of effecting the necessary changes in primary legislation and of using a single United Kingdom instrument to deal with several Community instruments at the same time, Lord Brooke's Committee concluded [31] that Europe would involve only 'a relatively small addition to the number of instruments, approaching one thousand a year', that are already considered by Parliament. Accordingly, provided the other improvements in procedure recommended in their Report are adopted, the Committee concluded that 'it should become possible for Parliament to maintain a watch over delegated legislation stemming from a decision to join the European Communities, without overstraining the Parliamentary machinery'.

In the same way I used the expression 'European *flavour*' advisedly as well. For there will be no clear-cut division, either in Parliament or in the courts or in practical business life, between European and non-European law. Increasingly the two systems of law will interrelate with and permeate each other. Future British legislation about, for example, companies, road haulage or aspects of agricultural policy is quite likely to contain some European elements.

This is why any reforms in our parliamentary procedure that are designed to facilitate and improve parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation are likely in the long run to have a wider scope and significance than is necessitated by Europe alone. It is too early yet for me to try to foreshadow, even if I could, the precise nature of the changes that will be desirable. Clearly, however, they may involve the proposals that have been canvassed by Lord Brooke's Committee, in the context of delegated legislation generally. Equally it will be necessary, as Mr. Geoffrey Rippon made plain during the Second Reading debate,[32] to consider what would be the most suitable method of ensuring parliamentary scrutiny of draft Community instruments before their submission to the Council of Ministers for decision. This was why, as long ago as February 15, 1972, we suggested the establishment of an *ad hoc* joint committee to consider this question.

It was, therefore, no great surprise when the Select Committee on Procedure in their report, published in July, expressed themselves 'convinced of the need for an enquiry of wide scope'.[33] The Committee concluded that 'the entry of Britain into the Communities presents a

[31] Report from the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation: Session 1971–72, paras. 141 and 142.

[32] 831 H.C.Deb., February 15, 1972, cols. 274–277.

[33] Third Special Report from the Select Committee on Procedure: Session 1971–72.

profound challenge to many of the established procedures of Parliament which, if not adequately dealt with, could leave Parliament substantially weaker *vis-à-vis* the executive '.

I personally should agree that entry into the Communities *does* involve a challenge for our legislative and constitutional procedures. But I believe that it is a challenge that can be used to the advantage of Parliament, if we have the vision to make the most of the opportunities that now present themselves.

HOW FREE ARE THE SEAS?

J. E. S. Fawcett

ARE we witnessing a gradual closure of the seas? For most of the three centuries down to the middle of the 20th century the freedom of the seas has been a resounding principle, which has with great effect governed the conduct of the maritime nations. It has meant that no part of the high seas can be occupied or ' closed ' by any state or subjected to its exclusive jurisdiction.[1] But since 1945 maritime claims have been and are being made, some novel and some extravagant, but all exceeding in extent, and in the number of countries involved, any previous claims. The claims of Iceland, leading to the present ' cod war ', not only extend earlier claims by that country but now form part of a world-wide pattern of assertion of new rights over the sea and its resources.

Before examining this pattern, it is worth looking back at some of the maritime claims and conflicts that marked an earlier period of expanding use of the seas, which began with the great voyages of Columbus, da Gama and Magellan.[2] England asserted jurisdiction in the 17th century over an area of sea ranging as far as from Cape Finisterre in Spain to a point in western Norway,[3] and in a form expressed by Charles I in a letter to his ambassador in the Hague[4]:

> . . . commanding the seas he [the King of Great Britain] may cause his neighbours and all countries to stand upon their guard, whensoever he thinks fit. To such presumption Mare Liberum gave the first warning piece, which must be answered by a defence of Mare Clausum, not so much by the discourses as by the louder language of a powerful navy to be better understood, when overstrained patience seeth no hope of preserving her right by other means.

Mare Liberum is no doubt a reference to the work of Grotius, published in 1609 and addressed to the problems of navigation and trade in the East Indies, and *Mare Clausum* to the work of John Selden, written in 1618 and published much later, in the reign of Charles I, and dedicated to him. The two titles symbolise the basic maritime conflicts of the time. For similar broad claims to those enunciated by Charles I were made

[1] The *High Seas Convention 1958*, accepted now by 49 countries, declares that ' the high seas being open to all nations ' no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty: Article 2.

[2] For a brief but fascinating survey, see J. H. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, Vol. IV (Leyden: Sijthoff. 1971), pp. 8–39.

[3] Great Britain-Netherlands Treaty of Peace (January 1674).

[4] Cited by Verzijl, p. 11.

earlier in the 17th century by the Kings of Denmark-Norway, purporting to prevent the circumnavigation of northern Norway by ships from other countries, and they sought to restrict access of foreign vessels to Iceland and Greenland, whether for trade or fisheries. In the Mediterranean, Monaco, Genoa and Pisa all had pretensions to control shipping in their adjacent seas, and the famous marriage of Venice with the Adriatic sea had a practical form in the imposition of tolls on all shipping moving north of the line joining Ravenna and Fiume. The activities of the great trading companies in the 17th century brought claims to distant seas off the Levant and in the Indies, East and West.

Fisheries off north-western Europe were, not surprisingly, matters of conflict from early times.[5] For example, English fishermen resented the licence granted by Edward I in 1295 to Zeeland vessels to fish '*in mari suo prope Jernemouth*' (Yarmouth); and in 1413 the King of England and the Count of Holland agreed on the appointment of *gubernatores*, later called *judices conservatores*, to stop the repeated clashes between fishermen; freedom of fishing in coastal waters was often regulated by treaty. But the northern seas between Norway, the Faeroes, Iceland and Greenland have been the scene of prolonged disputes over maritime jurisdiction and fishery rights since the beginning of the 17th century.

Two features of these historic claims and conflicts must be noticed. First, claims by countries to jurisdiction over parts of the high seas were often inconsistent—in the 16th century Great Britain denied to Spain and Portugal rights in distant waters which it claimed in its own neighbourhood—and extended claims were seldom recognised in fact by other countries; so despite conflicts, it would be no exaggeration to say that the principle of the freedom of the high seas, beyond recognised territorial limits, gradually prevailed despite adverse claims and was indeed the base of opposition to such claims and the instrument of their suppression. Secondly, claims adverse to the freedom of the seas, and consequent conflicts, have been most frequent when the uses of the seas have been expanding. The uses of the sea had been stabilised for centuries up almost to the Second World War, being confined to surface navigation, laying of seabed cables, fisheries and the getting of seabed resources easily accessible from the shore. Two factors have added new dimensions to the sea: the discovery of vast and valuable seabed and subsoil resources, and the uses of the submarine; consequently since 1945 we have been in a period of expanding uses of the sea, and of instability of long-accepted principles governing those uses.

In September 1945 President Truman issued his famous proclamation on the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf of the United States. This continental shelf was a geophysical feature

[5] Verzijl, pp. 24–29.

extending generally to the 100 fathoms line, and its natural resources were declared in the proclamation to be 'appertaining to the United States subject to its jurisdiction and control'; but the declaration went on to emphasise that 'the character as high seas of the waters of the continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected'. While this was not the first time that claims had been made to the resources of the seabed beyond territorial limits —the historic pearl fisheries off Ceylon and other sedentary fisheries have been so recognised—the proclamation established a general principle, which was to have rapid acceptance and application around the world. It became a key issue at the UN Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, which adopted a Continental Shelf Convention, now accepted by forty-nine countries. The rights of a coastal state over its adjacent continental shelf are described in Article 2 of the convention, with certain qualifications, as 'sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources'. However, the definition of the continental shelf itself, in Article 1, shows less caution and is not confined to continental shelves in the strict geophysical sense; for the purposes of the convention it is 'the sea-bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres, or'—fateful words—'beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas'. While, with the technology available in 1958, this appeared to be a practical limitation, the accelerating development of sophisticated techniques since that time have made any limitation of exploitability by depth of water ineffective. The limitation of seabed rights of coastal states under the convention has been to depend heavily on the term 'adjacent' in Article 1,[6] and the whole concept will come up for reconsideration at the UN Law of the Sea Conference in 1973.

Features of ocean space

It may be useful now to describe briefly the dimensions of 'ocean space' as they are at present seen. In the past the sea has been a two-dimensional space in the sense that, with a few limited exceptions, its uses have been confined to and dependent on surface navigation. But it is now overwhelmingly three-dimensional. In addition to the needs of surface navigation, the body of water of the sea is vital not only for its resources, but as an area of pollution, and field of movement for submarines; the seabed has also revealed itself as having vast sources of energy and minerals and as a base for sophisticated naval devices, and it remains the seat of long-distance cables which are still to be outmoded by communications satellites.

[6] See judgment of International Court of Justice in *North Sea Continental Shelf Case*, 1969 I.C.J.Rep., p. 22.

For the purposes of regulation of its uses, the ' ocean space ' is divided into a number of sub-spaces or zones, some overlapping, and they may be conveniently described in turn in relation to the surface of the sea, the body of water, and the seabed and subsoil. Each coastal state has a *territorial sea,* which is under its exclusive jurisdiction and control, subject to a general right of innocent passage for foreign vessels, though not all countries acknowledge such a right for warships. It may also, in order to enforce its immigration, customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations, exercise control over foreign vessels in a *contiguous zone* of the high seas beyond its territorial sea and having the same base-lines. Beyond the territorial limits of states lie the *high seas.*

The body of water of the sea is divided into territorial sea and high seas but the allocation of its resources, principally fish, is not so simple. In the first place, a coastal state has exclusive fishery rights in its territorial sea, though not in the waters of its contiguous zone of the high seas. However, it may by agreement permit foreign vessels to fish in parts or the whole of its territorial sea, or it may establish exclusive fishery limits beyond its territorial sea, provided that, according to rules recognised in the Territorial Sea Convention 1958 but now challenged, they do not exceed twelve miles from coastal base-lines.[7]

The seabed and its subsoil form part of the territory of the coastal state up to the limits of the territorial sea, and beyond those limits, although under the high seas it is subject to the ' sovereign rights ' of the adjacent coastal state as far as it satisfies (under present rules) the criteria in the Continental Shelf Convention already described. Since the limits of exploitability are one of these criteria and are at present indeterminate, the geophysical features of the continental shelf and deep seabed or abyssal plain are of some importance. Beyond the continental shelf, which is for a greater or lesser distance an extension of each landmass and lies at moderate depths seldom exceeding about 200 metres (about 100 fathoms), there is the continental slope where the shelf begins to fall away and the continental rise where it meets the deep seabed or abyssal plain, lying at depths of many thousands of feet. The United States has made proposals for an international regime to govern the uses of the seabed which would be based in part on these geophysical distinctions.

The claims to extended sea-space which have been more and more insistently made by many countries in the last twenty years may be seen as having two broad objectives: security and acquisition of resources. They take the form of enlargement of the territorial sea or establishment of zones of exclusive jurisdiction in the adjacent sea by coastal states, for different purposes, and it may be remarked here that some countries, for

[7] The United Kingdom Fishery Limits Act 1964 fixes these limits at 12 miles at a number of points around the British Isles, but the territorial sea remains limited to 3 miles. Denmark increased its fishery limits to 12 miles in 1967.

example France and Belgium, have never sharply distinguished in their practice between the two methods.

At the time of the UN Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, forty-six of the seventy-three participating countries adhered to a three-mile limit for the territorial sea.[8] The conference did not succeed in reaching general agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, and a compromise proposal for a limit of six miles, with a six-mile contiguous zone beyond, failed of adoption by one vote at the follow-up conference in 1960. However, the Territorial Sea Convention 1958, by setting a limit of twelve miles for the contiguous zone, came to be interpreted as permitting countries to declare a territorial sea of twelve miles, forgoing of course any right under the convention to a contiguous zone beyond that limit. The pattern changed rapidly in the 1960s and at present over half the countries in the world having seacoasts claim territorial seas of six miles or more.[9] One troublesome consequence of these territorial sea extensions is that passage through straits, much used by shipping, may become subject to restriction. Where there is a channel of the high seas through a strait, no problem arises; but where all the waters of a strait constitute the territorial sea of one or more countries, it may become a matter of dispute whether by long usage all shipping has a customary right of passage through it, or whether there is only a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in the strait which may itself be restricted on various grounds. The United States has proposed that the Law of the Sea Conference in 1973 should consider the establishment of recognised international corridors through important straits which have been or may be 'territorialised'.[10]

Security: against attack and pollution

Of security, as one of the objectives of extended claims to sea-space, three illustrations may be given: the uses of the seabed for attack or defence; the Canadian legislation in 1970 for prevention of pollution; and the Malacca Straits controversy.

The first are naturally arcane, but some inferences can be drawn from the Seabed Arms Control Treaty.[11] It prohibits the emplacement on defined areas of the seabed of 'any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installa-

[8] In Europe, Finland (1920), Sweden (1779), Norway (1812), Iceland (1952) had a 4-mile limit; Spain (1936), Italy (1942), Spain (1760), Yugoslavia (1948) had 6 miles; Albania (1952) 10 miles; Bulgaria (1951), Romania (1952) and the Soviet Union (1921) 12 miles.

[9] 6 miles (17 countries); 12 miles (35 countries); 30 miles (Nigeria); 50 miles (Iceland); 130 miles (Guinea); 200 miles (Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil).

[10] Dover; Gibraltar; Bab el Mandeb; Hormuz; Malacca; Ombai, Selat Lombok and Sunda; Western Chosen; Bering.

[11] Entered into force in May 1972, 34 countries, including United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union, having ratified it.

tions or any other facilities' in support. That the emplacement of other instruments is not prohibited—for example, sonar or magnetic detection devices or submarine missiles—is clearly implied, and that it is in progress is emphasised, by the undertaking in Article 5 'to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof'. Further seabed areas covered by undertakings in the treaty are defined as those which (a) lie beyond the twelve-mile limit from coastal base-lines; or (b) lie within that limit, to the extent that they do not underlie the territorial sea. In effect then, uses of the seabed for the emplacement of arms and other devices, other than those expressly prohibited, is permitted in the territorial sea up to twelve miles from the shore.

The other examples are of the search for security of a different kind: the defence against, and prevention of, marine pollution. In 1970 the Canadian legislature [12] took the unprecedented step of establishing *shipping safety control zones* up to 100 nautical miles seawards of the entire Canadian coastline north of 60° North latitude. The government is empowered to lay down shipping standards of hull construction and navigational aids, entry to the zones being denied to any vessels failing to meet them; to require proof of financial responsibility of owners of ships and cargoes operating in the zones; and to seize ships and cargoes suspected of causing damage by pollution. The Act imposes formidable penalties including a fine of $Can. 100,000 a day upon a ship depositing unauthorised waste in Arctic waters. The United States protested sharply in a Note to the Canadian government, and the State Department observed:

> International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdiction on the high seas, and the United States can neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction. We are concerned that this action by Canada, if not opposed by us, would be taken as a precedent in other parts of the world for other unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas.

Canada has not however altered its policy.

The Malacca Straits controversy turns on policies having certain similarities. Indonesia and Malaysia issued a joint statement in November 1971 that those waters of the Straits of Malacca, which formed part of the territorial sea of either of them,[13] would no longer be a customary international waterway and that foreign vessels would have only a right of innocent passage; and in March 1972 the two governments declared that the passage of naval vessels would require prior consultation and

[12] Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.

[13] Both countries adopted a 12-mile territorial sea in 1969. Over 200 miles of the Malacca Straits are less than 24 miles in width, and at certain points have a depth of only 10 fathoms.

that the passage of foreign tankers over 200,000 deadweight tons would, to prevent navigational and pollution dangers, be prohibited. The declarations have met with strong protests from the Soviet Union and Japan; the latter intends to raise the issue at the Law of the Sea Conference in 1973.

Marine resources

New claims to sea-space, and particularly extensions of the territorial sea, are frequently aimed at securing access to marine resources and their exploitation.

The world catch of fish increased from 33 million tons in 1958 to 68 million tons in 1970, not least through technological advances—more powerful ships, larger nets, and fish detection by electronic devices and earth satellites—and through the expansion of long-distance fishing fleets, particularly by the Soviet Union,[14] Poland and Japan. Further, deep-sea mining for nodules on the seabed yielding nickel, cobalt and copper is in closer prospect than seemed possible a decade ago. Exploratory operations have been conducted off the coasts of Georgia and Florida, New Zealand and in the South Atlantic: samples have been taken at depths of 13,000 feet. The immense developments in the recovery of oil and natural gas from the ocean subsoil need no special mention here.

It is hardly surprising then that coastal states, and among them particularly the developing countries, are determined to stake out maritime claims to secure these resources. In the Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea in May 1970 the majority of Latin American countries [15] asserted that all nations have the right to claim as much of the sea and seabed near their coasts as they deem necessary to protect their actual and potential offshore wealth. The 200 miles of sea-space claimed by Chile, Peru and Ecuador in the Santiago Declaration of 1952 was certainly not recognised by other countries, and perhaps not even taken seriously, at the Law of the Sea Conference in 1958; nevertheless measures of enforcement against intruding fishing vessels have been successfully taken by Peru and, perhaps more significantly, the principle has now been adopted by Brazil and Uruguay, so that three-quarters of the marginal seas of South America are now covered by claims to exclusive jurisdiction out to 200 miles from the coast.

Iceland is not alone in making extensive fishery area claims. In February 1971 Canada implemented its Territorial Waters and Fishery Zones Act 1970, enacted at the same time as the Act already described, by

[14] The Soviet Union has made a loan to Peru of $60 million for the development of 'industrialised' fisheries.

[15] Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela voted against the resolution, the former two perhaps because, being land-locked, they looked for some compensatory principle.

declaring large areas off both its eastern and western coasts as closed zones [16] for Canadian fishing vessels exclusively. Brazil has also established exclusive fishery zones up to a 200-mile limit from its coast. Canada, like Iceland, bases its action in part on the need for conservation and good management of fish stocks. Furthermore it is of interest that, in demarcating the exclusive fishing areas, Canada has applied the principle of drawing base-lines, which is recognised as appropriate for defining territorial sea limits off a coast much broken by inlets and islands.

In comparison with these claims, the action of Iceland is seeking to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a zone of fifty nautical miles around the island is not then as extravagant as perhaps appears at first sight; and in the dissenting opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo in the recent decision of the International Court of Justice we find the issue of the interest of coastal states in the resources of the adjacent sea succinctly described. He said:

> In a system of progressive development of international law the question of fishery limits has to be reconsidered in terms of the protection and utilisation of coastal resources regardless of other considerations which apply to the extent of the territorial sea.
>
> . . . not only Iceland, but many coastal states in all regions of the world, know by experience the harmful effects of the ever greater threat of highly developed fishing effort near their shores by foreign fishing fleets equipped—like the modern trawlers of the United Kingdom—with sophisticated technical gear.[17]

While his dissenting opinion may be open to legal dispute, he points unerringly in these two passages to the forces which are motivating extended claims to sea-space. The reasoning in the second passage echoes closely the statement of the Canadian Prime Minister in Parliament, referring to the Canadian legislation described above, that existing rules as to the action for the conservation and good management of marine resources are inadequate and unduly 'favour the interests of the shipping states and the shipping owners engaged in the large-scale carriage of oil and other potential pollutants'. It is to be hoped that the International Court will, in dealing with the merits of the Icelandic claim of extended fishery limits, take the same broad view of the importance of the economic factors as it did for the determination of territorial limits in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries dispute in 1951.

It is plain that the coming UN Law of the Sea Conference will be faced with a pattern of claims and practice of maritime nations very different from that of 1958. If further arbitrary or selfish closures of the sea are to be avoided, the conference should urge the management of

[16] Gulf of St. Lawrence and Bay of Fundy; Queen Charlotte Sound, Dixon Entrance and Hecate Strait. Over 100,000 square miles of sea are covered.

[17] *Fisheries Jurisdiction Case* (1972) I.C.J.Rep., pp. 40 and 41.

marine resources, and the resolution of territorial and jurisdictional conflicts over the sea, upon regional bases. Some progress has already been made in European waters, in the delimitation of the bed of the North Sea, in a similar proposal for the Baltic, extended to all Baltic States,[18] and in the gradual evolution of a common fisheries policy in the EEC.

[18] Declaration on the Baltic Sea: Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, Poland (October 1968), adhering closely to the principles of the Continental Shelf Convention 1958.

STABILITY MECHANISMS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA*

I. PROSPECTS FOR REGIONALISM

Phillip Darby

OVER the past two decades attempts to order the development of Asian affairs through the employment of concepts and techniques about the management of power have met with limited success. Disenchanted with both the costs and the moral basis of *realpolitik* precepts, the belief has grown that there is little reason for supposing that the next two decades will be much different from the last. While it may well be true that the dynamics of Asia's course are too various and too impellent to be susceptible to any easy regulation of this kind, the search for appropriate frames of reference and guides to action is not thereby rendered irrelevant. The shape of regional developments is too important to be left to the vagaries of events in the simple hope that in time order will find its own level and right its own salvation. What is required is a review of security mechanisms, a better understanding of their inbuilt assumptions, and a larger appreciation of their limitations when applied in the fluidity of the Asian context.

It is not by accident that Western regulatory mechanisms have been based on the value of stability. The notion of order is deeply embedded in the history of European thinking about international politics and it has been powerfully reinforced by the development of nuclear deterrence. In the larger context and in the longer term, to minimise violence and regulate non-violent patterns of diplomatic behaviour are proper objectives. But more immediately this can only mean the establishment of conditions in which the restraints on, and alternatives to, violence can take root and in turn perpetuate themselves over time. The problem with Western policy in south-east Asia has been its attempt to impose too much stability too soon.

The fact of the matter is of course that stability seen through Western eyes always meant stability of a particular kind.[1] It meant freezing the distribution of power both within and between states along the lines

* The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Josef Szwarc, of the University of Melbourne, for help in thinking some of the ideas through.

[1] See Phillip Darby, 'The West, Military Intervention and the Third World', *Brassey's Annual 1971* (London: William Clowes), pp. 67–70.

which had been established after the devolution of empire and in w
which worked to the advantage of the Western states. The argument
a moratorium on violence was always misconceived, but there w
grounds for having substantial external checks during an interim per
while the new elites went about the business of putting their houses
order (if they chose). The time for such a breathing space is now sp
The passing of the cold war and the fading of relationships forged by
imperial experience make it especially pertinent to establish
circumstances in which violence should be allowed to run its natu
course.

To argue that violence may have a role in the process of moderni
tion in south-east Asia is not to ignore the human costs and innoc
suffering inevitably entailed. Still less does it imply any gene
acceptance of violence as a good in itself, as Frantz Fanon and oth
would have us believe. There are, however, strict limits upon
capacity of external action to restructure the economic and politi
conditions which give rise to violence. It follows that at times the r
choice is between violence and an order which may itself be a prod
of violence—that of the state—and not of legitimacy. Where that is
choice, there is a strong argument for rejecting the morality which le
the external observer to deny the right of a people to choose, by the o
means at their disposal, the grouping or government they prefer. N
would such a denial seem the prudent course, because an order wh
is based on repression and injustice may be sowing the seeds of its o
destruction.

It is against this background of limited options and moral dilemn
that in some circumstances violence must be accepted as a costly l
inescapable part of the process of change which may lead to real pr
pects of stability in the longer term. The first case is where violence l
a revolutionary purpose and commands widespread support in
indigenous society. When an existing national elite is failing in t
tasks of political modernisation and economic redistribution and t
door to constitutional change is closed, guerrilla warfare may well co
stitute an exercise in nation-building, not an instrument of extern
designs. The second case is where violence is employed by a commun
group in an attempt to carve an independent future. When the state
obviously failing to create a community, then it is time to ask wheth
some existing community should not form the basis of a new state. T
costs of secessionism—in terms of spreading more thinly already scar
administrative and political skills and increasing, through fragmentatio
the relative disadvantage of the underdeveloped world in its dealin
with the developed—cannot be lightly disregarded. Yet neither can th
be considered an absolute bar when a revision of the existing st

system appears to be essential if the potentialities for economic development and political stability are to be fully realised.

A more recent line of argument, advanced by Ali Mazrui, is that violence may have a general utility in as much as it furthers integration both nationally and regionally.[2] At the national level the process of resisting violent challenge over a period of time may help to cement national loyalties, strengthen central institutions, and develop the links between government and people. At the regional level an undercurrent of violence may loosen inhibitions on the part of one state against interference in the affairs of another and thereby encourage the development of wider relationships in a way which furthers the regional cause. In such circumstances an acceptance of the contention that violence has a part to play in establishing the conditions for longer term stability rests on the functionality of the response it provokes, whereas in our earlier cases acceptance rests on the legitimacy of the ends sought.

At least in south-east Asia, it does not follow as a matter of course that violence will work towards integration. By and large it is reasonable to assume that a degree of violence at the national level will prove integrative if it is handled by an adept and strong central authority. But the case of Burma demonstrates that violence taken in isolation has no inbuilt capacity to produce positive results. Similarly, violence may be integrative at the regional level, but only in certain carefully controlled circumstances. Violence was endemic to south-east Asia for centuries before the establishment of European colonial rule and the historical record discloses little evidence of a movement towards any broader unity. Recent precedents are rather more encouraging. One example is provided by joint military action between Malaysia and Thailand and Malaysia and Indonesia to suppress guerrilla activities in border areas. In the event of a more major challenge, however, reliance on external great powers must remain a real option. To the extent that an indigenous state is assured of continuing external support, violence may tend to hamper the development of regional links at least in the short term.[3]

The implications of this analysis do not significantly disturb existing patterns of thought about the role of security mechanisms in south-east Asia. It is neither appropriate nor necessary to encourage or permit the growth of violence irrespective of the ends sought. On moral grounds such a position is indefensible; in practice there is no need since there is plenty of evidence that violence is unlikely to fade away. The burden of this discussion has been to suggest that the commitment to order

[2] Ali A. Mazrui, 'The Contemporary Case for Violence', *Civil Violence and the International System Part I: the Scope of Civil Violence*, Adelphi Paper No. 82 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies. 1971).

[3] However in certain circumstances external military involvement may contribute to the development of regional co-operation. See p. 34.

in south-east Asia should not exclude indigenous action to reshape existing political systems and redefine existing nation states through resort to force. The prescriptive significance of Professor Mazrui's perspective must be limited to which parties respond and in what manner; in short, security mechanisms must be so arranged as to give full play to integrative possibilities. Given an acceptance of the regional notion, arrangements are required which discourage external intervention, which at times, though not at all times, encourage intra-regional involvement, and which emphasise the economic and political as well as the purely military aspects of conflict resolution.

The historical record

If order and stability are not absolute values, equally they have never been seen as absolute interests by statesmen. Thus in taking stability as the central reference point for surveying the historical record one must accept the distortion produced by merging disparate threads. As often as not, concepts and techniques employed to minimise violence have been developed for other purposes or evolved to meet other needs. Moreover, they have been used only insofar and in such a way as to enhance the basic and continuing interests of their users.

During the period of British, French and Dutch ascendancy, an externally imposed system of stability regulated south-east Asian affairs. The European state system, with its presumption of strong central governments, was superimposed on the existing landscape of fragmented authority and spasmodic conflict. Both by direct force and by restructuring relationships in the area, the traditional sources of instability were neutralised or at least frozen for a time. In part the very development of formal empire can be attributed to the desire to establish conditions of political stability so that the business of trade and investment could proceed with a minimum of disruption. At the same time it is clear that the initial European economic involvement contributed to the erosion of indigenous authorities, such as they were, and that attempts to secure territorial advantage imported new sources of rivalry into the area. After the partition of south-east Asia the imperial system developed inbuilt checks and restraints on issues such as boundaries and buffers, the point being that the specific interests of the European states in the area were less important than their general interest in ensuring that relationships in Europe were not disrupted. Throughout the colonial period, therefore, south-east Asia was an appendage to Europe and a regional frame of reference had no meaning. Relationships linking the metropolitan and colonial societies developed at the expense of those between the colonial societies themselves. One result of this linkage distortion was to minimise the

opportunities for indigenous rivalry and conflict—and thereby the possibilities of compromise and perhaps eventually of co-operative action.

Fundamentally, however, the stability associated with imperial rule was tenuous and historically transitory. With the devolution of power it was inevitable that traditional animosities, sometimes expressed in modern forms, should reassert themselves. In addition, the disruptive impact of imperial penetration on indigenous social structures and ideologies had created new sources of conflict, which now began to work themselves out. Significantly, the immediate post-colonial era coincided with the development of the cold war, which added a further level to the dimensions of conflict and tended to obscure the true actors and the real ends for which they were working. Considerations of imperial obligation and interest, heightened by cold war perceptions, led to the continued involvement of the United Kingdom and, for a more limited period, France. The United States, armed with a conception of global interests linked to the bi-polar balance of power, was drawn deeply into the area and the drawstring was anti-communism. Some Chinese involvement in south-east Asia was no doubt inevitable but both the fact and the nature of United States intervention ensured a high Chinese priority for the area. This in turn quickened Russia's interest and led to the conviction that it could not be left on the Western sidelines. The net effect of these developments was that the shape of south-east Asian affairs was determined less by the interaction of the indigenous states themselves than by their interaction with the external states.

It has sometimes been suggested that the external powers have exercised a predominant influence in the making of regional decisions, and by way of support reference has been made to the course of the two Geneva conferences on Laos and Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia.[4] The point is arguable on its own terms—consider the process of decolonisation itself—but set in a wider perspective it is profoundly misleading. Even at the level of formal agreements and settlements the indigenous states have sometimes been able to play off one external power against another to their own advantage and frequently they have used an association with an external power as a means of furthering their own interests. President Sukarno's successful attempt in June 1961 to obtain American support (in the name of mediation) for Indonesia's claim to West Irian by threatening Soviet

[4] See for example George Modelski, 'Indonesia and the Malaysia Issue', *Yearbook of World Affairs 1964*, Vol. 18, p. 129. For more general discussions, see George Modelski, 'International Relations and Area Studies; The Case of Southeast Asia', *International Relations*, Vol. 2, April 1961, and Michael Brecher, 'International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia', *World Politics*, Vol. 15, January 1963.

involvement is an example of the former. The action of Tunku Abdul Rahman in working through the British to secure the Malaysian Federation is an example of the latter.

More important, however, is the fact that an analysis which stresses the mechanics of decision making tends to obscure the underlying forces of nationalism and revolutionary war which have set the longer term course. The unconventional diplomatic and military means which indigenous groups and states have been forced to employ have in the end counted for more than the votes, pacts and battalions of external states. Vietnam provides the classic illustration of the extent to which indigenous forces seem likely to recast the regional setting.

Two approaches were available for those who saw their task as limiting the role of force and the resort to violence. The first drew on Western *realpolitik* theory and offered counterforce as the only solution. The second was offered by India and proposed a mixture of increased communication and partial political disengagement. Broadly, the answer of the West was military intervention and it was accepted by many of the indigenous states as the best that could be done in circumstances in which local power was clearly inadequate. States like Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand set about keeping their external links in working order through a system of alliances. America's contribution was the doctrine of containment, which led to a succession of local crises being cast in terms of grand strategy.[5] In retrospect, the shortcomings of military intervention as a general strand of policy are readily apparent. There were a number of successes, such as British support for Malaya and later Malaysia, though even here the price was considerable. Where historical circumstances were less favourable, intervention became a long and costly essay in disaster, amply portrayed by French and American experience in Indochina.

The alternative answer was non-alignment. As a policy it was adopted by Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Indonesia [6] but it is doubtful how far it was seen by any of these states in terms of its potential for reducing tension in the area. The reasons for its adoption were primarily domestic. It offered the attraction of a well-rounded posture which could serve to rally disparate groups and could be adapted to various national requirements—from isolationism in the case of Burma to aggressive self-assertion in the case of Indonesia. It also had its uses in external terms, especially for a state like Cambodia, but it was always arguable that its efficacy depended upon a continued Western

[5] For a critical analysis see David P. Mozingo, 'Containment in Asia Reconsidered', *World Politics*, Vol. 19, April 1967.

[6] Although the label was retained during the Sukarno years, the substance of Indonesia's policies over this time suggest that non-alignment became more a means of overturning the existing order through force than of adjusting that order to the processes of peaceful change.

presence. As a doctrine for furthering world order non-alignment became something of a falling star during the 1960s, partly because of the realisation, after the Sino-Indian border war, that it did not dispense with the need for national defence forces, and partly because of its questionable relevance to disputes between Asian states themselves.

It is significant that neither approach proceeded on the basis of a regional frame of reference. For those who operated with a power-oriented model of international politics, the nub of the matter was that changes in the configuration of power in south-east Asia could affect the central balance. The tendency was therefore to see regional developments as flowing from external manipulations and their outcome as impinging on the international system as a whole. To a lesser extent, attempts to invest non-alignment with more substance by forcing the withdrawal of the external powers and increasing communication between the new states went beyond the limits of either the south-east Asian or southern Asian map. It is true that initially non-alignment was geared to the Asian scene but subsequent efforts to develop it both as an international doctrine alleviating world tensions, and as an Afro-Asian consciousness drawing on feelings of economic exploitation and social prejudice, placed Third World unity above the more earthy issues of area interest.[7]

Since the late 1960s the movement of events has increasingly eroded the established approaches to ordering change in south-east Asia. Indeed, it seems likely that the turn of the decade will come to represent the beginning of a new period of diplomatic interaction in the area in which the principal actors will be the indigenous states (together with national and communal groups), and the role of the external states will be that of guarantors rather than party principals. A number of developments set the scene: the waning of relationships established during the period of imperial rule; the passing of the cold war frame of reference and hence the irrelevance of the various pieces of supporting paraphernalia in the form of the doctrine of the indivisibility of peace and the domino theory; changing Western values and especially the declining legitimacy of military intervention; the rising level of indigenous military power; the growth of intra-regional communication and with it resistance to external penetration. It would be easy to exaggerate the significance of these changes for the emerging pattern of regional relationships and in any case the outlook is not necessarily encouraging. Actual and potential sources of domestic disunity and regional instability still exist in the background, much as before. This basic continuity seems likely to ensure that challenge by violence and

[7] The African use of non-alignment would seem rather different in that African unity was the first imperative, perhaps because of the 'mystique of the continent' and the sense of negritude, neither of which had any counterpart in Asia.

response by force remain a characteristic feature of diplomatic interaction in south-east Asia.

The fact is, however, that new guidelines are required as to who should respond and in what manner. To some extent there has recently been a convergence of Western and indigenous thinking on these questions. On domestic and intra-regional violence a view which has gained currency suggests that action must rest with the indigenous states and that the development of regionalism offers the best hope of longer term stability. With respect to external threats faith has been pinned on the emergence of a new multi-polar balance of power. In various quarters neutralisation has been seen as an alternative safeguard against external penetration and one, moreover, which may have a stabilising influence within the region itself. It is appropriate to examine each of these concepts and its assumptions in turn.

The concept of regionalism

Strictly speaking, regionalism is not a security mechanism but a signpost pointing the way to the development of what has been called a security community, able to ensure that change within its area takes place through orderly processes.[8] As the term is usually employed, it is taken to mean the movement towards regional co-operation which is seen to lead ultimately to some form of regional integration—the merging of previously independent polities into a single larger unit. Understood in this sense, regionalism is too remote an end to serve as a useful reference point. Regional co-operation is a more appropriate objective so long as it is remembered that the road to co-operation is often paved through conflict. Fundamentally, however, for our purposes regionalism must focus on the determination that the affairs of the area will be settled by the states of the area, thus embracing both the resort to force and reliance on diplomacy.

There is good reason to enquire closely into the basis of the widespread acceptance of regionalism as the design for tomorrow. In so far as contemporary thinking proceeds on the assumption that geographical propinquity will increasingly prescribe the arc of strongest political relationships, economic interests and strategic links, it runs counter to technological developments in transport and communication, which make the mere fact of distance less likely to serve as a primary determinant of the pattern of global interaction.[9] There are of course

[8] The concept was developed by Karl Deutsch and others in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957), p. 5. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1958, p. 198.

[9] This line of argument is put strongly by Albert Wohlstetter, 'Strength, Interest and New Technologies', *The Implications of Military Technology*, Adelphi Paper No. 46 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies. 1968), and 'Illusions of Distance', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, January 1968.

other bases for the regional conception, such as the racial factor and the drive for development, but their significance in the case of south-east Asia is not very great. Race is too multifarious a force to be channelled for regional purposes. The commitment to economic development, though more important, has real limitations in that different states see the issues and priorities in different ways. The fact is, however, that for the moment regionalism has caught the scholar's imagination; more important, it has moved the statesman's hand and its influence can be seen in recent diplomatic trends in south-east Asia. Whatever the long-run prospects, some mileage can at present be obtained by harnessing the regional drive to further stability interests. At the same time, conflicts of an essentially regional nature might be uncoupled from the central balance, thus contributing to a general easing of global tensions.

For over a decade regionalism in south-east Asia has been putting down its roots. Experiments with bodies like ASA, Maphilindo and ASEAN have provided focal points for exchanging ideas and promoting the cause.[10] The development of habits of consultation between national leaders has gone some way towards replacing the earlier communication linkage with external powers. The fact that major initiatives have come from the indigenous states themselves and that, increasingly, co-operative ventures have been of a pragmatic and functional character may indicate that the soil is more fertile than previously supposed, or at least is being better prepared.[11] In short, attempts to promote the growth of regionalism have proceeded on all three fronts recognised by theorists as offering prospects for a regional take-off—in terms of institutions, functions and communications.[12]

From the political and strategic viewpoint there is little argument

[10] ASA (the Association of South-East Asia) was established in 1961 as a forum for co-operative ventures, with Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines as founding members. Maphilindo, launched in 1963, was a loose grouping between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines supposedly designed to give expression to Malay nationalism. In 1967 ASA was succeeded by ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations), the members of the new organisation being Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines.
On some counts ASPAC (the Asian and Pacific Council, founded in 1966) might be said to have contributed to the growth of regionalism. However, its Western leanings and hawkish disposition have tended to neutralise the regionalist strands in its thinking. The fact that its membership extends to east Asia and the Antipodes does not of itself nullify its regional significance. For our purposes the mood of thinking of such a grouping is of more consequence than the geographical perimeters established by its membership.
For further details about regional organisation see Peter Lyon, *War and Peace in South-East Asia* (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs 1969), pp. 154-160. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1970, p. 608.

[11] Not all of these developments stem from a conscious regional design and invariably motives are mixed.

[12] For a helpful discussion, though from a rather different angle, see Ernst B. Haas 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-theorizing', *International Organisation*, Vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 1970.

that the institutional and functionalist lines of approach do not of themselves appear likely to produce much in the way of immediate stability-security dividends. No regional organisation in south-east Asia seems capable of developing machinery or procedures for the settlement of domestic and intra-regional disputes. The problem of acquiring appropriate means, the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient consensus among the members, and the likelihood that one of the parties to a dispute will look to an external power or perhaps the United Nations to further its ends, thus widening the dispute or generating conflicting regulatory pressures, appear to present insuperable obstacles.[13]

Nor do the beginnings of functional collaboration in fields such as agriculture, transport and telecommunications (under the aegis of ASEAN and ASPAC) offer real prospects for the kind of political 'spillover' which might lead to joint action in maintaining stability in the area. As a general proposition it is far from clear that economic co-operation automatically works to further political co-operation, even in the case of well integrated and economically advanced societies. In the Third World the tendency for apparently low level economic issues to be prematurely politicised adds a further dimension to the problem and at times the risk that economic collaboration may produce new sources of political friction.[14] It is perhaps relevant to add that even if regional collaboration of the above kind assists the process of national economic growth and social reconstruction, there is little reason to assume that domestic instability and violence will be rendered less likely. Indeed the case will often be exactly the reverse. The beginnings of modernisation, of broadening economic opportunities, and rising literacy rates may well be accompanied by a growing impatience and a determination to hasten the process by violent means.

External penetration firmly rejected

The significance of organisational developments and functionalist trends rests rather on their incidental role in furthering contacts and expanding communications between south-east Asian states. The flow of information, the exchange of ideas and the development of habits of consultation are crucial if regionalism as a process is to gather momentum. By contributing to link-building between the various national units and by working to limit and restructure the links with the outside world, the expansion of communications may establish a pattern of interaction which itself helps to further the long-run stability of the area.

In the first instance the significance of this interaction will be very

[13] It could be added that the experience of regional organisation in other areas is hardly encouraging. See Linda B. Miller, 'Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict', *World Politics*, Vol. 19, July 1967.

[14] The point is culled from the literature on regional integration. See further Roger D. Hansen, 'Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts', *World Politics*, Vol. 21, January 1969.

largely negative in that external involvement will be rendered more difficult and the costs to an indigenous state of calling on outside help will become higher. Equally, the expansion of indigenous contact may highlight points of difference rather than areas of accord. But in time the negative aspects can be expected to force adjustment and to lead to limited co-operative and regulatory exercises. Elements of the process can be seen at work in south-east Asia today. During the 1960s the most notable feature of the regional movement was its firm and explicit rejection of external penetration. Foreign bases provided a ready-made target and the ritual of declaring, year after year, that they must be regarded as temporary in nature and could not be allowed to subvert national independence was therefore to be expected.[15] Recently, however, action has been of a more practical nature, as shown by the declaration of the Indonesian and Malaysian governments in November 1971 extending their territorial sea claims to close the Strait of Malacca.[16] Moreover, a number of constructive initiatives have been taken, though little has yet come of them, *viz.*, the Djakarta conference on Cambodia called by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, in May 1970 and the ASEAN endorsement at Kuala Lumpur in November 1971 of the proposal for the eventual neutralisation of south-east Asia.

If the above analysis indicates the direction of movement, the next step is to enquire how the process will work itself out at various levels. Assuming a pattern of increasing communication in south-east Asia, what are its implications for stability within the states, between the states and in terms of their relations with external powers?

In cases of internal violence the chances are that extra-regional involvement would be increasingly difficult to sustain and regional intervention would be extremely limited. Certainly there is no reason to expect that indigenous states would be prepared to underwrite each other's domestic stability. Support might be forthcoming in the form of diplomatic reassurance, training and advisory missions, military aid and perhaps some joint military action in border areas such as has taken place between Malaysia and Thailand and Malaysia and Indonesia. Conciliatory action could take the form of despatching observers and fact-finding missions, and creating opportunities for the parties to meet around the conference table. In sum, regionalism offers no broad solution to the most likely form of instability. However, given that the incidence of domestic violence tends to reflect the need for fundamental change, this need not necessarily be a major shortcoming.

[15] The texts of a number of such pronouncements are compared in Bernard K. Gordon, *Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., London: Prentice-Hall. 1969), pp. 115–116. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 422.

[16] In March 1972 the two states claimed the right of prior consultation on the passage of foreign naval vessels and announced a ban on the passage of foreign tankers of over 200,000 deadweight tons.

Regionalism's main contribution to a more stable order lies in the relations of the south-east Asian states with each other. The growth of dialogue can be expected to lower threat perceptions, suggest alternative means of resolving conflicts of interest and open channels for mediation and conciliation. There is also the possibility of special relationships developing on the basis of which two or three states might act together to restrain another which seems likely to step out of line. One can imagine, for example, Indonesia and Thailand attempting to check the Philippines should it press its claims to Sabah, not so much in terms of a balance of power understood in the traditional way as in terms of influence and persuasion. However, there is no reason to think that the development of regional order will always be a smooth process or that it will be advanced solely by the indigenous states. Occasional break-downs may occur which threaten not only the interests of an individual party but the very existence of the regional system itself.

In some circumstances external intervention may make a positive contribution. Britain's involvement in the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia from 1963 to 1966 is a case in point. The confrontation crisis led to the fall of ASA, the first significant attempt to secure regional co-operation, but by forcing rethinking on the part of each of the states involved it helped to establish a stronger and more broadly based regional organisation in the form of ASEAN.[17] It was partly the fact of external intervention which enabled the strains of that conflict to be turned to regional advantage. However, it must be recognised that Britain's unique historical link with Malaysia was a key factor in its success and one must thus be wary of drawing general lessons.

The third area of enquiry is how far regionalism offers answers to external threats to the existing order. It has already been argued that in so far as south-east Asia is able to speak with a collective voice to the outside world the likelihood of external penetration is reduced. This would seem pre-eminently true in cases where the interests of an external power in the area are marginal and thus the diplomatic support extended to a threatened state by other regional states may be critical in preventing a dispute from reaching the point of hostilities. But if the interests of an external power are primary and there is a real possibility that a dispute will be settled by force of arms, diplomatic pressures unbacked by power fade into insignificance. At this point we enter the world of balance of power. Whether regionalism and balance of power are compatible and whether a regional grouping could marshal the necessary resources raise wider questions about whether the concept of balance is appropriate in the Asian context at all. These issues will be considered in the second and concluding part of the article.

[17] See further Bernard K. Gordon, pp. 124–125.

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT *

Robert Jackson

LIKE the Netherlands and like Britain, the Indian sub-continent looks out across the sea while at the same time being deeply engaged in the politics of the continental land-mass in its hinterland. The outside powers with interests in the sub-continent therefore fall into two broad categories—those whose interests arise from what might be called the ' oceanic ' aspect of the sub-continent's external relations, and those whose interests stem from their ' continental ' aspect. Before the British conquest of India the ' continental ' aspect predominated; but at the same time India's ' oceanic ' connections ranged from the Mediterranean basin to southern Africa and south-east Asia. And although during the 200 years down to 1947, and even since then, the dominant connection has been ' oceanic ' in character, there is a sense in which the ' continental ' aspect of India's strategic situation is the more enduring and permanent. Although the sea is open, it is flux; while the mountains are a barrier, they do not fly away.

Nevertheless, we must not underestimate the contemporary importance of the Indian sub-continent's ' oceanic ' relations, which of course include its relations with Britain. For centuries the external trade of the sub-continental states has been very largely maritime rather than landward; and the economic connections across the continental land routes have been very much less significant than those which have lain across the ocean routes. This bias was not introduced but was merely reinforced by the experience of British rule. The British Indian settlement in the African hinterland, in South Africa, in the West Indies and in the United Kingdom itself was only an extension of the previously existing immigration in south-east Asia and along the east African and Arabian seaboard. While the underlying forms of the Indian and Pakistani character—if not perhaps the character of the Bengalis—derive from successive ' continental ' conquests stemming from the Near East, the dominant culture in the contemporary sub-continent is that which was imposed by an ' oceanic ' occupation originating in Western Europe.

Thus the sub-continental states are all members of the Commonwealth —or they were, until Pakistan withdrew in January 1972. They are all

* This article is based on a paper read at the Annual Assembly of the Scottish branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs on November 18, 1972.

participants in the sterling area, and active members not only of the United Nations but of the whole range of 'free world' multilateral international agencies for trade, aid, investment and international monetary management. For the present and for the foreseeable future they are oriented culturally and economically across the oceans towards the social-liberal democracies which they have reproduced, or which they strive to reproduce, in their own societies.[1] And if this orientation can be said to be now under challenge, the threat seems to come, not so much from pressures arising from the 'continental' hinterland as from the internal evolution of forces within the sub-continent which may have been only temporarily overlaid by the 'Western' order introduced from across the oceans.

* * *

How are we to characterise the strategic interests in the sub-continent of those outside powers whose connection is essentially of this 'oceanic' type? Here we must distinguish between the United States, and the other so-called 'Western' powers ranging from Europe to Japan. The United States stands for the time being in an essentially 'continental' relationship with the sub-continent, because of its super-power interest in the Asian strategic balance. But as for the non-super-powers in the world beyond the oceans, the most obvious feature of their relations with the sub-continent is that they are hardly, if at all, incompatible with the interests of the sub-continental states as they at present perceive them. From time to time there may be difficulies arising from the continuing British presence in the Indian Ocean, from the development of British and European markets for goods from the sub-continent, and from the structure of British trading and investment interests in the region. France's diplomatic cultivation of the Muslim world may from time to time affect the interests of one or other of the sub-continental states. And there are likely in the future to be growing problems arising from Japanese economic expansion, and the possibility of a more active Japanese naval interest in the security of the Indian Ocean trade routes. But none of these outside powers at present has either the capacity or the will to pursue policies which seriously challenge the pursuit of sub-continental interests as they are understood by the countries of the region. Britain and France of course enjoy a special position in the United Nations which involves them in many diplomatic aspects of the international relations of the sub-continent—as in the Pakistan crisis of 1971; and in Britain there is also a desire to make an independent contribution through the Commonwealth to the welfare of

[1] Pakistan's attempts to find an Islamic basis for its constitution—whether in Muslim tradition or in 'Islamic Socialism'—have not yet been successful.

the sub-continent. But the main interests of such powers as Britain, France, Japan and West Germany are in the peace, stability and harmony of the sub-continent—interests which are in principle uncontroversial, which need at worst involve them only in temporary disagreements with the sub-continental powers, and which in any case they are too weak to pursue forcefully.

Nevertheless, I do not want to play down too much the interest which many of these powers involved in an 'oceanic' connection with the sub-continent feel in the international alignment of the sub-continental powers. On the European side, and especially in Britain, there is of course a guarded fear that India may give direct or indirect support to the expansion of Soviet naval power—which is regarded as a threat to European interests in the Indian Ocean area. On the Asian side, for example in Japan, no definite pattern of attitudes has yet emerged. But the most important fact about the non-super-powers in their 'oceanic' relation to the sub-continent is that they now have very little power with which to make their views felt.

America's dual approach to the sub-continent

The United States, however, does not lack this power. Its relation to the sub-continent is a curious mixture of the two types of connection which we have identified—the 'oceanic' and the 'continental'. Its underlying attitude is founded on the facts of a relationship of the 'oceanic' type; and its links with the sub-continent are of the kind which we have described above in relation to India's other 'oceanic' connections. On the other hand, the United States as a super-power also has the attitudes and interests of a 'continental' Asian power, since one of the main concerns of its foreign policy is the management of the balance of power on the continent of Asia.

This combination of approaches makes the United States the least stable and predictable of the powers with interests in the sub-continent. Since the great power interests of the other 'oceanic' powers in the region are relatively unimportant, so long as they wish to continue to exercise influence in the region they are bound to defer to the local balance of forces. On the other hand, by its nature the 'oceanic' relationship imposes no particular ties. Because it has this kind of relationship with the countries of the region, the United States is more or less unrestricted by permanent geographical factors of the kind which have a profound effect upon the attitudes and interests of the 'continental' Asian great powers. On a realistic view, the system of 'oceanic' economic and cultural connections which links the sub-continent to the 'Western' world is pretty strong. Its existence is certainly not immediately at stake, although of course its long-term preservation is

a major interest of the 'oceanic' powers. While it has occasionally felt—as in the early 1960s—that this whole system was in jeopardy, the United States has on the whole felt itself able to pursue its Asian 'continental' policies with a comparatively free hand. We might, in effect, say that American policy is free to be guided by considerations which need have no relevance to the actual situation in the sub-continent or to the interests of the sub-continental powers as they understand them —much as British policy in Europe at different times in the 19th century enjoyed the same freedom.

But it would not of course be true to say that the United States enjoys a completely irresponsible freedom of manoeuvre in the sub-continent. It is true that it has fewer permanent commitments there than either of the other super-powers; but it is nevertheless subject to the logic of its present paradoxical position as an Asian great power without a fixed and enduring position on the continent. So long as it wills itself to assume an appropriate share of the burden of responsibility for maintaining the present system of world order and its position in it, the United States will be bound by the logic of that endeavour. Its policy towards the sub-continent cannot be merely whimsical or spontaneous. It will be dictated by the interests which, in its view, arise from the exigencies of the world balance and of America's present place in it. In 1965 this perspective led the United States to adopt a more or less neutral attitude to the Indo-Pakistan war of that year and to give its support to Soviet attempts to bring about a reconciliation. In 1971, the American relationship with China having been radically changed, the United States was led by the same general perspective into a quite different attitude to the revival of the Indo-Pakistan quarrel. But before discussing American policy during the 1971 crisis, let us analyse further the principles upon which the United States Asian policy has for the moment come to be based.

In President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report for 1972 we find a twofold definition of the wider United States interests in Asia and of their consequences for policy towards the sub-continent. The most prominent of these formulations is that concerned with world order.[2] It asserts an overriding American interest in the settlement of international disputes according to the principles of the United Nations Charter. This concept of a stable, rational, legal world order articulated through the United Nations and the allied international agencies is still the central concept in the American philosophy of foreign policy—and it is one which, in the American view, imposes upon the most powerful nations a responsibility for defending those principles for the resolution of crises. In Asia the application of this concept of international order

[2] See the discussion of these themes in 'Mr. Nixon's Philosophy of Foreign Policy *The Round Table*, October 1972.

is conceived to be especially important at the present juncture because there are so many areas of tension and potential conflict still to be settled. Thus for American spokesmen in 1971 it made sense to suggest that India's behaviour towards Pakistan was likely to make it more difficult to use the United Nations system to maintain whatever agreements may be arrived at in the Middle East and in Indochina. The link between these diverse problems is the concept of the universal reception of United Nations principles as the appropriate means of maintaining international order in Asia.

The second of the wider American interests in Asia was mentioned by President Nixon only in connection with this higher interest in the articulation of a comprehensive legal order in Asia, although it raises a very different set of issues. In terms of world order, the United States is now seen to have a vital interest in the successful grafting of Communist China onto the international system founded upon these principles. But beyond this interest in the consolidation of an international legal order, China is also at the centre of the further argument that the United States has a powerful interest in achieving a balanced relationship with China such that America can improve its balance of power position in relation to the Soviet Union. At this point considerations of world order merge into considerations of strategic balance: and in neither respect would it be appropriate for the United States to be much influenced by the local concerns and preoccupations of the sub-continental powers, or by the rights and wrongs of their local disputes.

Thus, although India was able very appositely to quote the Declaration of Independence at President Nixon in 1971, his policy in the event set a higher value upon the maintenance of United Nations principles than upon the realisation of self-determination in East Bengal by Indian intervention in Pakistan's domestic affairs. And although India was also able to argue convincingly that it was in its national interest to liquidate the East Pakistan problem, President Nixon's response was merely to persist in his view that the American national interest involved a diplomatic rapprochement with China, with certain necessary consequences for American policy towards the less important region of the Indian sub-continent.

These dual American interests—in world order and in the Asian balance—are in the nature of broad commitments arising from the circumstances of American history and cultural development, and from the logic of contemporary American power. Their application to the sub-continent is not a consequence of any direct American involvement in the region—since, as I argued above, the geographical situation of the United States in relation to the sub-continent sets that relationship in an 'oceanic' rather than a 'continental' context. Consequently, although America's interest in the international rule of law

is fixed and universal—if not permanent—in character, its balance of power interests in the sub-continent are potentially as variable as the international environment which the balance is designed to stabilise.

Except for the underlying facts of continental geography there is nothing permanent about the present constellation of political forces in Asia or in the sub-continent. At the moment, over and above the basic Indo-Pakistani antagonism, China is hostile to India and both China and the United States identify the Soviet Union as their principal rival among the super-powers. The consequence of this pattern of relations at present is that the United States is oriented towards China and therefore against India. If China and the Soviet Union were to draw closer together this would probably imply some easing of the conflict between India and Pakistan—in so far as it is inflamed by great power rivalries—and therefore a shift in American policy back towards India, and a return to the system of alliances around the Asian periphery upon which the United States position in Asia rested between 1949 and 1971. The permutations of this kind of game are of course endless. The point of sketching out a ' scenario ' is to confirm the judgment that in relation to the sub-continent the United States has neither eternal friends nor eternal enemies—neither does it even have permanent interests in the sub-continent save those that may be thought to arise from its particular vision of the appropriate principles of world order.

The pattern of Sino-Soviet rivalry

When we turn from the United States interests in the sub-continent to the interests of the Soviet Union and China we move decisively away from the world of ' oceanic ' connections to the realm of ' continental ' relations between adjacent land powers. The underlying fact of Asian political geography is that the Soviet Union and China have a common frontier—at present disputed for much of its length—which runs for thousands of miles from the Pacific to the Himalayas. Despite the evidence of history, it might be argued that this fact alone need not induce a state of permanent tension between the two powers—although it is doubtful whether they will ever be able to settle down to the uniquely amicable kind of relationship that developed along the Canadian border in the 19th century between the United States and the British Empire. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a common frontier, taken together with the now sufficiently advanced state of development of nuclear military technology on both sides, has had the paradoxical—but historically predictable—effect of transferring the locale of active tension between China and Russia away from their mutual border to regions where the risk of direct confrontation is less acute. Of these regions the Indian sub-continent is at present the most important.

Here again geography takes a hand. The Soviet Union is still pent up behind the geopolitical barriers erected around the sub-continent against the Tsars by the British Empire. Russia and Pakistan are still separated by that carefully negotiated strip of Afghan territory that gives Afghanistan a common frontier with China. And beyond the Wakhan strip, Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir interpose yet another barrier between Russia and India. On the other hand, while China has a long frontier with India, its only link by land with Pakistan traverses the disputed territory of Azad Kashmir across the high passes of the Karakoram in the extremest corner of its remote far West.

The purpose of pointing out these circumstances is not to argue that the Soviet Union and China are proposing to try to alter the territorial settlement in the sub-continent to improve their position—although it is important to remember that the territorial settlement is not firmly established, and that China's communications into Pakistan lie across genuinely disputed territory. The point is that the political geography of the north-western region of the sub-continent very largely determines the pattern in which Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region is cast. For Russia it is a great gain to its diplomacy in Asia to have India on its side; but the concrete value of this gain is very much reduced by the fact that both Afghanistan and Pakistan lie across all its land routes into India. So long as Pakistan holds aloof from the various Soviet projects for transit arrangements linking Russia, Afghanistan and India, the Soviet Union is compelled to maintain its relationship with the sub-continent on an essentially 'oceanic' basis; and with the Suez Canal closed, its sea communications with both India and Pakistan via the South Atlantic and Indonesia are even longer than those between the sub-continent and Western Europe, Japan, or the United States. In these circumstances Russia may indeed be able to derive advantages from a diplomatic alignment with India; but it cannot cement those advantages by the development of close and permanent economic and strategic ties—assuming, of course, that the Indians would want to enter into them.

Pakistan's refusal to participate in Soviet schemes for regional co-operation in the sub-continent thus prevents Russia from deepening its influence on India; and by engaging India in regional preoccupations Pakistan's hostility also reduces India's capacity to support the Soviet Union in its rivalry with China. If Pakistan were to settle down to the 'good neighbourly' relations with India which Russia has been urging upon it for more than a decade, India's regional preponderance would have been decisively confirmed and it would be much better able to compete for regional influence with China, especially in the Himalayan states—including Tibet. For although India may not have the capacity to join China in the ranks of the super-powers, either

independently or with Russian support it would be able to play a more commanding part on the Asian stage if the disputes with Pakistan could be resolved in its favour.

Thus the system of 'good neighbourly' relations pressed by Russia upon Pakistan is one which could—if realised—bring very great benefits to the Soviet Union. These benefits would come to it not only in its confrontation with China, but also in terms of the extension and practical application of its influence in the sub-continent—with the further prospect of working with India in extending that anti-Chinese influence into south-east Asia through a network of security arrangements backed up by economic co-operation.[8] But because of the geographical position, very few of these benefits can be properly reaped by the Russians without the co-operation of Pakistan.

It is on this basis that we must explain the course of Soviet policy towards the sub-continent in the 1971 crisis. Over the five years since Tashkent in 1966 the Russians had been faithfully pursuing Mr. Kosygin's concept of Soviet friendship with both sub-continental powers leading eventually to co-operation between them. With some initial waverings Moscow continued to follow this line for several months after the events of March and April 1971 in East Pakistan—and one of the rewards it won was the first glimmerings of a Pakistani agreement to open up the overland route via Afghanistan for trade between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. However, the prospect that India's friendship would be almost irretrievably soured if it were to fail to solve the East Bengal problem for want of Russian support fused in July 1971 with Russian alarm at the sudden and dramatic improvement in Sino-American relations. Accordingly in August the Russians entered into a formal treaty of friendship with India. But at the same time, for three months after the signing of the treaty, they reassured the Pakistanis that its purpose was the better preservation of peace in the sub-continent; and the Russians continued to maintain a sympathetic and understanding line towards Pakistan until it became apparent on October 12 that Yahya would not accept any solution in East Bengal that could also satisfy India's minimum requirements. For the next two months the Russians did everything the Indians could reasonably expect of them. But immediately after the resolution of the crisis in mid-December the Soviet Union began to encourage President Bhutto to come to terms with India; and the Soviet-Pakistani relationship began to be repaired.

In the postwar period the Soviet Union has continued to encourage Pakistan and India to come to an accommodation along the lines

[8] The Indo-Bangladesh treaty of 1972 may be the beginning of such a network of arrangements bringing India closer to the Muslim 'non-aligned' powers of south-east Asia. Until the 1971 crisis the Muslim factor caused these powers to lean towards Pakistan. The new regime in Dacca provides the basis for a reappraisal.

sketched out in the Simla agreement. After the *froideur* of October-December 1971 the tone of Soviet-Pakistani relations has been warm enough. On the other hand, it is always possible that if Pakistan continues after the disasters of 1971 to pursue the same recalcitrant and unco-operative policy that it followed after the 1965 war, Russia may be tempted to withdraw the restraints it has put upon Afghanistan and India in supporting secessionist movements in the provinces of Pakistan. So far India seems to have put this dangerous thought out of its mind; and Russian influence has been cast more or less firmly against such risky courses. It is unlikely that either India or the Soviet Union will depart from their customary caution in this respect, not only because of the implications for their own internal stability, but also because of the strength of feeling in almost every capital against secessionism and those who encourage it from outside. However, so long as the tension between India and Pakistan continues, the possibility of exerting pressure along these lines must continue to be open to Pakistan's foes.

If Pakistan is for Russia the key to India, for China it is also a central position—for the reverse of the same reasons. As we have seen, so long as Pakistan refuses to improve its relations with India the land route into India is denied to the Russians, and the prospect of a stronger Indian competitive position is diminished. The minority nationalities of the remote far western mountain regions of China are exposed to hostile influences; and Pakistan is the vital gap in what would otherwise be a ring of hostile powers encircling China's most vulnerable salient. The relationship with Pakistan has also provided useful support for China in extending its connections into the Indian Ocean and the Near East, and especially into the non-Arab Muslim world in which Pakistan is one of the leading powers. It is perhaps in this context that we must view Pakistan's decision to remain in Cento while withdrawing from Seato.

If we examine Chinese policy in the 1971 crisis, we find that, just as the events in East Bengal exposed the basic orientation of Soviet policy in the sub-continent, so in the same way it revealed the nature and extent of the Chinese interest in the region. One remarkable feature is that it was not until mid-April, three weeks after the crisis had broken at the end of March 1971, that the Chinese publicly declared their position—obviously after a lengthy debate among their policy makers, which probably embraced the whole range of issues connected with Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations. The formula being pressed upon China by Pakistan was a commitment to the 'national unity and territorial integrity' of Pakistan—a formula which implied a threat of war against India in defence of Yahya's position in East Pakistan. In the event, the Chinese deliberately decided not to adopt this phraseology, and the formula they chose instead referred to Pakistan's

'independence and state sovereignty'. Obviously this was ambiguous in relation to East Bengal, although it certainly represented a firm commitment to the survival of the nucleus of Pakistan in the West.

This position of course defined very precisely the character of the Chinese stake in Pakistan—deeply committed to the maintenance of a strong and independent West Wing, but interested in the East Wing only as a means of strengthening Pakistan, and only to the extent that support for Yahya's position in the East was necessary if competition from the Russians for influence in Islamabad was to be beaten off. As it turned out, the Chinese had made a very accurate reading of the situation. Pakistan was unable to retain East Bengal; and although during the first months of the crisis Russia was able to make some headway in its efforts to improve its position in Islamabad, as the pressure of events intensified Russia and Pakistan inevitably drew apart, and China was left sharing possession of the field with the Americans. In the end, despite every plea from Islamabad, Peking did not move an inch from the precise commitment into which it had entered in April—and although in December East Pakistan was overwhelmed by the Indians, the West remained more or less intact.

At this point we must return to the Americans, the nature of whose interest in the sub-continent we have already discussed. Having decided to try to effect a rapprochement with China, Mr. Nixon was obliged for some time ahead to pursue policies which as far as possible would not bring him into conflict with vital Chinese interests. This ruled out the possibility of supporting India's claims on behalf of the Bangladesh liberation movement. Consequently the extension of Soviet influence in India could not be forestalled—indeed it might be said that the price of better relations between Washington and Peking was an improvement in relations between Moscow and Delhi. But as we have seen, this was a price that America rightly feels that it can well afford to pay—a paradoxical tribute to India's present strength and stability. Because of the essentially 'oceanic' relationship between America and India, the influence of the United States in Delhi was in fact more or less expendable.

From this position it is easy to see how the American movement to a strong 'tilt' towards Pakistan came about. In the crisis which developed between March and December 1971 the United States had nothing to gain by neutrality along the lines it had followed in 1965. Refusal to express a firm view would not only have incurred hostility in each of the affected capitals without any compensating gain: it would also have seemed like an abdication of American power—and as the crisis developed it also appeared more and more that the effectiveness of the United Nations was at issue. On the other hand, support for Pakistan's position conferred influence in Islamabad that

it was hoped could be used to encourage progress towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis in East Bengal and to restrain Pakistan from provocative actions against India. In the end, of course, American influence was not sufficiently powerful to achieve either of these purposes. But even more important than the attainment of either of them, was the fact that support for Pakistan was a policy that reinforced the President's approach to China by demonstrating that on Sino-Soviet issues which were of vital importance to China the United States was willing to throw its weight on the Chinese side. For obvious reasons it was impossible for the moment to do this in the areas of long-standing Sino-American confrontation—in Formosa, Indochina, Korea, or in relation to Japan. Only in the Indian sub-continent, for reasons we have already discussed, was America sufficiently uncommitted to be able to establish substantial common ground with the Chinese.

Thus if we look back to 1971, American policy during the crisis started off by bringing heavy pressure to bear on Pakistan, first to permit a United Nations role in East Bengal, then to reach some kind of political settlement with an acceptable selection of Bengalis. But as the international tension mounted, and as the long hiatus drew on between President Nixon's China announcement and the actual date of his visit, the United States moved with increasing determination to the support of Pakistan and China-in-Pakistan. When full-scale war actually came in December the Americans of course took the lead in organising world-wide diplomatic pressure against the Indians; and when that failed to have any effect, the United States mounted a notorious display of unilateral power in the Bay of Bengal. Whether or not this gesture had any influence on the Indian decision not to press their advantage in West Pakistan—I do not believe that they ever seriously intended to make such an attempt—there is little doubt of its effectiveness as an indication of America's support for Pakistan and therefore, by implication, for the Chinese commitment to the defence of West Pakistan.

Since the end of the crisis China and the United States have continued to maintain parallel courses in their relations with the sub-continent. It is true that although China has not recognised Bangladesh, the United States has. But although the Americans also did not support the Chinese in their decision to exclude Bangladesh from the United Nations, the fact remains that the United States was slow to accord recognition to the new state, and that its official relations, especially with India, have remained distinctly frosty. Further, when the East Bengal problem had been resolved, Kashmir once again became the principal issue between Pakistan and India; and over Kashmir the United States has shifted its position nearer to that of Pakistan. Thus, in the communiqué after President Nixon's visit

to Peking the references to Pakistan predictably marked the highest common factor of common agreement between the two powers—with the Americans echoing the strong Chinese declaration of support for self-determination in the disputed territory of Kashmir.

The sub-continental powers

If the shape of the sub-continental interests of the outside powers is largely determined by the facts of *geography*—by the patterns of an 'oceanic' or a 'continental' relationship, and by the different forms taken by the 'continental' relationship—we might say that the pattern of the external interests of the sub-continental states is largely determined by the facts of *history*.

The nature of the relations between India and Pakistan, and between Pakistan and Bangladesh, is not something which is, or has been, created or dictated by the influence of outside powers—although the outside powers have of course often sought to influence the development of those relationships in their own interests. India and Pakistan, and now Pakistan and Bangladesh, are at daggers drawn because of a long history of internal tensions within the sub-continent—tensions and conflicts which have been working themselves out over many generations. The history of the split between Pakistan and Bangladesh can be traced back at least as far as the beginning of the 13th century, when Muslim invaders originating in the Near East established themselves in Bengal and the indigenous people began to be converted to Islam. In the same way the seeds of the conflict between Pakistan and India were implanted in the same Muslim conquest of northern India, and in the subsequent failure to achieve a synthesis or rapprochement between Hinduism and Islam.

What was at stake for East Bengal within Pakistan was the free development of its Bengali personality; and in the national movement of the past few years in East Bengal concern for that identity came—for the time being at least—to take precedence over the previous concern for the Islamic affiliation of Muslim Bengal which was responsible for East Bengal's original participation in the state of Pakistan. For generations the relationship between Bangladesh and Pakistan will be clouded by bitter memories of the behaviour of Punjabis and Pathans in Bengal during the crisis. But at the same time it should not be forgotten that East Bengal remains an overwhelmingly Muslim society, whose relations on the cultural level with a predominantly Hindu India and West Bengal are overhung by a complex history of mutual antagonisms and will be rendered yet more difficult by the economic problems that are already emerging.

These issues are likely to affect the development of the international

relations of Bangladesh. It seems possible that there will be a more or less permanent undercurrent of hostility in the relations between Bangladesh and India—with the probable effect that Bangladesh will seek as far as possible to develop independent sources of support from powers outside the sub-continent. So long as China retains its interests in Pakistan—and so long as the tension between Pakistan and Bangladesh subsists—it is unlikely that China will have any role to play in Bangladesh. The choice for Bangladesh in seeking some measure of independence from India must therefore be between Russia and the United States; and of these two the United States will probably be more attractive to the Bengalis, both because it is richer and likely to be more lavish with its assistance than the Soviet Union, and also because it must inevitably be difficult for Bangladesh to develop an independent relationship with the Soviet Union so long as the present intimacy between the Russians and the Indians continues.

In Pakistan's external relations history will also continue to be a powerful and shaping factor. The Pakistanis of course feel—with a deep intensity—a Muslim repulsion from India. Although Bangladesh represents only one half of a cultural nation, it at least has a homogeneous Bengali identity to provide a foundation for its existence as a state—but in what remains of Pakistan that function must still be performed by Islam. Pakistan's commitment to an Islamic identity is therefore fundamental. Geographically, economically, socially and culturally, the new Pakistan is of course much more viable as a state than the old Pakistan in two wings. But we must never forget that the bond of Pakistani solidarity is still provided essentially by the two related themes of Islamic nationhood and hostility to India. From the historical point of view it might indeed be argued that the maintenance of a brutal separation from India is a necessary requirement for the long-term survival of Pakistan as an independent entity. I think it is this compulsion that underlies the continuing refusal of the Pakistani government to come to terms with India. 'Good neighbourly relations' between the two states would fly in the face of half a millennium of antagonism, and in effect it would deny the possibility of a separate national existence for the Indian Muslims.

Looking to the future, I have already referred to the possibility that Pakistan's recalcitrance might be met by Indian attempts to bring pressure to bear by encouraging the secessionist movements in Sind and Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. Afghanistan might be willing to support such attempts—especially if the Russians gave their blessing. But this would of course be a very dangerous game for Russia and for India to play. Nevertheless, they have the political initiative against Pakistan, whose only definitive choices, broadly, are either to give in on the best possible terms, or to continue to maintain

an independent and defiant position with the support of China and the United States. Probably President Bhutto hopes that by following a skilful course between the three interested outside great powers he will be able to postpone any final commitments indefinitely—thus in effect sustaining Pakistan's independence and integrity, but at the cost of achieving no reduction in the intensity of its present external problems. Although, as we shall see, an indispensable requirement of such a policy is the maintenance of intimate Sino-Pakistani relations, the key to such a policy must lie in Moscow, whose sympathetic interest in a stable and united Pakistan would be enough to restrain any pressures that India might be able and willing to apply to Pakistan—although of course we must not lose sight of the fact that India and Bangladesh have the whip-hand over the Pakistani prisoners of war, and of the possible domestic political consequences inside Pakistan of their indefinite retention by India.

And so we come to India. Any discussion of India's international relations must of course start from the proposition that it has now firmly established itself as the dominant regional power in the sub-continent. For the time being at least it is less restricted by the pressures of history than either Pakistan or Bangladesh; and its economic and military strength now very greatly exceeds that of its nearest regional rival.

On the other hand, although India dominates the sub-continental scene it is unable to compel Pakistan to come to an accommodation on the outstanding issues between the two countries. Although there are at least two alternatives, the hope of achieving this accommodation is likely to be the dominating theme in Indian external policy until the disputes are somehow resolved. In this endeavour, the two most relevant outside powers are the Soviet Union and China; and India has the choice of continuing to pursue its purposes in Pakistan through co-operation with the Russians, or of attempting to realise them by coming to terms with China. In my view, Russia is likely to continue to be unable or unwilling to persuade Pakistan to adopt a more co-operative policy, and in the long run it is only by winning Chinese support that India can achieve a settlement with Pakistan. But of course, as we have seen, China cannot afford any strengthening of India which would at the same time strengthen the Soviet Union. For any Indian approach to China to be effective, there would therefore have had to be either an abatement of Sino-Soviet conflict, or some convincing evidence that India was determined to pursue an independent policy which would be at least as satisfactory to Peking as to Moscow. Thus the price for India of any rapprochement with China must be willingness to bring about a marked reduction in Soviet influence in India, coupled with

an equal readiness on the part of India to accept a balanced settlement both with Pakistan and with China in all the areas of Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian tension.

Since the Sino-Indian antagonism is the weakest and least rational element in the system we have been describing, it is likely that something of the sort will eventually emerge from the evolution of the balance of forces. Meanwhile, if we look at alternatives, the interesting possibility remains open that this whole range of questions, which relates essentially to the 'continental' aspect of India's strategic position, might come to occupy less of its attention if India were to decide to give more emphasis to the 'oceanic' aspect of its international relations.

At the end of last year, India succeeded in resolving some of the main problems arising on its 'continental' side from the dissolution of the British imperial system along the northern purlieus of the sub-continent. But the most fundamental change in respect of India's continental defence surely occurred twenty years before, in 1947, when it achieved independence with its own system of self-government. The fact that India is no longer merely an element in a world-wide imperial system, but a power in its own right has fundamentally transformed its international relations by reducing its vulnerability to external interference. So long as its system of government remains effective, the idea that India might in some sense 'change hands' is an absurdity; at the same time, territorial annexation is easier to apply to an imperial dependency than to a strong self-governing state. Short of another imperial conquest, outside powers will only be able to obtain influence in India with the consent and co-operation of the Indians themselves. The implications of this fact have perhaps not yet been fully understood.[4] What this argument adds up to is the conclusion that India's remaining difficulties along its continental edge need not remain in the forefront of its thinking about its external relations. 'Continental' preoccupations came naturally to the servants of the Raj; and they continued to be appropriate in the period between 1947 and 1971. In the future they may still be a source of diplomatic tensions and occasional border confrontations. But they need be nothing more.

If this is appreciated, there are, as I observed above, at least two alternatives for the future development of India's international relations. One, the more probable, is that there might be a turning inwards in India towards a concentration on the solution of its problems of economic and social development. But there also remains the possibility of an expansion of the political, strategic and economic aspects of the 'oceanic'

[4] The continuing unwillingness of the Indian government to undertake the construction of nuclear weapons may, however, be based on an understanding of this point.

dimension of India's relations with the outside world. As we have seen, India relies upon the sea routes for nearly all of its external economic activity; and the origins of its modern national culture lie beyond the ocean. Since the creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947 India has inevitably looked towards the plains and mountains of its northern boundary. But as the last stage of decolonisation works itself out in the area of the Indian Ocean, India will be bound to devote more of its attention and resources to taking up its share of the inheritance—which is bound to be a major part.

The outlines of such a strategy can already be discerned. If the naval activities of outside powers can be limited by diplomacy—and if, in particular, an agreement on a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean can be reached—India will be in a position to assert itself as the strongest naval power in the region between South Africa and Australia. This is not a question of any revival of gunboat diplomacy; but the implications of such a development for, say, the stability of the oil trade routes between the Persian Gulf and Western Europe and Japan are obviously very considerable. Until 1947 India was the key-stone in the system of British naval power in the Indian Ocean area; since then India has been preoccupied with the continuing problems of its landward aspect, while maritime security has been provided by Britain. Nevertheless, India's interest in the ocean which surrounds it remains and has deepened.

But it yet remains to be seen how much of this 'oceanic' relation imposed from outside, will survive in the future, and whether the 'oceanic' orientation of modern India will translate itself into a strategic role as a sea power; or whether that orientation will wither as India turns in upon itself, either to find its own distinct personality, or to lose it in a welter of competing indigenous traditions.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:*

SOME PROBLEMS OF AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY ENTERPRISE

Christopher Brown

THERE is fairly wide recognition in universities and polytechnics that the conventional boundaries of academic study have to be crossed in order to consider a number of the most important problems posed by the changing nature of the contemporary world. In the 19th century the present boundaries of the social sciences developed in response to the problems of that age. Now the problems are distributed in a different manner, but the academic organisation of the social sciences has not, as yet, caught up with the changes that are taking place in their subject-matter. This is partly because the separate social sciences have developed their own characteristic techniques and assumptions. How can this separation be overcome? In specific terms, when economists and political scientists come together to discuss the changing nature of the 'real' world, and the ways in which they can convey this change to their students, what points of agreement and disagreement can be identified? And further, does the division of opinion take place along the lines of the present disciplines, or is the disagreement intra- as well as inter-disciplinary?

This article attempts to answer these questions in the light of the discussions at the Cumberland Lodge Conference. It is bound to be highly subjective since it is one participant's view of the agreements and disagreements which took place. No doubt each of the forty different participants would produce a different formulation of the problems. At the same time the conference did have some less subjective results. In addition to hearing and discussing papers on the international political

* This article draws on material from the discussion at an international political economy conference which was held at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, in July 1972 and which evolved from an international political economy group based on Chatham House. The conference, which was supported by Chatham House, the Nuffield Foundation and St. Catharine's Foundation, Cumberland Lodge, enabled a group of about 40 international economists and international relations specialists—most of them teachers in universities or polytechnics—to spend 10 days discussing the problems of how to relate political and economic contributions to the understanding of the international political economy, both in teaching and research.

The author accepts responsibility for the content of the article. But he would like to acknowledge his debt to all the participants in the conference and in particular to thank Miss Susan Strange of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, who organised the conference, and Mr. Michael Hodges of the University of Kent, for their help and advice.

economy, many of which were precisely focused on the problems of inter-disciplinary study, working groups were set up with the intention of providing specific proposals for teaching and research and this article is, at least in part, based on their separate reports.†

Before proceeding to the substantial points of agreement and disagreement, it should be pointed out that the participants were in no sense representatives of their respective disciplines, and the discussions that took place were as much within as between disciplines. The participants did not accurately reflect the state of their own disciplines; some approaches to both politics and economics were seriously under-represented. Those economists who were present for the full ten days of the conference were not, by and large, members of the neo-classical school, which is arguably the dominant mode of thinking in academic economics departments today. The position in international relations was rather different in that the dominant school of thinking, at least in British universities, was rather over-represented. Most of the international relations specialists who were present throughout the conference could probably be considered members of the 'classical' or 'traditional' rather than 'behavioural' schools of thought. It must be admitted that this double imbalance may have had an effect on the type of issues that were discussed, and the conclusions or non-conclusions that were reached. Hopefully, since most points of view were expressed in one way or another, the imbalance was not sufficient to call into question the validity of the exercise.

The extent of consensus

What, then, were the points of agreement? First, and perhaps implicit in the nature of the enterprise, there was general agreement that the gap between, on the one hand, the changing nature of the real world and, on the other, the conventional divisions of academic study has increased, is increasing, and should be decreased. While politics and economics—and their international branches—continue to be isolated from each other in universities and polytechnics, in the world outside political and economic considerations are increasingly intertwined. All the participants agreed that this state of affairs was undesirable—that academic study divorced from the real world was, in the last resort, sterile.

There was also, and perhaps more surprisingly, general agreement about those trends and tendencies in the world which were making the isolated study of politics or economics untenable. The nature of the system of international economic co-operation established in the immediate postwar years is changing rapidly, partly because of the

† A Report summarising the papers presented at the conference and containing the concise outlines suggested by these working groups has been published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at 50p.

stresses and strains of interdependence, partly because of the demands being made on it by the developing countries, and partly because of the tensions caused by new, or newly significant, factors such as the impact of the multinational company, the development of trading blocs and the emergence of an autonomous market as a major actor in the international economic system. Although there was disagreement on various points of detail, there was none on the general significance of these changes. Similarly, it was generally agreed that the major feature of the emerging system was that the political dimension of international economic relations has taken on increased significance, or at least has become more immediately apparent.

It was also common ground that the lack of political analysis of international economic relations, the failure to realise that we are dealing with an international *political* economy, was the result of a confusion inherent in the norms of the present system, a confusion reflected and reinforced by the behaviour of the members of the system in international negotiations on economic questions. Influenced by the disastrous experiences of the 1930s, the founders of the postwar economic system—primarily, of course, the United States and Britain—attempted to build into their work the notion that the issues of international relations were to be dealt with in separate ways, and by separate institutions. International monetary questions were to be separate from international trade matters, and, most centrally, political considerations were to be banned from either. The idea of the autonomy of economic relations has probably always been fallacious, but in many ways it has been a 'convenient fiction' in the words of one speaker at the conference. Although most states have at one time or another broken down the compartments between politics and economics, for some purposes they have acted as though these compartments did exist. If negotiations can be confined to the level of detail, success is more likely; if the norms of the system can be taken for granted, discussion can centre on technical issues, and although the bargaining may be hard and bitter, progress can be made, as the success of Gatt in reducing tariff levels illustrates. Equally, if the issues can be kept at the technical level, a purely economic analysis can be relevant, because some overall idea of optimality exists against which this analysis can be measured.

In such a situation, political analysis has an important role to fulfil in explaining and if necessary criticising the basic norms of the system. But when these norms cease to determine the behaviour of the members of the system—when the norms themselves are the subject of contention—politics becomes of major importance in understanding why and how the disagreements in the international political economy have arisen. There are then no issues of detail which can be settled on the basis of give and take within an agreed framework; all matters of dispute concern

not the workings of the system, but its very existence. In this context all questions are both political and economic and all issues are both technical and fundamental.

There was broad agreement that the present state of the international political economy can be characterised in these terms. The shift can be traced quite specifically in terms of the abandonment of the norm of autonomous economic negotiations by the United States in the dollar crisis of 1971; in the rejection of the norm of non-discriminatory trading relations by the less developed countries as symbolised in their emphasis on Unctad rather than Gatt as a negotiating forum; and in the irrelevance of the norm of tariff reductions to the industrialised Western states struggling to retain some control over their own economies in spite of the activities of multinational companies and international money markets.

On some points there was disagreement: the proposition that liberal trade relations, in general terms, maximised welfare for the system as a whole, if not for individual members, was hotly contested by some participants, although it appeared to receive majority support. From the disagreement on this issue there followed disagreement on how the international political economy reached this state of affairs, and how it was going to get out of it. Still, on the general point there was little disagreement: the international political economy is in a state of crisis the nature of which can only be understood by bringing political and economic analysis into some form of relationship with each other.

Perhaps the last area of agreement at the conference was to be found in the recognition that transforming the international political economy into a viable area of study would not be easy. It would require a considerable commitment in a number of areas—research, teaching and, perhaps most important, self-education. For if one certain thing emerged from the conference it was an awareness of the extent of the mutual ignorance of each other's disciplines. With the exception of one or two polymaths, there was an acute sense of the different concepts, techniques and, perhaps above all, languages that we were employing.

Disagreement over method

Although all agreed that international political economy as a field of study was both necessary and important, when specific questions came to be asked about it, the prevailing consensus evaporated. These questions inevitably involved the nature of the two disciplines, politics and economics, and the terms of any relationship which could be developed between them, and on this sort of 'gut' issue consensus is rather difficult to achieve. Most participants considered the nature of the two disciplines to be different, although any definition of the difference was hotly disputed. In general this difference, however defined,

was believed to be at the root of the problem of the study of international political economy, but a strong case was also made for seeing the problem from the perspective of academic organisation. It was suggested that the basic difficulty about studying international political economy is the lack of international political economists because the departmental structures of most universities and polytechnics do not give much opportunity for students to become specialists in both the political and economic analysis of international relations. From this perspective, the case for inter-disciplinary international studies degrees was made with some force, on the analogy of area-studies degree courses. However, although most participants agreed that such courses would be a good thing *per se*, the idea that they offered a solution to the problems of studying international political economy was rejected. The majority opinion was that such courses would eventually have to come to terms with the differences between economics and politics; the problem could not be avoided by changing the organisational context in which it was likely to occur.

Out of the many conflicting ways in which the sciences of economics and politics were characterised, one consistent theme emerged and eventually came to dominate the discussions—although it never lacked opponents. This was to see economics as essentially one-dimensional in contrast to the multi-dimensional nature of politics. Economics concentrates on one strand of human behaviour—in the classical writings, it is the desire for wealth, in contemporary terms, it can be better defined as that aspect of human behaviour which is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends—and builds upon that foundation a system of logically coherent and internally consistent causal relationships. Before this analysis can be applied in the real world, other factors concerning man's social, political and moral beliefs have to be taken into account, but the essence of economics lies in its concentration on one single aspect of human behaviour.

Politics, on the other hand, cannot be confined to the study of a single strand of human behaviour. Its boundaries cannot be drawn on the basis of any first principles and its goals are indeterminate. Politics, and perhaps especially international politics, is a synoptic, holistic study, while the tendencies of economics are reductionist. In this essential difference lies the problem of the study of international political economy —how can two such disparate disciplines co-operate at anything beyond the most superficial level?

Implicitly or explicitly, such an approach tends to lay the blame for non co-operation at the door of the economists. According to one version of the one-dimensional as opposed to multi-dimensional theme, the science of economics is flawed in its foundations—no approach which sets out to disregard the moral, social and political qualities of man

can be regarded as satisfactory; the imposing edifices of economic theory must rest on unsure foundations if the complex multi-dimensional nature of human behaviour is reduced to one single strand. Another formulation refuses to lay the burden of original sin on the economists, but points to the fallacies and errors which always threaten to overwhelm their work. This approach concedes the validity of economics in its own terms, but suggests that it always has a tendency to go too far—to overrate the importance of the economic dimension of human life to the exclusion of all others.

This characterisation of economics was largely the work of political scientists rather than economists. Those economists who were prepared to accept it in broad terms generally wished to make important reservations. The most important of these concerned the extent to which it was possible to offer any single description of economics. With some force, the point was made that there are many schools of thought in economics, and although, arguably, neo-classical economics could be described as one-dimensional, the same epithet could not be used to describe Keynesian or Marxist schools of thought. In short, although some schools of economics—including perhaps the dominant mode of economic thinking today—do deserve to be classified in rather pejorative terms, this is a far cry from asserting that economics as a whole must be described in this way.

An alternative formulation of the differences between politics and economics, while it was definitely a minority view, did receive some support from both economists and political scientists. This formulation rejected any characterisation in terms of holistic or reductionist, one-dimensional or multi-dimensional. What is rather pejoratively described as reductionism is merely the necessary process of attacking the problem of complexity. Economics concentrates on a single strand of human behaviour because it is only thus that knowledge as opposed to speculation can emerge. Of course, before propositions arrived at in this way can be applied, other factors have to be considered, but the business of economics is to produce economic propositions; the aim of the economist is to provide knowledge with which specific problems can be tackled, and he can only do this if the subject-matter of his discipline is rigorously defined. Although the theoretical constructs of economics—'the firm', 'free trade' and so on—are divorced from the real world, they enable the economist to produce theories and generalisations which offer a better chance of solving real world problems than an approach which refuses to simplify or pose answerable questions but prefers to remain at a level of complexity so great that intuitive speculation is the best it can be hoped to achieve.

By a similar chain of reasoning, the multi-dimensional nature of political study is a source of weakness rather than strength. It is pre-

cisely because political study has not been able to reduce the complexity of its concerns, that it has not developed the same level of theoretical sophistication that economics can boast. It is further argued that the road towards theory in this sense of the term is precisely the road which increasing numbers of political scientists are treading because they are coming to see politics as one aspect of the general study of the allocation of resources in society—specifically as the authoritative allocation of values in a society. To the extent that this is so, the difference between politics and economics does not lie in their essential natures but in the sort of interactions that they study.

In whatever way one characterises the differences between politics and economics, the fact remains that international economists and international political analysts have not found it easy to work in some form of unison on the study of international political economy. It is useful therefore to examine some of the ways in which this goal could be pursued. Probably the most realistic, but also the most limited, approach recognises that for one reason or another, politics and economics are very different activities, and therefore any form of unified study of the international political economy is not to be expected. The best that can be hoped for is that the finding of one discipline should illuminate the activities of the other; any attempts to go beyond this limited goal run the risk of destroying the distinctive features of both sciences. If even this limited change of attitude is to be viable, a process of self-education must be undergone. Political scientists must at least learn the language of economics in order to follow its debates; economists must be prepared to understand the political process in its own terms rather than in the light of conventional economic values and assumptions. Research teams might be developed with each member bringing to the enterprise his own distinctive skills and techniques. But whatever co-operation or communication is achieved will be within the framework of separate disciplines, each sticking to its basic tenets and methods. It can be argued that even if the intellectual problems involved are ignored, any more ambitious project must be doomed to failure because it is totally unrealistic to expect either political scientists or economists to change the central assumptions they make about the world. There are too many organisational and personal obstacles in the way.

The main opposition to such a point of view came from those, both economists and political scientists, who believed that a unified approach to the study of international political economy is both possible and desirable. Whatever differences may exist between politics and economics, there is no reason to suppose that a synthesis cannot be achieved. In the real world, which is the area of study of both disciplines, the distinction between what is 'political' and what is 'economic' is becoming blurred; to suggest that academic study must rigidly adhere to

this distinction is to condemn it to the pursuit of increasingly sterile goals. In the medium- to long-term, it must follow the lines of development in the world at large, and these lines are rapidly converging.

Between them these two main schools of thought cover most of the possibilities for a direct approach to the problem of bringing together economic and political analysis. Both approaches are open to serious criticism, the first because it rarely lifts itself above the mere assertion of the need for co-operation, the second because it does not specify the terms on which a fusion of economics and politics might take place. The first point does not need to be laboured; clearly, an approach that offers wise words about the need for increased contacts, self-education and a better understanding of each other's work is not in fact offering very much. It may be the best that can be achieved but it does not offer any real increase in explanatory power. The second point requires further elaboration. Most ideas of the terms of fusion come down essentially to the proposition that one discipline should take over the defining characteristics of the other. One variant suggests that economics should widen its scope to include the moral, social and political aspects of human behaviour as well as the economic; this, it is alleged, would make co-operation between politics and economics easier, to the extent that a fused study of the international political economy could emerge. This might be so, but only because the study of economics had become, in effect, a sub-branch of politics. This may or may not be desirable, but to describe such a process as 'fusion' is to misunderstand what is going on.

According to another approach fusion could take place through the medium of a change in the methods and goals of politics, for example, by the adoption of part of the language of economics and the framework of assumptions which underlie economic analysis. Again, it can be argued that this would be a desirable development, but it is difficult to see how it can be regarded as the basis for a fused study. However, if one or another variant of this route to fusion cannot be accepted, it is not easy to see what is meant by the term. In the last resort it becomes merely another way of stressing the need for economists and political scientists to talk to each other more often and, while no doubt desirable, this is no real answer to the problem.

If the problems of uniting politics and economics as such appear to be particularly intractable, it is still possible that the basis for some form of unity can be found in another perspective which looks beyond the immediate problem towards the prospect of a unified science of human behaviour. If such a science existed, the problems involved in the study of international political economy would fade away. There might be some problems of application, but the most pressing problem of all—the search for a proper foundation for study—would disappear. The

obvious objection to this perspective is that a unified social science does not exist. The justification for bringing it forward, however, lies in the realm of academic priorities, because the effort which is put into establishing the basis for the proper study of the international political economy might be better used in trying to achieve a wider frame of reference.

Two further points buttress the case for adopting this perspective. In the first place it draws attention to some important international phenomena which a concentration on politics and economics alone might otherwise overlook. The psychological and socio-psychological roots of both economic and political behaviour cannot be ignored, especially when many of the most crucial problems of the international political economy are concerned with changing attitudes and aspirations. Second, it allows the trend towards the study of international political economy to link up with those other areas in the social sciences where the isolated study of either politics, economics or sociology is coming to be seen as untenable. It would be a disastrous mistake to think that it is only on the international stage that the tensions between compartmentalised academic study and an uncompartmentalised world are to be found; on the contrary, they exist at all levels.

One final approach to the study of international political economy has to be mentioned, not because it solves the problems involved, but because it may avoid them in a fruitful and convenient manner. The adoption of a historical approach to the study of international political economy may be the best way to broach the subject to students, and it may also be the best way to develop the sort of links between political scientists and economists which might lead to co-operation at the analytical level. This is partly because the language problem ceases to be of crucial importance. Most students of politics, and a fair number of those studying economics, have some experience in methods of history, and the differences between economic and political history are not so great as to make the experience of one inappropriate to the study of the other—although the activities of the new schools of econometric historians may in time make this proposition invalid.

Apart from the argument of convenience, there are other, more substantial reasons why the approach through history has merit. In the first place many of the most important issues in the international political economy have significant historical precedents on which the analyst can draw. The tension between national control of the economy and the benefits of liberal trade relations is by no means a new development. These tensions have existed wherever there has been trade between collectivities. Furthermore, just as economic and political history are more widely comprehensible than contemporary economic or political analysis, so the language and concepts of some historical, political or

economic thinkers are more readily accessible than those of contemporary thinkers. The classical writers on free trade and mercantilism, for example, are more easily read by political scientists than are their modern equivalents. The reason, of course, lies in the absence of advanced quantitative techniques in their writings, and the modern economist would be justified in complaining about an approach which is based on the ignorance of the reader rather than the value of the writer. Still, the case for a historical approach can be made in its own terms, as well as for less respectable reasons of convenience, and although it does not cope with the major problems, it does offer a useful means for self-education and teaching.

In returning to the specific questions posed at the beginning of this article, two significant points should be recapitulated. First, the agreements which emerged at the conference were largely connected with matters of substance, and the disagreements with methodology. Although, of course, there were many significant nuances of interpretation, on the whole there was remarkable agreement on the central features of the changing international political economy. Although this was partly because the participants were a self-selected group, it contrasts strongly with their failure to reach any kind of agreement on the proper basis for the study of international political economy. Second, although the disagreements were most marked in the realm of methodology, there were no disagreements simply between economists and political scientists. Although many of the most hotly contested propositions were put most forcibly by the practitioners of one or the other discipline, they still managed to attract at least minority support from ' the other side '.

The conference revealed serious disagreements over methods and a discouraging degree of ignorance of each other's disciplines. At the same time, it confirmed the participants' belief in the importance of not rigidly confining the study of social problems within the conventional boundaries and strengthened their resolve to overcome the difficulties involved in putting the study of international political economy on a proper footing.

BOOKS

THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

François Duchêne

THAT the period since the Second World War has been one of extraordinary material growth is obvious because there are cars in streets and statistics in offices to substantiate it almost too well. Yet, though less immediately overwhelming, intellectual progress—if progress, as the evolutionists claim, is defined by increasing complexity—has in some ways been even more startling; and of all the growing species international relations has been one of the most explosive. A pessimist could even argue that it has run to seed. The compulsion, above all but not only in the United States, to publish or be damned in one's academic career has produced a Triffid-like undergrowth of theses written in polysyllabic Amergerman.

But this should not conceal the fact that the efflorescence itself is a remarkably creative response to the challenge of an international world new both in scope and quality. Removed from overt action as much of the output of the discipline may be, its root in a desire to shape a rapidly changing world is clear in its origins and development alike. As Roger Morgan points out in his excellent survey of the field at the end of *The Study of International Affairs* [1]—it should surely have been a preface—the first university chair of international relations in the world, the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, was set up by David Davies in 1919 on condition that the incumbent should undertake studies to further the work of the newly founded League of Nations.

Today, it is the fashion to be more sceptical and hard-nosed. Yet even a cursory glance at the intellectual *coups d'état* which have succeeded one another in the past generation across the international relations scene, with the confusion of a Shakespearean chronicle play, shows how closely they have reflected and responded to policy directions in the outside world. On the one hand there have been the generations of unifiers of the world: the idealists of the League of Nations and the United Nations, the constitutionalists, came first before and after the Second World War. They were followed by the integrators, the functionalists like Ernest Haas and then the behaviourists like Karl Deutsch, who measured societal interaction by the statistics of contact across frontiers. The fact that their material was almost entirely concerned with the Western world showed how much they reflected the growing awareness of 'interdependence' in the 1950s and early 1960s. Treading on their heels during the 1960s, as declining cold war brought arms control to the fore, particularly between the super-powers, were the peace and conflict researchers.

[1] *The Study of International Affairs*: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Younger. Edited by Roger Morgan. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1972.) 309 pp. Index. £5·00.

On the other hand, there were the analysts if not champions of diversity. There were the realists like E. H. Carr, from the left, or Hans Morgenthau, from the right, who refurbished balance of power doctrines during the war and the cold war. The problems of the nuclear balance in the late 1950s and early 1960s produced what has probably been the most original of all the new waves in international theory, the primarily American group of civilian strategic thinkers who tried to find a rationale for deterrence and for the politics of power within a system where major war was excluded. Later still have come the eclectics, the unifiers in diversity, the futurologists, like Herman Kahn and Brzezinski, who have tried a systems approach, throwing technology, economics, strategy, integration and games theory into their efforts at an intellectual gymnastic of possible options and choices. And as transnational and societal influences on international relations have obtruded more and more since the *crise de civilisation* of the later 1960s, more and more attention has been given to the influence of internal bureaucratic or perceptual factors on the formation of foreign policy, the main innovator being Richard Neustadt with his study of the Skybolt and Polaris crises in Anglo-American relations.[2] All these developments have been clearly related to the political developments of the period; and one reason why there is such a bewildering richness of doctrines and methods in international relations today is that it has been in some ways a record of the energetic attempt of academic America to absorb and digest the new conditions of a world in which the United States has for the first time been a prime actor.

This desire, to put the world in Bacon's phrase 'to the question', in order to understand it, to propose action ('policies') and ultimately to control events, is evident in the contributions to *The Study of International Affairs* made by the members of the Chatham House staff. The ideology of the house, as here expressed, is the need for inter-disciplinary work breaking down the walls between the traditional specialities of the economist, the political scientist, the international lawyer and the rest, in order to illumine the choices of the man of government. 'What is required for the next generation of Chatham House scholars', writes Andrew Shonfield, is 'a capacity to engage in cooperative research with people whose assumptions and methods of investigation start out by being different. . . . The team rather than the individual is the basic unit for the main body of the research work that needs to be done.' The need to break the self-sufficiency of the economists in particular is passionately argued by Susan Strange in an impressive essay on international economic relations. It is interesting, and perhaps symptomatic of a certain British conservatism, that this should need to be put with such crusading zeal. The contribution of economists and physicists to strategic thinking in the 1960s, of statisticians to conflict research, of games theorists to alliance relations has been so obvious and distinguished that one might think the point needs no arguing. The work of Chatham House and other institutes has already long been collective and to some extent inter-disciplinary. Yet one sees what the authors mean. It is not only that economists, strategists and the rest all tend to immure themselves in a parochial professional pride. The problem is that each imaginative insight tends to produce its own scholastic and that as these multiply, it becomes harder and harder to

[2] *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press. 1970). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 373.

integrate all the fragmentary pieces into a whole mosaic. Yet this has to be done if scholarship is both to illuminate and face the test of practice. Every time a new insight develops a new discipline, the problem of reintegrating it into a coherent view becomes more important as well as more complex.

Some of the difficulties are visible in the structure of this book. The aim behind it is threefold: to survey the work done in the field; to record what Chatham House has achieved in its own research over fifty years; and to suggest new areas to be cultivated. In short, the intent is purposive as well as descriptive. This is quite clear in the 'functional' essays with more or less universal application, like international law, economic relations or security studies. But there is little echo of these broader themes in the essays on particular regions which have loomed large in the past studies of Chatham House. Where the essays on functional studies, written by the staff, suggest problems to be solved and a future to be quarried for new issues, the area studies, written mainly by outside contributors, offer relatively little sense of universal currents exemplified in local situations. There is relatively little, for instance, about the impact of global super-power policies on local problems, and the editors themselves deplore the lack of essays on the Middle East where this might have been visible, or Latin America where some of the themes of recent radicalism would have been to the fore.

This is understandable, since the book is partly a record of work done in Chatham House and a single institute, however busy, cannot cover everything. But one gap is striking and basic. This is the almost complete lack of reference to works in languages other than English. One could have the impression from reading this symposium that international relations is an eccentricity of the English-speaking world or of English-speaking scholars from other countries. D. C. Watt stresses the modern historian's need to work at least in French and German as well as English. But Michael Kaser's essay on 'The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe' confines itself to English texts to the point where one imagines he must have decreed a self-denying ordinance to avoid the Russian sources he knows so well. This suggests a restriction in the editorial concept, the audience, the discipline or all three: it is culture-bound.

* * * *

It also suggests some of the ways ahead for international relations. Today, many of the most important problems which call for research are international as well as inter-disciplinary. There is increasing need for studies which are international in personnel and sometimes in their administrative base. Chatham House itself is moving in this direction, not only traditionally towards America but also towards Europe and Japan. This is probably a good moment. Barriers are, or should be, coming down. Participation in the European Community should dig some kind of Channel Tunnel through the reluctance of the British, as heirs to the modern *lingua franca,* to learn lesser foreign tongues of lesser scope. Barriers are also being lowered between the 'capitalist' and 'socialist' worlds. We are in for a period of what will probably become increasingly competitive contact between the Russians and Chinese and the West. Ways need to be found to integrate the thinking of different cultures on the international system. Money, or diplomatic effort, could even be spent in using and expanding translating services which already exist to publish and distribute

significant texts from the remoter languages into English and diffuse them. This could enrich as well widen the field of vision. The American domination of international relations has given the discipline enormous vitality but also a rather mechanistic cast of thought. There are serious gaps in its common stock of awareness. Theodore Geiger struck what was, but should not have been, a new note [3] when he stressed the primary importance of cultural traditions—of distilled and collectively inherited subjectivity, or values—in the problems of development. This has been far too little stressed: such matters as the history and role of the state or of violence in a country's consciousness are extremely important but little emphasised. Similarly changes in awareness, such as attitudes to authority, which are taking place under our very eyes, are crucial to interstate relations. So are new questions which are beginning to command attention, notably at Chatham House, such as transnational and subnational factors which are implicitly excluded from the very title 'international relations'.

The origin of international relations in the peace movement before and after the First World War betrays one of its underlying motives—the desire to move from the anarchy of which war has been one of the symptoms to a more ordered dispensation where citizen needs are met by contracts freely accepted. Even those who dislike the intrusion of political preferences like these into a discipline which can be seen as a social science in its own right tend to think in terms of 'systems' which assume a minimum of coherence in world affairs. Both seem to be signs of the growing interdependence which (to cite a contrasting extreme) would have been utterly inconceivable to the inhabitants of the Roman, Parthian, Kushan and Chinese empires in their common heyday. In this sense, international relations is a symptom of a broad, though almost endlessly complex, movement which suggests that indeed '*l'ère d'un monde fini commence*'.

In such a world, it is natural and necessary to work out the dialectics—or, better, the wave theory—of the attractions and repulsions of an increasingly common life, and the differing codes, appropriate to varying and partial but interrelated functions, by which these commotions can be channelled and controlled. The present juncture, where we are climbing painfully out of our various separatenesses into a new whole, is peculiarly favourable to the sociology of the communication and interaction between many cultures and societies. International relations is no doubt the study of states and their interrelations; but by the same token it is also potentially part of the sociology of a new world which is as diverse, eclectic and ultimately ecumenical as Malraux's *Musée Imaginaire* or McLuhan's global village.

[3] *The Conflicted Relationship, the West and the transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America* (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1967). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1969, p. 317.

REVIEWS

HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Pointing the Way 1959–1961. By Harold Macmillan. *London, Melbourne, Toronto: Macmillan. 1972. 504 pp. Illus. Index. £4·50.*

THERE is very little in this book that might not have been written by an able and well-informed political journalist, save the necessarily formal letters to the Queen, and some of the reflections on topics of the day in the form of memoranda and letters to his colleagues. Mr. Macmillan shows himself to be acutely sensitive to the stop-go politics of the time; he is very critical of the City and at times of the Bank of England and the Treasury. His letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on February 27, 1960 on Budget tactics is a model of political good sense (pp. 220–22). He objects to running the City on 'an old-boy basis' (p. 362). His criticisms of some bankers are bitter. At the time of the international crisis in 1961 he writes in his diary: 'These intrepid speculators and bankers, who have survived two wars, will start to take themselves to Switzerland or Bermuda, having first changed their money into gold. Then they at least—and their gold—may survive nuclear war' (p. 391). His contempt for financial middlemen comes out even more clearly in his comment on the death of one of them in the Congo. 'Yesterday', Mr. Macmillan writes, 'an Ethiopian soldier shot a Swiss banker in Elizabethville with a bazooka. No one knows why, and no one cares. But even Swiss bankers ought to have some rights' (p. 456).

Curiously enough, all Mr. Macmillan's domestic geese turn out to be swans. He comments on Butler's 'admirable' management of day-to-day business (p. 121); he says that Lord Listowel, then Governor-General of Ghana, was 'a gracious and generous host' (p. 122); and when he reports to the Cabinet on the failure of the Paris Summit he notices that 'all his colleagues were friendly' (p. 215). He was happy to find his new Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) 'in capital form, full of confidence, buoyant and with many practical ideas' (p. 361). And again, Selwyn Lloyd 'has been splendid' throughout the sterling crisis in 1961. 'He has been calm and confident' (p. 372). John Hare (Minister of Labour) 'showed great skill in managing some of the most ticklish aspects' of the numerous labour conflicts then plaguing the country (p. 363).

Of American politics and politicians he is on the whole condemnatory. Eisenhower's diplomacy towards Khrushchev was stupid, naive, and incompetent (p. 78); the American handling of the U2 affair was 'inept' (p. 215);

Dulles was 'a disaster' (p. 283); and then there was 'the folly and weakness (mixed with vanity) of Adlai Stevenson' in the Congo affair (p. 451). He writes, with a good deal of justice, of Adenauer's trickiness (p. 317). Adenauer had long carried out an anti-British campaign because he thought the British were soft on Russia. Adenauer had become, Mr. Macmillan notes, 'vain, suspicious, and grasping'. He had been carrying on 'a great campaign of vilification of Her Majesty's Government and especially of me. I am Neville Chamberlain re-incarnate, and so on' (p. 64).

Perhaps the most interesting and entertaining part of this book is the one that deals with the reception of General de Gaulle at Birch Grove. There is a macabre touch about the account of the effects on the Macmillan household of the constant preparations made for an immediate blood transfusion for the General in case of an attempted assassination. From the social point of view, the visit was very successful. But the political results were nil. 'He does not apparently listen to argument. I mean this most literally. Not only is he not convinced, but he actually does not listen. He merely repeats over and over again what he has said before' (p. 427).

About the only people who come out well in this book are Harold Macmillan and some of his colleagues. The rest are nowhere.

THOMAS BARMAN

Heinrich von Brentano di Trimezzo: seine Herkunft, sein Leben und Wirken für Europa. By Maria Stirtz. *Darmstadt: Bläschke. 1970. 407 pp. Illus. Index. DM 28.50.*

HEINRICH VON BRENTANO, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Dr. Adenauer's Cabinet from 1955–1961, also played an important role as Chairman of the Christian Democratic Parliamentary Party in the Bonn Diet from 1949 to 1955, and again from 1961 to 1964, the year of his death. Like his chief, Dr. Adenauer, he was a 'Westerner' in foreign affairs, a champion of German co-operation with France and the EEC and also of close ties with the United States. He also strongly supported the Hallstein Doctrine.

The scion of a distinguished family, partly of Italian origin, which in previous generations had made its mark in German literature, philosophy and economics, and like his father a lawyer in Darmstadt, Brentano laid the foundations of the CDU in Hesse after the national collapse of 1945. In 1948 he joined the West German Parliamentary Council and took a hand in drafting the Basic Law, the constitution of the Federal Republic. Civilised, approachable and an excellent linguist, this 'gentleman in politics', as his political adversary Willy Brandt has called him, contributed much to the gradual consolidation of democracy in Bonn.

This book, which describes Brentano's origins and career, his political friendships and affiliations and his work as a good European, is not a critical biography but a memoir written by a journalistic admirer and friend of the family. Offering a good deal of relevant information, it lacks historical perspective and is not free from trivia. There are no chapters or headings.

The question the historians are likely to ask is whether and how far Dr. Brentano was in foreign affairs more than the conscientious and faithful executive of his Chancellor. How much truth was there in a statement made by a South German newspaper at the time that 'Brentano thinks and Adenauer rules' ('*Brentano denkt und Adenauer lenkt*') (p. 177)?

The author maintains that while both men agreed on ' the principal lines of policy ', Brentano ' sometimes held different views on tactical matters '. Hurt when he was merely regarded as the executive organ of the Chancellor's policies, he called people who talked in this fashion *ahnungslos*, ' without any insight ' (p. 176). Dr. Adenauer had indeed ' a much closer relationship with Power ' than had Brentano who was inclined to put the issue first and himself second. In a fine appreciation of his predecessor at the Foreign Ministry, delivered in 1969 and reprinted here, Willy Brandt gave it as the opinion of those who had worked under Brentano that he had been ' anything but a Yes-Man ' (p. 323). Brandt's address also throws some light on the reasons for Brentano's resignation as Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1961 after the CDU had lost its absolute majority in the federal elections.

The volume contains excellent photographs of Brentano and the politicians and statesmen with whom he was associated at home and abroad. There is an unfortunate mistake in the caption under a picture showing Brentano with the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Menzies, and the German ambassador, Herr Hess, during a visit to Canberra in 1957. It was not Menzies, as alleged, but his successor Harold Holt, who lost his life in a swimming accident.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. Vol. III. By Sir Llewellyn Woodward. *London: H.M.S.O. 1971. 620 pp. Index. (History of the Second World War.) £5·00.*

THE third volume of the late Sir Llewellyn Woodward's history covers the period from the beginning of 1944 to the antecedents of the Potsdam Conference. The greater part of the book deals with British-Soviet relations, which embraced most of the European issues and, incidentally, with British-American relations regarding the major problems. Seven separate chapters are devoted to sets of relationships in which Britain played a leading role—with France, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy. The common denominator of all the latter can be found in the converging difficulties from all directions. The regimes supported by Britain all created serious problems: de Gaulle was at his most difficult on the eve of the Normandy landings and yet there was no alternative; the monarchies supported in Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy were all unpopular and faced with communist oppositions; the Russians were behind the latter, although, abiding by wartime agreements, not very actively; the Americans were frequently unhelpful. The details divulged in this volume confirm that in all cases the British government acted realistically, whether working towards an agreement with the Americans (for example, accepting a plebiscite on the constitutional question in Italy), shifting support to Tito in Yugoslavia or prevailing against ELAS in Greece.

The most interesting item concerns the assessment of Soviet intentions and the determination of British policy towards the Soviet Union after Yalta. It is set out in fair detail on the basis of a memorandum by Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr, of March 27, and of a letter by Frank Kenyon Roberts, of April 25, 1945 (pp. 561–64). Sir Archibald thought that, although the Russians would, in violation of previous agreements, bring about changes in social structures in the Balkans in harmony with that of the Soviet Union, they would refrain from doing so in Greece; at the same time, they had not given up their intention of collaborating with the Western powers after the

war and would continue their meetings. Although this violated British notions of democracy, which was to be established in these states according to the Yalta Agreement, it amounted to a Russian policy of limited objectives, none of which endangered British interests. The Russians understood by co-operation 'something like a division of the world into spheres of interest and a tacit agreement that no one of the partners will hamper or indeed criticise the activities of the other within its own sphere'. Therefore Britain's quarrels with the Russians should be confined to issues on which the country was prepared to stand its ground—where its vital interests were involved as in Greece, Iran and Turkey; it was useless to argue about Romania and Bulgaria. In his subsequent letter, Roberts developed further the implications and discussed the lines of policy open to Britain. On the one hand, he claimed, Britain should avoid the danger of confusing Russia with Nazi Germany and regarding it as potentially as dangerous—there was no essential conflict of interests between Soviet Russia and the British Commonwealth. On the other hand, he warned against the opposite extreme of thinking that Russia would soon 'settle down' and that the adverse experiences since Yalta should be forgotten; he stated his conviction that the Russians were determined to organise Eastern Europe regardless of Western wishes or prestige. Britain's main task was to show strength and determination in defending its own interests, to make clear that there was a limit beyond which the Russians could not safely go, and to guide the Western world in resisting Soviet pressure of infiltration.

Churchill himself was less inclined than the Foreign Office to take the view that the Russians had only limited objectives; the Fulton speech was a logical development of his 1945 thoughts; Sir Llewellyn plausibly suggests (p. 572 n. 1) that there was perhaps a parallel between his disillusionment at the Russians' cynical attitude to their promises at Yalta and Chamberlain's reaction to Hitler's breach of the Munich Agreement; perhaps Churchill was also more hopeful than his officials about the prospects of the democratic institutions in Eastern Europe. The concluding pages are devoted to his futile endeavours to secure Truman's co-operation which, he realised, was essential to pursue a meaningful policy in Europe. The President, however, was not only more optimistic about Soviet intentions but also favoured bilateral discussions with Stalin which Churchill was expected to join only later.

Thus, already in the spring of 1945, the major issues of British postwar foreign policy had emerged—how to negotiate from strength with the Russians, how to overcome differences with the Americans, and how to maintain a world role as one of the Big Three.

J. FRANKEL

Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War. By Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint. *London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 1972. 959 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index £6·00.*

THIS is a very good book: a work of scholarship, well written, with not too much detail, yet enough to make the story intelligible and of absorbing interest. It is a book about which one might say, if it had not run to nearly 900 pages, that one could read it through at a single sitting. It covers (to quote the publisher's blurb) the origins of the war, an account of the war

itself; and it gives wide-ranging descriptions of life in Britain during the war, of life in occupied Europe, and a picture of wartime Asia. Europe and the Middle East are dealt with by Peter Calvocoressi; and the Far East, India and the Pacific by Guy Wint, though Wint died before it was finished. It is extremely well illustrated.

In the space of a very short review, one can single out certain parts of the work, not necessarily because they are better or more interesting than the rest but because of their great appeal to the writer of this review. There is for instance this excellent piece on Mussolini:

> By the time that Hitler came to power Mussolini had had a decade of experience in the techniques and fruits of brutality. . . . He was ready to impress Hitler as he had impressed other leaders, but he had not bargained with the possibility that both he himself in relation to Hitler, and Italy in relation to Germany, might have to play a subordinate role in world politics. For the rest of his career he kicked ineffectually against these pricks (p. 151).

And then there is this piece, taken from the section on Hitler's New Order:

> Even after Hitler's decision to exterminate the Jews became known through official sources during 1942 and was confirmed by the preparations for its practical implementation, this information was received in the West with a *sang-froid* akin to complicity. Hitler was able to exult that nobody wanted the Jews and so, since there was nowhere for them to go, he had no option but to destroy them (p. 238).

The point about Winston Churchill is well-taken and could not be more succinctly expressed: 'Churchill was by temperament a monarchist of a traditional and sentimental kind; like most conservatives he tended to think of society as a number of applecarts which must not be upset; he had not been among Mussolini's enemies until Mussolini attacked France and declared war on Great Britain' (p. 382). The same point is made about by the origins of the war. It 'was a war against Germany. The part of Hitler's programme which provoked it was not the beliefs and practices of Nazism but the infringement of frontiers by Germany. The German conspirators against Hitler were the natural allies of anybody fighting Nazism but they were not the natural allies of a state at war with—or contemplating having to fight—Germany' (p. 401). So the gravamen of the charge against Neville Chamberlain becomes, not that he failed to react against the evils of Nazism, but that he did not see the dangers facing this country from Hitler's unbridled territorial ambitions.

The section called 'Great Britain at War' (pp. 404–34) fills this reader, at least, with a strong feeling of lost opportunities. So many admirable social, economic, political and cultural reforms that were put in hand during the war somehow fizzled out, or were simply dismantled in the peace that followed. 'The main source of these feelings [uncommon seriousness and optimism about their common future] and the main condition of their survival, was not simply the baneful fact of war but the clearing by war of the channels of communication within the nation. Soon after the end of the war these channels began to silt up again' (p. 434). The great race for £sd was resumed unchecked; indeed it assumed more vigorous forms than before, until today we are victims of an apparently uncontrollable inflation from which the old, the weak, the creative, and those simply concerned to do their daily job in happiness and contentment suffer equally badly.

Guy Wint's sections on the Far East and the Pacific War are outstanding, in particular, his chapter on the China (p. 610–22). Beginning with the China of 1931, Wint writes:

> The government issued enlightened decrees—hence the good reputation internationally of the Kuomintang. But there was no civil service to give effect to them; no government with an effective will; almost anarchy. The apparatus of the Chinese administration was adequate when it was worked by educated and dedicated men; but the spirit of the times had forced these into retreat. . . . The machinery of government fell into decay. . . . Most offices became objects for purchase. The magistrates and assistant magistrates, having bought their posts, set themselves to exploit their office to recoup themselves. They taxed remorselessly, and they sold justice (pp. 614–15).

Guy Wint's bird's-eye view of General MacArthur is as penetrating as Peter Calvocoressi's of Winston Churchill: 'A remoteness from understanding American politics complicated his career. Piercing political insight into fundamentals was combined with a pathetic political incompetence in day-to-day matters' (p. 778).

One point must be made in conclusion. The book is refreshingly free from footnotes; but it has an excellent bibliography.

THOMAS BARMAN

Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and Administration. By D. J. Payton-Smith. *London: H.M.S.O. 1971. 520 pp. Maps. Index. (History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Civil Series. Ed. by Sir Keith Hancock.)* £6·75.

THIS is the last volume to appear in the United Kingdom Series of the History of the Second World War. The author has produced a fascinating record in the form of a painstaking distillation of a great volume of contemporary documents. He has confined his work to a strictly administrative study and in so doing he has produced a scenario of the events of the time that will clearly be of much value to future historians.

The subject matter is arranged in chronological order. Planning for the possibility of war began in 1934, with a target date of January 1940. The narrative then takes us through the 'warm' to the 'hot' war to the end of 1941. After Pearl Harbour there were the complex problems of ocean transport, of rationing supplies and of meeting the rapidly expanding needs of high grade aviation fuel. And then in the years 1943–45 there was the build-up that culminated in victory.

A very interesting aspect of this study is the account of our relationships with our Allies. There was our lack of liaison with the French, both before and in the first stages of the war. The book then deals at length with the complexities of the Anglo-American relationship. These are set out in a clear light, in particular the tug-of-war over the two items in most critical supply—aviation fuel and tankers. Agreements were largely reached on an 'old boy' basis and without the formalities of civil service procedure. There are lessons here for staff colleges in the machinery for successful international collaboration.

Not everything went according to plan: the effort wasted on plans for Britain's self-sufficiency: the lack of port facilities: the misjudgment of the vulnerability of tankers: and likewise the relative invulnerability of oil storage. (In this context the stocks of fuel captured by the Germans in the

Low Countries and in France not only sustained the Luftwaffe in its attack on Britain, which involved a consumption higher than production, but they also enabled an attack to be launched on Russia. And one of the primary objectives of the attack on Russia was to capture the oil of the Caucasus. Thus did oil bend the shape of history.)

A total of 86 million tons of oil was supplied to Britain and the SHAEF area of Europe before the battle was won. Since then the importance of oil in the world economy has increased tenfold. The life of Western Europe is now vitally and inexorably dependent upon the oil supplies that must come by the Cape. Indeed the importance of oil supplies must predominate in international affairs. This admirable book is a valuable contribution to the study of the subject.

O. F. THOMPSON

Disaster at Moscow: Von Bock's Campaigns 1941–1942. By Alfred W. Turney. *Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1970. 228 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $6.95.*

ACCORDING to the author of *Disaster at Moscow*, ' Fedor von Bock . . . aside perhaps from Adolf Hitler, played the most decisive role in this major turning point of the Second World War ' (p. xi). Not all military historians will agree with Dr. Turney's view of the German field marshal's role, but there can be no dispute about the interest which his personality arouses in historians and students of the Second World War both as one of the top German military commanders and as a typical representative of Prussian Junkerdom.

Von Bock was born on December 3, 1880, at Kuestrin, the fortress town on the Oder. He began his military career at 17 and during the First World War served on the staff of a Bavarian division until 1917, when at his own request he was given the command of a battalion.

His career after Hitler's rise to power was rapid. For although he never used the Nazi salute and refused to mitigate his Prussian arrogance even for the sake of making friends with Goering, his desire for military revenge and his belief in Germany's right to conquer and rule other peoples made him an enthusiastic executor of Hitler's racialist policies. In March 1938 he led the German troops into Austria, and during both the Polish campaign in September 1939 and the campaign in the West in 1940 he commanded an army group. Against the advice of the Army High Command, whose opinion of von Bock's talents as an army commander was highly critical, Hitler personally chose him to command the most important army group in his planned war against the Soviet Union.

Von Bock commanded the Army Group Centre until Hitler dismissed him on December 18, 1941, after his final failure at the gates of Moscow. He was recalled to command the Army Group South in January 1942 and under his command the *Wehrmacht* completed the conquest of the Crimea and launched the gigantic offensive towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus. However, dissatisfied with von Bock's cautious appraisal of the fighting potential of the Red Army despite its gigantic losses, Hitler dismissed him again in July 1942. Although sacked without any good reason, and threatened by a Gestapo agent with the direst consequences unless he kept silent about his dismissal, von Bock refused to take part in the plot against Hitler. He also tried to save what could be rescued from the ruins of the

Third Reich by joining Admiral Doenitz's 'government' in Schleswig-Holstein. He was on his way by car to Doenitz's headquarters when he was killed north of Hamburg, probably by RAF fighters.

Von Bock was the embodiment of the German *Drang nach Osten.* When Hitler revealed to him his plans for destroying Russia in a blitzkrieg of a few weeks' duration, he did not share the doubts of most of the other *Wehrmacht* commanders. On the contrary, although in the French campaign he had made himself highly unpopular with other German commanders by his distrust of armoured thrusts unaccompanied by infantry, he now became an enthusiastic advocate of an armoured blitzkrieg across the vastness of Russia. Obsessed by the chance of becoming the captor of Moscow, he accepted without hesitation Hitler's vision of pursuing the Red Army into Siberia should the Soviet regime not collapse after the fall of the capital. On the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union he was approached by an official from the German embassy in Moscow, who begged him to use his influence to stop the war. Von Bock's reaction was to tell him that 'it was Germany's magnanimous destiny to excise the scourge of communism from the world and to bring culture and political freedom to the Russian peoples' (pp. 44–5).

A book about von Bock must therefore be a study of those forces in German history and society that are usually described as Prussian militarism and of how the people representing these forces, despite their aristocratic outlook, managed to collaborate so closely and loyally with Hitler. Dr. Turney, Professor of History at Southwest State College in Weatherford, Oklahoma, has failed to do this. Moreover he attempts to whitewash von Bock's record in a way that makes one doubt his qualifications as a historian. In statistical terms, the greatest crimes against the civilian population and prisoners of war were committed by the Germans in the territories conquered by the Army Group Centre, and even though the worst crimes against the 'Aryan' population were committed after von Bock's departure in December 1941, the extermination of the Jews and of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war was carried out while von Bock was in command. Yet the author asserts that von Bock opposed the genocidal policies and '... had never implemented Hitler's infamous and controversial "political commissars' order" in his army group' (p. 71). Dr. Turney also claims that von Bock tried to protect the 'Aryan' population, but informs us that when asked by an official of Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories to write to Koch, the *Reichskommissar* of the Ukraine, and point out that the terrorist treatment of the Ukrainian peasantry only helped the partisans, the field marshal refused to do so (pp. 176–7).

Furthermore, the author does not appear to be familiar with his subject, the German-Soviet war, for he describes Voronezh as 'a Ukrainian city on the Don River' (p. 130), informs us that Bulgaria sent troops to the Soviet front to fight beside the Germans (p. 171), and quotes as one of the reasons why Guderian's armoured divisions suffered defeat at the gates of Moscow was because 'For the first time in the German-Russian war, the Russians brought out their new tank, the fearsome T-34' (p. 119). Yet it is no military secret that the T-34s were encountered by the Germans from the very first day of the war, because they were already in service, although in small numbers, with the Red Army's armoured brigades.

R. AINSZTEIN

Against Stalin and Hitler: Memoir of the Russian Liberation Movement 1941–45. By Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt. Trans. and with a foreword by David Footman. *London: Macmillan. 1970. 270 pp. Illus. Index. £3·00.*

THERE was a story widely told in Tsarist Russia that when General Yermolov, the conqueror of the Caucasus, was asked by Tsar Nicholas I how he could award him for his services, the general replied: 'Will your Majesty deign to make me a German?' The story expressed the resentment of upper class Russians at the privileged position of Baltic Germans in their empire. The author of the book under review is one of those Baltic Germans. Born in Latvia in 1896, he was educated in Petersburg and served as an officer in the Imperial Russian Army during the First World War. After the revolution he settled in Riga. In 1939 he had to move to Poznan as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and at the outbreak of the German-Soviet war he was called up to serve on von Bock's staff as an adviser on Russian affairs.

The claim that Hitler could have won the war in the East by using Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other inhabitants of the Soviet Union to fight their own compatriots deserves a serious study, especially as it was accepted by many American generals during the cold war. However, Strik-Strikfeldt's book is no more than a personal apology, full of the kind of half-truths, to say no more, that are typical of the books written by men who were involved in making it possible for the Nazis to commit their monstrous crimes. Although a historian may find the book useful as a source story of the Germans' attempts to use hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners-of-war to help them occupy their own homeland and exterminate millions of its inhabitants, it is no more reliable than Juergen Thorwald's *Wen sie verderben wollen*[1] published in 1952, in which the author compared Nazi rule in Russia with British rule in India and Nazi genocidal policies with the British colour bar.

Strik-Strikfeldt's hero is Field Marshal von Bock, to whom he was related as a member of the Baltic branch of the Bock clan. According to him, von Bock was not only 'in the tradition of the best type of Prussian officer' (p. 19), but also opposed the Nazi policies of genocide. Strik-Strikfeldt wants us to believe that von Bock's dismissal from his post of commander of the Army Group Centre was not due to his failure to capture Moscow but to his protests against the massacre of 'many hundreds' of Jews at Borisov.

An examination of this story shows just how reliable Strik-Strikfeldt's book is, even as a personal account of what the author saw and knows. The number of Borisov Jews who were massacred was not 'many hundreds' but 6,500 according to the *Einsatzgruppen* reports presented to Heydrich, which were used as evidence at the Nuremberg Trials. The reason why more Jews were not slaughtered was because von Bock's troops had not captured more when they occupied the town. Why the massacre of the Borisov Jews should have moved von Bock more than the scores of similar massacres carried out by the *Einsatzkommandos* of *Einsatzgruppe B* operating under the protection of his 1,200,000 men is not explained by the author.

Nor is it true, as Strik-Strikfeldt claims (p. 53), that only the SS committed such crimes. A number of cases are known of the SS complaining that the *Wehrmacht* had carried out massacres of Jews on its own initiative

[1] Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag. 1952.

and in a badly organised fashion. Strik-Strikfeldt also assures us that von Bock did his best to save Red Army prisoners from extermination and that the field marshal gave his approval 'after cautious consideration'—an approval which he promptly withdrew—to a memorandum prepared by the author and two other officers, in which they proposed that President Roosevelt should be asked to send food for the prisoners. But for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, we are told by Strik-Strikfeldt, American food might have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Red Army prisoners (pp. 50–1).

Although Strik-Strikfeldt claims that he never believed in the Nazi ideology, the only reasons why he disapproves of Hitler appear to be because Hitler did not know how to make use of Russians to fight Russians and because in 1941 he 'had still the opportunity to refashion Europe on the basis of freedom, justice, and equality' (p. 247). For the same reasons he found Baldur von Schirach, the arch corrupter of German youth and the man who regularly watched the gassings at Mauthausen,[2] an agreeable person because he listened carefully to his own and Vlasov's plans and conveyed them to Hitler (p. 152).

Finally, the author's chief purpose in writing the book seems to be to rehabilitate Vlasov and thus justify his own activities, whose net result was to mislead or terrorise many thousands of Russian prisoners into serving the Germans. That Vlasov's fate was tragic is indisputable, but it was no more so than the fate of the five million Red Army prisoners exterminated by methods that were frequently more hideous than those used to annihilate the Jews. Nor are we convinced by Strik-Strikfeldt's picture of Vlasov as the man of destiny who claimed that he needed only an army of 200,000 Russians to overthrow Stalin and that his collaboration with Hitler was of the same nature as Churchill's and Roosevelt's alliance with Stalin.

R. AINSZTEIN

Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven: Zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Revolution in Norwegen. By Hans-Dietrich Loock. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1970. 588 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, Band 18.)*

THIS massive book is now the most authoritative work on the German decision to invade Norway and the immediate political consequences of the invasion and it replaces Skodvin's earlier study.[1] It is written within the context of recent research on the nature of fascism, and approaches the political events in Norway as the extension of the National Socialist revolution to that country. As the title indicates, the story is spun out of the ideas and actions of the three principal revolutionary fascist contenders for power, a method which has certain advantages. We now have the first good book about Josef Terboven, who emerges as the patient, determined and extremely able man that he was. We also now know far more about Quisling, especially about his intellectual background and ideas. Here the author's

[2] Evelyn le Chêne, *Mauthausen: the history of a death camp* (London: Methuen. 1971), p. 85.

[1] *Striden om okkupasjonsstyret i Norge fram til 25. september 1940.* (Oslo: Norske Samlaget. 1956).

diligent scholarship is not so well rewarded, for Quisling on closer acquaintance is as uninteresting and as unlikeable and as incompetent as he was when still known less intimately to historians. His unpublished intellectual testament seems likely to remain unpublished if even Professor Loock cannot work up much enthusiasm for it.

But there is some contradiction between regarding German policy in Norway as an ideology in action and the kind of events which are described. The book concentrates on the usual historical matter of diplomatic and political negotiation and personal intrigue. The fascist ideology implied the creation of a new society fashioned out of new men. But little of these enormous aspirations can be grasped from the long constitutional wrangles which fill the book. Indeed it ends with Hitler breaking-off the negotiations for creating a *Riksråd* and the proclamation of the State Council and its 'commissioners'. The attempts at a National Socialist revolution in Norway did not end in September 1940 with these political events but continued on a deeper social level throughout the occupation. And even in the earlier period it is not in this political field that the attempt at an ideological revolution can best be seen. It is interesting that so very good and learned a book written with such meticulous care should show, precisely because it is so thorough and learned, the weaknesses of a tradition of historical scholarship which is designed to illuminate liberal Western societies, when it has to deal with a man like Terboven, who literally blew himself up for his ideas, and a party whose ultimate aim was to abolish many of the aspects of political life described here.

Even so, within its own genre this book is excellent. Professor Loock was the first scholar to use and publish material to any extent from the voluminous uncatalogued captured archives of the German administration in Norway. This initial exploration together with his researches in the *Bundesarchiv*, in the German Foreign Office archives and in the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* means that the book makes a real and substantial increase to our historical knowledge. It is very satisfying that for the only period when Norway really did play an important role on the world's stage so serious and important a book should be written about it.

A. S. MILWARD

Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933–1945: Kalkül oder Dogma? By Klaus Hildebrand. *Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, Mainz: W. Kohlhammer. 1971. 186 pp. Bibliog. Index. DM 16.80.*

THIS short book by the young author of the massive study, *Vom Reich zum Weltreich, Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945* [1] has obviously been prompted by a resurgence in Germany of the debate about Hitler's role in German history and foreign policy: between Hans-Adolf Jacobsen who argued for the 'break' thesis in his *Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933–1938* [2] by emphasising what A. J. P. Taylor obviously does not accept, the decisiveness if not uniqueness of Hitler's contribution to foreign policy after 1933; and Andreas Hillgruber's short essay, *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler*,[3] which

[1] Munich: W. Fink. 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 748.
[2] Frankfurt-on-Main: A. Metzner. 1968.
[3] Düsseldorf: Droste. 1969.

argued more for a consideration of Hitler's essential place in the mainstream of German history and politics from the time of Bismarck. Given the meticulousness of his previous study, which covered the whole period of the sorry history of the Nazi Party, it is not surprising that Klaus Hildebrand has felt himself more than qualified to enter the fray on this question, although he has done so with the kind of detailed analysis and survey that many historians would only have considered undertaking towards the latter part of their professional career. The final result is, however, a tribute to his own professionalism on the subject. As it is, the debate over Hitler's role continues with the appearance of Professor Weinberg's study, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*,[4] and Taylor's forthright criticisms of it in a recent review.

In 136 pages of closely written and cogently argued text, backed up by informative footnotes (unfortunately and irritatingly placed at the end of the book), Hildebrand comes to the only reasonable conclusion possible in any discussion of this by now familiar question: that while many of the fundamentals of the Third Reich's foreign policy were steeped in the German tradition from the time of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, and certainly from the fateful year of 1919 and the Treaty of Versailles, there can be no doubt either of the nature of Hitler's contribution to German foreign policy after 1933, particularly in terms of its essential pace, drive, and motivation. Hence the author's conclusion that Hitler's regime and policy was both the completion and extension of the (tragic?) history of the old 'Prussia-Germany' that met its ruin in 1945.

Any discussion of the question of German—or Nazi—guilt for the Second World War (for this is the basic point at issue) must revolve around the answer given to one fundamental question: would there have been a general war in Europe after 1933 if Hitler had not been Chancellor? In other words, would the continuing efforts of the Weimar governments and diplomats to remove the shackles of Versailles and create for Germany a position of respect and strength in Europe necessarily have led to war? Since the answer must be a fairly definite No (one would also be safe in answering No to a similar question about the Jewish issue), the finger of guilt can only point in one general direction. As Hildebrand argues at length, the root cause of the problem is to be found in Hitler's determination to execute the high point of his *Mein Kampf* 'programme', the defeat and conquest of Soviet Russia. The essential prerequisite of this was the achievement of a position of inalienable strength or authority in the rest of Europe, and together the whole exercise was to enable Germany and the 'New Europe' to face up to the United States in the world league.

In taking the ultimate execution of the *Mein Kampf* 'programme' as the essential motivating force of Hitler's foreign policy, Hildebrand has tried to see whether and when these ideas conflicted with what might be called the 'traditional' lines of German foreign policy. Taylor would agree with part of his analysis, that in much of this period German foreign policy was not so much a question of 'Kalkül *oder* Dogma' but more a question of '*und*', if we interpret 'Kalkül' as the traditional power politics pursued by Germany and Hitler (and all other nations for that matter), and 'Dogma' as National Socialist ideology. Indeed, it would have been most surprising if there had not been points of identity between many of Hitler's foreign policy objectives and those pursued by Germany's governments from 1919.

[4] Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1971.

Hence the support which many of the regime's objectives received from the Wilhelmstrasse, the Army, and German big business. Very often, though, any conflict that arose between 'Kalkül' and 'Dogma' was over tactical methods and not the final ends in view.

Yet while there were few totally innocent German souls along the path to Armageddon, it cannot be denied that there was a fundamental difference between what Hitler saw as Germany's ultimate destiny and what was absolutely necessary to attain it, and what others were prepared to achieve and accept for Germany in the context of the 1930s and early 1940s. No one else had the same broad vision as Hitler, nor the intention to carry out such 'final' policies as were attempted against Russia and applied to the Jews of Europe. Unlike Taylor, therefore, Hildebrand accepts that November 5, 1937 was a decisive turning point, not only for the state of Hitler's thinking and preparedness for the future, but also for the nature of the relationship between 'Kalkül' and 'Dogma' in German domestic and foreign policies.

Like the *Mein Kampf* 'programme', Hildebrand makes a great deal of Hitler's *idée fixe*, the (elusive) striving after an *Ausgleich* with England, a subject which still requires an examination in depth within the context of Anglo-German relations 1933–1939. The tragedy, if one can call it that, was that Chamberlain's period of 'appeasement' came after Hitler had passed his point of no return both in his attitude towards England and with regard to the kind of pace that had to be set in German domestic and foreign policy. Yet while Hitler never quite lost a feeling of ambivalence towards England, von Ribbentrop was never to lose his feelings of Anglophobia because of what he thought were the many rejections he had endured at English hands. To this extent 'Dogma' had its own enemies within court circles, while even the German Navy regarded England as a greater potential enemy than was ever Hitler's real conviction. In the final analysis, however, the paradox remains: that the policy of the man who most wanted Anglo-German friendship ensured that there could never be any such relationship. As Hildebrand points out, there was always the pending question—and luckily for Britain it remained unanswered—of the exact limits and obligations involved in such an Anglo-German 'friendship' based on a German supremacy of the continent of Europe.

This is a stimulating and useful book, and the author has covered the familiar ground well. At the same time he has shown all too clearly that, with its racialist and expansionist ethos, the defeat of 1945 was the best thing that could have happened to the state which emerged from the old 'Prussia-Germany'.

JOHN P. FOX

Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West 1925–1929. By Jon Jacobson. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 420 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·25.*

THE purpose of this book is to explore 'the personalities, the politics and the diplomacy of the Locarno era, and offer a historical interpretation and synthesis of it'. In the process, the issues of German disarmament, French security requirements, reparations and war debts, as they affected Germany's relations with the West between 1925 and 1929, are examined in great depth, with the help of unpublished German and British government papers.

The author begins with an analysis of the Locarno agreements, pinpointing the different ways in which they were interpreted by Britain, France

and Germany. As he observes, 'Stresemann looked forward to the restoration of Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Upper Silesia to the Reich, perhaps by peaceful means, but by force if one day circumstances should permit. But his first concerns were to come to a political understanding with France and to free the Rhineland from foreign control' (p. 155). However, for Briand Locarno 'was not the first step towards the revision of Versailles, but the first step on the road to compliance' (p. 150). As Mr. Jacobson points out, Franco-German differences could not be resolved without the mediation of an influential outside power, but neither Britain nor the United States of America was prepared to assume such a role on a permanent basis. To Chamberlain, Locarno did not mark a new era of British mediation between France and Germany but rather indicated the limit and extremity of British involvement in European affairs and underlined Britain's 'semi-detached position' in relation to Europe. The United States government was concerned only that France, Britain and the other wartime allies were in a position to repay their war debts.

Thus there was no serious prospect that the Locarno era could fulfil the hopes and expectations of Franco-German rapprochement and European stability, which the conclusion of the Locarno agreements had aroused. Instead it was an era marked by 'grudging concessions and agreements' over such issues as whether German disarmament conformed to the Versailles limits, when the Allied troops should evacuate the Rhineland, and to what extent that evacuation should be linked to the conclusion of a new reparations settlement to replace the Dawes scheme. Negotiations were hampered, as Mr. Jacobson shows, not only by divergent French and German political objectives but also by political instability in the two countries. Both Briand and Stresemann had to try to reach agreement on a whole range of issues without incurring popular hostility by appearing to pay too high a national price, which would weaken them electorally, and in the face of strong and persistent criticism by well-entrenched and influential right-wing factions.

Mr. Jacobson makes good use of the extensive German source material he has consulted to document with great thoroughness the policies of Stresemann, Briand and Chamberlain towards the Locarno agreements and the issues arising out of them. In the absence of definitive biographies of these three statesmen, the detailed material contained in the book will be of great interest to modern international historians and political scientists. In addition, the views of French, German and British foreign office advisers, ambassadors, military experts, cabinet ministers and opposition spokesmen are carefully outlined. The resulting study, though sometimes turgid and occasionally repetitive, is a massive and scholarly survey of Germany's relations with the West between 1925 and 1929 which will be of enormous value to students and teachers of the interwar period.

RUTH HENIG

The Hollow Legions: Mussolini's Blunder in Greece, 1940–1941. By Mario Cervi. Trans. by Eric Mosbacher. *London: Chatto & Windus. 1972. 336 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

The Italian edition of this book was published in 1965 with the title *Storia della Guerra di Grecia* (Milan: Sugar Editore). In his review in *International Affairs*, July 1966, p. 484, C. M. Woodhouse described it as 'a most perceptive and honest account of a melancholy and inglorious episode.'

INTERNATIONAL

The Reform of Power: A Proposal for an International Security System. By Leonard Beaton. Foreword by Lester B. Pearson. *London: Chatto & Windus. 1972. 240 pp. Index. £2·50*

LEONARD BEATON'S last book represents a synthesis of three of his main concerns over more than a decade of politico-strategic writing: Nuclear Proliferation, the Western Alliance and Arms Control. It is 'a study of power and how it might be organised', the purpose of which 'is not to say when the kind of conscious international security system it advocates might come into existence [but] how certain elements of it could be constructed, if fear of unlimited war and of the spread of weapons of mass destruction should combine to persuade a decisive group of countries that they must find a safer way to organise affairs' (p. 20). The approach, described as 'conservative and gradualist', is however by no means conventional, challenging as it does the orthodoxy of the détente/disarmament (as also of the universalist) school. Nor does it lack urgency, for Beaton is not disposed to 'wait for some better day before facing the problems of power. There is no reason to think that the international climate is certain to become better; and some grounds for believing that it is as good now as it can ever be expected to be' (p. 22).

After a chapter on the 'Need for Reform', he proceeds to examine current proposals to that end, notably those for General and Complete Disarmament, which he subjects to stringent analysis, concluding that the very concept of GCD is fallacious; and that the lip-service still officially paid to it is not just a harmless exercise in self-deception (or cynicism) but a hindrance to genuine reform of international security. While the claim that addiction to GCD has in practice blocked positive measures of arms control perhaps needs substantiating, these pages in which the first half of the book culminates are among the best things in it, and deserve serious attention, not least by governments.

The second part contains Beaton's own prescription for a better ordering of the international power system, which he advances in three stages. First, what he calls 'cognisance', that is 'knowledge and understanding of the armed forces of the world, and the security policies these have been designed to serve. . . . If governments could agree that their armed forces were a proper subject for international study and comment, both the professional and the political arms of an international institution could be developed with this as a central objective . . .' (p. 159). So understood, 'cognisance is a broad starting point which involves governments in a genuine commitment and yet poses no threat to their security. It gives the world order a chance to become self-conscious, and allows international servants to show governments that they can be trusted' (p. 175). (Incidentally, one of his institutional innovations would turn the Geneva Disarmament Committee into the Defence Committee of the United Nations.) There follows a chapter devoted to weaponry, with prime emphasis on nuclear developments, where the argumentation is none the less valid for being by now largely familiar. This leads to his central proposal for a system whereby 'states can subject part or all of their military forces to common organisation, while retaining ultimate ownership and control of these forces. . . . To the extent that national governments could see that their security objectives were being achieved by the collective body, they would commit their forces to it; to the extent that they felt they must use their forces for purposes inconsistent

with international security, they would retain them under purely national control' (p. 202). Admitting that the idea 'may sound theoretical and unrealistic', Beaton invokes the example of what has been developed and refined over the past 20 years in Nato, where certain national forces have been assigned for joint planning and common tasks. He also cites Article 43 of the United Nations Charter as evincing a similar concept.

Yet both these analogies would, for different reasons, seem inapplicable to the kind of thing Beaton envisages. It is in fact difficult to grasp what would be the rationale, or the practical functioning, of an international force that was not organised, actually or potentially, against a perceived adversary—which indeed, on the contrary, itself comprised members of opposing alliances—and from which was expressly withheld any role of enforcement, this being due to revert to individual states. Moreover, apart from lack of military credibility, the political presuppositions are surely open to doubt. In particular, Beaton does not appear to draw a necessary distinction between political and military security—it is thanks to a sense of *political* security that his own country can maintain its unarmed frontier with a neighbouring military super-power, whereas the absence of such confidence in Western Europe has entailed substantial measures of military defence. By the same token, he could also be felt to underrate the depth and importance of political antagonism in the world, coupled as it is with the abiding possibility of at least some states having—or being thought to have—expansive aims.

A similar tendency may account for some rather exaggerated emphasis, in his final chapter, on the dangers of discriminatory super-power consensus, *e.g.* where he speaks of 'the growing conviction in Washington and Moscow that they can solve the world's problems together' and 'the widely held Soviet-American illusion that they are the only powers that count'; and warns them that 'it is possible for Washington and Moscow to imagine that they rule the world only so long as they act with the realism of the Holy Roman Emperors' (p. 233). Do we really believe them to entertain such notions?

But this is a stimulating work, which cannot be done full justice in a short review. As always, Beaton's writing is at once trenchant and felicitous, matching the combined originality and good sense of his thought. Above all, one must regret not being able to look forward to having his amplification of the ideas expounded here, and his rejoinder to some of the criticisms that they at first sight suggest.

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

The Contemporary World: A Historical Introduction. By John Major. *London, Toronto, Sydney, Wellington: Methuen Educational. 1970. 241 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £1·30; hardback: £1·75.*

THE purpose of this book is to provide a historical account of the changes which have been brought about by two revolutions. The first is described as having 'given mankind the possibility of controlling its physical environment'; the second, as having 'declared that all members of a community, and not just a few, have a stake in its future'. Both began to emerge as powerful forces in Europe towards the end of the 18th century and their effects are now felt throughout the world. The book itself concentrates on

the period since the start of this century. An opening chapter traces the development of 'mass society', the phenomenon in which the two revolutions find both their greatest opportunity and their clearest expression. Subsequent chapters deal by topic with forces of disturbance and control which have, through their interaction, produced the characteristic features of the modern age: democracy; totalitarianism; the balance of power; the death of empires and the emerging self-consciousness of a third world; racialism; and internationalism. The strength of the idea of the nation as a framework and a tool for managing affairs is a continuing theme in the book, as is the inadequacy of the attempts which have been made to control the forces which have had the most deleterious effects on human life.

The value of a book such as this to students of history is self-evident. Its particular virtue is that it will counteract any tendency to focus only on the narrowly political or to be blinkered by their own culture. Furthermore, for many students a historical introduction to the contemporary world will be an inevitable preliminary to work in the modern social sciences and this is a book which will serve their need well. Its scope is broad. Within the limits imposed by length and the need to sketch the general outline of an enormous subject, the author draws out the complexities of the problems which he describes. He focuses on Europe as the source of disruptions which have revolutionised the world, but is not excessively Eurocentric. The treatment is not marked by an artificial demarcation between the realms of the political and the economic, or between the international and the domestic. It puts no obstacles in the way of further study through a wide range of disciplines and in a variety of special fields of interest (it is a pity that the range and variety are not reflected more fully in the suggestions for further reading). The author also shows an awareness of which issues are likely to be of interest to contemporary students (contemporary, that is, with 1969), but treats them in a way which shows few concessions to fashionable opinion.

Apart from their inevitability, historical introductions have practical advantages. While the modern social scientist is left fumbling with his methodology, the historian decides what he wants to write about and marshals his facts accordingly. He can deliver a clear description of the world as he sees it. What the historian cannot do is to point the way towards the solution of the problems he describes. He may—or may not—sense that internationalism, or the accurate phrasing of relevant questions, or whatever, would be the best way to proceed. But he cannot, as a historian, do anything to help. For that we need the social scientists; it is a pity that they are prevented by their methodological problems from writing introductions to the study of the contemporary world as a whole which could equal the historians' work in clarity and scope.

C. M. Mason

The Analysis of International Politics. Essays in honor of Harold and Margaret Sprout. Ed. by James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice A. East. *New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1972. 397 pp. Index. £3·75.*

This is a collection of essays in honour of Harold and Margaret Sprout, with contributions from several generations of American academics who have studied under them, taught with them, or benefited from their work.

The authors include many of the most stimulating writers in the field of international relations at present working in the United States: Morton A. Kaplan, Charles A. McClelland, J. David Singer, Klaus Knorr, Bruce Russett and Oran Young among them. A glance at the table of contents suggests a provocative and stimulating book; the contents however are often disappointing.

With 18 contributions gathered into less than 400 pages, the majority of the essays are short. Only four contain more than twenty pages of text; the two shortest stretch only to eight pages. They are grouped into three sections: 'theoretical problems', 'conceptual foci', and 'empirical concerns'. With the exception of McClelland's opening review of theoretical developments within the discipline since the first flood of what he calls 'the third wave' in the mid–1950s, and Charles F. Hermann's discussion of alternative theoretical classifications of foreign policies, the essays in both the first and the second sections are generally brief, and have little to offer which their authors have not said elsewhere before. It would be easy to parody some of them by selecting particular tangled sentences and incomprehensible phrases. The level of abstraction is at times very high, venturing, with reference to Carl Hempel, Ludwig Wittgenstein and A. J. Ayer, into what Singer calls 'the epistemological quagmire'—though he is himself discussing 'the notion that we can evaluate and compare bits of knowledge in terms of their epistemological profile' (p. 85).

The authors share a number of common assumptions, and footnote each other as fellow participants in a continuing theoretical debate. As leading members of 'the fourth wave', in which a concern for testing limited ranges of concepts against bodies of hard data is said to have replaced the large conceptual schemes of the early 1960s, they also share a common problem in the unavailability of data. Hermann's declaration that 'we want cross-national foreign policy data which are publicly accessible for all nations' (p. 72) suggests the enormity of this problem. One hesitates to accept as valid for the entire discipline the statement from Robert Gilpin that 'modern students of international relations tend to take theoretical physics as their model' (p. 167), or that of David Singer that 'our major goal' is 'a mathematical theory which is also machine readable' (p. 94n). More to the point, perhaps, is Singer's conclusion that after the theoretical formulations of the last fifteen years theorists should now 'begin' to pay 'as much attention to evidence as to speculation in the construction of taxonomies, models, and theories' (p. 93).

The third section is far less abstract. The longest, and to this reviewer the most useful, contribution here is from Dina Zinnes, carefully reviewing the relevance of American quantitative research, both that based on aggregate data and on the content analysis studies, to the Sprouts' theoretical writings on the relationship between decision makers and their environment. Chadwick Alger contributes a detailed paper analysing patterns of interaction between delegations in the Budgetary Committee of the UN General Assembly during the 1963 Special Session. Two rather traditional and factual essays by Burton Sapin and Vincent Davis examine aspects of the American foreign policy making machine. Sapin's sobering conclusion is that 'a lopsided allocation of research resources' has left only a 'slender empirical basis' for judgments on the effectiveness of the Washington machinery: 'the intellectual apparatus that we now bring to the study of American foreign policy is woefully inadequate' (p. 341).

Like all collections of essays, then, this is a mixed bag. For this reader, only a minority of the contributions were novel or stimulating. One's frustration was increased by awareness that the authors have written far better essays elsewhere. The Sprouts deserved more than this.

WILLIAM J. L. WALLACE

The International Trade in Arms. By John Stanley and Maurice Pearton. *London: Chatto & Windus for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1972. 244 pp. Index. £2·25. Paperback: £0·80.*

THIS study traces the development of the international trade in arms from the days of the post-Second World War surplus disposals to the comprehensively organised industry that it is today. Zaharoff and Undershaft crop up, as indeed they should, but only by way of introduction and in order to point up the changes that have come about as individual and corporate efforts have been overtaken by government licensing and control. The principal theme of the study is to identify 'the pressures which make for the arms trade and the controls which have gradually and imperfectly been developed to regulate it' (p. 8). The book is therefore quite different in scope and purpose from other studies like, for example, the SIPRI Yearbooks or accounts of the 'military-industrial complex', to which ostensibly it might seem allied. The authors focus on three principal issues: the extent to which governments have developed a comprehensive system for exercising control over arms exports; whether government involvement in promoting arms exports is likely to become a standard area of government activity; and whether, now that governments have the means to control their own arms exports, they can also control the flow of arms to a particular state or region collectively. The emphasis is therefore on the problems and the options with which the principal arms-producing countries are faced; the problems of the customers are not considered to the same extent except insofar as they may have a degree of choice, in some cases, between importation and manufacture.

The first major section of the study deals with restraints and controls, the second with mechanisms (like the defence sales organisations) and with industrial and economic considerations. The chapter on economic pressures in particular is an excellent and interesting account of the various economic aspects of national policy that constrain policy makers either in allowing or in sponsoring arms sales. The book ends with four brief case studies about efforts that have been made to restrain the international trade in arms by embargo or collective agreement: the Portuguese African colonies, South Africa and Rhodesia, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Latin America.

As the authors themselves point out, the material that is available is not complete: 'to obtain reliable information in an area of such political delicacy and commercial competitiveness is not easy' (p. ix), and Soviet sources are especially hard to come by. Nevertheless, they have been able to obtain a great deal of factual and circumstantial material, which is woven together with great skill; it provides an illuminating and well-presented account of an activity which all too seldom attracts such careful analysis.

PETER NAILOR

The Superpowers: The United States and the Soviet Union Compared. By W. H. Parker. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 347 pp. Maps. Index. £7·00.*

ALTHOUGH the United States and the Soviet Union have been fully qualified super-powers for about twenty years, there has been little comparative writing about them. Americans and Russians are usually reluctant to admit that there is any basis for comparison, while analysts from other countries have argued that the task is too great to be tackled in any meaningful way. Surprisingly, the Oxford geographer W. H. Parker is the first scholar to attempt to compare in a comprehensive manner the contemporary situation of the two super-powers. Concentrating on the economic and political aspects of his subject after some introductory chapters in which his own specialist expertise is to the fore, the author says little about education and almost nothing about ideology and the arts. Nevertheless, the book should be required reading for all students of international relations, for in a clear, matter-of-fact manner Parker succeeds in drawing a balanced picture of the circumstances which condition the behaviour of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the picture is all the clearer for being comparative, since all important human enquiry may be said to proceed through comparison, and only distortion can result in its absence.

The great virtue of the book, therefore, is that it compels the reader to think about the similarities and difficulties between the pressures operating upon Nixon and Brezhnev and likely to operate upon their successors. For example, after assimilating Parker's elucidation of the Köppen system of climatology among other geographical phenomena, nobody could doubt that there is more to the relative performance of American and Soviet agriculture than individual versus collective enterprise. The author puts to good use the impressions that he has gained from wide travel in both societies, his description of the persistence of the Central Asian *yurt* after the disappearance of the North American wigwam being one of the more unexpected points that he makes. In the future, the United States and the Soviet Union may be joined as super-powers by China, which the book discusses, or by some other aspirant such as the economically if not strategically credible Japan, which the book does not discuss. Meanwhile, the best pair of super-powers that we have must coexist as best they can, a task to which this book could make a positive if modest contribution.

PAUL DUKES

The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. By Georges Fischer. Translated by David Willey. *London: Europa Publications. 1971. 270 pp. Index. £4·00. $11.95.*

A translation of a book first published in French in 1969. The review in *International Affairs*, October 1969, p. 706, described the book as '. . . a most impressive history of the struggle to contain the spread of nuclear weapons from the signing of the partial test ban in August 1963 to the opening for signature of the Soviet-American sponsored Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1968. The work is a model of scholarship and impartiality, with most assertions supported by references to documentary sources.'

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Comparative Legislative Systems: A Reader in Theory and Research. Ed. by Herbert Hirsch and M. Donald Hancock. *New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1971. 470 pp. Index. £4·50.*

THE comparative study of legislative systems is possibly the most classic means of analysis lawyers and political scientists employ when studying political systems. This reader contains the most current and contemporary theories in this field, especially those developed in the United States; the editors explain in their introduction that the theoretical approach is behaviourist and comparative. As the behaviourist approach has mostly been developed in the United States, the papers are mainly from there and from the Continent. But the editors have difficulty in working out the comparative method: they fail to classify legislative systems and compare what is perhaps incomparable (for example, the systems of West Germany, the United States, the Philippines and Mexico among others).

The introductory papers discuss the supports of legislative systems, i.e. the political basis on which they exist. The role of pressure groups in the legislative process, electoral campaigns and elections are dealt with (for example in the United States and Mexico). Then B. M. Russett examines the United States Senate and the House of Commons and their attitudes towards international problems. It is only in the second section that papers treating the structures, processes and relations of legislatures can be found. The structure of Congress and of the Colombian congress are outlined and the committees and their roles in legislation in the United States, Canada and Chile are compared.

Legislative decision making forms the third section of the reader: parties and constituencies in the United States and West Germany are sketched out and the role of the opposition in France and the United States is defined. Suggestions for future research conclude the book, which will be found useful by university students, although its comparisons will have to be improved before it satisfies university teachers.

J. F. N. BRADLEY

Comparison of Economic Systems: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches. Ed. by Alexander Eckstein. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1971. 366 pp. Index. $15.75. £6·20.*

PROFESSOR ECKSTEIN should be congratulated for editing this remarkably interesting and useful book. Its aim is to provide an analytical framework for the comparative study of economic systems. To that end, it explores alternative methodological approaches in their analyses and probes some of the theoretical issues in the field of 'comparative economic systems'. In the editor's words: 'The approach to the study of national economies as mixed systems with the distinguishing characteristics blurred rather than clear cut, requires a broader and rather different framework of analysis than might be called for in a more "ismistic" study of economic systems. This is the task we set . . . in this book' (p. 5).

Thus, in a sense, the attempt marks the end of the distorting influence of the cold war on the academic analysis of varying economic models around

us. It more than questions the validity of the identification of specific national economies with particular system models or 'isms'.

The aim, then, is to define new criteria and indicators so as to be able to compare economic system behaviour and performance, with ideology relegated to no more than being just one among several components. So, the approach is predominantly operational and much less political or ideological. It focuses rather on the comparative study of traits, problems and institutions which cut *across* systems.

The individual papers are grouped into four parts. The first is preoccupied with the analytical framework and attempts to define 'axes of comparison'. Professors Koopmans and Montias—the principal contributors to this part—identify them as: (a) kinds of economic freedoms; (b) property relations; (c) nature of incentives; (d) the character of the resource-allocating and co-ordinating mechanism; and (f) as the mechanism and processes of decision-making. The dethroning of property relations as a central characteristic of system identification, is in itself a major break-away from the 'ismistic' approaches of the past and permits a less political and more economic, that is, a far more realistic confrontation with reality.

It is against such a background that in the remaining three parts of the book the main themes are examined by a team of brilliant specialists ranging from Herbert S. Levine to Alexander Gerschenkron and from Simon Kuznets to Morris Bornstein. First, the comparative analysis of systems of economic organisation and their effect on economic behaviour and performance. Then, more specifically, three phases in the comparative study of economic systems follow: analysis of the ideological and technological environment in which the economies in question are embedded; the investigation of the specific traits of different economies; and an appraisal of performance and results, evaluated in terms of some of the criteria laid down at the beginning of the volume.

If, as Professor Bornstein concludes, comparative economic studies are useful '. . . by providing the perspective to overcome the parochialism inherent in economic thinking . . . based on the experience of a single economic system' (p. 355), this is a thoroughly constructive contribution. The disagreements between the contributors are highly stimulating. The book as a whole is original, highly readable and, so one hopes, the first in a series to fill in the gaps along the road traced by the present volume.

TIBOR MENDE

The Destiny of Gold. By Paul Einzig. *London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1972. 128 pp. Index. £3·50.*

The Destiny of the Dollar. By Paul Einzig. *London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1972. 196 pp. Index. £2·95.*

International Interest Rate War. By Eric Chalmers. *London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1972. 260 pp. Index. £4·95.*

I CAN highly recommend these books to all those with a taste like mine for the unorthodox and the heretical in economic literature, those who are still not entirely convinced that mainstream professional economists have all the answers to inflation, to the international adjustment process and the management of international liquidity—if only the bone-headed politicians would listen to them. You may not altogether agree with Dr. Einzig or

Mr. Chalmers but they should make you stop and think. Both are first-rate technical experts, at home with every recondite detail of international finance. Both see themselves as economic puritans in an economically permissive society, Savanorolas perhaps, preaching against official self-indulgence in economic policies at home and abroad.

Dr. Einzig's two books are complementary but not repetitious; completed within four months after the Smithsonian agreement. The case they argue is broadly the same though they treat the two obverse sides of the subject. Briefly, the argument is that the United States, for its own sake as well as ours, must return to the old republican virtues, abandon dollar imperialism and practise restraint in growth, 'reducing pollution at home instead of increasing it abroad', thus restoring the prestige and strength of the dollar. This goal, Dr. Einzig believes, requires a major devaluation (or conversely a major increase in the valuation of gold reserves), a return to normally fixed exchange rates and an end to the persistent American payments deficit. The latter could be achieved primarily by deliberate large-scale disinvestment by American companies in their foreign subsidiaries. Europe, for its part, must take over some of the burdens of its own defence. In both books Dr. Einzig is sceptical about the capacity of the SDR ('Speedier Doom Results'?) to solve our problems. 'To rely exclusively on SDRs for meeting all requirements of the international monetary system would be like relying exclusively on the UN for our national security' (*The Destiny of the Dollar*, p. 184). The other fashionable panacea of floating rates, he argues from close observation of the behaviour of the market, to be inherently unclean and to boil down in the end to no more than easily adjustable fixed rates.

The 'wars' which Mr. Chalmers' book deals with are not deliberate, aggressive wars of conquest so much as collision wars between states set on policy courses ultimately bound to conflict with one another. He identifies two wars in recent years. The first was set off by the British resort early in the 1960s to high interest rates as a means of attracting short-term funds to London, and ended (or was suspended) with the Chequers meeting of January 1967. A short-lived truce in that spring soon gave way to the second war, begun this time by the Americans and leading to much more severe acceleration in the upward trend of interest rates and in world-wide inflation. The villains, in this version of the story, were Britain and America, both of whom tried to pursue growth, full employment *and* costly and incompatible foreign policies. Both governments were offered 'by their economic advisers a series of attempted easy-way-out solutions rather than effective cures' (p. 230). Conversely, Mr. Chalmers is at pains to exonerate Germany, sometimes blamed by the Anglo-Saxons for unhelpfulness and for over-rigid policies rooted in an exaggerated inflation-phobia. But on the factual evidence Mr. Chalmers thinks Germany was more sinned against than sinning. He agrees with Dr. Einzig that there is no easy answer to be found in the 'vogue solution' of flexible exchange rates nor in totally abandoning the 'barbarous relic' in favour of SDRs; only in a return to strong economic management and resolute rejection of these and other permissive solutions in favour of a hard and co-ordinated struggle against inflation, 'with certain countries'—no prizes for guessing which—'having to fight harder than others to combat it'.

SUSAN STRANGE

British Monetary Policy 1924–1931: The Norman Conquest of $4.86. By D. E. Moggridge. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1972. 301 pp. Bibliog. Index. (University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics Monograph 21.) £6·80.*

THE exaggerated secretiveness of the British Treasury and the Bank of England in matters of monetary history is becoming something of a bad international joke. It seems quite extraordinary—and justifiable on no conceivable interpretation of the national interest—that Dr. Moggridge in writing this book should have been denied access to the relevant Bank and Treasury records. Other central banks do not behave so old-maidishly towards scholars; even the Foreign and Commonwealth Office these days—with better excuses—is not so reticent. Such undue deference to departmental amour-propre underrates the intelligence of scholars such as Dr. Moggridge (not to mention his readers), impairs the otherwise high reputation of our monetary authorities abroad; and gravely belittles the importance of the underlying issues involved. It is high time for a radical change to an ' open door ' policy in this country.

Dr. Moggridge's book expands and extends an earlier study of Britain's return to gold in 1925, considering not only the reasons for it but also the consequences for monetary policy making that followed from it in the period to 1931. It is a fascinating and a sobering story told in considerable detail and constantly explaining the interaction between domestic policy making and developments in the international economy. Dr. Moggridge's main conclusion is that the return to gold at an overvalued parity for sterling fatally narrowed the choice of policy options at a critical time, leading (because of the ineffectiveness of bank rate as a policy instrument) to some innovative but essentially palliative devices. His gravest criticism against the step was not so much that it was a gamble but that it was a gamble made in ' blissful and aggressive ignorance '. ' The root of the policy problem ', he says, ' lay in a lack of knowledge '.

If only, he argues, Montagu Norman had not been so wilfully scornful of statistics, if he had been more fully aware of the economic contours of the problems, the people of this country might have been spared much hardship and bitter disillusionment. Yet, recalling the blinkered mistakes of more recent years (and looking at the American as well as the British record in the 1960s), it is difficult to be so sure that salvation lies in better statistics. As Dr. Moggridge himself points out at the beginning, when he explains that the argument in 1925 revolved more around the timing of the return than around the step itself, the principal limitation on policy makers is not ignorance but mental myopia—and in particular the perennial inability of governing elites first to imagine and then to plan for a future radically different from the familiar past.

SUSAN STRANGE

The Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism: Corporate Structure, Inflation, Credit, Gold, and the Dollar. By Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1972. 237 pp. $8.95. £3·70.*

THIS book contains a collection of essays published between 1965 and 1971. The first part contains essays dealing with such topics as monopoly and stagnation while the second is concerned with financial problems, including the balance of payments. The approach is Marxist. The economist will readily

see that although interesting facts may be brought to light the essays rarely present adequate data for drawing firm conclusions. The general reader will not so readily see the omissions and could be deceived into believing that the performance of the United States economy is worse than it really is. There must be gaps in any treatment of a subject that is intended for a non-specialist readership, but here it seems possible that there is also a reluctance on the part of the authors to face certain facets of the situation that do not fit their picture of the capitalist system and its inherent flaws. This is apparent in the first essay, in which it is claimed that the United States has not been able to achieve 'reasonably full employment in any year since 1953 [and] but for the military effort might have from 20 to 24 million unemployed'. Despite their disclaimer that they are not writing about what 'might have been', there is a clear implication that the economy is heavily dependent upon the defence programme, both directly and indirectly through the multiplier effect. A drastic cut in defence spending, however, would create a totally different situation, with lower levels of taxation and vastly different opportunities for the Government to stimulate other activities. There is still the problem of something like an 8 per cent. level of unemployment, but even this does not necessarily reflect a failure of the system to generate demand but may largely reflect difficulty in employing workers whose particular skills are no longer needed or who live in regions depressed by technological change. It may still be a very real problem but quite different from that suggested by the authors.

The essay on 'The Resurgence of Financial Control' is an interesting example of wrangling within the socialist camp. It is a hard-hitting reply to an article by Fitch and Oppenheimer in *Socialist Revolution* and seeks to refute their contention that the giant American corporations are controlled by the banks and financial institutions. While the authors may not be entirely unprejudiced in their attempts to expose weaknesses in the capitalist system, they are at least not so naive as to see the scheming financier as the root of all evil.

The second group of essays shows clearly some of the difficulties created by the persistent American balance of payments deficit. Many economists are aware of the unreasonableness of expecting other countries to accumulate ever increasing claims to dollars. So long as the balance of payments deficits could be attributed to the scale of American overseas investment and government spending, it was possible to pretend that all was well fundamentally. Since the last of these essays was written, however, we have seen the trade balance go into the red.

To conclude, this is a stimulating collection of essays. One may not always agree with the analysis but problems are revealed which do require study.

J. M. JACKSON

American Aid for Development. By Paul G. Clark. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1972. 231 pp. Index. $8.50. £3·50.*

PAUL G. CLARK served as Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy of the US Agency for International Development (AID) at the end of the Johnson and the beginning of the Nixon Administrations. This book, written for the Council on Foreign Relations on the completion of his AID assign-

ment, is in no sense an apologia for American aid policy. Its purpose is to examine the principal issues which 'are most relevant to designing rationally and then implementing a fresh start in US aid programs' (p. 3). In pursuit of this objective Mr. Clark goes on to describe the development problems of the 1970s, examine the reasons why America should be involved, analyse the needs of low income countries, compare multilateral and bilateral aid and finally draw up guidelines for a new American development assistance programme.

The United States is the world's largest source of aid, and most of this is double-tied, both to project and procurement. Since 1963 American official aid has declined each year as a proportion of GNP and at 0·31 per cent is now well below half the Pearson target of 0·77 per cent of GNP. Mr. Clark sees the main reason for this reduction as the 'decline in support within the American political system for cooperation with developing countries' (p. 5). The reasons for this crisis in aid policy are concern at the worsening United States balance of payments, the high cost of the Vietnam war and a growing recognition of the fact that foreign aid does not make friends. The cuts made by Congress in the President's aid appropriations have reflected this critical disaffection with aid. A variety of institutions have put forward proposals to restore the United States to its old position as pacesetter in development assistance, including the proposal by Robert Asher in a Brookings Institution report 'that the United States should shift by 1975 to a predominantly multilateral system' (p. 10). President Nixon's proposals, based on the report of the Presidential Task Force on International Development (the Peterson Task Force), went some way to meet these suggestions. In effect they involve the separation of development assistance from military aid in the basic legislation, the gradual increase of contributions to multilateral agencies, notably IDA and the Inter-American Development Bank, and the separation of development loans from technical assistance. Whether they will have a better chance of success in the new Congress remains to be seen.

While finding Mr. Nixon's proposals 'constructive and well adapted to the decade ahead' (p. 168), Mr. Clark suggests that they fail by not presenting a practical approach to expanding American development assistance. His own proposals, summarised below, are relevant whatever the outcome of Congressional deliberations during the new Administration. His first proposal is that the United States should provide development assistance both through a major national aid programme and through substantial contributions to international agencies. 'A mixed system,' in his view, 'is very much preferable to either channel by itself' (p. 170). According to the experience of AID, a major national programme is needed to achieve an adequate total flow of resources and 'enable the United States to exercise constructive initiatives within the system' (p. 212). Mr. Clark's second proposal is that development assistance should be separate from 'security assistance', which 'includes both military assistance and economic assistance designed mainly to support military forces of allies' (p. 171). Political reactions to the Vietnam war, urging a cutting back in activities related to defence, certainly support this proposal.

On aid administration Mr. Clark proposes a new Corporation 'explicitly designed for expanding total US flows of development assistance' (p. 212). This would have a four year authorisation of funds covering the full presidential term. It would mobilise funds in four ways: through a schedule of

rising annual appropriations; by receiving the 'principal and interest re-flows of all previous government-to-government loans' (p. 181); through authority to borrow in the American capital market; and authority to guarantee foreign government securities. These arrangements would give continuity and authority to the Corporation and enable it to mobilise funds in ways complementary to each other. Technical and capital assistance would be integrated in the Corporation so that they could reinforce each other in the individual country programmes. A small separate institute or a research-oriented division of the Corporation would concentrate on research projects designed to encourage innovation. The Corporation would have authority to vary loan terms for countries with severe debt-service problems. It would reduce overseas personnel but maintain field missions by relying on technical assistance contractors. Operating strategy would be based on country programmes designed to encourage long-term constructive development policies.

These proposals certainly strengthen the official aid programme, particularly by providing more flexible and assured fund arrangements for the new Corporation. The crux of the American aid crisis is the need to end the association of aid for development assistance with defence spending. This will not be achieved by renaming the institutions. Mr. Clark does not comment on the upset in the international monetary and trading system following President Nixon's policy initiative of August 15, 1971, which introduced a new environment for the aid discussion. However, as a basis for the assessment of the development policies of the new Administration, the restatement of principles enlivened by practical experience in Mr. Clark's book is timely and helpful.

RICHARD BAILEY

The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GATT? By John W. Evans. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1971. 383 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·75.*

'MAN is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.' With equal justification we might say 'Trade is optimal when it is free, yet everywhere there is protection'. Occasionally, there are spurts towards freer trade. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorised the greatest trade liberalisation effort in history, the Kennedy Round, but in 1967, when these negotiations came to an end, the strong sentiment of protectionism reasserted itself.

Mr. Evans, who has top practical experience as a participant in these negotiations, begins this authoritative and comprehensive book by tracing the legal and economic development of the main issues, focusing on their relevance to the internationally accepted rules of commercial policy incorporated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt). He next examines the political and economic climate that led to the extraordinary delegation of authority contained in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It is the story of the American response to the European Economic Community. The next part is devoted to a discussion of the negotiating rules for the formal negotiations. Then comes a discussion of the negotiations on industrial tariffs, agriculture, non-tariff barriers and trade with less developed countries. The final part appraises the results of the Kennedy Round and assesses prospects for the future. It is these gloomy prospects that explain the subtitle.

The basic contradiction of Gatt is that the principle of reciprocity is a

built-in obstacle to the achievement of its objective: the bargaining power to obtain tariff concessions from others is increased by keeping one's own tariffs high. Making concessions to others weakens the opportunity of obtaining them from others. It therefore establishes a good reason against unilateral tariff reductions, even though these are beneficial to the reducing country. 'An international agreement to achieve the goal of total free trade within a fixed timetable would remove the most powerful incentive for demanding reciprocity—the need to preserve bargaining power' (p. 315).

But the wave of the future is not rolling in this direction. Mr. Evans shows how the three pillars of Gatt—non-discrimination, prohibition of quantitative restrictions and generality—are being undermined, even while the Kennedy Round was still in progress and with greater force since. There has been a proliferation of common markets, free trade areas, economic co-operation agreements and similar preferential arrangements. Whatever their merits, they violate the principle of non-discrimination. Generalised preferences for less developed countries have removed a further chunk of world trade from the most favoured nation principle. Quantitative restrictions or their equivalent, 'voluntary agreements', or ways of frustrating the intention of their prohibition, are also mushrooming: attempts have been made to extend them from cotton textiles to synthetic and wool textiles, to oil, shoes and to tinned mushrooms. With the enlarged Community, the EEC's variable import levies will remove the British agricultural market from the type of price competition contemplated by Gatt. Mr. Evans believes that the fragmentation of the world into trade blocs, the danger of trade wars and the rise of neo-mercantilism are deplorable retreats from the multilateralism laid down by the drafters of Gatt in 1947. He concludes with a pessimistic note. 'Two conclusions do seem safe. . . . Of the actors on the stage of world trade in the 1970s, only two—the United States and the EEC—come close to having the economic power required to lead the world toward the revival of a genuine multilateral trading system. Of these, the EEC . . . is unlikely to have the necessary incentive for a long time to come, and the United States is certain to have neither the will nor the power until it has conquered the causes of inflation and domestic strife' (p. 327).

PAUL STREETEN.

The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries. By Bela Balassa et al. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank. 1971. 375 pp. Index. $12.00.*

IN the last few years discussions of trade policy have revolved around the concept of 'effective protection'. This focuses not upon the direct tariff on a particular commodity but upon the protection accorded to the actual manufacturing activity. In other words, it measures the percentage by which actual value added in the industry under consideration may exceed foreign or world market value added. Whereas nominal tariffs provide us with information about the internal structure of prices in the protecting country, effective protection gives us direct information on the incentive for or the efficiency of domestic production relative to world market terms. Esentially it was developed from the ideas of input-output analysis, which draws our attention to the role of intermediate goods in production and trade. Empirical analysis of effective protection requires much detailed information of the

sort that goes into input-output tables. Like input-output analysis, the effective protection concept is fundamentally based on the idea of very limited or no substitution between different inputs in production processes. Maybe this is justified, but it has prompted considerable criticism on the grounds that where tariffs are imposed on manufactured inputs firms will tend to use fewer of these inputs and more labour or capital (i.e. more value added) in any given manufacturing stage. Attempts to investigate the effects of substitutability theoretically have not been particularly satisfactory. Balassa in this volume argues that in the cases studied the choice of input-output coefficients—notional world market and domestic ones were the alternatives tested—made little significant difference to the inter-industry structure of protection.

This present volume by Balassa and his associates is a further instalment of the massive empirical work which Balassa has done on the structure of protection. Six less developed countries—Brazil, Chile, Mexico, West Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines—plus Norway were studied. The choice of countries is not representative of all less developed countries but was determined by the availability of the necessary data. It does, however, provide very useful information about a number of countries which have pursued policies of industrialisation via import substitution. The primary aim of the study was to produce detailed estimates of the inter-industry structure of protection and this is done in considerable depth for all the countries examined. Since trade restrictions make it possible to sustain an overvalued currency—relative to the free trade position—this entailed making estimates of the extent of overvaluation in the different countries. Clearly an overvalued exchange rate combined with protection of domestic industry militates against exports; thus further estimates were made of the bias against exporting implied for various industries by the structure of tariffs, taxes and other trade barriers.

The study of effective protection presents many knotty problems—for example, the treatment of quotas and other non-tariff barriers or of non-traded goods. These further illustrate the theoretical difficulties involved in handling the effective protection concept, but on an empirical level they are dealt with reasonably satisfactorily here using conventional methods. The results which this study presents are primarily of interest for the light that they cast on the ways in which countries protect their industries. Frequently there are large differences in industry rankings between nominal and effective rates of protection. The absolute magnitudes of effective protection provided to manufacturing industries tend to be considerably larger than the nominal rates might suggest. There is also a general bias against primary industries and in favour of import-substituting manufacturing industries. Only in Norway and Malaya is agriculture treated more favourably than manufacturing industry; in the other countries primary production received negative protection, i.e. it was positively discriminated against as a result of trade policies. Within the manufacturing sector protection exhibited the familiar pattern of escalation with effective rates being generally lowest on primary commodities, followed by intermediate goods at increasing levels of fabrication, and finally consumer goods. The consequence of these high rates of protection is seen in the difficulty several countries have encountered after the initial stage of import substitution in non-durable consumer goods. Further, the discrimination against agricultural production and exports which was observed has severely hindered growth in both these sectors. In con-

sequence it is estimated that the loss due to protection is particularly large in countries like Brazil, Chile, and Pakistan which have followed these policies. The estimated degrees of overvaluation due to trade restrictions vary from 4 per cent for Norway and Malaya to 50 per cent for Pakistan and 68 per cent for Chile.

There is an enormous amount of detailed information in this volume on the countries studied, and it will thus be of considerable interest to economists and others particularly concerned with them. For others the empirical work and conclusions serve to reinforce other recent studies, such as the OECD ones, which have examined the problem of industrialisation and trade in underdeveloped countries.

GORDON HUGHES

Economic Development, Peace and International Law. By Wil D. Verwey. Preface by B. V. A. Röling. *Assen: Van Gorcum. 1972. 362 pp. Bibliog. (Polemological Studies No. 16. General editor: B. V. A. Röling.) Fl. 54.00.*

THE author is a research member of the Peace Research Institute of Groningen University and a grant by the Dutch organisation for the advancement of pure research enabled him to write his book. It is not agreeable to point out the weaknesses of a volume full of good intentions. Yet to claim the attention of readers over some 350 closely printed pages involves also some obligations. One of them is to offer something at least mildly original. The second, perhaps, to lead to meaningful if not constructive conclusions. Though one is offered some analyses of value and documentation on facts already well known, the book as a whole satisfies neither of the two legitimate expectations. It states—occasionally eloquently—the obvious, tends to be verbose and, regrettably, is almost naive in its idealistic reasoning.

Simplified to the extreme, Dr. Verwey rediscovers that the North-South problem is becoming more important for the future of peace than was the East-West one, that unremedied misery and injustice are likely to produce desperate, extremist minorities and, finally, that only respect for the law of the world community and coherent global strategies for development can save us from mounting threats to world peace. The scientific jargon used to state the obvious tends to become tiring and the conclusions lead distressingly towards the rarefied air of UN resolutions without much contact with inflexible realities. That lack of economic progress leads to instability, and thus to international tension, is clear enough. That economic development too creates instability and produces its own tensions is not seriously examined. That the great powers interfere in the South and may be sucked into local conflicts is equally clear. But it would have merited some thought that this very danger might bring together the powers of the northern temperate belt precisely in order to maintain peace against the threats originating in the growing turbulence of the underdeveloped world.

The type of painstaking analysis of the impact of underdevelopment on world peace offered here is obviously useful and necessary. But it ought to be much shorter. The publishers, for their part, ought to have asked someone to correct the author's English. Dr. Verwey's noble motives, however scientifically subdivided into numbered paragraphs, simply do not replace either original insights or helpful conclusions.

TIBOR MENDE

The Community of Oil Exporting Countries: A Study in Governmental Co-operation. By Zuhayr Mikdashi. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 239 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·30.*

THE blurb to this book reverses the importance of title and subtitle, claiming that it is a contribution to the study of governmental co-operation among developing countries, with the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and related groupings—in effect, only its Arab counterpart OAPEC—as examples. The author makes no such statement, and in fact the book consists essentially of a history of how and why OPEC came into existence, coupled with an examination of its successes and failures and of its possible lines of evolution in the future. But the blurb-writer's mistake is understandable, since Professor Mikdashi seems, during the process of composing the book, to have changed his mind—either that or the book was written at two different times, with an interval between the composition of the first three chapters and of the subsequent five. One gets the distinct impression that, in spite of references to 1971 in the early chapters, they were written before then. Moreover, in this part of the book the author frequently quotes oil company spokesmen but seems to have completely misunderstood what they were saying. One also meets this kind of sentence: 'The premise which underlies the present analysis is that the greater the similarity, consistency and complementarity (for short, congruence) in key relevant conditions, policies, and goals—referred to hereafter as "profile"—among OPEC countries, the better the prospects of voluntary functional co-operation. Conversely, the greater the profile incongruity, the greater the potential for conflict' (p. 69). 'Profiles' of Kuwait and Iran are then compared in a diagram, and the banalities which it reveals are established in the text. Fortunately, at this point Professor Mikdashi puts the flannel aside and writes a different kind of book—and a worthwhile one for most of the remaining 150 pages. The last two chapters, dealing respectively with the measurement of the terms of trade and with OPEC's future, are both interesting and valuable.

GEOFFREY DRAYTON

International Labor Relations Management in the Automotive Industry: A Comparative Study of Chrysler, Ford and General Motors. By Duane Kujawa. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1971. 297 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £7·75.*

Unions in Europe: A guide to organised labour in the six. By Eli Marx and Walter Kendall. *Brighton: Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Sussex. 1971. 47 pp. Bibliog. £0·30.*

Joint Venture Survival in Multinational Corporations. By Lawrence G. Franko. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1971. 217 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £7·25.*

IT is rare to find books analysing the current activities of named companies. Duane Kujawa's is one. He examines the management of labour relations in three major American auto companies, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler.

He focuses on the interplay between industrial relations staff at the American headquarters, the regional levels (where they exist) and the foreign subsidiaries in Canada and Western Europe. His information comes from structured interviews with industrial relations personnel in all the relevant units in these three firms. This study is mainly for the organisational theorists and students of industrial relations. However, there is a good deal of interesting information tucked away between the tables and charts.

The multinationals leave industrial relations very much to the managers on the spot. Kujawa even makes out a good case for the belief that Ford-England's disastrous attempt in 1969 to take its unions to court was a hurried decision by the British management; Dearborn was not advised until after the action was taken. This decentralised policy is forced on the companies by the extremely varied legal and cultural environment in which their subsidiaries are found. Spain, France, Germany, Britain or Canada all pose different problems. International headquarters stick to gathering information and giving technical support. On the surface, international union responses have had little impact. On a number of occasions, though, the interviewees mention the growing international awareness of the labour representatives they face. They cite the 'Americanisation' of demands and bargaining tactics by British unions, which are wary of making concessions that the UAW could generalise back to the United States. Workers at Ford-Genk and GM-Strasbourg are fully aware of conditions in their German 'parent' plants. All in all, then, this is a well-researched series of case studies in an area where objective studies are thin on the ground.

Marx and Kendall have produced an invaluable, cheap pamphlet which soundly and clearly sets out the political and cultural background of the union movements in the EEC. Kendall analyses in turn the situation in each of the Six and also contributes a piece on industrial democracy in Europe. Marx gives a useful summary of trade union action in the Community from the 1940s onwards. The beauty of this work is that the authors not only give the basic statistics and put the names to the initials, but they manage to put all of these disparate union movements solidly against their national cultures. The tensions arising from religious and political divisions are well illustrated; so also is the relative weakness of most European union movements compared with Britain's. There are obvious areas where one would have liked a fuller analysis, but this is to be hypercritical. This is a near-perfect reference source for its length and price. One eagerly awaits Kendall's forthcoming *The Labour Movement in Europe*.

Franko's book is one of the products of Harvard Business School's project on multinational companies. He has done some extremely rigorous statistical analysis on 314 cases where the School's sample of multinationals has been involved with joint manufacturing ventures where the terms have been significantly modified (normally in favour of the multinational). It is a very competent piece of work which is, though, of limited interest to readers of this journal. One conclusion is that he sees no general inexorable tendency for corporate decision making to become 'geocentric'. Regional and even national factors still matter and many companies are perfectly happy (and justified) in continuing to work with foreign partners.

LOUIS TURNER

International Aspects of Overpopulation: Proceedings of a Conference held by the South African Institute of International Affairs at Johannesburg. Ed. by John Barratt and Michael Louw. *London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1972. 334 pp. Index. £4·50.*

Manpower for Development: Perspectives on Five Continents. By Eli Ginzberg. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1971. 331 pp. Index. $10.00. £4·25.*

GROWING public concern with 'the population explosion', the gap between rich and poor and the problem of resources has provoked an explosion of literature on the subject, so that whereas readers in the 1950s relied on a few well known texts, some rather dated, they are today faced with an abundance of volumes and a difficulty of choice. The difficulty is increased by the fact that many of these texts are based on certain attitudes to population growth, ranging from doomwatch pessimism to myopic optimism through various intermediate views. In addition, conferences, symposia and colloquia on the subject have proliferated, held by all sorts of societies, learned and otherwise, in most parts of the world.

International Aspects of Overpopulation represents the proceedings of one conference, held by the South African Institute of International Affairs at Johannesburg in 1970. Convened to mark the centenary of the birth of Jan Christiaan Smuts, the conference considered the impact of the world's population explosion upon the relations between states, and starts with a basic premise of overpopulation, although this diagnosed condition is not defined. To help in their deliberations the South African authors were supplemented by a number of distinguished foreign social scientists, especially demographers, economists and political scientists, including William Brand, Ugo Papi, Joseph Spengler, Jean Bourgeois-Pichat, C. A. Price, A. F. K. Organski, Alfred Sauvy and Kei Wakaizumi, and the attendance of these guests was obviously made possible by the sponsorship of an impressive list of companies, organisations and individuals. The programme of the conference was designed to permit the participants to consider first a variety of aspects of population growth, especially on a national level, then its international implications, and finally the role of population in the political and economic development of four major regions: Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe. Along with the research papers, the volume contains brief summaries of discussions held and conclusions reached.

It is not surprising that a volume of this sort contains little which is new, for authors are constrained by space to from five to twenty pages on broad topics like 'contemporary world demographic trends', 'world resources, their use and distribution', 'world food supplies', 'national policies for population control', 'international migration' and 'population factors in Latin America', which are frequently treated at book length. Many of the papers, however, are useful summaries of general situations, and it would be churlish to accuse their authors of omissions. Although the ensuing discussions have been summarised by rapporteurs, it appears that some of the visitors were much less pessimistic than some of their hosts, and there was no doubt refreshing argument. On the other hand, the conference organisers have obviously searched for some generally acceptable notions, and these are listed as 19 tentative conclusions at the end of the book, but to this reviewer at least some are questionable, some tendentious and some platitudinous. The first three might be indicative of this sort of over-synthesised conclusion:

1. The key to the prosperity and power of a country lies in the quality and productivity, rather than in the size of its population; 2. The widening economic gap between more and less developed nations, as evidenced by income per head, is partly due to continuing disparities in their fertility rates and is a source of increasing international stress; 3. It is the moral responsibility of each nation, shared by its government and people, to achieve an improving balance between its population size, food production and ability to purchase necessary imports (p. 278).

One generalisation omitted from the list of conclusions of the South African conference forms the main thesis of *Manpower for Development*, the forty-fourth book by Eli Ginzberg—that development of poor countries does not depend on pouring in capital, but on developing the skills of their inhabitants. Professor of Economics and Director of the Conservation of Human Resources Project at Columbia University, Ginzberg has been an adviser to the United States government and many other governments and organisations on the subject of manpower economics. Investment in people is the main message of this book, which is very remote from growth models and econometrics and represents an introduction to the author's theory of human economy. He stresses the interrelationships between a country's value system, political structures, economic organisation and manpower system, and he calls for 'a clearer understanding of the institutional matrix out of which development policies must be constructed and implemented' (p. 20). In his view there is a tendency to overemphasise formal education, to neglect on-the-job training and the training of foremen, to discriminate against women and to create excessive hierarchies. These are common threads through the summaries of his field studies in some 27 different countries, which constitute the bulk of this book. Racing from country to country in the fashion of John Gunther, it makes interesting reading without probing deep, and Ginzberg fans will find much is a distillation of earlier volumes and papers.

JOHN I. CLARKE

Tyranny: A Study in the Abuse of Power. By Maurice Latey. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972. 381 pp. Bibliog. Index. £0·50.*

A paperback edition of a book first published in 1969. In the review published in *International Affairs*, October 1969, p. 712, it was described as '. . . much more than a catalogue of tyrants and their character and motives. Mr. Latey draws on all the serious writers on the subject—Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes and so on—and provides a critical and well-documented history of political ideas. . . .'

The Ideologies of the Developing Nations. 2nd rev. ed. Ed. by Paul E. Sigmund. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 483 pp. Bibliog. £5·00.*

This is the second revised and enlarged edition of a book first published in 1963 and reviewed in *International Affairs* in October of that year (p. 568). The first revised edition, published in 1967, was reviewed in the journal in April 1968, p. 319. The present selection has been expanded by the addition of several recent items. The editor has supplied a new introduction and has brought the bibliography up to date.

LAW

International Disputes: The Legal Aspects. Report of a Study Group of The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. Foreword by Sir Francis Vallat. *London: Europa Publications for The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. 1972. 325 pp. £5·50. $11.95.*

In 1963 the David Davies Memorial Institute established a Study Group to consider the question of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Group published its report in 1966. In 1969 it was thought advisable to bring the report up to date and to republish it. This time the Group decided to invite certain experts to prepare memoranda on specific topics which would afford a basis for the revised report. The present work is the outcome of this project.

The actual report consists of 46 pages (3–49) forming Part 1. Appended to this are 10 memoranda, being papers by specialists, (pp. 57–287). The work concludes with a brief case study on the award of HM Queen Elizabeth II in the Argentine-Chile boundary dispute of December 9, 1966 (pp. 315–325).

In its introduction the Group envisaged its task in these terms: '(a) to review the existing framework of international machinery for the settlement of disputes as it exists today; (b) to consider the use actually made of the machinery, and in what respects it may be defective or inadequate; and (c) to suggest possible ways of improving the machinery and promoting its wider and more effective use as a means of disposing of disputes and lessening international tension' (p. 4).

After a review of the existing modalities for the peaceful settlement of disputes, embracing those specifically recited in Art. 33 (1) of the UN Charter, namely, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies, the report ventures the somewhat depressing conclusion that: 'The Study Group does not think that the apparent failures of States in many instances to have recourse to appropriate means of settlement can reasonably be attributed to the inadequacy of the several procedures available' (p. 37). This, if anything, is a scholarly understatement of considerable proportions. As has been pointed out before this report, and will doubtless be pointed out many times thereafter, the central reason for the consistent failure of states to resort to the plethora of carefully contrived mechanisms now available for the peaceful settlement of international disputes is the attitudes of governments towards these various mechanisms. It is a failure of the will. The report rightly points out that 'the fundamental problem is to persuade them [governments] of the political advantages of recourse to the various institutions and procedures of settlement' (p. 39). It is a matter of regret that this report, and the accompanying memoranda, have very little to suggest in this direction. Perhaps the reason is that the wrong people are writing the report, which is an accurate and balanced recital of the existing modalities for peaceful settlement of international disputes. If the true remedy be to heighten the climate of confidence in these procedures so that resort to them becomes part of the accepted pattern of international activity, and failure so to do, the abnormal happening, then it would seem that what is wanted is a report by psychologists, particularly those who specialise in group activities and the conduct and motivation of governments, perhaps a discipline to be styled 'the psychology of governments.' Such a

group might have a valuable contribution to make as to the latent springs of the inhibitions currently debarring governments from resorting to the International Court of Justice for judicial disposal of their disputes. Thus, at the moment it would be helpful to know the deep seated causes why governments will not risk losing international litigation, a risk which citizens, let alone large commercial corporations, have learnt to accept in municipal forums long ago. The plea that international law has a very high content of uncertainty is really no answer. In the first place it is not true, and in the second place there is no legal rule that is not composed of a core of certainty and a penumbra, varying in extent, of uncertainty.

In its suggestions for improving the machinery and promoting its wider use (pp. 42–9) the report is somewhat anaemic. There is, it would seem, 'no place for suggestions for radical steps to improve the machinery for peaceful settlement' (p. 43). It is suggested that a more positive attitude to, and greater observance of, Art. 2 (3) of the UN Charter might be one improvement. This is the least invoked provision of the Charter: 'All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered.' Some reference to the preceding provision, (Art. 2 (2)), might not have been out of place in this context: 'All Members . . . shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in the present Charter.'

Here we have it. What may be the basic shortcoming that has led to the lack of confidence in the existing pacific procedures is a lack of a shared or international morality. As Professor Goodhart has put it—the weakness of international law is not due to the lack of enforcement but 'to the absence of an international moral sense'. As to how this sense may be generated the report has nothing much to say.

The accompanying memoranda are useful expositions of the existing procedures available to the international community. Particularly useful for the student of international affairs, although depressing in its realism, is the one entitled 'The UN and Peaceful Settlement' by D. W. Bowett (pp. 180–209). He stresses the importance of acceptable fact-finding devices, permanent in character, to which the Soviet Union has recently expressed its hostility (UN Doc. A/5746, pp. 183–4). Without such machinery little can be done and, conversely, once the facts of a dispute or situation have been impartially investigated and publicised, in many cases the dispute is virtually resolved without further ado.

This is a useful study even if it says nothing of outstanding originality. Its price, £5·50, is devastating and the blow is not softened by the lack of an index.

G. I. A. D. DRAPER

International Law and Order. By Georg Schwarzenberger. *London: Stevens. 1971. 298 pp. Index. (Library of World Affairs. Gen eds.: George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. No. 69.) £5·75.*

THIS is the latest of a number of published collections of essays and lectures by Professor Schwarzenberger. As in previous collections an effort is made to produce a group of papers with a theme. At the same time, opportunity is taken to bring the works up to date. Some of the papers are easily accessible, but many are not and one or two do not appear to have been published before. As with much of Professor Schwarzenberger's

work, these papers are not easy. In language and in thought they are particularly demanding. But again, as with much of his work, they are provocative and of the highest order of scholarship.

Schwarzenberger's writings have shown him to be a man more interested in the philosophy, principles and ideology of international law than in the mundanities of its detail or its daily practice. His textbooks contain some of the most scholarly and thoughtful writing on the subject, and this latest collection of essays emphasises that he is an international jurist rather than an international lawyer. Indeed papers on Law, Order and Legitimation and on the Forms of Sovereignty are almost pure jurisprudence. Each is followed by an attempt to restate the principles within the international legal context. In the Sovereignty paper this is done in the second half of the same paper, while there is a separate paper on International Law and Order.

The collection includes papers on Abuse of Rights, Treaty Interpretation and Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, and a number of aspects of the laws of war, associatable aggression, and war crimes. In addition a number of letters to newspapers published between 1941 and 1967 are included. These are interesting in showing the view taken by the author at particular times and on particular issues, but read out of time and out of context they are of limited value.

Schwarzenberger sees law and order as distinct though closely related phenomena. Sociologically, order tends to precede law and indeed one might suggest that the existence of some degree of order is a precondition for the existence of law. Certainly Schwarzenberger is right in his argument that international law is conditioned by the underlying quasi-order of power politics. One would be hard pressed to support a reverse proposition that the structure and balance of the international political order is conditioned by law.

In some ways the most remarkable of the papers is Images and Models of International Law and Order. It raises the issue of the significance of the international lawyer's subconscious; to what extent his thoughts and resolutions are responsive to unexpressed even subconscious prejudices and images. If prejudices and images can determine the sensitivity of the critic they can also, by triggering patterns and structures, have intellectual significance and determine analytical thinking. In one sense this is no more than stating the obvious, while taken too far the theory could become an extravagance. Properly stated and properly used it highlights an important and unexplored influence in international negotiation and decision making. Immigration, minority rights, the resources of the seas, the exploitation of foreign economic resources, war crimes and many other subjects trigger off subconscious responses. But equally our understanding of broader concepts like sovereignty and recognition or even our understanding of the nature of international law is affected by subconscious patterns and images, sometimes transferred from our municipal law thinking.

Thought-provoking and demanding, these essays are not for the layman or the undergraduate. For the scholar and the teacher and for the international legal practitioner or the diplomat, who desires to seek the underlying jurisprudential truths of his profession, the essays are very rewarding.

J. A. Andrews

A Guide to European Community Law. By P. S. R. F. Mathijsen. Preface by J. D. B. Mitchell. *London: Sweet & Maxwell; New York: Matthew Bender. 1972. 204 pp. Index. £2·50. Paperback £1·50.*

An Introduction to the Law of the European Economic Community. Ed. by B. A. Wortley. *Manchester: Manchester University Press; Dobbs Ferry: Oceana. 1972. 134 pp. Index. (The Melland Schill Lectures.) £2·40.*

Legal Problems of an Enlarged European Community. Ed. by M. E. Bathurst, K. R. Simmonds, N. March Hunnings and Jane Welch. *London: Stevens & Sons for The British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 1972. 369 pp. Index. (British Institute Studies in International and Comparative Law, No. 6.) £6·75.*

Of the three books under review, Professor Mathijsen's is the only one that covers all aspects of Community law. It is of special interest to those without previous knowledge of the subject, who will find in it a useful account of the problems concerning the relationship between Community law and municipal law, an exposition of the basic provisions of the treaties establishing the three Communities and a description of their institutions. The author makes extensive use of the case law of the Court of Justice, and English readers will be assisted by the Table of Cases containing references to those of its judgments which have been published in English in *The Common Market Law Review*. In dealing with the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community, Professor Mathijsen points out that Parliament, by passing the European Communities Act, has enacted law which—contrary to popular belief—not for the first time is intended to bind its successors. In future the courts of this country will have to pass judgment upon the consistency of English statute law with pre-existing Community law, in much the same way as the constitutional courts of other member states scrutinise their municipal law in relation to treaty law accepted by them.

An Introduction to the Law of the European Community, edited by Professor B. A. Wortley, contains six lectures delivered at the University of Manchester as part of the Melland Schill series of lectures. The subjects chosen by the contributors include an account of the composition, procedure and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, the first modest steps taken towards co-ordinating municipal systems of company law, especially concerning the protection of the interests of shareholders and third parties in their dealings with companies, including the abolition of the *ultra vires* rule in English company law, and two chapters by Professor Wortley himself on Monopolies and Restrictive Practices in the Community. The appendices to the book include the White Paper on the 'Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European Communities' (Cmnd. 3301).

Legal Problems of an Enlarged European Community contains some of the working papers submitted to a conference held in Dublin in 1970 under the auspices of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. The problems discussed in these papers cannot easily be fitted into any specific categories. They are concerned, in a general sense, with the situation facing states seeking membership of the Community, and also the position of states intending to remain outside the Community. The position of Sweden has crystallised since then, while that of Switzerland is under negotiation.

The three books provide ample proof that in spite of the long time gap separating this country from accession to the Community there has always been a keen awareness of the need to keep abreast of its developments.

F. HONIG

WESTERN EUROPE

The Security of Western Europe: Towards a Common Defence Policy. By Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin. *London: Charles Knight. 1972. 189 pp. Index. £3·00.*

IT is indeed pleasant, as well as instructive, to read a book on a complicated and contentious subject by persons (like Sir Bernard Burrows, until lately the British representative on the Nato Council) who really know what they are talking about. The main problem posed is, however, simple in its essence. If Western Europe—as all our politicians tell us—is really going to unite within a measurable future, that is to say if it is going to have a common monetary and economic policy, to say nothing of a 'harmonized' foreign policy, then it cannot escape having a common defence policy of some sort as well. What, within the limits of the possible, could such a common defence policy conceivably be? Is it possible, for instance, even if it were desirable, for the enlarged EEC of Nine, to aim at becoming a 'Third Force', equal, even from the nuclear point of view, to the other super-powers? If this is dismissed (for fairly obvious reasons) is there then any reason to have a common European defence system at all? Can we not, for instance, just go on as we are, the Americans continuing to provide the ultimate 'deterrent' and the bulk of the effective 'conventional' forces as well? If the authors do nothing else, they at least show that this is hardly less out of the question than the transformation of the Community into a super-power—if only because in all probability the Americans, for economic and indeed for general political reasons, will not for much longer oblige us in this way.

Unless, therefore, we are to contemplate an ultimate political surrender to the super-power of the East we must fairly shortly agree with the Americans on the most suitable defence role which a gradually unifying Western Europe will play within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. This is where the book of Sir Bernard Burrows and Mr. Irwin is especially valuable. For it is chiefly devoted to an examination of the various practicable ways of achieving this end.

The short point is that, though actual hostilities in Western Europe are at the moment most improbable, the weaker the general defences of Western Europe, the greater the temptation on the part of the East at least to secure some political objective by means of threats of one kind or another. In the event of an American withdrawal (which cannot be altogether dismissed) this danger would be obvious. Even in the event of a serious reduction of the United States contribution to European defence it would be very considerable. Is there, therefore, any means of defending Western Europe in such circumstances by conventional means? In other words, could there be some streamlined and co-ordinated 'conventional' defence of Western Europe by Western Europeans only (with the major American nuclear 'deterrent' always in the background) which would at least be capable of holding up a 'conventional' Soviet assault and thus of placing the Soviet Union in the position of having to make use of, or threaten, a

nuclear first strike, which might in its turn trigger off the nuclear deterrent of America, and failing that, the not inconsiderable second strike (submarine) deterrent of the United Kingdom and of France?

Of course there could be, and the authors make an attempt to indicate (on pp. 77 and 78) how this might be accomplished technically (by, for instance, the co-ordinated use of such new weapons as armoured rocket-carrying anti-tank helicopters, many independently operating anti-tank vehicles, up-to-date fighter bombers and so on rather than cumbrous Second World War armoured divisions). It is true that they also contemplate the possible first use by the Europeans of tactical nuclear weapons, which I myself believe would be unwise, given the ability of the Russians to reply in kind and to the obvious consequent danger of nuclear escalation. But an essential preliminary to any such scheme must be far greater co-ordination of the Western European armed forces (including the French) than now exists and some means whereby their resulting plans can be cleared with the Americans either in the North Atlantic Council or—if France really will not consider such an arrangement—by some other means.

Much of the book is consequently devoted to an examination of the existing organs for co-ordinating European defence, more particularly the unofficial 'Eurogroup' (of which France unfortunately is not a member), and there is a further profitable discussion of the possibility of making use of the existing Western European Union machine, and of, as it were, grafting it on to the existing 'Davignon' procedure—to say nothing of the prospects of one day fusing the Western European Union Assembly with the so-called Parliament of Europe. The authors are, however, rather pessimistic about this grafting.

In other words, for all who want to take the question of the defence of Western Europe seriously and to relate it to our entry into the extended European Communities this book is 'must' reading. And the whole problem is probably much more immediate than we now think.

GLADWYN

Europe at Risk. By Alan Watson. *London, Toronto, Wellington, Sydney: Harrap. 1972. 224 pp. Index £2·50.*

MR. WATSON'S book is timely. During the debate on British entry into EEC much was said about butter, little about what the 'new Europe' was to achieve. Some of these wider issues form Mr. Watson's theme: he sees a prosperous Western Europe whose achievements are at risk owing to an inability to advance politically. The three main strands of this risk are the 'American challenge' to national economies, the threats to democracy arising from the declining capacity of national political systems to control a country's destiny effectively, and the dangers of a resurgent Germany. Mr. Watson is perhaps most disturbed by the implications of a German national Ostpolitik which he sees as disastrous if, improbably, it succeeded, as releasing dangerous emotions if unsuccessful, and as causing a potentially fatal delay to European unification in either event. What Mr. Watson prefers is a 'European' Ostpolitik. And indeed the central burden of his message is that the solution of all three dilemmas is to be sought through tighter unification in Western Europe. To say this is perhaps unfairly to compress the author's argument—but his own case is by no means

free from overcompression and undue simplification. It is questionable historical shorthand to assert that de Gaulle chose to resign in 1969 rather than reverse his economic and foreign policies, the rejection of his proposals for constitutional reform being simply a 'pretext' (p. 36); nor would one expect a former contributor to *The Money Programme* to ascribe the General's refusal to devalue in 1968 solely to considerations of prestige (p. 38). So, while the book is welcome in raising neglected, even unfashionable, issues—particularly in relation to Germany—simplified diagnoses tend to produce simplified solutions. Though he is interesting on the consequences for British and French domestic politics of the loss of empire and the erosion of effective sovereignty, the roots of both nations' political malaise are much more complex than that. Most important, while Mr. Watson consistently argues the necessity of a united (Western) Europe, he says disappointingly little about a strategy for attaining this goal. Nor does he ever really move from the eminently reasonable contention that the solution to his three dilemmas *might* be in a united Europe, to showing the sceptic any reason to believe that unification would indeed lead to the solutions he advocates.

MARTIN HARRISON

External Relations of the European Community: Associations and Trade Agreements. By Stanley Henig. *London: Chatham House/PEP. 1971. 145 pp. (European Series No. 19, Oct. 1971.) £1·25.*

The European Community in the world: The external relations of the enlarged European Community. Ed. by Ph. P. Everts. *Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press. 1972. 205 pp. (Proceedings of the Conference of the Institute for International Studies and the Europe Institute, University of Leyden, May 1971.) Fl. 38.00.*

WHEN the European Economic Community came into being in 1958, relations between members were external relations and for most purposes this is still the case. It was perceived that the Community as a whole would have its own external relations, separate from the external relations of each member and yet affecting each member, but it could not be foreseen how these would evolve. Thus, in retrospect, it may seem curious that member countries reserved their full negotiating rights in trade agreements even if they left the Commission to do the talking to the prospective trade agreement partner, while (at least in theory) the Commission was given power to negotiate accessions or associations without prior approval of all members. In fact, accessions or associations have more far-reaching consequences than mere trade agreements, and they could not be negotiated in disregard of the real power wielded by the Council of (national) Ministers. External negotiations came to be more and more bogged down by bargaining amongst these ministers, and only when they had finished could the Commission call in the negotiating partner from the antechamber to tell him some agreed and well-prepared lines.

Reading through Mr. Henig's lucid survey, one must resist the temptation to conclude that the Community is on the way to becoming an amiable but slow-moving dinosaur. These are early days, and the survey ends before the enlargement negotiations began in earnest. By then, the Community was a mere 12 years old. Still an infant, it was very much under the tutelage of its guardians on the Council of Ministers. True, right at

the beginning the infant was precocious and, in the Association Treaty with Greece (1961) somewhat exceeded its mandate. This was not to happen again; in subsequent negotiations the Commission was not allowed out without nannies (representatives of Council members). The guardians gave the Commission homework to do but did not expect it to speak unless spoken to and, when outsiders were present, only well prepared lines. The guardians were, however, wont to squabble. The infant's homework consisted more and more of finding ways to reconcile the guardians' differences. Internally, this meant that the infant became a powerhouse of economic knowledge and political reconciliation. It was growing up, but has not yet done so enough to speed up matters pertaining to external relations.

Mr. Henig presents one theme. He does not refer to nannies and guardians, but this reviewer found it possible to put the argument in this way when confronted with the task of summarising a learned argument in a few lines. Other readers may summarise it differently but, whichever way they do it, there should be plenty of them. It is difficult to be so sanguine about the numbers who will read the second volume under review. It consists of a number of papers presented at a conference in 1971, together with snippets of what was said in discussions of those papers. Although much of the individual chapters is valuable in itself, the volume as a whole is somewhat unbalanced. It starts with an intellectual prehistory of ideas relating to European unity. This is followed by two chapters on relations with communist countries. As analyses of commercial relations between capitalist and communist countries, they deserve their place in the appropriate literature. In a book on the external relations of the Community, they hardly deserve priority over other external relations. As the authors show, Community-communist relations are overshadowed by political considerations and these have so far allowed for no more than minor agreements. The chapters on relations with communist countries are followed by one on relations with the neutrals. It is not the author's fault that much of what he said has now been overtaken by events. Next come two chapters on Community preferences and aid to developing countries. They show how the Community was groping towards a policy through ad hoc agreements. Throughout the book, there is scant reference to the United States and Japan. This appears to have been deliberate so that the symposium should not become too long. But it is not enough to point to centre and periphery theories of the world polity, and then omit relations between the three major centre countries (taking the enlarged Community as one). Ultimately, what happens between the centre countries will have more impact even on the Third World than any preference on oranges.

F. V. MEYER

Les Groupes de Pression dans la Communauté Européenne, 1958–1968. Structure et Action des Organisations Professionnelles. By Jean Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski. *Brussels: Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie; 1971. 728 pp. Index. (Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles. Thèses et travaux politiques.) Bel.frs. 1,170.*

THIS study of how groups representing various social and economic interests within the Common Market have been formed, how they operate and the degree of success they have had in protecting those interests serves a

twofold purpose, at least for a British reader. First, it is a thorough and competent account of an important aspect of Community life—an aspect which, because of the way in which decisions are increasingly taken at Community rather than national level, is perhaps of more significance than is generally realised. Secondly, with the United Kingdom on the brink of entry, there are important practical lessons to be drawn from the experience of those who have trodden this path before.

On this evidence, British pressure groups will have to make a major effort, as soon after entry as possible, to adjust their sights, fixing them no longer exclusively on the national government but lengthening the range to include primarily the Commission but also the co-operative federal organisations which pressure groups within the Six have already established. British interests may take some time to realise the degree to which it is possible to by-pass governments, but they will be helped in this by the hard-won experience of their European counterparts.

Some will be luckier than others; the effectiveness of European interest groups has varied according to a number of factors, but none more so than the unity which national groups have been able to achieve in fixing their objectives. Industry and the trade unions here provide an instructive contrast. The representative organisations of European industry have had little difficulty in identifying and pursuing their aims within the Community, and they must rank as the most successful of the interests which are striving to influence the direction in which the Community is moving. They have also, incidentally, demonstrated the virtues of vertical, as opposed to horizontal, organisation.

The European trade unions by contrast have a less successful story to tell. The British Trade Union Congress, which will be the largest trade union organisation in the Community and which has already established regular and formal contacts with the European trade union movement, will find that Common Market membership will mean, as it has meant for their European colleagues, a new dimension to their concerns. While many of the initial doubts felt by the trade unions about the Common Market have disappeared, it remains true that their role has been primarily a defensive one, reacting to others rather than taking initiatives themselves. This is largely due to the weakness of European trade unionism, which has traditionally suffered from political and religious differences and from the low proportion of workers who take up membership; but even with the accession of the British Trade Union Congress, the multinational firm is still likely to pose enormous problems.

Other groups will face problems too; farmers, consumers, professional bodies will all have to adjust to wider horizons. And as this useful study shows, there are major prizes to be won by those who learn their lessons fastest.

B. C. GOULD

L'Elargissement des Communautés Européennes et la Position des Pays Non-Candidats à l'Adhésion. By H. C. Binswanger and Hans Mayrzedt. *Brussels: Ligue Européenne de Cooperation Economique. 1972. 97 pp.*

Europapolitik der Rest-EFTA-Staaten. Perspektiven für die Siebziger Jahre. By H. C. Binswanger and Hans Mayrzedt. *Zürich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag; Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller. 1972. 129 pp.*

HANS MAYRZEDT and Hans Binswanger have established a near monopoly

in published writing on the problems created by the movement for European integration for those Efta countries which are not applying for EEC membership. They were joint editors of, as well as contributors to, a collection of essays published in 1970 under the title *Die Neutralen in die Europaischen Integration*.[1] As chairman and rapporteur respectively, Dr. Binswanger and Dr. Mayrzedt participated in a working group on the problems of the non-candidate Efta countries set up in 1970 under the auspices of the Ligue Européene de Coopération Economique. The two pamphlets under review are essentially the result of that working party as interpreted by the two authors. They cover the same ground, the difference being in the organisation of the material under different headings and the provision of more statistical information in the German version.

The value of the pamphlets lies in the fact that they provide in an easily digestible form a survey of the main issues arising. These are described briefly under numerous, perhaps too numerous, titles, subtitles and subsubtitles and then grouped together and modestly amplified for each of the countries concerned. The possible alternative arrangements are described: the degree of interdependence of the different West European groupings—EEC, Efta candidates for EEC membership, Efta non-candidates—is illustrated by pertinent figures. The authors are not concerned to argue a thesis. The only hint of political bias that is allowed to intrude is perhaps to be found in a certain tendency to assume that the economic forces making for a progressive harmonisation of the modes of integration of all West European countries, including the neutrals, will inevitably prevail over the political forces that sustain the present variety of modes. But the authors nevertheless give due acknowledgment to the political obstacles.

The pamphlets suffer from the defects of their virtues. They are comprehensive in their coverage of the issues, but their brevity leaves no space for analysis. And the manner of representation limits the usefulness of the material presented even as raw material for analysis. Although the issues are described clearly in isolation and collated for each country, no attempt is made to assess their relative weights either for the individual country or for the future development of European integration. The authors leave an impression of a Europe without balance or tension. In dealing with the legal problems created for the neutrals by integration they fail to illuminate the political choices lying behind the legal puzzles. The authors cannot be blamed for not describing the internal political influences constraining the decisions of governments but the Danish and Norwegian referenda campaigns will serve to remind the analyst that foreign policy is not exclusively about trade flows, international legal obligations and the rest, but also about how communities of people conceive their relations with each other. It is that after all that is the source of the real drama of international politics.

For all their limitations these pamphlets have a real value as providing the framework on which an analysis of the present phase of European politics may be built.

STEPHEN MAXWELL

[1] Vienna, Stuttgart: Wilhelm Braumüller. 1970. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 805.

The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity 1947–56. By R. B. Manderson-Jones. *London: London School of Economics and Political Science and Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1972. 168 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

Is there anything more to be said on how Britain missed the European bus after the Second World War? Mr. Manderson-Jones thinks so, and his thesis that Britain had a constant, almost Gaullist, idea of the Europe it wanted while the United States shifted under the pressures of people and events, bears him out.

From Marshall Aid to the Schuman Plan, he argues, the United States wanted Britain to promote Western European unity. Britain sought only close inter-governmental relations in Europe, to bolster ties with the United States and the Commonwealth, insisting that all three areas were equally important. The Americans achieved limited success, as in pressuring Britain into the European Payments Union. But by 1950 they abandoned any hope that Britain would take part in the Schuman Plan or the European Defence Community; the Korean war led them particularly to value British bases around the world. As the European movement developed in the 1950s, greater Anglo-American divisions appeared, only to diminish again as the Europeans threatened to get out of hand.

Mr. Manderson-Jones rightly stresses the rise and fall of departments within the American policy machine: the Economic Co-operation Administration's drive for European economic integration conflicted with the Defense Department and the Treasury. But it is questionable whether American policy was ever as coherent or as ambitious as he maintains. Acheson's 'stunned incredulity' when told about the Schuman Plan (p. 87) surely reveals a good deal about the prospects for European developments at that time. It is also too easy to forget the extent to which well into the 1950s Britain was the only militarily powerful and politically stable ally in Europe the United States had.

It may well be true that Nato was a contrivance of Bevin to promote Anglo-American intimacy. But it takes one no further to argue that a commitment to a strengthened Brussels Treaty Organisation would have been the American preference if this was never plausible, given the state of Congressional and public opinion. Indeed, at a time when the United States was content for European powers to practice their colonial policies outside its control—or even to pay for their wars—it is controversial how concerned it was to promote the 'dumb-bell' concept so popularised a decade later.

Mr. Manderson-Jones makes considerable play of the neo-imperialism of the Brussels Treaty powers, arguing that for Bevin the 'substantive basis' for Western Union was to be use of the combined resources of European dependencies. To this reviewer, Bevin's position is explained by the economic views he formed in the interwar years. But whatever one's ideological stance, one can hardly avoid noting Britain's *failure* to link European policies with those of the Empire and Commonwealth; hence the dilemma when faced with EPU, and hence the profound shock of Suez, when for the first time Britain was no longer given a free hand by the United States in the non-European parts of the world.

The material for controversy which can be gathered from this succinct book is however a tribute to its handling of such fascinating themes, and it is strongly recommended.

ROGER SCEATS

The Politics of Defence. By David Owen. *London: Jonathan Cape. 1972. 249 pp. Index. £2·95.*

DAVID OWEN was Minister of State for the Royal Navy between 1968 and 1970 and is now an Opposition front bench spokesman on defence matters. This book may accordingly be regarded as the reflections of a man of experience in the politics of defence. Not the least extraordinary aspect of it is that he chooses to devote more than a fifth of it to events—subsumed under the general title of 'Crisis Decision-Making'—which occurred before he took office and of which he plainly knows no more than any reasonably attentive student of international affairs. The rest of the book goes over the issues with which he wrestled, frequently to no avail, in the Ministry of Defence. He tells us very little that we did not know already. 'The documentary evidence that exists', he assures us on the first page, 'points to serious errors and omissions in actual defence decisions in all the countries of the Western Alliance. . . .' Just so! Furthermore 'it is clear that similar deficiencies also exist in the Warsaw Pact countries'.

What is to be done? The politician's contribution should be 'to question the central assumptions on which defence policy lies, to reduce where possible expenditure and to explore the decision-making process through which any policies will be exercised'. Thus equipped with the scepticism of a philosopher, the mind of an accountant and the analytical skills of a RAND technician, the politician will proceed to: pursue the elusive goal of greater unification of the three services; reform service education; introduce an integrated career structure for the more senior defence posts; make the central organisation of defence even more functional in form; drastically curtail the existing pattern of decision making by committee; abolish the Chiefs of Staff Committee; insist on accountable management with well-defined responsibilities; and start the process of an informed public debate in Britain about future defence policy. And the result of it all will be: further marginal increments in the process of change which has been going on in Whitehall for twenty years and more.

The great deficiency of this book is *not* that it is a superficial exposition of the conventional wisdom of the *avant-garde* in Whitehall, but that the author is patently unaware of this fact. He does not question any central assumptions; he pushes some of the existing assumptions a little way into the future. There is no harm in that; but for an examination of the central assumptions and, indeed, for a thorough analysis of the other issues raised in this book, the reader will have to look elsewhere.

C. M. MASON

Ambitions and Realities: British Politics 1964–70. By Robert Rhodes James. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1972. 311 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives, the State and Industry 1945–1964. By Nigel Harris. *London: Methuen; New York: Barnes & Noble. 1972. 384 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·75.*

MR. RHODES JAMES rejects the notion that political science enshrines all wisdom; he has doubts about psephology, and he dislikes the exaggerated cult of personality in the study of modern politics. With so much good

sense on his side, it is perhaps surprising that he has not written a better book. We are offered a brief record of political events: Rhodesia, arms for South Africa, economic problems occupy a page or two before we pass on to the next issue. The Labour government, indeed, may have cause for complaint, with only 80 pages against the Conservative opposition's 130. Mr. Rhodes James has an odd sense of proportion: it is open to argument whether the significance of Mr. Enoch Powell's political influence justifies the attention devoted to it here. This work, by a perceptive, well-informed and invariably sensible author, has a monotonous quality: the knowledge is not so esoteric, nor the judgments so iconoclastic as to occasion much surprise or excitement. We realise that we are being told, shrewdly and thoughtfully, what we knew all the time. The author is lively on personalities: Mr. Wilson is treated more kindly than is fashionable, Mr. Heath's virtues are faithfully recorded, and Mr. Powell's merits accorded due respect. In the discussion of Conservative organisation and electoral tactics, and of the electoral developments of 1970, important and sometimes neglected factors are emphasised. At the end, we are indebted to a civilised and literate observer for his thoughts recollected in tranquillity. The higher political journalism is very good in its way, but we are so surrounded by it already that it is something of a puzzle to know why Mr. Rhodes James has chosen to add to it.

Where Mr. Rhodes James's pages are filled with people, Mr. Harris's study concentrates on principles and policies. He makes an attempt, in many ways a heroic attempt, to locate and identify some important elements in the Conservative Party's ideology. He examines, in considerable detail, the presence within the party's thinking of two contrasting beliefs, '*étatiste* corporatism' and 'pluralist corporatism'. The first regards the state as an interventionist agency in the economy, while the second regards it as a restrictive force which hinders the freedom, in particular of businessmen, to shape society as they wish. The contrast is between a new collectivism, a kind of quasi-Social Democracy, and a neo-Liberalism with antecedents in the 19th century: in European terms, a contrast between Mollet and Erhard. From his initial, and inevitably over-simplified, historical introduction, through the longer sections on the Conservatives in opposition from 1945 to 1951, and in office from 1951 to 1964, Mr. Harris traces the tension, or rather the fluctuations, between these opposing views. In crude terms, he sees the late 1940s and early 1950s as dominated by *étatiste* conceptions, with a swing back in the late 1950s and 1960s to a more pluralist emphasis. In the course of his discussion, he has much that is useful to say about the content of Conservative rhetoric, about the rationalisations used to justify specific policies, and, indeed, about the priorities which underlie Conservative thinking, even if he is sometimes driven to rely on the opinions of obscure Conservatives as evidence. But the question remains: while much of this may well be obviously true, how far is it fundamental? The search for a Conservative ideology is rather like the quest for the Holy Grail: few of those who set out arrive at the desired destination. Mr. Harris is no ideological Galahad; he has too much sense. He knows, and admits, that the Conservative Party has a strong streak of pragmatism, seeking to keep the support of certain groups in society, groups whose composition and priorities are themselves constantly changing. He knows, too, that few Conservatives maintain consistently one priority against the other, preferring to muddle both in an ideologically unsatisfying compromise. Mr. Harris's

misfortune is that he must try to make specific what is most credible when kept vague. As the present Conservative government so clearly demonstrates, events can only too easily overtake consistency of purpose.

GERARD EVANS

The Government and Politics of France. Vol. I: Institutions and Parties. By Dorothy Pickles. *London: Methuen. 1972. 433 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·00. Paperback: £2·00.*

FEW can have struggled with the complexities of French politics without becoming indebted to Mrs. Dorothy Pickles. In particular her work on the Fourth and Fifth Republics has a reputation which will ensure the acceptance of this newest book, even in a field which is now far more crowded and competitive than when we first met her through, say, *France Between the Republics.*[1] But *The Government and Politics of France* is something more than either an undergraduate text or a replacement for *The Fifth French Republic.*[2] On the one hand it can be read profitably by the more advanced reader as well as the student, and on the other it is on a larger scale than the sketchier, outdated *Fifth French Republic.* (The fact that a volume on politics and policies is to follow later means that one's assessment of this volume must necessarily be tentative for the present.) Mrs. Pickles here offers a discussion of the evolution of political institutions and forces in the Fifth Republic. Where a number of comparable works have taken as their starting point either a survey of 'land-and-people' or (as in *The Fifth French Republic*) a rapid sketch of the French political tradition, Mrs. Pickles opens by setting the present constitution within the French constitutional tradition. She apparently chooses this because of the importance of constitutional disputation among Frenchmen. But one wonders whether what is first nature to the Frenchman is necessarily the best *point de départ* for the 'Anglo-Saxon' neophyte. This first chapter is certainly the heaviest going and the least accessible. Once over this hurdle, Mrs. Pickles shows just how skilfully she can illuminate the complex and sometimes contradictory evolution of de Gaulle's constitutional thought, while providing sufficient for the specialist to savour—particularly in the copious footnotes. The tone is judicious, though this does not preclude some fairly stern and summary judgments on, say, deputies' lack of energy and imagination or the irresponsibility and escapism of the parties. Mrs. Pickles delineates an essentially sterile and frivolous political class—while reserving her sharpest words for the turbulent irrelevance of the *groupuscles.*

Having tilled much the same ground as Mrs. Pickles, one naturally disagrees with her occasionally. For her, 'the most important single political reality of the Fifth Republic is not the emergence of strong Governments, but the non-emergence of strong Oppositions able to prevent the majority from doing what the majority will do if it can . . .' (p. 96). Yet surely the significance of the fragmentation of the opposition springs mainly from the emergence of a disciplined 'dominant' governmental party, while one can only be sceptical about the capacity of any parliamentary opposition to 'prevent the majority from doing what any majority will do if it can'. Like

[1] London: Contact Publications. 1946. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1946, p. 578.

[2] London: Methuen; New York: Praeger. 1960. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1961, p. 92.

all of us who watch the regime, Mrs. Pickles notes both its relative longevity and the persistent French tendency towards upheavals, and her Preface reveals her uncertainty about whether the old malady of instability has at last been cured. It is a pity that this tension between apparent stability and potential disruption is not more searchingly probed; the concluding 'Prospect' is disposed of in under three pages. But perhaps Mrs. Pickles's overview is something for which we must await her later volume. Meanwhile, especially for those who lean more to the historical than to the sociological emphasis in political studies, this is a welcome work of lucidity and mature insight.

MARTIN HARRISON

Communism in Western Europe. By Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach and Aldo Garosci. *Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books. 1971. 239 pp. Bibliog. Index. $7.50.*

The French Communists: Profile of a People. By Annie Kriegel. Trans. by Elaine P. Halperin. *Foreword by Aristide R. Zolberg. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1972. 408 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·65.*

THE contributors to the first volume under review, now reprinted after an interval of twenty years, wrote at a time when an understanding of the communist phenomenon in France and Italy was deemed essential for an efficient defence against the Soviet conquest of the continent of Europe. As liberal and progressive Christian Democrats who had a knowledge of communism and of communists both through direct personal contacts and as political scientists, the authors successfully expounded to an international audience the view that communism—though widely considered at the time of course to be as monolithic as it was arcane and dangerous—was more fruitfully understood as an historical growth whose vegetation varied according to the native roots upon which the international elements were grafted. France and Italy they saw as areas in which individualistic capitalist expansion had been retarded and in which therefore the advantages that liberal capitalist democracy can offer were little apparent. 'Rigidities and cleavages in the social structure . . . favoured the class warfare approach of the Communists' (p. 7), and they were, further, countries in which fascist control had been not simply an idea to be abhorred but an evil that had been experienced, so that many people tended 'to identify the extreme right with the known and personally felt atrocities of fascism and nazism . . . and . . . insisted in keeping alive a much more attractive picture of what a Communist state might be in Western Europe' (p. 18).

Already in 1951 the support in votes and the party press had fallen into sharp decline as compared with the immediate postwar period. It was already apparent in France that voters sometimes transferred their support to Gaullism, which alone shared with communism an exemplary integrity at certain levels. When the opportunities of the liberation period had evaporated, communism presented itself in such a way as to collect the *no* vote and became a party of opposition determined on change rather than a doctrinaire Marxist-Stalinist movement, and the conquest of, or participation in, parliamentary power took precedence over the search for positive solutions to the economic problems of the community. These brief indications are sufficient to show that the analysis has worn supremely well, and

the three essays of the volume can now be read not only as history of the postwar period but as a source of clarification of more recent debates. The ratio of narrative to interpretation is finely judged.

Madame Kriegel first published her essay on the French Communists in 1968,[1] and offers interpretations which support and complement the earlier volume rather than supersede it. Herself an ex-communist, she followed up her distinguished research on the first Stalinisation of the French Communist Party with more accessible writing directly relevant to the standing of communism in France today. In the present essay she offers an examination of those who vote, those who read the communist press, those who join, those who commit their lives to militancy, and those selected to play a role in secret and strictly delimited decision-making and to be brought into contact with the international organisation. The membership itself is broken down by age, sex and professional status and the figures cover the period from the Congress of Tours onwards. French communists are becoming both younger and less agricultural—in conformity with overall national demographic trends—and the composition of the party is now more socially diversified. It is noteworthy that neither the bolshevisation of the 1920s nor the continued insistence on factory-based branch organisation have ensured that industrial workers preponderate. Not content with the conventional analysis of age-structure, Madame Kriegel goes on to account for the successive 'generations' that have been recruited and to relate their political attitudes to the situation prevailing at the time of their mobilisation. Each wave of recruits then bears its own characteristic mark, and the existence of disparate 'layers' in the party complicates the effects of changes in policy or tactics. Political science and history are in this and similar ways effectively combined: but Madame Kriegel is in addition a sharp personal observer, a psychologist and a human being of some residual involvement, and moreover she has sufficient academic prestige and assurance to be able to permit herself to comment on a personal and often poignant note. The transformation of the PCF into a movement at once indigenous, socialist and free is still her hope. She can infringe the requirements of historical perspective for a moment to lambast the present party for giving only lip-service to the equality of women, and she can suddenly impart to the discussion a new and spiritual, if unfashionable, dimension when she says (p. 140) that 'the slogan of happiness is the most nauseating, miserable and sterile of all the mottoes ever whispered into the ears of men'. When that bold word has once been said the more conventional, if masterly, analysis of what makes an *apparatchik* so uninspiring an individual seems incomplete without it.

Madame Kriegel is naturally more informative than the earlier authors on the internal life and stresses of the party and on the intricacies of its relations with the Soviet Union. It is possible however that in her interest in the organisational mechanisms that are used by communists in all countries she misses the wider perspective of the Christian Democrats and fails to identify some minor peculiarities as specifically French. The intensity and passion of nationalist Jacobinism could certainly receive more emphasis for the benefit of a foreign readership, but by the same token communists in France might examine whether or not its links with communist ideology are as logical and necessary as they habitually assume them to be. The authoritarianism in the PCF and the neglect of intermediary levels in the

[1] A. Kriegel. *Les Communistes français* (Paris: Seuil. 1968).

organisation fit neatly with French habits of administration as latterly analysed. The theory of the 'absolute pauperisation of the working class' could not have enjoyed the credence it did if France had not been suffering severe restrictions on consumption while the economic miracle of the postwar expansion was being prepared. Both the simple expediency that dictates electoral voting tactics and much of the persistence of Stalinism are traceable to the peculiar situation in which the French Communist Party finds itself, being obliged by the balance of forces in the opposition to seek alliances on the left and to reinforce its own internal cohesion at one and the same time. Madame Kriegel explains the idiosyncrasy of Jeanette Vermeersch's views on birth control (p. 49) as being in part motivated by a desire to see the party ranks replenished and in part the result of theoretical confusions in the reading of Lenin and Marx. Viewed from a greater distance however it looked rather as though the PCF could ill afford to dissociate itself from the pro-natalist obsession of France, which in 1956 was still accepted by the masses of the people as well as by officialdom.

Madame Kriegel has been ill served by the translation. On page 296 we read: 'From now on, the weight of national considerations will counteract the concern evoked by the socialist community; sooner or later, this community will triumph', whereas the original text conveys that 'Today national considerations already carry as much weight as the concern with the (international revolutionary) socialist community as a whole: it cannot be long before the balance tips in their favour'. Indeed, the belief that as the centralised rigid system of the international organisation crumbles national parties will inevitably in future find their own way and respect their own interests is one of the points most insistently made in this essay. Misinterpretations of equal gravity occur every few pages or so in the English version. Readers seriously interested in the way communism works will turn to the original—obtainable in any case at a fraction of the price.

M. Hilton

The Netherlands. By Max Schuchart. *London: Thames and Hudson. 1972. 160 pp. Illus. Index. (New Nations and Peoples Library.) £2·00.*

This short guide to contemporary Dutch society, politics and the economic system, although clear and accurate, compares unfavourably with the longer book on the same topic by Mr. Huggett published last year.[1]

While some chapters appear to capture the flavour of Dutch life very well, the work tends to be cursory and makes excessive use of quotations from the works of others. Mr. Schuchart is also sometimes careless in his use of statistics, neglecting to offer bases for comparison or sources. It would no doubt be churlish to demand authority for the interesting estimate that 50 per cent of Dutch priests are involved in sexual relationships (p. 130).

There are good illustrations, some useful information on Dutch art and literature, and an absorbing chapter on hydrology.

Roger Sceats

[1] London: Pall Mall. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1972, p. 320.

Norway. By Ronald G. Popperwell. *London: Ernest Benn.* 1972. *335 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Nations of the Modern World.) £3·25.*

This is the best book on Norway since Gathorne Hardy's *Norway* also published (in 1925) by Ernest Benn in their *Modern World Series*. Perhaps Gathorne Hardy dealt more in the broad sweeps of Norwegian history and culture. Dr. Popperwell goes more into detail, and the book is possibly more valuable for that reason. It is very readable. It has also the great merit of being illustrated.

The book begins, in Part I, with the emergence of Norway in the 19th century; then in Part II, it goes back to the 'Span of History', referring to the Komsa culture in Norway 11,000–12,000 years ago when the last Ice Age began to melt; then continues into the Bronze Age, when the climate took a decided change for the worse and many people must have perished from the cold, down to the Viking age of greatness, and the subsequent decline. Part III is devoted to the language question and literature; and Part IV to Norwegian life and culture in the 20th century. In the 20th century, writes Dr. Popperwell, changes in the pattern of life have been dramatic. He comments, in particular, on the radical change in the position of women. Curiously enough, no musicians of great international stature, with the exception of Kirsten Flagstad, have emerged in the 20th century. He devoted some attention to the strong individualism and passionate patriotism of the average Norwegian: 'Norwegianness is not simply allowed to be in the air everyone breathes. It has to be brought out and emphasised. Travellers to Norway will be familiar with the ubiquity of the Norwegian flag; the emphasis on the folksy; and the pervasiveness of the word *norsk* (Norwegian). One could speak of a "cult of the national"' (p. 302).

This is excellent stuff and hits the nail on the head. Some other points of interest may be noted. First of all, the author says that the peasantry in the 13th century was not so depressed in Norway as in other Scandinavian countries and in most of Europe at the time, nor were the Norwegian landowners independent feudal lords of the type found elsewhere. Norwegian landowners had a greater feeling of interest with their fellow landowners and greater attachment to the Crown than was the case in countries where the lord of the manor enjoyed far more local autonomy. In other words, Norwegian democracy goes back a very long way; and this explains the passion with which, at times, it is supported today.

Dr. Popperwell might have made more of the disastrous effects of the Reformation on Norwegian culture. It not only made Danish the only written language in the country (pp. 192 and 219). It was the abolition of the vernacular and its substitution by Danish in Church Services, that caused even more harm. As for the Norwegian merchant fleet, Dr. Popperwell points out that it was the third largest in the world, after Britain and the United States in the second half of the 19th century. But as Professor Keilhau has reminded us, in his *Det norske Folks Liv og Historie*, while Norwegian shipowners in 1880 owned 11 per cent of the world's merchant shipping, only 1 per cent was steamship tonnage. The rest were clippers and a motley assortment of sailing ships. Norwegian shipowners, thanks to their frugality, were able to run their merchant fleet more economically that way, at all events, at that time.

But I repeat: this is an excellent book and warmly to be commended.

THOMAS BARMAN

Bridge across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey. By Ferenc A. Vali. *Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1971. 410 pp. Bibliog. Index. $12.50.*

IT must be a cause of annoyance to some Turks to realise that the dramatic military and diplomatic successes of the young republic in the 1920s seem to have robbed Turkish foreign policy of its interest for non-Turkish writers. We have a vast stock of literature on the 'Eastern Question' of the 19th century but very little on Turkey's foreign relations since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The lacuna is regrettable because Turkey still occupies an important strategic position. Its foreign policy has been affected by an internal process of fundamental social and political change which has sometimes been taken as a developmental model. Any study of the foreign policy of the Turkish republic has seemed assured of a warm welcome.

As it is, Professor Vali's well-researched book, which concentrates on the period since the Second World War, does a good deal more than close a noticeable gap in the library shelves. His first two chapters summarise Turkey's international experiences during the past century and a half as well as the geographical and ideological foundations on which Turkish foreign policy rests. What he says here may be familiar reading for area specialists but will still be of use to those whose interests are more global. A subsequent chapter discusses current foreign policy attitudes of the Turkish political leadership and (so far as they can be ascertained) of the mass of Turks. This is followed by separate treatments of Turkey's relations with the United States and its other Nato partners, with the Soviet Union and its satellites and with its Middle Eastern neighbours. There is a useful statement of the Turkish role in the Cyprus dispute, some discussion of the economic aspect of Turkey's foreign relations and a concluding section which helps to put each of the author's themes in perspective.

Professor Vali's emphasis on the overriding desire of Turkey's leaders to make it an accepted member of the Western community is justified, for it is this aim which has combined with natural fears for its national security immediately after the Second World War to produce each of the major initiatives of Turkey's postwar foreign policy—its commitment to the Western alliance system of Nato and CENTO and its current progression towards eventual full membership of the EEC. His interesting discussion of the foreign policy views of rival political parties and constant reference to editorial statements in all sections of the Turkish press is equally important because contemporary Turkey affords an illuminating demonstration of a gradual democratisation of foreign policy decision making. Until the 1960s, the introduction of a competitive party system in 1950 did not seem to have made its mark on foreign policy: as the author remarks (p. 78) it had hitherto been 'considered unpatriotic to speak openly on such delicate questions'. The emergence of a vocal left wing in Turkish politics after 1961 coincided with general disappointment at the American reaction to Turkey's treatment of the Cyprus crisis of 1964 to bring about a new flexibility in Turkey's approach to the super-powers and the Arab world, a guarded rapprochement with the Soviet Union and increasing public discussion of foreign policy issues.

The writer's strictly thematic rather than chronological account of this story may however detract from the usefulness of his book. Turkey's relations with the United States, with the Soviet Union and with Cyprus are handled separately and this forces the reader to skip backwards and

forwards through the book in search of the full causes and effects of any given incident involving all four governments. The emergence of the intercommunal fighting in Cyprus in December 1963 is discussed on page 255, but one has to go back to page 130 for the American intervention of the following June and then forward to page 177 for the effect of this on Turco-Soviet relations. Professor Vali can bridge some of the gaps only by repeating himself and this has greatly lengthened his book. Conciseness and continuity may not be the only literary virtues, but its lack of them does hamper one's appreciation of this important work.

WILLIAM HALE

Western Europe since 1945: A short political history. 2nd ed. By D. W. Urwin. *London: Longman. 1972. 349 pp. Bibliog. Index. £1·50.*

The second edition of a book first published in 1968 and reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 518. To bring the book up to date, the author has added three new chapters and revised the rest of the text and the bibliography.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Uncensored Russia: The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union. The Annotated Text of the Unofficial Moscow Journal 'A Chronicle of Current Events' (Nos. 1–11.). Ed. by Peter Reddaway. Foreword by Julius Telesin. *London: Jonathan Cape. 1972. 499 pp. Illus. Index. £5·00.*

EUROPEAN Security Conference—Ostpolitik—rapprochement—detente: whatever the language, the words add up to the same dream of a more stable Europe, in which East and West reach a closer understanding and work together to solve the outstanding divisive problems. But from wherever the new initiatives are coming to achieve this, one major question must be raised: how seriously can a new view of the Soviet Union be accepted (and presumably be made the basis for future treaties) while its internal and inter-bloc policies remain as unyielding as they have been over the last decade? Indeed, on balance the situation within Eastern Europe has hardened since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Every country trying to find some way of easing the yoke of Soviet imperialism now knows concretely that force will be used if there is no other way to avoid granting concessions.

On the other hand, if there were to be some sign of a shift within the Soviet Union, some genuine move towards democracy, then completely new answers would begin to suggest themselves on the question of European security. To put it bluntly: there can be no guarantee of European security while Soviet totalitarianism and colonialism persist, while an internal change will suggest solutions almost overnight and bring Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and probably other nations swinging back into the European community at once.

All this is a preamble to pointing out the international importance of Peter Reddaway's edited and translated version of *A Chronicle of Current Events*, the most important journal to have appeared in the Soviet Union—albeit clandestinely—since the Revolution. That the politicians of Western Europe and those opinion makers responsible for developing the climate

in which detente is possible have not been queuing to receive each new number of the Chronicle is hard to credit. Yet it is a fact that the 23 issues which have so far come out of the Soviet Union have not yet received a microscopic part of the attention which was given, for example, to Khrushchev's dubious memoirs in the most shameful publishing episode of 1971. Mr. Reddaway, his team of collaborators and the admirable presentation of the publishers, with a magnificent collection of photographs included, have now removed the excuse of ignorance or language difficulties. Recent texts of the Chronicle in English may be obtained from Amnesty International.

Uncensored Russia immediately establishes itself as one of the most important books ever published on the Soviet Union. With a self-denying objectivity, admirable from the editor, almost superhuman from the Soviet compilers directly involved in the events, the progress of a nascent democratic movement is charted from 1966 to 1971. Never since before the Revolution has there been such a broadly-based movement of intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union. The analysis of it made by the Russian compilers of the Chronicle makes no wild forecasts of future success, yet its very restraint makes the voice so much the more powerful.

Mr. Reddaway's editorial method is simple. He has taken a knife to the text of the first eleven issues of the Chronicle and regrouped the resulting snippets under relevant themes, introducing each by some editorial comment and supplying links between the passages where necessary. Far from being a patchwork, the final product is far more coherent than anyone would ever be able to imagine from reading a single issue of the Chronicle. One can feel the groundswell of the movement.

Is it powerful enough even remotely to justify the first two paragraphs of this review? In terms of achievement to date—the enforcement of change upon the system—the answer is no. But the dynamics of history have their own tempi. The Soviet regime has not been able even to begin to stamp out the desire for democratic freedom, although it has introduced a battery of sledgehammers into the operation. Education and the rise of a younger generation who do not know the terror of the purges are constantly enlarging the base upon which future democracy will grow. The process may not be quick, but it cannot be stopped by anyone less than a new Stalin. History, time and human nature seem to be on the side of the editors of the Chronicle.

MICHAEL BOURDEAUX

Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union 1917–1967. Ed. by Richard H. Marshall Jr., Thomas E. Bird and Andrew Q. Blane. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1971. 489 pp. Bibliog. Index. $19.95. £8·65.*

As the cautious title implies, this book does not, despite its great length, cover all aspects of religion in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is one of the most important books on the subject ever to be published and draws together a remarkable galaxy of 18 contributors, besides the three competent editors. Ten years ago it would have been difficult to locate many qualified contributors to such a volume, except for Dr. Paul Anderson, to whom this volume is dedicated as a *Festschrift*, and the late Walter Kolarz. Within that span of time, both churches and universities have

begun to realise that not only is religion far from being dead in the Soviet Union, but that it is also a subject deserving serious study.

The stimulus for this development has come largely from within the Soviet Union itself. Many people there—Baptists, Russian Orthodox, Eastern Rite Catholics, as well as the Jews—have begun to speak for themselves, to force attention from outside by putting their case for religious liberty before the court of world public opinion. This, in its turn, stimulated Western churchmen and scholars to study that case through the words of Soviet Christians.

Here, however, is the weakest feature of *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union 1917–67*. That new voice goes unmentioned, except in one or two footnotes and tucked away into three small paragraphs of the appendix. It is not sufficient to state that its full power was not heard outside the Soviet Union until after 1967, the terminal date of the book. The new movement began in 1961, several scholars knew a great deal about it by 1966 and therefore what the book implies about the 1960s is badly out of perspective. A reasoned estimate of the importance of the new voice—Dr. Bird could have done it excellently—would have both filled a breach which is serious for the general reader and brought the work to a satisfying conclusion. The scholar will no doubt turn to other works where he can supplement his information.

However, having said this, one still recommends the book as essential reading for an understanding of the background to the present situation. Because of its very wide scope and high standard of accuracy, it is destined to be the standard work on religion in the Soviet Union for the 1970s, just as Walter Kolarz's *Religion in the Soviet Union* was throughout the 1960s.

Several of its chapters are a class above anything which has ever been published before on their respective subjects. For example, Bohdan R. Bociurkiw's 'Religion and Atheism in Soviet Society' is not only in effect the introduction to the whole book, but is probably the best short guide to its subject ever written. Dr. Bociurkiw's writings deserve to be far better known than they are.

Joshua Rothenberg writes with an encyclopaedic knowledge of the Soviet legislation on religion (Chapter 5). Some of the contributors on individual churches in the later part of the book might well have been able to improve the perspective of their own work if they had had the benefit of being able to read this chapter before beginning.

'Khrushchev's Religious Policy, 1959–64', by Donald A. Lowrie and William Fletcher, is quite the best study of this period of persecution ever written. It should be required reading not only for every single churchman who sets foot in Russia, but also for everyone who expresses an opinion on human rights in our age. What a supposedly civilised nation could do to a major sector of its society is here set out in a mere 24 pages of text. Every point is documented with accuracy and no 'opinion' of the authors obtrudes. This onslaught upon the Church provided the stimulus for the vocal reply, mentioned above.

Not all of the more specialised chapters on individual religions and Christian denominations grouped in the second half of the book are up to the uniformly high standard achieved in the earlier section. There are no serious inaccuracies, but some chapters are not as penetrating as others. Those on the Georgian Orthodox and the Armenian Churches (Elie Melia and Mesrob K. Krikorian) are particularly disappointing: Trans-Caucasus is frequently visited by tourists, yet nothing authoritative has ever been

published on the post-revolutionary history of religion in either. These chapters do not take us beyond what Kolarz said on the same subjects eleven years ago. A special chapter on the Ukraine in this section would also have been welcome. Nevertheless, there are many other contributions to justify the ambitious design of the editors: to provide both scholar and general reader with the most accurate survey ever published of an important and complex subject.

MICHAEL BOURDEAUX

Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. By Roy Medvedev. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 566 pp. Index. £5·75.*

THIS is a regrettably retarded review of a work whilh has already been very competently reviewed by experts in the field, elsewhere. There is little left for me to add to these appreciations of Roy Medvedev's success in producing this scholarly analysis of all the phases of Stalin's career in spite of the harassments and restrictions under which he laboured in his researches. Nothing daunted by the usual ban on such works, he even presented his book for publication to the literary authorities in Moscow before it reached the West clandestinely for publication. If this book were available to Soviet readers it should greatly enlighten them about many of the odious ramifications of Stalinism still largely covered by an official curtain of silence or distortion. For the most part, this is familiar territory in the West, especially after Robert Conquest's major work on the trials and terror of the 1930s.[1] Nevertheless, Mr. Medvedev has been able to elucidate many incidents and events in greater depth by using unpublished materials and personal interviews hitherto unknown to Western students of this subject.

While few will disagree with the broad outline of his history of Stalinism, some of Mr. Medvedev's interpretations and conclusions cannot be so easily accepted. This largely arises from the fact that in spite of the terrible record of ' socialism ' under Stalin, with which he is so familiar, Medvedev remains an incorrigible Marxist-Leninist and is therefore at pains to find a Marxist interpretation for events which would seem to the non-Marxist far from convincing, if not at times ridiculous. In the first place, Medvedev's unwavering belief in Lenin's omniscience blinds him to the origin of Stalin's despotic reign of terror in Lenin's arbitrary conduct of the dictatorship of the proletariat and introduction of the terror after 1917. His Marxist view ' of the decisive role played by the masses in history ' leads him to the astonishing conclusion that it was ' the masses, aroused by the socialist revolution, who managed to check and later to overcome many of the harmful consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality ' (p. 566). Not surprisingly, no details are given of what the masses actually did to check the Stalin cult or its harmful consequences. I find Medvedev's comments on Svetlana Stalin's (Alliluyevna) *Twenty Letters to a Friend*[2] excessively nasty. If he finds the book untruthful, insincere and highly distorted, one wonders how he can unquestionably accept her account of her father's death *in toto*?

VIOLET CONOLLY

[1] *The Great Terror* (London: Macmillan. 1968). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 530.

[2] London: Hutchinson. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*. April 1968, p. 345.

The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Operations 1565–1970. By Ronald Hingley. *London: Hutchinson. 1970. 305 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·00.*

THIS is a fascinating and brilliantly organised book, which must be essential reading for anybody wanting to understand the historical forces that have shaped Soviet communism and the realities of Soviet life today. The author appears to agree entirely with Vladimir Nabokov's view that Russian history can be treated 'First as the evolution of the police . . . and second, as the development of a marvellous culture'. But the reader who cannot agree with this point of view will still find this book illuminating as well as provoking. For this reviewer, the dominant conclusion derived from the book is that the crimes and inhumanity of the Soviet regime do not stem from its Marxist ideology, but are due to the fact that the Soviet state has been created by Russians who have been unable or unwilling to overcome their past.

Although this is not the author's intention, his book explains why Trotsky and his followers, with their clear understanding of the heritage of barbarism shaping the ideas and actions of the majority of Russians, did not stand any chance of success in their conflict with Stalin, the Georgian who had unashamedly embraced the darkest and most Asiatic elements of Russian history and rehabilitated them in the name of Marxism-Leninism. Above all, Hingley's book explains why the purges and the mass terror were possible. The first chapter traces back to the *Oprichnina* the antecedents of the kind of mentality that could conceive and execute the purges and extermination of entire groups of people. The following chapters, describing the creation and development of the secret police from Peter the Great to the last days of tsardom, do more than explain the transformation of the Soviet state into a police state. Above all, they help us to understand why the majority of Russians wanted to believe in the charges levelled against the victims of the purges.

The book also throws valuable light on the Soviet Union and its rulers as they are today. One may disagree with Ronald Hingley's pessimistic assessment of the chances of success of the anti-Stalinist and liberal forces in the Soviet Union of today, but one must treat it with respect. And it is not only the concluding chapters of the book, 'Beria and the MVD/MGB', 'The KGB under Khrushchev', 'The KGB after Khrushchev' and 'Conclusion', that help us to understand the present. It is equally illuminating to learn or to be reminded that the precedent for locking up in asylums those intellectuals who are regarded as politically dangerous goes back not only to the practices of the Russian Orthodox Church, but to the reign of Nicholas I. After Pyotr Chaadayev had published his first 'Philosophical Letter' in *The Telescope* in 1836, in which he attacked the Russian Orthodox Church and described Russia as too primitive to have its own history, the journal was closed, its editor, N. I. Nadezhdin, was exiled to Siberia, and Chaadayev was branded as a lunatic and on the Tsar's personal order subjected to medical 'treatment' for one year. Equally, the fate of Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn is made easier to understand by Hingley's description of how tsardom dealt with Pushkin and Lev Tolstoy.

R. AINSZTEIN

The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. Ed. by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron. *London: Butterworths. 1971. 478 pp. Index. £5·50.*

THIS is a large and solid book of readings of previously published articles for students of Soviet foreign policy. It contains six parts whose subjects might be rendered as: Introduction; Domestic Politics; Communist Ideology and Belief Systems; Western Diplomacy, International Communism and the Cold War; Competitive Coexistence; the Third World; Retrospect and Prospect. In all, there are 31 contributions. Most of the authors hold positions at American universities. The editors contribute a general introduction and introductory essays which preface each of the parts.

It is not claimed that the book covers comprehensively all aspects of Soviet foreign policy. The editors have stressed ideology, the origins of the cold war and competitive coexistence while de-emphasising international communism, international law, international organisations, foreign policy elites, and policy making institutions. There is very little about economics and virtually nothing about geography. The editors are aware of these limitations, and point out that the selection is intended to complement *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67* by Adam B. Ulam [1] and *Soviet Foreign Policy* by Jan Triska and David Finley [2]; furthermore, treatment of all aspects in depth would have demanded a longer and more expensive book. Instead they preferred to treat in depth *certain* aspects.

The concluding article, by Marshall D. Shulman, is not in any sense a summing-up of the whole. Indeed, there is no consensus of views, for the editors have chosen studies which present alternative viewpoints, and which in their experience stimulate classroom discussion. Several of the articles are rather badly dated, or take up extreme positions; for instance, it is difficult to agree that a mistaken interpretation of 'totalitarianism' can have been responsible for so many ills as are ascribed to it by Herbert J. Spiro and Benjamin R. Barber. I personally was most impressed by the articles about Soviet ideology and foreign policy by Richard Lowenthal and Adam B. Ulam. A dichotomy emerges between the views of the 'new revisionists', who seek the origins of the cold war in American rather than Soviet foreign policy, and their opponents, who place the emphasis on Stalinism. The former place such emphasis on the United States that some sections of the book could fit within a symposium entitled alternatively 'The Conduct of US Foreign Policy'. Except in the discussion of the origins of the cold war, the foreign policies of European states in relation to the Soviet Union are ignored. It is indeed the interaction of Soviet and American foreign policies which the book best illuminates, as in the important article by Robert C. Tucker, 'United States—Soviet Cooperation: Incentives and Obstacles'. Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World is examined very usefully by Roger E. Kanet, Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier and Walter C. Clemens Jr. Analysis of Soviet policy towards communist bloc states is conspicuously absent.

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS

[1] London: Secker and Warburg. 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 532.
[2] New York: Macmillan. 1968.

Russian Agriculture: A Geographic Survey. By Leslie Symons. *London: Bell. 1972. 348 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Bell's Advanced Economic Geographies. Gen. ed.: R. O. Buchanan.) £4·00.*

THE author of this book is Senior Lecturer in the geography of Russia in the University of Swansea. His primary purpose is to present a detailed analysis of climatic and soil conditions throughout Russia's vast territories, and the agricultural pattern that has evolved from these conditions. Such a study is basic to an understanding of social, economic and political questions.

One striking fact is the small proportion of Russian lands that can be used for agriculture at all—little more than 25 per cent. The list of obstacles to successful farming within this restricted setting is formidable, water shortage being the worst. Other hazards are the intense winter cold, late springs and short summers; strong winds that increase evaporation and intensify droughts; widespread susceptibility to frost, with soil-freezing and perma-frost in eastern and northern areas. Remedial measures demand more time and money than have so far been made available for complete success. Artificial drainage for the reclamation of marshlands, the building of shelterbelts to lessen wind erosion, and of irrigation systems to make cultivation possible in arid or semi-arid conditions, all need to be extended. Requirements for increased use of mineral fertilisers and agricultural machinery to modernise and mechanise farming activities are not yet being fully met. Until they are, agricultural production in the Soviet Union will remain below Western standards.

The effect of adverse physical conditions has been exacerbated by the evolution of a political system based on authoritarianism and repression. Stalin's crushing of farming incentive in order to secure resources for rapid industrialisation 'robbed farmers of their hard-earned gains . . .' and left them 'politically at the mercy of central and local administrators and Party directives, which seemed perversely calculated to make the job of practical farmers even harder than nature had made it' (p. 306).

Mr. Symons's stimulating book underlines two important points, viz., the validity of the Russians' claim that their country has been a 'step-child' of history as well as of nature, and the futility of making direct comparisons of crop yields in the Soviet Union with those in other countries where conditions are not comparable. It is not widely appreciated, for example, that 'the U.S.S.R. lies in latitudes almost wholly north of the U.S.A.' (p. 181).

The present Soviet leaders are firmly committed to raising the standard of living of their people, and this they can only do by giving their agriculturists a fairer deal than they have ever had in the past. It is a valuable service to set out in objective terms what will have to be done to accomplish this, as well as to enable Soviet agriculture to feed its own people more adequately, and even in the future to make some contribution to world food shortages. On these matters the author's viewpoint is one of cautious optimism.

MARGARET MILLER

Modernization and Political-Tension Management: A Socialist Society in Perspective: Case Study of Poland. By Dennis Clark Pirages. Foreword by Jan F. Triska. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 260 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs.) £6·25.*

THIS book is one product of a collective research effort undertaken at Stanford University with the aim of producing a long-range study of communist states. As his contribution to the project Professor Pirages has set out to examine the relationship between modernisation or industrialisation and societal decision making in Poland with a view to appraising whether the decision making process has become more open. Poland is an ideal country in which to attempt such an investigation, especially if the researcher follows, as does Professor Pirages, the hypotheses advanced by political scientists like Sidney Verba, Seymour Lipset and Gabriel Almond, that there is a tendency for modernising societies to move towards more open forms of government. It has been a predominantly agricultural land undergoing industrialisation and urbanisation, and for more than a quarter of a century has been under the domination of the Communist Party—an organisation not renowned for favouring open forms of consultation and decision making. In addition, Poland has a well established tradition of sociological research, and although there have been periodic setbacks in the freedom given to academics, much relevant material is available.

Professor Pirages has drawn widely on this and presents many findings that would otherwise be inaccessible to most readers. But it is regrettable that he has devoted well over a third of his short—but not inexpensive—book to summaries of the observations of eminent Western political sociologists who are interested in the phenomenon of social change, and whose works are standard texts. A few brief working definitions would surely have sufficed to tell the reader the purpose and framework of the study. Even worse, Professor Pirages is prone to stating the obvious. Remarks like 'Socialist revolutions have enjoyed less than universal popularity with the citizens' (p. 108) seem out of place in a work which, by virtue of its subject matter, is aimed at the specialist rather than the general student. Professor Pirages is at his most valuable when he discusses research by Polish sociologists which would be of interest both to the sociologist and the student of East European affairs. However, when he resorts to Pearson Product Moment Correlations to explain subjects like 'communication development and highly correlated variables', this reviewer was unable in interpret the figures and did not find adequate explanations in the text. The purpose of Professor Pirages's study is admirable; the result is less pleasing.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Poland's Industrialization Policy: A Current Analysis. Sources of Economic Growth and Retrogression. Volume I in Industrialization and Planning Under Polish Socialism. By George R. Feiwel. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1971. 748 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £10·50.*

Problems in Polish Economic Planning: Continuity, Change, and Prospects. Volume II in Industrialization and Planning Under Polish Socialism. By George R. Feiwel. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1971. 454 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·50.*

THESE 1,200 pages, making two formidable volumes, offer the most complete source, known to the present reviewer, of information on Poland's most recent economic history. This alone makes it invaluable to the student of the subject. But the author has set himself two additional objectives, and both are extremely exacting.

One is the study—from the Polish example—of the fundamentals of a planned socialist economy. Specifically, as Dr. Feiwel puts it, it is concerned with the dynamics, growth determinants and barriers and *modus operandi* of such an economy. Patently such an approach—we may call it, from the particular to the general—has its pitfalls. The working of what we classify as an economic system may be more successful in one country and less so in another (and Feiwel focuses precisely on the system's empirically established efficiency). To draw inferences from Poland's post-1945 experience in mandatory planning for socialism in general (or for that matter, for its Soviet version) is not much safer than, say, to draw conclusions for capitalism in general from the performance of the Polish pre-1945 competitive market capitalism. It is precisely a great merit—one of the many merits—of this book that, in a scholarly, careful exercise, it tries to separate analytically those elements in the Polish experiment that may be related to the specific environment, and along these lines to distil those which may lend themselves to meaningful generalisation.

Even more exacting is the second of the additional goals which Feiwel set himself. It is a confrontation of the Polish experiment with some theoretical models of socialist economic mechanism and of economic growth which we owe to the world famous Polish economists, Lange and Kalecki, in particular to the latter (one of the volumes is dedicated to his memory). Again, relating real life to a model—that is, by definition, an 'idealised' construct—has its inherent traps; and again the virtue of this book is the author's effort to avoid these traps. The present exercise will be of still greater general interest since in the later years of his life, Kalecki was involved in economic practice—in strategic planning in his own country; and in addition to the Kaleckian work *in abstracto*, Feiwel himself refers to Kalecki's contribution to the application of his ideas, his views, appraisals and forecasts.

This work is certain to be for a long time central to any discussion of its subject.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe. Ed. by E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 210 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs.) £6·00.*

THE prevailing fashion for publishing random collections of essays by a variety of authors on a convenient central theme has some advantages for the editors and for their colleagues who are given an outlet for their occasional papers. For the readers, the exercise is of less use: the contribu-

tions are frequently unequal in quality and far too often they relate only marginally to the central theme. The book under review suffers from all these disadvantages. In addition it is outrageously expensive—£6 for 200 pages of IBM-set, offset litho printwork, without justified margins, without an index, and with the footnotes irritatingly grouped at the ends of chapters rather than at the foot of the page. The title of the collection is not an exact description of the contents—there are essays on several aspects of the effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in various selected areas, which appear to have been arbitrarily chosen, presumably in accordance with what was available at the time. Why is there a discussion of the economic effects in Yugoslavia, without any attempt to deal with the political impact? The effects on drama are included, but there is no mention of the arguably more interesting consequences for the cinema. There is an adequate, though outdated discussion of 'Czechoslovakia and the Future of Soviet Foreign Policy' (a repeat of an article in *Internationale Spectator* by Roger E. Kanet) but there is nothing at all about the effect of the crisis on the integrative organisations in Eastern Europe—the Warsaw Pact and Comecon.

However, there are some interesting and stimulating contributions. The analysis of opinion polls in Czechoslovakia during the Dubcek months, by Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, although not strictly relevant to the book's declared theme and concerned with polls based on very small samples, provides some insight into the progress of the crisis and the processes by which Dubcek and his colleagues lost control over the situation. Hana Benesova's article on 'Czech literature in the 1968 Crisis' would have been more valuable had it gone beyond 1968—as it stands it illustrates once again the intellectual arrogance of Czech writers with their obsession dating back to 1918 that they, in some mystical way, have been chosen to act as the 'nation's conscience'. Ivan Svitak's contributions come up to expectation—they are written with sincere passion, but they reflect the disillusioned Marxist's pessimism about the future of democratic socialism; it would have been valuable had Svitak been able to develop his thesis that Dubcek's failure in Czechoslovakia 'portends the failure of the humanistic version of Marxist theory applied by Yugoslavia' (p. 64). Dubcek's 'socialism with a human face' was defeated by outside interference; Tito's compromise in Yugoslavia seems to be threatened primarily by internal nationalistic pressures: it would be interesting to trace the construction of Svitak's hypothesis. But the book is too short and too superficial for that—it goes on quickly to glance at Hungarian and Polish attitudes, at the theatre and at the economic effects on Yugoslavia.

Perhaps the most useful chapters are those which deal with the Romanian reaction and which try to compare the Hungarian revolution in 1956 with the Czechoslovak crisis twelve years later. E. Bennett Warnsstrom's eyewitness account of the courageous posture adopted by Ceausescu, with the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of Romania, is vivid and full of real understanding of the East European dilemma. An attempt to analyse Bucharest's diplomatic offensive in face of the alleged danger of Soviet action against Romania would have increased the value of this contribution.

The comparison of 1956 and 1968 by Ivan Volgyes is thoughtful, but it is difficult to accept his view that 'in the long run, the Czechoslovak revolution was more successful than its Hungarian predecessor' (p. 130)—a

conclusion which could hardly stand up to a comparison of the state of Hungary under Kadar today with the condition of Husak's Czechoslovakia.

On the whole, an expensive curate's egg of a book—only good in parts.

OTTO PICK

Social Change and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia. By Jaroslav Krejci. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 207 pp. Index. (Political and Social Processes in Eastern Europe.) £3·95.*

Political Groupings in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement. By Vladimir V. Kusin. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 224 pp. Index. (Political and Social Processes in Eastern Europe.) £3·95.*

HAVE we heard everything we ought to know about the endeavours to build in Czechoslovakia a socialism with a human face, a slogan neither coined nor even first used by Dubcek? After the many attempts to exploit the exciting events of 1968 in hastily written commentaries often containing factual errors, we are now confronted with more serious works which try to go deeper into the matter and to present a much more sober picture. Into this category belong two heavily documented and closely argued books presented by two Czech scientists who came to this country in or after 1968.

Jaroslav Krejci, an economist and sociologist, has for the first time analysed the sociological changes in Czechslovakia's population since 1945, caused in the first instance by the enforced removal of more than two million Germans (with a higher percentage of industrial workers than among the Czechs) and furthermore by the country's transformation into one of the most subservient outposts of Moscow orthodoxy. His book does not make easy reading. Many of the conclusions at which he has arrived after ardent research only confirm the obvious—for example, that the class of persons classified (and discriminated against) as 'capitalist', which in 1950 formed 3·1 per cent. of the population, had disappeared altogether by 1969. But some of his findings are of great interest. He establishes that the relative position of women within the scale of incomes has by no means improved since the war and has even deteriorated as a consequence of a greater supply of qualified women in the labour force. The fact that the proportion of party members among heads of families is much greater than among the population as a whole—in 1967 the respective figures were 33·0 and 4·2 per cent.—seems to prove that membership in the governing party was at least at that time widely regarded as a kind of social insurance.

Vladimir V. Kusin investigates in great detail the nature and activities of the various political and ideological groupings outside the Communist Party which contributed to make the Czechoslovakia of 1968 such a unique experience. As an intellectual, the author naturally devotes much of his attention to the revolt of the writers, artists and other members of the intelligentsia, but he also gives a good picture of the sweeping changes the trade union movement underwent during that troubled period and he does not neglect any other group with a share in the process of regeneration, slight as this share may be. The great number of unfamiliar names may be somewhat bewildering for the English reader, but Kusin's is a most conscientious work. His facts are all correct and his analysis clearly

reflects the basic dilemma which confronted the reformers of whatever shade of opinion and position in society: in order to assert themselves, they all had to insist on a clean break with the immediate past and above all on complete freedom of expression, while at the same time trying to avoid as far as possible Soviet wrath. Could we in the circumstances really blame them for their inability to square the circle? The author certainly tries hard to be fair to everybody concerned, but some of his criticism of individual acts or omissions by some of the reformers seem somewhat coloured by the easy wisdom of hindsight.

J. W. BRUEGEL

The Doomed Democracy: Czechoslovakia in a Disrupted Europe 1914–38. By Vera Olivova. Trans. by George Theiner. Introduction by Sir Cecil Parrott. *London: Sidgwick & Jackson. 1972. 276 pp. Illus. Index. £4·50.*

THIS book is described on its jacket as 'an admirably objective account of the destruction of Czechoslovakia by the signatories of the Munich Agreement'. Anybody who is acquainted with Czechoslovak affairs, and who knew the country's political leaders, would hesitate to agree with that description. Presented to us as 'one of the most perceptive and distinguished Marxist historians', Dr. Olivova exaggerates the chances missed in Czechoslovakia by the Third International as organiser of European revolution after the First World War. She condemns Poland for defending itself against the advance of the Red Army, forgetting that the Polish victory of 1920 saved Europe in general and Czechoslovakia in particular.

Describing the foreign policy of Edvard Benes, Dr. Olivova recognises that Locarno dealt 'the first serious blow to Czechoslovakia's international position', and that the Four Power Pact of 1933 'put its existence in jeopardy'. Dr. Olivova seems to believe that Czechoslovak security was increased by the transformation of the Little Entente into a sort of triple alliance, obviously ignoring the fact that such an alliance could be effective against Hungary alone, whereas Germany was the potential aggressor. True, since 1924 Czechoslovakia was linked with France by a political accord without any accompanying military convention. In 1935 Benes went to Moscow to sign a treaty of mutual assistance which expressly stated that the Soviet Union would come to Czechoslovakia's help only if France had already done so. But Benes never accepted Polish proposals for a defensive alliance against the common danger. A mediocre politician, Benes was devoid of all heroic spirit. To the bitter end he was deluding himself that he would be able to make a good bargain with Germany.

Dr. Olivova's book is most unsatisfactory as history, especially as she neither mentions her sources nor provides even the shortest bibliography.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MIDDLE EAST

Revolution in the Middle East and other case studies. Ed. by P. J. Vatikiotis. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 232 pp. (School of Oriental and African Studies: Studies on Modern Asia and Africa No. 9.) £3·75.*

Political Dynamics in the Middle East. Ed. by Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander. *New York: American Elsevier. 1972. 666 pp. Index. (The Middle East: Economic and Political Problems and Prospects. Studies from a research program of the Rand Corporation and Resources for the Future, Inc. Program Director: Sidney S. Alexander.) $ ca. 25.25.*

THE papers edited and introduced by Professor Vatikiotis were originally presented at a seminar held by the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Two are concerned with semantic issues in both European and Middle Eastern languages, six deal with specific examples of revolution, rebellion and reform in the Arab Middle East, North Africa and Iran while three others discuss the pattern of revolutions in Eastern Europe, Latin America and China.

What the volume shows is the great diversity of usage in the term revolution and how many elements are subsumed in this misleadingly simple word. The editor has stressed in his brief, but penetrating, introduction the remarkable lack of one of these elements, that of political organisation, which could increase participation and so sustain a true revolution in the Middle East. The machinery which is needed to mount a *coup d'état* is simple—indeed the details are described in several well-known books—but a real revolution requires inventive administrative structures, the creation of a fresh political identity and the formulation of a new basis for popular and active loyalty. Such tasks are hard, and many of the leaders of Middle Eastern coups have been unwilling—if not totally unable—to face them. The lack of sustaining institutions is, as Professor Bernard Lewis points out in his illuminating contribution, 'Islamic concepts of revolution', no new phenomenon. The classical Islamic political doctrine was essentially one of obedience amounting to quietism, for the duty of the devout Muslim was to comply with the commands of the Imam. Only if the Imam was to order something contrary to the law of God were disobedience and resistance permissible. Even this, however, provided little basis for justified revolution because there were few discussions of how the wickedness of a command could be tested and even fewer attempts to create the machinery which could force the ruler to return to the path of righteousness.

The book edited by Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander, who also writes the Foreword, consists of 15 chapters most of which deal with the politics of the Middle East on a country-by-country basis. The policies of the two super-powers as well as of Great Britain and Western Europe also receive separate treatment while two chapters look at the issue of the Palestinian refugees. The approaches taken by the individual contributors vary greatly—from the historical to the sociological survey—and some chapters waver uneasily between analysis and prophecy. The author of the Foreword is Professor of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and this background has perhaps led him to over-emphasise the importance of American-Soviet activity in the area. Even if a detente between the super-powers could be implemented, there are few signs that this would ensure progress towards peace in the Middle East. Although the chairmen of rival boards may come to a limiting agreement, the managers of local branches and subsidiaries may be reluctant to follow their directives—and in some cases the local branches have the resources to maintain this independent attitude.

A final, but increasingly frequent, reviewer's note—both books are marred by minor typographical errors. Do publishers' proof-readers no longer exist?

R. M. BURRELL

Nasser. By Anthony Nutting. *London: Constable. 1972. 492 pp. Illus. Index. £3·95.*

ANTHONY NUTTING'S *Nasser* is one of a number of recent studies devoted to an analysis of the role played by Egypt's late President in the history of his own country and of the rest of the Arab world. But in spite of a number of virtues it is in many ways the least satisfactory. For one thing it concentrates almost exclusively on foreign policy and has almost nothing to say about developments inside Egypt itself. As a result, it is probably inevitable that the author should look at the making of Egyptian policy as though it was virtually an autonomous exercise carried on without relation to internal pressures. More important, it is only by ignoring domestic events that Nutting is able to come to the conclusion that, after the break-up of the union with Syria, 'it was downhill all the way' for Nasser. And yet viewed in a wider perspective it was only after 1961 that the regime began to make its major contribution to Egyptian economic development by means of the investment programme contained in the first five-year plan, the extension of the system of supervised co-operatives, and many other measures.

A second major criticism concerns the absence of references. In certain types of biography this might not matter very much. But in the case of a work which relies so heavily on information gained in conversations with the author's Egyptian friends it is vital to know the source of each particular story or impression. As it is, although it is obvious that Nutting's descriptions of the in-fighting between the important members of the regime is coloured by his talks with such men as Zacharia Mohieddin and Mohamed Heikel, it is difficult to say in what ways and by how much.

Where the author is at his best is in his description of events with which he himself was closely connected, such as the making of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, the decision to withdraw the American offer to provide money for the first stage of the Aswan dam and, of course, the Suez invasion of 1956. But he also has much of interest to say about many other aspects of Nasser's foreign policy. And in general it would be difficult to quarrel with his two major conclusions—first, that while in the 1950s Nasser derived considerable advantage from his ability to influence the policies of his neighbours, he was soon to become very much a prisoner of the Arab nationalism he had done so much to promote and, second, that Egypt's best interests always lay in trying to steer a middle course between total reliance on either America or Russia.

As for the character of Nasser himself, much remains an enigma. Nutting undoubtedly knew him about as well as any other non-Arab and, as his report of the interview he had with the President just before the June War shows, he was able, on occasions, to talk to him with considerable frankness. But this is not enough, for example, to allow him even to begin to speculate about why Nasser allowed Marshal Amer to remain at the head of Egypt's armed forces so long after he had demonstrated frightening weaknesses in the job.

Perhaps one series of clues to the character of the man might be

found if writers were to follow the admirable lead given by George Vaucher in his *Gamal Abdel Nasser et son Equipe* [1] and say more about the President's earlier years and, in particular, what it was like to be a member of such a class at such a time. How, for example, would he have been taught to view the world and Egypt's place in it? Without more attention to problems of this kind much will remain obscure.

ROGER OWEN

The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics. Ed. by Derek Hopwood. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 320 pp. Maps. Index. (School of Oriental and African Studies: Studies on Modern Asia and Africa No. 8) £4·25.*

THIS is Number 8 in the series of Studies on Modern Asia and Africa from the School of Oriental and African Studies, and consists of papers read at a three day conference jointly sponsored by the Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College, Oxford, and the School, held in London in March 1969.

The papers were prepared for publication by the Librarian of the Oxford Middle East Centre, Dr. Hopwood, who himself presented a paper on Western Studies of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Aden. This gives a genuinely critical but necessarily cursory account of about forty of the more important books on these territories published between 1946 and 1968, though some were written earlier. It brings out the great difficulty of finding any unified pattern in which to contain an 'area study' of the Arabian Peninsula.

The remainder of the volume is divided into four parts—History, Political Developments and International Relations, Sociology and Culture, and Economics. Each part illustrates the problem of unity. There are five papers in the History section and the writers approach their subjects from several different viewpoints. Professor Abu Hakima gives a useful, if rather pedestrian, account of the development of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States. He sticks closely to facts and concentrates on describing the near-contemporary changes in methods of administration and the beginnings of a wider sharing of political decision. His study brings out the greater degree of Western penetration of the societies at the head of the Gulf, but does not attempt any deep analysis. In similar fashion George Rentz, formerly an Arab Adviser to Aramco, traces the history of the Wahhabi State from its 18th century origins into the 1920s but, unlike Professor Abu Hakima, his emphasis is on the period before the discovery of oil.

Mr. Wilkinson's approach is quite different. His interest lies in 'the origins of the tribal pattern', and he believes that in its relationship to the Ibadi imamate 'the fundamental issues affecting "national" unity can be understood' (p. 67). His study digs deeply into the problem which has beset Islam from its beginnings. How to combine the religious with the temporal aims of the state, and the failure of the former to transform, and of the latter to transcend, the intensity of tribal rivalry with its ideals of honour and revenge. This foretaste whets the appetite for 'the much

[1] Paris: Julliard. 2 vols. 1959–60. Vol. I reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1960, p. 537.

larger study he is preparing on Oman' (p. 86). Mr. Wilkinson concentrates on the internal problems of Oman, while Mr. Bathurst looks at its external trade up to 1728, a period which covers the beginnings of the European maritime irruption of the Portuguese into the Gulf. Professor Kelly carries on the story of this irruption, and its effect on Oman down to our own time.

The section on Political Developments and International Relations begins with Mr. Kelidar's look at the recent history of the Peninsula from the standpoint of the inter-Arab power struggle. 'A dominant feature in the modern history of Arab politics has been the struggle for the leadership of the Arab countries. This has invariably been undertaken in the name of Arab unity', he begins. This truism has even now been inadequately grasped by journalists, and this lies at the root of much Western misunderstanding about contemporary Middle Eastern affairs. Mr. Burrell's analysis of Anglo-Persian relations between the wars is particularly valuable now that Iran (supported by the West) is beginning to take over the British position as the wielder of ultimate authority in the Gulf; while Mr. Stoakes provides a very interesting attempt at an analysis of how social and political change is taking place in the oil producing principalities. Like Mr. Wilkinson's essay, this makes one look forward to the 'more detailed and comprehensive exercise in structural-functional analysis' (p. 189) which Mr. Stoakes promises us.

This reviewer has little competence to discuss the remaining two sections on sociology and economics. They range from the fascinating detail of 'Measuring the Changing Family Consumption Patterns of Aramco's Saudi Arab Employees, 1962 and 1968' by Thomas O'Shea to the magisterial swoop of 'Oil and State in Arabia' by Professor Penrose.

Any Middle Eastern library will need this book, though few readers will wish to read all the papers with equal attention.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

Economic Development in Iran 1900–1970. By Julian Bharier. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1971. 314 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·75.*

THE time has passed when it was possible to welcome each and every book on the Iranian economy. Given the flow of quality publications from Iran itself in both the English and Persian languages a more critical approach is necessary towards new Western studies. Increasing knowledge of agrarian affairs and a wealth of social studies throughout the country by a variety of indigenous and foreign students of Iran has done so much to elucidate the unique cultural influences upon the course of economic change in Iran that statistical examination of the economy in isolation appears to be a somewhat arid exercise. Julian Bharier's recent book, therefore, must be examined in a context different from its predecessors published only a few years ago.

Economic development in Iran, 1900–1970 sets its sights apparently high. In fact, as the author himself admits, the volume ultimately seeks only to analyse aspects of capital formation and national income data for the period specified. Economic development in the broader context is generally ignored and Bharier makes little effort to suggest why the Iranian experience in economic planning and development is so different from its neighbours or other oil exporting states in general. Important aspects of

regional variations in development are glossed over in order to present a concise history of centralised national accounts. The generalisations resulting from this treatment can serve only to mislead those without a deeper knowledge of this country, where regional deviation from the statistical norm makes nonsense of country-wide generalisations.

Bharier has tended also to become over-reliant upon statistical sources in compiling his data. Despite an admirable coverage of the sources, some of which have been utilised for the first time, the author makes the unjustified assumption that any statistics are better than none. Particularly in his treatment of the agricultural sector, which plays a significant role even to the present day, Bharier tends to accept fragmentary and often unreliable and inconsistent material as a basis for generalisation. Almost no account is taken of the importance of livestock as an element in rural capital formation, despite the considerable evidence from Iraq,[1] that livestock provides the largest single component of rural income in communities in this area. Certainly, assessments made of the Iranian economy before 1945 have been distorted by failure to take account of this factor.

Meanwhile, commitment to a statistical approach has led to a bias by the author in his selection of sources. It is evident that much of his material has been taken from non-Persian language material and has tended to be derived from the reports of foreign interests operating in Iran since these were a readily available source of figures. Often, however, commercial, consular and bank representatives in Iran were forced to make guesses concerning economic life from the flimsiest sources, frequently generalising from an extremely narrow regional base in the villages surrounding the large towns. In consequence, the authoritative presentation of material in this volume gives a false appearance of statistical impeccability, which the author himself would be the first to dispute.

Bharier has permitted himself the dangerous luxury of forecasting ahead from 1970 on the basis of his data for the 1900–1970 period. He suggests that the rate of economic growth attained in the 1960s will prove difficult to maintain during the 1970s, since the rate of growth in oil revenues will decrease in the decade following 1970. It is already clear that such pessimism is not justified. Indeed, all estimates of world oil demand in the 1970s have for some years indicated that the revenues of oil exporting countries would rise rapidly, partly as a function of the increasing volume of oil demanded by the industrialised countries and partly as a function of rising unit prices paid for oil. At the same time, the rapid development of processing industries using hydro-carbon resources indicates that Iran is increasingly bent upon lifting the element of value added in its petroleum and gas exports to augment its per unit take. In this situation, there are good prospects that there will be a steady increase in the flow of oil revenues to the Iranian exchequer for much of the 1970s and a rate of growth for the economy as a whole either similar to or possibly above that achieved in the 1960s.

Julian Bharier's book, despite these criticisms, has much to offer. It presents the first scholarly analysis of trends in national income over a period including the last years of Qajar rule, the formative years of the reign of Reza Shah and the inception of the modernisation of Iran together with the 29 years of the present Shah's reign in the second half of which,

[1] K. Haseeb, *The National Income of Iraq 1953–1961* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 1964). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1965, p. 345.

with some fluctuations, Iran has undergone rapid economic and social change. The volume, above all else, provides consistent series of data covering capital formation, economic growth and trends in per capita income which are not available elsewhere. It must also be conceded that Bharier's work is nothing if not painstaking, and his material is drawn from a variety of interesting and often new sources. For these characteristics, the volume will become a valuable work of reference for students of the Iranian economy.

K. S. McLachlan

Palestine Papers 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict. Compiled and annotated by Doreen Ingrams. *London: John Murray. 1972. 198 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

It was an admirable idea on the part of Mrs. Ingrams to collect in a single, and not lengthy, volume the *ipsissima verba* of all the essential papers in the Cabinet and the Foreign and Colonial Offices' files concerning the introduction by the British Government into Arab Palestine of organised, militant Zionism in and after 1917; and she rightly adds the text of some of the elsewhere reported speeches, letters, memoranda, etc of the time by notable speakers, writers, statesmen and eminent Zionists up to the period 1921/22.

Mrs. Ingrams's admirable chronological arrangement of all this material, with her minimum of editorial notes, allows it to tell its own story: the story, that is, of how, month by month, British Cabinet Ministers, advised by their staffs, moved towards decisions destined to lead to endless injustice, disorder and bloodshed on an international scale: how they ignored or rejected most of the factual information, and the well-based forebodings, of the best-informed officials and advisers in Palestine and in Whitehall: how they closed their minds to the literally unanimous views—and the already threatened reactions—of the Arab population and yielded instead, fatally, to the well-organised pressures and personalities of able and resolute Zionist leaders.

Often when historians review some outstandingly unwise or unjust act of a country's government they are able to urge, in partial excuse, 'Yes, but they couldn't, at that time, know the full facts and factors in the case; their errors were those of ignorance.' But in the matter of ill-fated Palestine this cannot reasonably be alleged. All the Arab attitudes of indignant rejection which were bound to follow the implementation of the Zionist claims were, from 1918 onwards, already and visibly in being, and were reported with force and clarity to Lloyd George, Balfour, Churchill, etc. Nor ought it to have been unknown to these and all other ministers that the Zionist organisers were already, in spite of specific public acceptance, cynically and totally ignoring, with a quite remarkable duplicity, the single, clear and would-be comprehensive safeguard inserted by the Cabinet itself into the Balfour Letter: that is '. . . it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. . . .' These 'communities' of Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs—the peaceful and unquestioned people of Palestine for many centuries—formed in 1918 between 90 and 95 per cent. of the population.

It would have been impossible, or monstrous, for the British government

after the First World War to repudiate the Balfour promise, but perfectly possible to interpret it for practical application—carefully phrased as it was to exclude the establishment of a Jewish State, or anything like one—without justifiable Arab objection. Such definition, firm and final, ought to have been issued at the earliest possible stage, in terms suitable to the symbolic yet substantial conception of a National Home, an object of interest, possibly of instruction, and even of sympathy to the Palestinians and gratifying to world Jewry, but no threat to the Arabs' occupation, government and development of their own country.

S. H. LONGRIGG

AFRICA

Toward Multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa. By B. W. T. Mutharika. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 434 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·50.*

Regional Mobility and Resource Development in West Africa. By Akin L. Mabogunje. *Montreal, London: McGill—Queen's University Press for the Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University. 1972. 154 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Keith Callard Lectures.) $4.50. £2·15. Paperback: £1·10.*

THE search for viable arrangements for economic co-operation among developing countries continues unabated from the ASEAN countries to the Andes. In the first of these books Mr. Webster Mutharika, an Economic Affairs Officer at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, sets out to provide a comprehensive study of economic co-operation in Africa written in simplified terms understandable to the politician and the layman rather than for the professional economist. The book deals with the origins of integration, approaches, institutions, experience and problems, and concludes with a discussion of means, referred to as a strategy, which could enable 'the dream of co-operation to be transformed into reality' (p. 391). The scope of the economic study is thus very broad. In addition, political aspects of economic co-operation receive consideration.

The book has several merits. As a broad description of the background to co-operation and of its instruments it is very comprehensive. It is simply and clearly written and includes a brief description of virtually every initiative and arrangement in the continent. Secondly, it provides a useful bibliographical guide to the large amount of ECA studies which have been produced on this subject in recent years, most of which are inaccessible to the general reader. Thirdly, it provides a clear view of official ECA thinking on the subject, and of the gradual change in its views in response to experience, from the advocacy of broad subregional groupings to support for more limited forms of co-operation, especially existing multinational agencies and initiatives. A further merit of the book is that it does not limit itself to industrial co-operation but considers also other forms of co-operation which usually receive less attention but which may turn out to be more viable and profitable in the foreseeable future than co-operation in the purely industrial field. The book also contains a useful 25 page appendix listing the postal addresses of nearly every agency

concerned with co-operation in Africa. Its usefulness would have been further enhanced by the inclusion of more references to country data and country studies and material other than that produced by international agencies. It is in places somewhat didactic and frequently irrefragable. The result nevertheless is a sensible compendium which should be useful not only for its intended audience but also to others as a source book, though its high cost, common to this particular and unattractive format, will place it out of the reach of many.

Few are likely to dissent from the author's final judgment that the process towards joint development will be slow. But the author may be too optimistic in concluding that co-operation will gain momentum in the 1970s, unless indeed in the forthcoming decade fresh methods of promoting industry are followed which can reduce the need for economic co-ordination and the conflicts of interest which have so far largely stultified efforts in this field.

An aspect of co-operation which does not receive much attention in Mr. Mutharika's book is that which takes the form of movement of persons rather than of goods or services. This is the subject of Dr. Mabogunje's scholarly book, which is concerned with labour movements in West Africa involving the crossing of ethnic or national boundaries, and the contribution of such migration to development. In the course of the book he discusses the attitudes of West African governments to inter-country migration and the prospects for a continuance of such migration. With respect to inter-country migration, the subject matter of the book is closely linked to Mr. Mutharika's, and many of the issues in terms of costs and benefits are virtually identical. The author explicitly refers to the connection of labour mobility with the long projected West African Economic Community. The importance of labour mobility in general for West Africa is underlined by the magnitude of the movements—two–three million per annum—its contribution to development, and the international frictions which the movements have recently generated between (and sometimes within) a number of West African countries, including Sierra Leone and Ghana, Ivory Coast and Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Nigeria, Dahomey and Niger and Ghana and Nigeria.

After documenting in Chapter 11 the pattern and magnitude of regional mobility in a way which skilfully illustrates the complexity of the movements, the author considers the effects of regional mobility on resource development. His discussion is not focused upon the contribution of what he terms labour movement of a purely colonial type, which involves seasonal migratory wage labour, though he regards this as having been an important factor in economic development in Gambia, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. Instead he concerns himself principally with the effects of other types of migrant—those who in the broadest of senses may be classed as entrepreneurs. The contribution of this group to development is discussed under four heads: development of institutions, diffusion and development of techniques, products and values. Among other things the direct and indirect influence of migration on resource development through the activities of ethnic associations and the spread of crops such as cassava and cocoa are interestingly considered.

To be able to cite the development impact of such migration in the past is not to say that today public modernising agencies may not be able to perform similar functions. But the persistence of regional mobility in the presence of such agencies as agricultural extension and other developmental

institutions may well, as the author suggests, be related to the frequently low level of response that these agencies have been able to develop. Whether, as he speculates, regional mobility would of itself disappear as education and industrial development spread, is surely debatable, for it originates in part in divergent development opportunities in the countries of origin, some of which must substantially be expected to persist—and of course new divergences frequently arise. However, this is an academic question for migration is unlikely not to be interfered with by governments.

This interference is a main concern of the last chapter, which recounts the post-colonial break-up of a largely common West African labour market, the citizenship crises and the impact of what Mazrui has described as the retreat from Pan-Africanism, which has involved the expulsion of strangers and migrants from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone. Apart from issues of security, these moves reflect to some extent, as the author says (p. 143), the mercantilist assumption that 'the gains of the migrants are the losses of the indigenous population'. No doubt, as he says, a positive policy of stimulating and developing the competitive abilities of the indigenous people *vis-à-vis* foreigners might achieve better results with respect to the goals of economic development and national integration than the application of repressive policies which generate further and frequently relatiatory antagonisms. Moreover, as he remarks, the stock of enterprise among the indigenous people is not necessarily increased by restrictive legislation (p. 143).

Nevertheless, when economies are underemployed, the utilisation of the stock of indigenous enterprise and factors may well be increased by such actions. The mercantilist approach thus may afford short term national gain. For this reason it is difficult to see much prospect of its being abandoned save in the context of rapid economic growth and fairly full employment. Of course, it frequently merely puts off the day when vital adjustments in domestic policies and the development of effective institutions will have to be undertaken.

This little book should be read by all those interested in understanding a phenomenon which for some time is likely to continue to give rise to difficult problems throughout Africa.

P. ROBSON

Africa and the Development of International Law. By T. O. Elias. *Leyden: Sijthoff; Dobbs Ferry: Oceana. 1972. 261 pp. Index. Fl. 43.00.*

SUDDENLY in the space of the last year or so there has been a plethora of books about Africa and international law, some in English, some in French. Two main themes run through these works. The first, more restricted in scope, is concerned with purely African international institutions, such as the Organisation of African Unity, or with African problems, such as those of frontiers or state succession. But the other *genre* of work is more ambitious, and represents nothing less than an attempt to rewrite international law from the viewpoint of the emergent African continent. The argument in the latter case is that modern international law has largely been a construction of the Western, formerly imperial, powers, who wrote the rules of international law, for instance about the acquisition of territory, in their own interest; now, it is argued, it is Africa's turn to shape international law with a due regard for African states' concerns and

problems. This book, by Nigeria's most distinguished jurist, is devoted to both themes, in each instance broadly interpreted. As the author indicates in his preface, his book is to a large extent a reprint or reworking of papers originally written for other purposes; while this imposes a looser structure on the book than might otherwise be the case, it has the advantage of bringing a wider range of topics to our notice.

Specifically African institutions are dealt with mainly in Part II of the work, which relates to the OAU, its Charter and its organs. Chapter 2 is somewhat outside international law strictly so called, in that it deals with 'Government under law in Africa'; so too is Chapter 6, 'The legality of illegal regimes in Africa', but in each instance there are international implications of what are mainly domestic problems. The views of the author, in his capacity of Chief Justice of Nigeria, on military regimes in Africa are particularly significant; a similar weight attaches to Dr. Elias's views on constitutional legality. Chapter 12 deals with the law of foreign investments in Africa, and Chapter 13 with communications; in each instance non-African states and individuals are implicated.

The remaining chapters deal with international law in general with no special African reference ('Modern international law'; 'Human rights under international law'; 'Freedom of assembly and association'), and with the contribution of Africa to international law (Chapter 1) and the involvement of Africa in world institutions ('The new states and United Nations'; 'The World Court and Africa'). As a member and former president of the International Law Commission, the author has made a practical as well as scientific contribution to these institutions and their evolution.

A. N. ALLOTT

African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule. By Richard Gibson. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations. 1972. 350 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

MR. GIBSON has written such a tendentious book that the temptation is considerable to dismiss it as totally absurd. But it would be a mistake to succumb. If he is so often so wrong in his recital of facts, and the related evaluation of movements, he is right in three critical perceptions. The cause of African liberation is not advanced by concealing the essential conflicts within it. Armed struggle of some sort is the only method by which a recalcitrant white racism, based on economic privilege, is likely to be displaced. And communists with Soviet-conditioned reflexes have not played an altogether wholesome role in Africa. They have aggressively defended the current Soviet position, as in the dispute with China or the chastisement of Czechoslovakia, at the cost of fostering the divisions within the particular liberation struggle to which they are attached. They have too often, for too long, encouraged discretion rather than valour. And in South Africa, they have engaged themselves to a doctrine of multiracialism which effectively nourished, instead of confronting, an exclusive black preoccupation.

It is important to recognise that opposition, within the African liberation commitment, to the 'Soviet line', need not be a sign of recruitment to the CIA or a 'petit bourgeois' betrayal of revolutionary ideals. But to

see and explain this is not Mr. Gibson's way. Having identified the devil in Moscow and the messiah in Mao, he anathematises or sanctifies movements to the extent that he sees each as drawn to the one or the other. In the process, he expends much spite, and numerous snide asides. This is deplorable; but it should not deflect attention from his basic errors.

A particular liberation movement is not the creature of Moscow because it has Soviet-line communists within it or on occasion supports Soviet conduct and policy, any more than another is the wave of the Maoist future because some of its representatives make ritual declarations of the appropriate thought. The African National Congress of South Africa has so far failed not because its relations with Moscow have been close, though a more independent posture, like that of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, would undoubtedly have served it better. It has failed because it has not yet developed, in the peculiar difficulties of its situation, a sufficient strategy to meet the massive power of white rule. But then the rival Pan-Africanist Congress, for all its anti-Soviet rhetoric, has scarcely developed one either. The ANC, however fitfully and inadequately, has at least been reaching towards the revolutionary objective of a socialist society, an ideological investment for which the Soviet-line communists within it deserve some of the credit. The PAC, like many of the other movements that enjoy Mr. Gibson's approval, has distinguished itself by a devotion to African nationalism.

And, as the Bandas and Amins of this world make increasingly clear, African nationalism too easily becomes the pursuit of arbitrary power and private greed, an investment in the vanity of black power, whose political sovereignty is the sustenance of elites and the disguise of economic subservience. It is not revolutionary: and Mr. Gibson gives his own revolutionary protestations little substance by suggesting that it is.

Indeed, his book diligently evades the real issues. How, beyond the vague commitment to armed struggle, is revolution to be made; and how secured from consuming itself? Is white power in South Africa credibly to be toppled by the sort of terrorism that Poqo pursued? And if the Algerians developed a movement to defeat the French, what but a defeat of its once avowed revolutionary objectives does Algeria today represent?

Had Mr. Gibson been serious about his subject, he would have seen that an alliance of liberation movements in Africa is no malignant imposition of Soviet policy but a necessary response to the natural alliance of white imperial and nationalist regimes. And movements that build now on narrow territorial bases are the quarrelsome constituents of tomorrow's OAU—if, to be sure, they get even that far.

RONALD SEGAL

The Oxford History of South Africa. Ed. by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson. Vol. I: South Africa to 1870. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1969. 502 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·75.* Vol II: South Africa 1870–1966. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. 584 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

THOUGH it disappoints in some ways, this is a major and extremely valuable work. Like many similar collections, it is not satisfactorily welded together, and it lacks an overall and coherent interpretation. The editors do however have a clear message: that South African history is essentially about

the interaction (in both conflict *and* co-operation) between many widely different societies and cultures, and is not the heroic story, beginning with the arrival of the Europeans in 1652, of the subjugation and civilisation of a barbaric land.

In their insistence on giving full weight to the role of the 'non-whites' (who comprise 80 per cent. of the population), in seeing them as active agents in a complex process, and in regarding their societies as being of interest and value in themselves, in all this, the Oxford History represents the culmination of almost half a century of liberal South African scholarship, whose most distinguished practitioners have included W. M. MacMillan, J. S. Marais and the editors themselves.

How does the History fulfil its intended role as a standard work for scholars and students? Volume I, and Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of Volume II, provide a narrative account of developments in South Africa, starting briefly with what is known of the earliest societies, describing the arrival of the Europeans (first Dutch and later British) and the interaction between them and the various indigenous societies, San, Khoikhoi, Zulu, Xhosa and Venda, and so on. This narrative account goes up to the formation of the Union, and the creation of the modern South African state, in 1910. The chapters vary greatly in quality and in the thoroughness of their coverage, but they all provide very full references to the relevant standard works on the subject, so that even the weak chapters are useful as starting points. Their strength lies in their scholarship and documentation, their weakness in a lack of social and economic analysis. They are too much a heap of (interesting and well-researched) facts. There is little or no discussion of the complex class structure of South African society, of the relationship between class and colour or between colour and culture and there is no exploration of the interests and the psychology that determine relations between the numerous groups.

In this first section, the best chapters are those by Leonard Thompson, who graphically describes the long, hard and complicated process whereby the colonists mastered, one by one, the different black groups. The Boers, on their own, did not have the capacity to defeat the major African tribes and it was British intervention which tilted the scales in their favour. This is often forgotten today and Chiefs Buthelezi and Matanzima gave offence to some when, on their visit in 1971 to this country, they pointed out—correctly—that it was the British who defeated them and took away their land!

For the period after 1910, the History abruptly departs from this narrative framework and instead there are chapters on the economy, farming, urbanisation, Afrikaner and African nationalism, and South Africa's place in the world. While they contain much that is useful and stimulating, these chapters do not really fulfil the text-book function. Francis Wilson's chapter on agriculture provides much information on a little researched sector. He is particularly good on labour and on the 1913 Land Act, which was not primarily an apartheid measure aimed at segregating black and white, but a measure aimed at reducing competition from black farmers and, by severely restricting their share of the land, at enlarging the supply of cheap black labour. David Welsh describes the urbanisation after the Boer War of Afrikaners and Africans—both uprooted and defeated peoples and both at a disadvantage in the alien English-dominated towns. In the fierce battle for jobs, the white workers successfully used their political power to eliminate black competition and ensure their own monopoly of the best jobs. The

whites are still caught, however, between their desire for black labour, which remains the backbone of the economy, and their fear and dislike of the black presence.

The lack of economic analysis accounts for the History's weakness on the question of South Africa's external relations. The 'external' element is a vital one in modern South African history. The colony was after all founded as a half-way station on the way to India and the external (primarily British) interest and stake in the country's strategic position and, after the discovery of gold and diamonds, in its economic development has been immensely important. There is a very able and readable account by Leonard Thompson of late 19th century British-South African relations and of the extraordinary vacillations of British policy (caught as now between sharply conflicting domestic pressure groups), and a useful account of South Africa-UN relations by Jack Spence, but there is practically no analysis of the influence of foreign capital and the role of commercial and financial considerations in shaping British policy, whether at the time of the Boer War or after Sharpeville. There is much else—notably Leo Kuper's stimulating chapter on African nationalism—that is informative and illuminating. Despite its weaknesses, this will be a basic work for all students of South African affairs.

MERLE LIPTON

South Africa: An Historical Introduction. By Freda Troup. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1972. 428 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

WITH the slaughter at Sharpeville the reality of the repressive conditions for Africans in South Africa burst on the mass of people in the Western world. Protests, faintly heard until that day, mounted to a crescendo of condemnation. Twelve years later conditions are worse, nothing has been achieved, the whites are obdurate, the Africans even more repressed with almost no hope of a change for the better. The mainstream of opinion has shifted in the past decade from an emphasis on urgent and violent change to a policy of gradualism—the use of social and industrial pressures within South Africa which will merely alleviate the worst excesses of the racialist state, leaving intact the main structure. Racial inequality will remain, the cheap migrant labour system will endure and the huge harvest of industrial profits which these ensure for Western investors will be safe.

What the advocates of this view do not understand is that, since the beginning of hostile contacts between the indigenous blacks and the intruding whites, the threads of events and determined policies have woven the tapestry of the modern racial state. It is almost impossible to unravel the present picture without violent change, for the whites will resist to the end. They are a determined people, defending a fortified white *laager* of privilege, truly believing that their backs are to the wall, that their Western Christian state is in dire danger from black hordes, outnumbering them by five to one, and that the blacks are both barbarian and communistic.

This is the tragic picture which Miss Troup has drawn, most competently for the enquiring layman, from the beginnings of prehistoric Africa, through to the days of the present prime minister, Mr. Vorster, and his rich, white, gold and uranium Afrikaner state. The book is well written and contains more than thirty plates, a number of modern political cartoons, drawings and nine good maps, which ensure that the reader can follow the movements of

peoples, black and white, as the settlement of the whole country moved apace towards its present racialist structure. Much care has obviously been lavished on the preparation of the text, with notes on the spelling of place names, a list of abbreviations, several appendixes giving a chronology, a list of principal officials and a comprehensive list of further reading. The index is exceptionally detailed and proved equal to every testing inquiry made by this reviewer.

Miss Troup has succeeded to a great extent in filling the need of the lay reader for a general history of South Africa, not specialised as is the definitive Oxford History and not confined to special aspects such as Hepple's work. This is the first study to place due emphasis on the place of the African in South African history and should establish itself authoritatively in its field.

LEONARD LAZAR

Lesotho 1970: An African Coup under the Microscope By B. M. Khaketla. *London: Hurst. 1971. 350 pp. Index. £3·50.*

STEREOSCOPES are generally better than microscopes for getting a balanced view. In October 1966 when the Basotho started, once again, on their road to independence, their problems were not so very different from those of Moshoeshoe in 1832: they were still a people surrounded by powerful neighbours, who needed to be united.

In 1966 they had a brand-new constitution with a nice balance of powers between the king, a hierarchy of local chiefs and headmen, a senate of 22 principal chiefs plus 11 other persons nominated by the Paramount Chief and, finally, a National Assembly of 60 members elected by universal adult suffrage. The National Assembly itself was delicately balanced. The Basuto National Party held 31 seats, the Basuto Congress Party 25 and the Maremathou Freedom Party 4. The parties differed more on personalities than principles. The MFP was royalist in sympathy and held a majority in the Senate. Mr. Khaketla was its Secretary General.

That the BNP and the prime minister, Leabua Jonathan, survived for four years was largely due to aid from foreign powers, including a generous subvention from the British government to balance the budget. A general election was due in 1970 and as it drew near, a situation developed which made Eatanswill appear as decorous as a conclave of cardinals.

Much of this book is taken up with a description of the personalities involved in the election, their manifestos and speeches and, in particular, with the malpractices of the BNP. Perhaps it would take a high-powered commission several years to decide where the balance of wrong lay, who fudged the most electoral rolls, stole the most ballot boxes or intimidated the most voters. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that as the results began to come in, the opposition parties' tactics appeared to be the more successful and that when the score reached 23 in all, the prime minister declared a state of emergency and announced that he was not ashamed to do so.

The author describes in detail the negotiations which followed to try and form either a national, a coalition or an all party government. Conference memoranda setting out the arguments for each alternative are quoted (pp. 299–325). In the end, the author shows that the stalemate was resolved by the British and other foreign governments' decision to resume financial aid for humanitarian reasons, which had the effect of making

political compromise unnecessary for the party which had seized power (pp. 330–34).

Mr. Khaketla is an experienced journalist; this book is well written and in broad outline, fair. If he has a bias, it is towards the king and against the prime minister. One of the king's speeches quoted takes up 10 pages (pp. 130–40) and although it is full of pleas for peace and unity, it is hardly uncontroversial. Leabua Jonathan is by nature more a conciliator than a despot and it is by no means certain that he was the strong man in the government responsible for the coup.

Basotho politicians at least had the wisdom to agree that an Act of Indemnity was necessary and that the election of 1970 should be ignored. It is to be hoped that in due course it will be possible to hold an election for which better preparations are made. Lesotho has enough external and financial problems to occupy all the energies of its able and intelligent people.

JAMES MURRAY

Tanzania: A Profile. By John Hatch. *London: Pall Mall. 1972. 214 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. (Pall Mall Country Profile Series.) £2·75.*

THIS book is mainly concerned with what the author describes as: 'The transformation within twenty years of what had been a sleepy backwater of the British Empire into a pioneering social experiment' (p. xv). The blurb on the flysheet speaks of 'an excellent introduction to a remarkable nation'. Broad introductory books are difficult to write. In a very limited space (only 214 pages in this case) the author has to cover a vast range of topics and in such circumstances it is impossible to avoid broad, unsupported generalisations, and also sections which read like lists of indigestible information. Certainly those who have no previous knowledge of Tanzania have a lot to absorb in the first few chapters. Some of the difficulties involved in absorbing the new information could have been avoided by a few imaginative maps, charts and diagrams. There is not one map in a book which starts by giving a geographical background, and then deals with the distribution of various tribes.

The most satisfactory parts of the book are when Mr. Hatch is writing about recent political and economic developments, and about President Nyerere's contribution to the country's development. The writing in these sections is lucid and lively and provides an excellent introduction to the issues involved. The last two chapters, which examine recent economic policy and progress and the Arusha Declaration, are particularly successful.

With justification, Mr. Hatch is a great admirer of President Nyerere, an African leader who has probably done more than any other to inspire new thinking and new hope in African development. But in some sections, the admiration for the president spills over into all things Tanzanian, and the book becomes far too uncritical. One example is in reference to post-independence development in Zanzibar. Mr. Hatch writes: 'where constitutional means had failed to secure majority government and social justice, force was used as the only alternative' (p. 168). Has the use of force secured 'majority government and social justice' in Zanzibar?

JAMES P. BARBER

The Nigerian Army 1956–1966. By N. J. Miners. *London: Methuen; New York: Barnes & Noble. 1971. 290 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in African History 5. Gen. Ed.: A. H. M. Kirk-Greene.) £2·25. Paperback: £1·40.*

Ghana Under Military Rule 1966–1969. By Robert Pinkney. *London: Methuen; New York: Barnes & Noble. 1972. 182 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in African History 6. Gen. Ed.: A. H. M. Kirk-Greene.) £2·00. Paperback: £1·00.*

THE Methuen series on African history under the editorship of A. H. M. Kirk-Greene has issued two studies of African soldiers to follow its general textbook by W. F. Gutteridge, *The Military in African Politics* (1969). Each had its origin in an academic thesis. Miners treats the development of the Nigerian Army before it was shattered by the two coups of 1966; Pinkney deals with the operations of the Ghanaian military government from the coup of 1966 to the general election of 1969, which returned civilians to power.

This contrast between subjects is accompanied by a contrast in style. Miners, writing what he calls 'a provisional account', gives the details of army life with the loving care of an eye-witness who helped with the Army Cadet Unit at King's College, Lagos (for example, the contrasting recruitment speeches from British and Nigerian colonels in 1960 and 1961, pp. 45–6). Chapters II–VI look at the process of Nigerianisation from a Nigerian point of view, with many references to newspaper articles, parliamentary speeches, pamphlets, and the local opinions he heard expressed. In spite of his inability to consult the British War Office or Nigerian Ministry of Defence files, his account of what happened is convincing (for example, Nigerian reactions to British NCOs, pp. 21–2). But Pinkney, hoping to test some of the broad generalisations which have been made on the involvement of the military in politics, moves with less confidence through the field notes he collected in 1969–70 while interviewing 90 leading members of Ghanaian society. He writes the shorter book about the more difficult subject, and finds some trouble in devising adequate categories to describe the character of the National Liberation Council. He includes a chapter on 'Running the Regions' 'because the majority of "political demands" . . . are for the provision or improvement of local amenities' (p. viii) while he implies that the 'majority of people wielded no political influence' (p. 158). His main thesis is that the NLC succeeded because it obtained the co-operation of a 'significant minority' including the chiefs and some of the 30–40,000 with secondary education.

Miners devotes the second half of his book to a summary of the evidence on the January and July coups, adding a short postscript about the civil war. His footnotes provide a useful guide to different 'versions' of the story, and to the careers of soldiers who were killed. He explained why the army did not take over before 1966 in terms partly of serious military operations—Cameroons, Congo, Tanganyika and Tiv (Chapter V)—and partly of the extensive popular violence in Nigerian politics (Chapter VIII). His account of the tensions within the army will inevitably be compared with that of Robin Luckham.[1] Miners's method is not sociological. 'There is insufficient evidence to say anything about the political opinions of the officers' (p. 127).

[1] *The Nigerian Military*: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960–67 (London: Cambridge University Press. 1971).

Some of the comments he quotes about the army's impartiality (e.g. p. 106) do not tally with the conflict of loyalties he describes (pp. 101, 124). But he marshals the evidence in a thorough and workmanlike manner.

Pinkney gives much less personal detail and argues with greater abstraction. For example, 'how the machinery worked' is dismissed in three pages (pp. 62–5). He sees the 1966 coup as 'a return to older and more familiar values'. If he had given himself a little more space—the length of Miners's book—he might have found that he could not retain such a monochrome conception of the NCL. Subsequent Ghanaian events suggest that there are more questions to be asked about the operations of the military government before 1969.

J. M. LEE

Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization. Ed. by Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1971. 303 pp. Index. £5·25.*

IN 1957, when it was clear that Ghana and the Ivory Coast were about to attempt different routes to development, Kwame Nkrumah suggested that their achievements might be compared after ten years. His challenge was the inspiration of this book. For most of the period the Ghana government was ideologically leftist and nationalist with a socio-economic policy aiming at rapid structural transformation. The Ivorian approach has been much less aggressive politically, relying much more on laissez-faire and a greater toleration of 'neo-colonial' penetration. No one doubts that the Ivory Coast has experienced greater political stability and more economic growth than Ghana, although both countries have roughly similar socio-economic characteristics. This success is rightly emphasised though its price—greater income inequality and less internal economic control compared with Ghana (the IMF notwithstanding)—tends to be underplayed in some of the contributions.

This is a multi-disciplinary work with ten chapters on the themes of political, legal, economic and educational development. It is a pity that the opening chapters on politics exemplify the mystification that is becoming normal when political scientists write about the Third World. Both are well-condensed accounts of the political history of the period but so carefully concealed in misplaced sociological jargon that the impatient reader may miss much that is valuable. For example, though most of Jon Kraus's contribution on Ghana covers ground already well cultivated by Apter and Austin, he carries the story forward and there is an interesting and novel account of the politics behind planning in the 1960s which demonstrates the importance of a strong institutional framework to successful planning. Not only was this lacking in Ghana but perhaps even more important was the absence of any commitment to plan discipline on the part of the political and administrative leaders. One honourable exception was the head of the National Planning Commission, Mr. J. H. Mensah, and it is good to be reminded of his early intelligent and courageous role now that he is wastefully imprisoned without trial as a result of his later association with IMF policies under Dr. Busia.

Of the three chapters on law, two are concerned with marriage and the family. The first compares the informal mechanism of law reform. Apparently these were more authoritarian in the Ivory Coast; the Ghanaians encouraged public discussion but have not managed to enact so much radical

change. The second gives a detailed analysis of the Ivorian reforms. Neither questions the assumption that the Western nuclear family is preferable to the traditional matrilinear polygynous form. Thirdly, Professor Pooley gives a lucid and useful analysis of business and public law in Ghana.

Controversy is greatest in the area of economic policy. The debate between those who advocate a policy of rapid structural transformation and the proponents of a more gradualist approach has a universal significance. The editors wisely chose to offer two opposing views: Elliot Berg argues that the strategy of the Convention People's Party in Ghana was by its very nature beyond the capability of any underdeveloped country while Reginald Green seems to argue that in spite of its apparent failure, the Ghanaian achievement does not actually fall far short of the Ivorian and it has laid a sounder infrastructure for longer term development. This view finds some support in the final chapter on education. Neither argument is conclusive, partly because both writers tend to draw their most important arguments from the Ghanaian experience; partly also because a final judgment must depend on one's view of the price of the Ivorian policy indicated earlier. Nevertheless, in spite of one's own predilections to the contrary, it must be admitted that Berg is the more persuasive.

EDWARD HORESH

Africa Contemporary Record. Vol. 4: Annual Survey and Documents 1971–1972. Ed. by Colin Legum. *London : Rex Collings; New York : Africana Publishing Corporation. 1972. 1225 pp. Maps. Index. £12·50.*

Now in its fourth edition this annual has established itself as an essential reference work for the student with either general or specialist interests in Africa. The present volume opens with a survey of the African university scene and closes with articles on the Trans-African highway and the South African-Rhodesian rail link. In between there are country by country reviews, texts of documents and other articles on current issues.

ASIA

India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers. By William J. Barnds. *London: Pall Mall for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1972. 386 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

MR. BARNDS was well qualified to write this book for America's Council on Foreign Relations, even if he made an unpromising start in life by joining the CIA. He worked as an analyst of the Soviet bloc, specialising before long on southern Asia, and then spent ten years in the Office of National Estimates, which assesses developments in other countries and their significance for the United States. His materials are drawn mainly from printed sources, but he has supplemented these by discussions with knowledgeable individuals; and while a good deal of his ground has been gone over often enough already, he presents his survey with clarity and objectivity, and with much instructive comment.

It is naturally his assessment of the motives and effects of his own country's policy that will be read with most interest. He might be said to leave out of account the pressures of private American capitalism; in reviewing government strategy he is praiseworthily cautious, avoiding sweep-

ing pronouncements, but recognising none the less many shortcomings an miscalculations. Central to his judgment is the character of the alliance wit Pakistan, in which each partner assumed that 'an unspoken and unsigne agreement going further was implied': America regarded it as an allianc against communism, Pakistan as against India (p. 106). It brought Washing ton benefits in the way of military intelligence, but it was 'on balance, failure' (pp. 252, 254). Mr. Barnds lays stress on the way in which th alliance involved the United States in Pakistan's internal affairs, notably b strengthening the army faction. This persisted down to 1971, when he wa finishing his book under the handicap of the fog of war then hanging ove East Bengal, which the army seized in March with 'brutal efficiency' (p. 240 Read now after the dénouement, his view of the events of 1971 comes out a rational and clear-sighted. One may feel indeed, with regret, that he ove estimates the reaction abroad when he writes: 'The press and public opinio in Western countries were appalled by the carnage'; the United States wa 'almost unanimous' in condemning West Pakistan and President Nixon' action in continuing to supply it with arms (pp. 244–245). It takes more tha a massacre in the depths of Asia to ruffle Western sangfroid, and more tha protests by public-spirited minorities to make Western governments alte course.

A final section gives the author's conclusions, undramatic but sensibl about what his country can hope and should try to achieve in that part o the world. He thinks its strategic importance to America has been greatl exaggerated in the past, but he does not favour the opposite extreme o withdrawing altogether, although he sees no communist military threat, an realises that one big nation's difficulties are not necessarily another's oppo tunities. 'The limits of power', he observes, and much of his book is reall a commentary on this text, have been growing 'visible to Soviets an Americans alike' (p. 229). He speaks of 'growing doubt in Congress an among the public that military aid was a useful instrument of America foreign policy' (pp. 222–223), and would prefer much more emphasis o economic aid, while showing a sober disbelief in its ability to work miracle If this kind of thinking can spread from intelligent Americans to thei government and policy makers, there will be a better chance for the aspira tion, which has, as he says, been spreading everywhere, of 'building a mor just and less dangerous world community' (p. 268).

V. G. KIERNAN

The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations: A Case Study of Soviet Polic towards India. By Harish Kapur. *London: Michael Joseph for th Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. 1972. 124 p Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

The Indo-Soviet Treaty: Setting and Meaning. By K. P. S. Menon. *Delh Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas. 1971. 83 pp. Rs. 12.0*

Before and After the Indo-Soviet Treaty. By Pran Chopra. *Delhi: Chan 1971. 175 pp. Rs. 25.00.*

MR. HARISH KAPUR is Professor in International Relations at the Graduat Institute of International Studies at Geneva and in this short book h attempts an analysis of the evolution of Indo-Soviet relations, first lightl sketching in the development of the Soviet Union's involvement in Asi

This has varied greatly; a constant doctrinal interest often not being matched by diplomatic or political action. Inconsistencies in Russian attitudes to India and the Kremlin's failures to assess accurately the strength of nationalist movements against colonial regimes deserve more study, particularly in order to gauge the sharp changes in Russian policies in South Asia in recent years. Mr. Kapur recalls that the Soviet reaction to Indian independence was distinctly unfriendly despite the fact that Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru's first declaration as Minister of External Affairs was clearly designed to assert the Indian desire for closer ties with Russia than had been possible under the British regime. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971 contained a clause acknowledging specific acceptance of the Indian policy of non-alignment, but in 1948 non-alignment, in the Russian view, was designed to justify a policy of collaboration with British imperialism and the establishment of close contact between the Indian bourgeoisie and English capitalism. Mr. Kapur's study stops short of the signing of the treaty but in concluding that India has come to occupy a very significant place in Soviet operational diplomacy, he felt also that India would be unlikely to reacquire the important position it held during the Khrushchev period. That judgment might now be questioned, but the value of Mr. Kapur's work lies in its brief and unemotional presentation of a developing relationship between two countries which, while of immense significance for both, has not lacked difficulties and setbacks.

For Mr. K. P. S. Menon however, there are no doubts and no difficulties. He was India's ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1952 to 1961 and is now President of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society and he publishes a collection of newspaper articles which amply demonstrate his convictions. He considers that the friendship of the Soviet Union for India has remained steady; and he uses (on p. 5) a metaphor from the Geeta likening that friendship to a 'flame in a windless spot which does not flicker'. He sees the treaty as the logical consummation of the policies of Nehru and Lenin.

Mr. Chopra's book also consists mainly of newspaper articles published before the Indo-Soviet treaty and ranging widely over India's problems in its relationships with the outside world. They are thoughtful, idiosyncratic, frequently penetrating and farsighted, occasionally myopic. He welcomes the treaty as being of assistance to India in the problem of dealing with Pakistan over Bangladesh, but urges that once that matter has been dealt with (it had not been when he was writing) India should make certain that in the long term its future is independent of the excessive influence of any major power—neither the United States, Russia nor China. India, in Mr. Chopra's reckoning, should cultivate good relations with all these great powers but specially develop a closely functional relationship with a number of medium and smaller powers (particularly those on the Asian rim) which also do not wish to be caught up in the big power web. This, he says (p. 20) has been the bedrock of India's foreign policy for the past quarter of a century and he thinks there will be no substitute for it for at least another decade. Far from sucking India into the Soviet orbit, in Mr. Chopra's reckoning, the treaty will, if used well, enable India to resume the world role originally set out by Nehru. So we come back to non-alignment, which continues to have as many definitions as it has interpreters. The fault in the Chopra thesis, it can be argued, is that India did not in the first 25 years of independence pay nearly enough attention to foreign ties of mutual interest with other countries anxious to be free of big power control. It was not quick enough

to realise that its own chosen path of non-alignment was not an easy one for countries less fortunately endowed. With non-alignment now so much more pliable, there are many countries with whom India can meet on friendlier terms.

EVAN CHARLTON

Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan. By Kalim Siddiqui. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 217 pp. Index. £2·95.*

India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh. By J. A. Naik. *New Delhi: Chand. 1972. 163 pp. Index.*

BOOKS about the Bengal catastrophe of 1971 continue to pour forth; most of them, necessarily, prepared fast. Here are two more: one good, the other mediocre—though better than it may seem. Mr. Siddiqui is a West Pakistani, youngish, Leftish, associated with *The Guardian* newspaper, but personally involved enough in the catastrophe for seven relatives to have been killed in March 1971, near Sylhet in East Pakistan, by Mujib's men, during the scantily reported three weeks' rural disorders before Yahya's military crackdown. He writes admirably, and throws off a sparkling succession of ideas.

Mr. Naik—a Bombay Hindu presumably—alas often uses a prolix, opaque kind of Indian-English, very hard to read; his proof-reading has been bad; and his publishers, unlike Mr. Siddiqui's, make clumsy mistakes. These defects are worst near the beginning and end of his book; elsewhere they become fewer, the effect almost being to suggest that parts have been drafted by another person. However, he explores the international aspects of the catastrophe in a fairly detached, objective way. As an Indian, he may feel some patriotic euphoria over it, but he is not personally involved; and what he writes, particularly about the Russian and Chinese encroachments on it, well repay careful reading—despite the verbal obstacles.

Mr. Siddiqui comes to it from within, as a Muslim who, in boyhood, was among the refugees who fled westwards from Northern India in 1947. And he has a theme, fervently declaimed: that the catastrophe was the logical result of 20 years of sustained selfishness and stupidity by the Pakistani 'elites'. He represents, we may infer, Pakistan's frustrated, lower-middle, ex-student class which, in 1969, toppled the Ayub regime and, not long after, under Yahya, spearheaded the success in West Pakistan of Bhutto's People's Party in the crucial 1970 elections. Though his unremitting diatribes against Pakistan's civilian and military bureaucrats, landlords, and business magnates may be largely justified by historical hindsight, they become wearisome from overstatement. These men, after all, were products of their time and circumstances; a proportion of them certainly did their disinterested patriotic best: in any case, as he admits, no other leadership was initially available; and the quality of the various elites elsewhere throughout the 'developing' Afro-Asian world has not been markedly superior; indeed, in some countries, obviously worse.

Mr. Siddiqui's book is, however, important. A gifted writer of acute intelligence and with inside political knowledge, who revisited Pakistan in 1969–70, he probably stands for something fundamental, and encouraging, in the new national life of a truncated, Bhutto-led country. All the same, reading these two books one after the other, one's heart gradually warms to the more modest, plodding Mr. Naik, whose work will not command any-

thing like so admiring a readership as Mr. Siddiqui's, but which contains valuable stuff, painstakingly assembled, which should not be overlooked.

The last two chapters of both books, being topical, will doubtless attract most attention. Both contain useful appendices.

IAN STEPHENS

Struggle for the Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations. By Shanti Prasad Varma. 2nd rev. ed. *New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. 1971. 316 pp. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 42.50.*

India's Boundary and Territorial Disputes. By Surya P. Sharma. *Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas. 1971. 198 pp. Index. Rs. 22.50.*

THE first of these two books is concerned mostly with the so-called Sino-Indian dispute, and while Professor Varma has little new to say upon the subject, this history of relations between the two countries from early times up to the present day is a useful summing-up of the situation. His most controversial chapter is devoted to a consideration of the motives which led China to attack India and then, apparently without reason, to withdraw. Chinese action, he suggests, might well have been undertaken solely for reasons of prestige and not to obtain territorial advantages. The author does what he can to excuse the Indian Army's ignominious defeat, but there is no doubt that standards of training and equipment had been allowed to deteriorate. Professor Sharma does not hesitate to note that these shortcomings were to a large extent due to the behaviour of some of the senior Indian generals, who appear to have been more interested in furthering their own careers than in winning the war.

Dr. Sharma also deals with India's relations with China, but his main concern is the Kashmir dispute. He rehearses all the familiar arguments, and while he naturally judges the issue from the Indian point of view, he does not neglect Pakistan's claim. He feels, however, that there is no easy solution to the problem.

Both these books are well-documented and indexed, but it is strange that, since both are concerned with geographical and kindred matters, neither contains a map.

I must end with a note of censure. The printing and binding of both these books (both of which are expensive), which are printed upon the nastiest kind of inferior paper, do no credit to a country which is perfectly capable of producing books of the highest technical standard. It is particularly deplorable that works of academic standard by recognised authorities should be turned out in this shoddy manner.

JOHN MORRIS

Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946. By Benedict R. O'G. Anderson. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1972. 494 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. $15.00. £7·15.*

Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Ed. by Claire Holt, assisted by Benedict R. O'G. Anderson and James Siegel. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1972. 348 pp. Maps. Index. $15.00. £7·15.*

Java in a Time of Revolution is an outstanding book which adds significantly to existing knowledge of the formative period of the Indonesian national

revolution. The underlying theme of this stimulating work is that the social priorities demanded by a policy of securing independence through *diplomasi* (negotiation) with the Dutch and attracting the benign regard of the Allies obstructed a just remoulding of Indonesian society. This policy of securing international recognition before all else, identified with the person of Sjahrir, was in contrast to the aim of an uprooted revolutionary youth (*pemuda*), who believed that their possession of fighting spirit (*semamgat*) made it possible to seize independence through *perdjuangan* (struggle). Impelled by a complementary combination of Japanese and Javanese values, these young men lusted for independence as if grasping for transcendental goals. They had no stake in an orderly transfer of power but were intoxicated by the very experience and excesses of revolution, which for many became an end in itself. These *pemuda* had a multiplicity of leaders but no figure of stature with organisation at his command to channel their energies into constructive forms. Their potential leader is the tragic figure of the aging national-communist Tan Malaka, whose latter days are portrayed by the author with sensitivity and more than a measure of commitment. Tan Malaka appears as a Ho Chi Minh *manqué*, who identified with the mood of the *pemuda* and recognised in their *semangat* a force to liberate Indonesia as a socialist state. In the event, he was to occupy an obscure place in Indonesian history as the government of the day made him a scapegoat for the fundamental cleavages within the political elite and the army. With his incarceration (which was a prelude to his murder) the option of negotiation prevailed, with President Sukarno ironically playing a decisive role in guiding Indonesia away from social revolution.

In this study, Anderson does express reservations about the logical implications of his own argument when he says that: ' In its own way, perdjuangan was no less a gamble than diplomasi. It was a wager that given the fragmentation of Indonesia's physical and social geography, given the ideological and organizational confusion left behind by the Japanese, and given the shortages of arms and trained cadres, a coherent movement could still be built ' (p. 308). Undoubtedly, the priorities of Sjahrir, supported by Sukarno and Hatta, did sustain a social and political order that did not match up to popular expectations in the years after independence. But whether the volatile and fissile *pemuda*, whom Anderson records on one occasion as drinking Japanese blood from samurai swords, could have matched the dedicated cadres of Ho Chi Minh and been capable of translating revolutionary fervour into revolutionary order must remain a matter of conjecture.

Culture and Politics in Indonesia is a collection of essays which, with the untimely death of Claire Holt, was seen through the press by Benedict Anderson and James Siegel. Its six chapters represent notable attempts to identify the cultural roots of Indonesian behaviour and include contributions from some of the most able students of that country. Among these are two Indonesian scholars, Sartono Kartodirdjo and Taufik Abdullah, who consider respectively the setting and development of agrarian radicalism in Java and modernisation in West Sumatra.

MICHAEL LEIFER

Indonesia since Sukarno. By Peter Polomka. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1971. 228 pp. Bibliog. Index. £0·40.*

Sukarno: A Political Biography. By J. D. Legge. *London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 1972. 431 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

Portrait of a Patriot. Selected writings by Mohammad Hatta. *The Hague, Paris: Mouton. 1972. 604 pp. Fl. 59.00.*

HERE are three quite different books on Indonesia—by a journalist, academic and distinguished historical participant respectively. Polomka is an Australian journalist with extensive experience in Indonesia, and his book is both perceptive and readable. His strength lies in description and catching the feel of situations, so that the picture that emerges is accurate as far as it goes (accurate enough, for instance, to have earned the accolade of being banned from Indonesia). But he really makes no attempt to analyse the present situation in Indonesia in any coherent way. The general reader will therefore learn a great deal in a general way without being offered unifying explanatory and predictive hypotheses; the reader with some previous knowledge of Indonesia will pick up much revealing detail to garnish and furbish his own particular theories or speculations.

Professor Legge, another Australian, has undertaken a fairly ambitious biography of Sukarno, obviously a key figure in the understanding of Indonesian political history from the 1920s through to the 1960s. The book is quite well organised and entertaining. The available information on Sukarno has been scrupulously combed, and some new information unearthed. For these reasons it is to be welcomed. But I have reservations. Some of the flights into 'psychologism' and imaginative (empathetic) biography are frankly embarrassing. More seriously, the analysis of social forces and personalities which provides the context for Sukarno's life is somewhat superficial. Indonesia, above all countries, cannot be properly understood without a satisfactory theoretical grasp of the complex interrelationships between colonialism, neo-colonialism and class structure. Granted that, Sukarno can be understood in terms of the interplay between his peculiar aptitudes, the needs of the bourgeois nationalist movement whose vacillations and divisions gave them scope, and the uneasy equilibrium it was necessary to maintain between the potential for genuine revolution and all other domestic and external forces with Sukarno as—at least for so long—the indispensable broker. An unanswerable historical question, decidedly intriguing, should be posed here: having seen the balance irrevocably destroyed, might not Sukarno have done a Sihanouk and called for armed revolutionary struggle, in which case what might have happened? Civil war might well have been less costly in blood and suffering than the one-sided white terror which retains to this day its grip on the people.

Mohammad Hatta, so unlike Sukarno, was a complementary running mate politically for a long time. His collected writings reveal him as an unregenerate intellectual (Bevan's derogatory epithet on Gaitskell—'desiccated calculating machine'—would have appealed to Sukarno as appropriate for Hatta, whom he regarded as cold, bookish and sexless). It is instructive to note that, despite all the sophisticated and scholastic analyses drawing on Marxism among other theories, he was unable to transcend his class background, and objectively played an extremely reactionary role in the Indonesian struggle for independence. Curiously enough, though, I quite enjoyed—as an economic historian—some of his earlier pieces which are not unperceptive and are certainly well buttressed with polyglot learning and references.

MALCOLM CALDWELL

The Lost Crusade: The full story of US involvement in Vietnam from Roosevelt to Nixon. By Chester L. Cooper. Foreword by W. Averell Harriman. *London: MacGibbon & Kee. 1971. 559 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·75.*

CHESTER COOPER'S book belongs to that hybrid species which falls halfway between history and memoirs. Much of it is based upon his own personal experience in the State Department and on the White House staff, but the rest comes from published sources and interviews with other personalities involved in the history of American involvement in Vietnam. Some of these are listed in the Acknowledgements and include the Bundy brothers, Wesley Fishel, Averell Harriman, Edward Lansdale and General Maxwell Taylor (pp. vii–viii). The trouble with this kind of book is that the reader cannot always tell whether a particular statement is based on first-hand knowledge or not, and therefore how much reliance should be placed upon it. Mr. Cooper's book admittedly contains 14 pages of references, but these are all to published material.

Despite Averell Harriman's claim in the Foreword that 'Mr. Cooper's thorough research on the early history of the United States relationship to Indochina adds significantly to the historical record' (p. x), there does not seem to be very much that is new in the early part of the book. Even where the author was personally involved—as an intelligence specialist at the 1954 Geneva Conference, for example—he does not add much to existing accounts, although it is interesting to learn that his first assignment was to discover whether there really was a Ho Chi Minh, 'or more precisely, was the original Ho Chi Minh still alive?' (p. 76). His account of how Ngo Dinh Diem came to be appointed prime minister of the State of Vietnam in June 1954 (pp. 120–28) does contain new information, but it does not answer the still unresolved question of the extent to which American pressure was involved.

By far the most useful section of the book concerns the various peace moves during the Johnson Administration. The general outline has already been revealed by journalists like Stuart Loory and David Kraslow, but it is good to have authoritative confirmation, and additional details, from someone who was closely concerned. English readers will be particularly interested in Chapter XIII of the book, which contains a long account of the famous Wilson-Kosygin talks of February 1967. (Mr. Cooper was the American official sent as liaison with the British.) The author provides a valuable counterpart, and an occasional corrective, to Mr. Wilson's own version of these talks, although one sometimes gets the impression that he fell into the same error as the British prime minister in supposing that London was the centre of the negotiating stage at that time. Thus, he implies on page 347 that the contacts between the United States and North Vietnam in Moscow were broken off before Kosygin's arrival in Britain. But this was not so. Why else would 'Washington officials . . . [have] regarded [the London episode] primarily as a sideshow to the main event they were trying to get under way in Moscow' (pp. 367–68)? President Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh of February 8, 1967 was in fact delivered through this very channel, two days *after* Kosygin's arrival in the British capital.

It would be churlish to conclude without mentioning that Mr. Cooper writes with great facility and a sense of humour that must have served him in good stead in what was frequently a frustrating job. His account of

a conversation with the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi, at a diplomatic reception during the 1961 Geneva Conference on Laos is particularly memorable. Overhearing Cooper say a few words in Chinese to a waiter, Chen Yi asked him if he could speak the language. 'I dredged up a Chinese idiom roughly equivalent to *comme ci comme ça*', the author recalls. 'This convinced my host that I not only spoke fluently but that I was also a becomingly modest man.' Chen Yi promptly dismissed the interpreter and launched into a half-hour monologue in Chinese, of which the unfortunate Cooper barely understood a word. 'Every six months or so,' he writes, 'I awaken with the thought that Chen Yi may have been trying to defect, or surrender all of Mainland China to the Americans, or sell me some rare Chinese porcelain' (pp. 184–85). Such gentle self-mockery is a rare and refreshing characteristic among writers of diplomatic memoirs.

GEOFFREY WARNER

Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change. By Byron S. J. Weng. Foreword by Jerome Alan Cohen. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 337 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs.) £7·25.*

THOUGH the author anticipated that mainland China might shortly be accepted into the United Nations, it was perhaps somewhat unfortunate for him that his book should appear only after that event had occurred. Today the main focus of interest clearly concerns the policy China is now pursuing as a member of the UN: the strategy it adopts to acquire leadership of the developing countries there, its attitude to the other main blocks, its method of combating American-Soviet domination, the extent to which it modifies its policy with experience, and so on. Compared with these, the attitude it displayed towards the organisation during its twenty years of exclusion become of somewhat marginal significance: of an interest that is scarcely even academic.

All this is especially so given the fact that there can scarcely be said to have been a Chinese UN policy during most of this period. The government's general attitude seems to have been: so long as we are kept out let us insist on our indifference. Pronouncements on the subject were few and far between: rare statements by a foreign minister (such as that of Chen Yi in 1965) and the annual tirade in the *People's Daily* on the occasion of the Assembly debate. But little else: no sustained lobbying, or even a systematic propaganda campaign. It is thus doubtful if there was ever material for a book here, at most only enough for a pithy and sharply-focused study of Chinese actions and attitudes in this period, and estimates of its probable policy once admitted. Unfortunately this painstaking, but somewhat long-winded work is not of this kind. It reveals the difficulty inherent in the subject, where clear-cut evidence of China's policy and attitude is so deficient. The book has thus had to be padded out with a good deal of extraneous stuffing: theoretical verbiage, conjecture and miscellaneous matter only marginally related to the main theme (for example, 37 pages are devoted to a vast bibliography, though very few of the books quoted have any direct relevance to China's UN policy). Part One of the book is concerned with describing Peking's world outlook, its decision-making machinery and its general foreign policy; but, rather than giving any clear proof of the precise

aims of the communist leaders in relation to the UN, the author has to be content with showing that there is no incompatibility between Chinese aims and UN purposes: that 'the UN as an actor is not necessarily a foe of the P.R.C.' The second part is a brief account of the development of Chinese foreign policy between 1949 and 1971; but policy towards the UN appears, here too, only as one modest strand within this (though some evidence is presented of alternating phases in attitudes to the UN). The third part is concerned with analysing 'elements of continuity'—the legal stand of Peking (rejection of the two-China policy), the UN as it may have been seen as an instrument of policy (again largely conjecture), and the 'impact of the thought and psychology of Mao Tse-tung' (in which general Chinese foreign policy attitudes, such as the 'indignation of a wronged party', are attributed, somewhat arbitrarily, to the psychology of the Chinese leader). Whatever continuity there may have been in these ill-assorted influences, one cannot help feeling that the nature of the evidence provided scarcely sustains the weight of the argument placed on it.

It has often been pointed out that Chinese words and Chinese deeds frequently diverge widely from each other. It will be interesting to observe how far the behaviour of the Chinese within the UN conforms to what they have been saying while outside: Mr. Weng might find this a more satisfying subject for his next book than the insubstantial evidence he has been studying here. Meanwhile his publishers are demanding a somewhat exorbitant price, even in these days, for a book with a substantive text of 225 pages.

EVAN LUARD

Origins of the Chinese Revolution 1915–1949. By Lucien Bianco. Trans by Muriel Bell. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1971. 223 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921–1949. By Jacques Guillermaz. Trans. by Anne Destenay. *London: Methuen. 1972. 477 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century. By Chester C. Tan. *Newton Abbot: David & Charles. 1972. 390 pp. Index. £4·20.*

THE authors of these three books attempt by slightly different approaches to answer the questions why the Chinese revolution of 1949 occurred and why it was successful. They give therefore different emphases to a common pattern of factors they consider to be relevant. Lucien Bianco examines the whole period from 1915 to 1949 in the best French tradition of social history. The book was widely acclaimed in the French edition [1] and now the English translation, with a slightly modified text, will make it even more popular. The author disclaims any attempt at original scholarship but declares his purpose to have been a synthesis of many detailed studies of China, mainly by American scholars, in order substantially to develop Chalmers Johnson's now classic thesis of peasant nationalism in China. In sweep and balance this is the best introductory text to the subject. Bianco takes first the two oppressive factors of feudal tradition and alien presence as roots of the Chinese trouble and goes on to seek the catalyst in a revolutionary movement that was armed with a doctrine and a strategy, but that was above all armed.

[1] *Les origines de la révolution chinoise* (Paris: Gallimard. 1967).

Mark Selden suggests in his foreword that Bianco has failed to develop analytical tools sufficiently fine to give precise weight to the many factors involved in the revolution, especially the relative importance of the internal and foreign pressures.

Jacques Guillermaz has attempted to write a much more detailed history of China from 1921 to 1949, using the Communist Party of China as his reference point. The text was first published in French in 1968 and the second volume of the French edition has now appeared, bringing the story down to 1972.[2] The author was a diplomat in China in the 1930s and 40s, when he observed many of the events he discusses at first hand, and had access to a wealth of Chinese literature, much of which has not been available in the West. The narrative account he gives of the military engagements throughout the period is lucid and well supported with maps and diagrams. Occasionally, there are some subjective judgments about guerrilla warfare, both on the ground and in Mao's writings, that do not seem to be supported by the evidence given in the narrative. The English translation becomes unobtrusive after some rough passages in the early chapters, made worse by poor punctuation. This could discourage the reader from pressing on to the great wealth of evidence in the central chapters, and to the relatively more refined analysis in the conclusion than Bianco was able to give. But the problems of interpretation of the evidence remain largely unresolved. How far is the achievement of the revolution attributable to the movement that worked for it and how far to the failure of the reformist movement to provide a viable alternative? This kind of question is probably impossible to answer objectively, as Bianco points out.

When one turns to the firmer ground of the battle of ideas that went on before and during the revolution subtle distinctions can be made between a number of schools of thought. In *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* Mr. Tan provides brief biographies of the main Chinese political theorists and summaries of their writings. Much of these are tantalisingly brief and occasional attempts to fill them out by comparing their ideas to those of Burke or Rousseau seldom seem to help. The impact of Western ideas on Chinese society can be seen clearly in the writings of its social theorists, but the influence of the latter on the actual course of events in China is a much more difficult matter to decide. The author documents his account of the relevant writings briefly and, in the main, leaves the reader to resolve this question.

M. Hookham

The Long March 1935: The Epic of Chinese Communism's Survival. By Dick Wilson. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1971. 331 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·00.*

Any layman wishing to gain a reasonable understanding of Chinese communism finds very quickly that there is still a shortage of accurate, informative, unbiased and *readable* books on the subject. The specialist is now well catered for, as the past decade has seen the appearance of a vast literature, much of it of the highest quality. But this is generally written by scholars for scholars; often extremely detailed and frequently esoteric, it can have little appeal for the general reader. To be sure, a number of books of more popular appeal have appeared in recent years, generally written by people

[2] *Histoire du parti communiste chinois* (Paris: Payot. Vol. I. 1968. Vol. II, 1972).

who have lived in or visited China for relatively brief periods. Although the best of these are informative and interesting accounts of contemporary China, they generally lack adequate historical perspective, paying scant attention to the forces which have shaped the present.

It is refreshing, therefore, to encounter a book like this. Mr. Wilson is a man of wide journalistic and academic experience, whose knowledge of China is based on long and close observation. He collects and evaluates information in a scholarly manner, and he writes superbly well. He has chosen a subject of great importance which, moreover, captures the imagination.

For the story of the Long March is indeed a tale worth telling. In October 1934, 100,000 communists broke through the Kuomintang encirclement of their base in Kiangsi and began an epic journey which twelve months later was to bring the few thousand who completed it to the relative sanctuary of Shensi, in China's north-west. 'The Long March led the Communists through eleven provinces, over raging rivers and snow-capped mountain ranges, through swamps and forests. They had to fight against nationalist armies as well as the troops of provincial warlords, local bandits and hostile tribesmen' (p. viii). They were usually short of food, adequate clothing, and medical supplies. Cholera, meningitis, malaria, typhoid and trachoma were among the diseases which afflicted them. 'The main force of the First Front Army averaged almost one skirmish each day of the Long March, and had fifteen days of major pitched battle.' Over the 6,000 mile route they averaged 'one whole day's halt for every 114 miles' (p. 72).

The march, then, was a triumph of human courage and endurance over appalling odds, and the author's reconstruction is the most detailed yet to appear in English. For since the classic account given by Edgar Snow,[1] few Western writers have tackled the subject in any depth. After a brief introduction of some 60 pages, in which the historical background is sketched in, the author devotes some 180 pages to describing what actually took place on the march. He has consulted a wide range of sources, both Chinese and English, published over the past thirty years and more, and he weaves them together with skill and sensitivity. An excellent feature of the narrative is that he allows much of it to be told by the participants themselves, a technique which vividly brings home the horrors they underwent.

This is not to say that he accepts unquestioningly all the 'reminiscences' of those who marched (many of them published long after the event). He treats his sources in a properly critical way, and one is generally convinced by what he writes. Nor does he confine himself to the heroic aspects of the march alone; he discusses also the tensions and quarrels among the communist leaders, basing his analysis on the recent findings of other scholars. Moreover, in assessing the achievements of the marchers he rightly stresses the element of good fortune which they enjoyed. For at several crucial stages, their survival depended as much upon the incompetence of nationalist and warlord enemies as on their own courage and discipline. Similarly he points out that had it not been for the Japanese invasion it is most unlikely that they would have succeeded in establishing themselves in Shensi, and expanding thereafter.

In his final section the author discusses briefly what he takes to be the major legacies which the march bequeathed to the Chinese communist

[1] *Red Star Over China* (London: Gollancz. 1937). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1938, p. 138.

movement. He notes the tradition of discipline which subsequently gave the elite an astonishing degree of cohesion and unity; the 'guerrilla ethic' which has figured so largely in Chinese developmental policy since 1949; the tradition of acting independently of the Soviet Union; and, finally, the way in which the march, both as fact and legend, contributed to the supremacy of Mao. It might be argued that these themes can be even better understood in the context of the 'Yenan period' (1937–45) which followed the Long March, and which is hardly covered here. Nevertheless, this is a minor criticism of a book which can be read with profit by general readers and specialists alike.

JOHN GARDNER

Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R. G. Casey 1951–60. Ed. by T. B. Millar. *London: Collins. 1972. 352 pp. Illus. Index. £4·50.*

AUSTRALIAN public figures must be among the most reluctant in the world to disclose details of their careers. For this reason, the publication of these extracts from the diaries of Lord Casey, covering his term as minister for external affairs, is something of an event. Of course, the book is only a selection from a much more voluminous record. As the editor reminds us, 'A good deal of relevant material has had to be omitted, either because of official security requirements, or because it represents the private views of living persons expressed in confidence, or simply for reasons of space', while 'in some places . . . the source [of information] has been made anonymous' (p. 9). Within the book itself, moreover, there is a greater emphasis upon the earlier years. However, one should be grateful to both Lord Casey and Dr. Millar for making available as much as they have.

Inside Australia, reviewers of the diaries have understandably concentrated upon what they have to say about issues which are relevant to the great debate which is currently taking place on the future of Australian foreign policy, such as the recognition of Communist China and the Australian-American alliance. There is a great deal that is of interest on these subjects, and upon other such predictable topics as the changing nature of the Commonwealth. But what most impressed the present reviewer was just how much useful information the diaries contain for students of the wider international scene in the 1950s.

Naturally, the major emphasis is upon the Far East. Lord Casey's account of the American attempt to organise 'united action' in Indochina in 1954 and of the subsequent Geneva Conference is particularly revealing. and will henceforth have to be incorporated into any study of these events. It certainly does not support one recent interpretation, according to which Dulles was not really serious about intervention in Indochina. There is also a fascinating account of a conversation with Chou En-lai on June 18, 1954, in which the Chinese prime minister 'said that of course there were two Governments in Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Government of Bao Dai' (p. 162). Casey seemed surprised that Chou should refer to the Viet Minh as a government; most people today would probably be more surprised that he described the Bao Dai regime as one.

There is some interesting information on the Suez crisis of 1956, in which Casey found himself, most unusually, on the opposite side of the fence to his prime minister, Robert Menzies, is consistently opposing the use of

force. 'I went to see Sir Walter Monckton (Minister for Defence) this morning', he wrote on August 20, 'mainly to ask him if I could be "let in on" the military appreciation of the Suez Canal problem. He said that only two other Ministers beside himself know about it and that the Cabinet as a whole did not, so that he would have to get Anthony Eden's clearance before he made us aware of it, which I asked him if he would seek to do' (p. 241). The outcome of this request is not clear, but it is sad to read that, in spite of Australia's helpfulness over the issue, Casey was spun the yarn by Selwyn Lloyd on October 31 that 'although the U.K. was not aware of what Israel would do, they knew several days ago that some Israeli action was contemplated' (p. 249).

The diaries also contain some useful sidelights on European affairs, such as the fact that the Italian government in 1951 had files on 350,000 known communists in Italy (p. 51) and Mr. Macmillan's belief, expressed on September 4, 1959, 'that we could forget about the reunification of Germany, which practically nobody wanted. Germany had only been "unified" for about sixty years of its history [and] Adenauer disliked the Prussians anyway' (p. 324). Dr. Adenauer, as it happened, was an old acquaintance of Casey's, and the latter's account of their joint rendition of the Lorelei after imbibing ample quantities of Rhine wine (p. 111) provides one of several lighter moments in the book, as well as a somewhat different picture of the West German Chancellor from that which emerges from the distinctly humourless pages of his own memoirs.

A final word of praise should be addressed to Dr. Millar's editing. He has written a useful introductory chapter on 'Australia after World War II' and has linked and commented upon the diary entries in a way which will undoubtedly make them much more comprehensible to non-Australian readers.

GEOFFREY WARNER

Politics and Government in Japan. 2nd ed. By Theodore McNelly. *Boston, New York, Atlanta, Geneva (Illinois), Dallas, Palo Alto: Houghton Mifflin. 1972. 276 pp. Maps. Index. £1·50.*

A revised and updated paperback edition of the book first published in 1963 as *Contemporary Government of Japan* and reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1965, p. 169. Our reviewer then described the book as '. . . concise, densely packed with straightforward information and comprehensive, with potted history as well as institutional description.'

NORTH AMERICA

American Pluralist Democracy: A Critique. By Darryl Baskin. *New York, Cincinnati, London, Melbourne: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 1971. 184 pp. Index. (New Perspectives in Political Science. Ed. William G. Andrews. No. 29.) £1·65.*

Power and Politics in America. By Leonard Freedman. *Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press (A Division of Wadsworth Pub. Co.); London: Prentice-Hall International. 1971. 436 pp. Index. £2·50.*

American Political Parties: Potential and Performance. By Judson L. James. *London: University of London Press. 1971. 205 pp. Index. £1·25.*

It is unusually agreeable to be able to recommend three texts on American government each of which is readable, intelligent, and has something new and useful to say.

The longest and most general of the three, Freedman's *Power and Politics in America,* is also the most conventional in its scope. It covers the major institutions of the American political system—Presidency, Congress, Supreme Court, bureaucracy, state and local government; factors in the political process—public opinion, pressure groups, parties, elections; and four major problem areas—poverty, race, the environment, foreign affairs and the war. The novelty lies not in the subject matter (though the up-to-date choice of examples is welcome) but in the approach. For wherever possible Freedman judges each institution, factor and problem area from the point of view of the four main contemporary political outlooks: the defenders of the existing political system, whom he calls centrists; those who seek substantial reform broadly within that system ('liberals'); the New Left; and the ultra-conservative Right. It is thus 'a book cast in terms of controversy', and it is refreshing to have the data presented in the style of argument and rebuttal. The author plays very fair, though his own stance as a rather disenchanted liberal is not hard to detect even before the conclusion in which he makes it explicit. His judgments seem to this reviewer eminently sensible, and his little case studies in the issue chapters at the end are models of compression. There are no strikingly novel passages or insights, but as a means of awakening interest in what is really happening in contemporary American government this is a quite unusually stimulating textbook.

James's *American Political Parties* is valuable for a different reason: this is now (since the yawning gaps in our knowledge of Congress have been rapidly filled in the last 10 years) perhaps the least well covered sector in American political literature. The organising principle here is to discuss the five main orientations towards political parties in the United States; the 'party government' and the 'non-partisan' (better 'anti-party') schools, which agree in believing American parties capable of co-ordinating governmental activity—a possibility welcomed by the former, who believe in majority rule, and abhorred by the latter who fear it; the 'progressive' and 'status quo' schools, similarly divided about majority rule but agreeing in doubting the parties' capacity to co-ordinate; and the 'responsible party' formula which stands midway on both the normative and the pragmatic criteria. This proves a generally useful and illuminating perspective, especially in discussing such aspects of party activity as the role of the law. But James also, throughout the book, hits a whole succession of particular nails on the head. He covers a lot of ground—both in information and in argument—with great shrewdness and unwillingness to take the conventional wisdom for granted; at the end he even ventures to redefine the American party and to argue that the national parties have more reality than the state ones. Altogether a first class little introduction to the subject, lucidly written and highly intelligent.

Baskin's *American Pluralist Democracy* is quite different: a careful polemic about political theory, not institutions—though his two institutional chapters are both excellent (about the United States: he is clever but often wrong about Britain). Believing that 'political culture' has primarily determined the way in which American institutions operate, he is mainly

interested in investigating the historical antecedents (religious as well as political) of pluralism today, and the interconnections between practice, theory (in the orientation of 20th century American political science) and ideology. While his conclusions approach those of the New Left, his argument is coherent and sophisticated and he makes an impressive case that American pluralists have little in common with the European pluralist tradition, and have redefined the criteria of democracy in a restrictive fashion based on the unique historical experience of their own country.

Here then are three illuminating books, written in readable and occasionally stylish English, without genuflections to the cult of irrelevant quantification and which are not afraid to admit that politics may involve conflict about fundamental values. Perhaps, in copying the worst extravagances of American 'political science', some British scholars are indulging in the familiar foible of imitating an American fashion as it goes out in its homeland.

P. M. Williams

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America: New World, Third World. By Stephen Clissold. *London: Pall Mall. 1972. 394 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

In the last decade there has been an explosion of books on Latin America. Those books which deal with the continent as a whole have nearly always suffered from one defect: in their eagerness to draw some general guidelines the authors have neglected the historical background and the particular problems of the 20 republics. Mr. Clissold has overcome this problem magnificently, and consequently his book is the best guide to the problems of Latin America.

He divides his treatment into three main sections: the Indian and Iberian colonial background; the coming of Independence and the individual histories of the republics since Independence; and lastly what Mr. Clissold calls the 'Latin American Scene', i.e. the social structures, institutions economic problems, political forces and patterns of culture which are relevant to the understanding of contemporary issues. He concludes with a discussion of inter-American and international relations where he brings out the two-tiered concept of nationalism: conventional national rivalries within the continent but a continental supra-nationalism against the outside world.

Throughout, the book is distinguished by a capacity to identify the main issues and to illuminate them without descent into writing an encyclopaedia. There are excellent summaries of the Díaz regime (pp. 85–6); of the crisis of 1954 in Guatemala which was to lie at the origins of so many important later developments (p. 100). There are brilliant sketches, for instance of eccentrics like Garcia Moreno, the 'progressive' but theocratic dictator of Ecuador (p. 152).

The accounts of the individual republics enable the reader to understand the general and comparative references in the later sections. We are reminded by Mr. Clissold that military government in Latin America is the rule, not the exception, and he points to the significance of the 'Peruvian' type coup when the army acts as an institution and not as the instrument of an individual *caudillo* (p. 161). He has interesting observations on the

primacy of family connections in the business world (p. 217). In his treatment of the birth control controversy he underlines the curious alliance between right-wing Catholic nationalists and a left anxious not to weaken the springs of revolution and ever ready to accuse the United States of genocide when it attempts to suggest a limit on a population growth that erodes increases in production.

He is particularly good on the *caudillo* tradition (the *caudillo* monopolises but at the same time institutionalises the violence that has made a free for all system an intolerable anarchy) and on the actuality of presidential power (p. 291). He sees Castro firmly in this tradition as prime minister, commander-in-chief, and secretary of the only permitted party. His treatment of economic affairs is descriptive rather than analytical, but none the worse for this. He makes some good points. The Prebisch Doctrine, he comments, is scarcely calculated to underwrite export drives (p. 283). Does Mexico, he asks, prove the monetarist or the structuralist argument?

The book is mercifully free from any airs of superiority. Mr. Clissold is willing to see that constitutions—although they must be taken rather as statements of intent than as a working body of law—nevertheless do sometimes secure a reflection in reality, as in the case of the Mexican Constitution of 1917.

RAYMOND CARR

Latin American Peasant Movements. Ed. by Henry A. Landsberger. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1969. 476 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $12.50. £5·95.*

Estudios de la Realidad Campesina: Cooperación y Cambio: Informes y Materiales de Campo recognidos en Venezuela, Ecuador y Colombia. Vol. II. By R. Puch et al. *Geneva: Instituto de Investigaciones de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Social (UNRISD). 1970. 421 pp. (Instituciones Rurales y Cambio Dirigido. Gen. ed.: Orlando Fals Borda.) $4.75.*

Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant. By John Duncan Powell. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1971. 259 pp. Index. $10.50. £4·00.*

EACH of these books has an important role in the development of research on peasant movements. Landsberger's *Latin American Peasant Movements* provides a valuable collection of sophisticated articles on peasant movements in Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Guatemala and Brazil. These essays represent for the most part the first attempts at systematic analysis as opposed to romanticised political journalism, and until the late 1960s they were scattered around in obscure places, very often in mimeographed form. However, the articles are arranged by region rather than theme, and in spite of an attempt to provide a common framework of analysis, each one tends to highlight features peculiar to its case, which makes for difficulties in comparison and a certain superficiality of treatment.

The UNRISD volume (Vol. II) focuses on the common theme of co-operativism and has some degree of geographic concentration in that it covers the north-western corner of South America, but again the articles are frustratingly brief. Powell's *Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant* represents what must be one of the first in-depth social science monographs

analysing the development of the peasant movement in Venezuela over forty years. It is an exhaustive case study, which has the attention to detail typical of a doctoral thesis-book.

Landsberger's tidy classificatory mind provides a list of exhaustive categories, which supposedly serve as the framework for each article. These are: the long-run dynamic of the political and economic structure in the society in which the peasant movement takes place; the events themselves; the goals of the movement; its mass base; its allies and enemies; ideology; means; organisation; successes and failures. While these categories give a certain systematisation to the articles, they are not the most meaningful in all situations, nor do they have profound explanatory power. Class structure and relations of production are omitted in favour of 'social status', which as we know can mean anything and nothing. The structure of leadership is also largely ignored—surely the crucial element which can tell us whether or not peasant movements are important for effecting long-term structural change in any of these societies. Common to all the data provided in this volume is the inevitable story of the decline of each political movement, yet there is no hint of any general law which might predict this, rather particular circumstantial factors in each case.

Does this mean, as many have suggested, that peasant movements will always be characterised by short-lived sporadic outbursts of political and military activity aimed at short-sighted goals? If this is the case, is it because the peasants' dependence on the market and lack of political power produce an inevitable reliance on external structures, thus rendering them liable to manipulation by the power elites?

Powell tackles this question directly in his analysis of a peasant movement which has sustained political militancy over four decades and has performed a crucial role in the mass mobilisation for democratic process. His book represents a first-class attempt to analyse the mutual dependence of the peasantry on the political elites and vice versa. His conclusion is that the peasant movement in Venezuela has died because of the fragmentation of peasant groupings, which in turn reflects the differentiation and fragmentation of the political elite at the top. It is tightly written and substantiated with well-chosen data.

In his dramatic introduction to *Estudios de la Realidad Campesina*, Orlando Fals Borda, the then Director of the UNRISD Latin American project, states baldly that the reformist alternative to revolution, co-operativism, has failed. This is because it functions principally as a mechanism of defence for the dominant classes and therefore does not challenge the political and economic structures whose removal is necessary if the conditions of the peasantry are to be substantially improved. The basic characteristics of this reformist strategy are: palliatives, intellectual colonialism, distillation of utopian ideology, an illusion of modernism, and capitalistic social and economic control.

While none of the mini-monographs in the book actually prove these so-called 'laws of reformist strategy' they do all have a common story: co-operatives flourish because of an input of organisational energy by external agents, be they political parties, the army or the church. Because of their reliance on these external agents, co-operatives basically 're-inforce the system of allegiance, dependence and the attachment of the "worse-off" to the traditional institutions'. Without structural change, the co-operatives have to rely on certain improvements in material welfare, in other words,

technological modernisation. Such innovations throw up leaders who are thereby given access to the manipulation of key political and economic networks. They are then able to improve their own personal position while becoming even more dependent for it on structures which cannot provide such benefits for the mass of the poor peasants. Finally the contradiction between material effect and ideology leads the co-operatives one by one into stagnation and decay.

ALISON M. MACEWEN

Capital Markets in Latin America: A General Survey and Six Country Studies. By Antonín Basch and Milic Kybal, with the assistance of Luis Sánchez-Masi. Introduction by Felipe Herrera. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger for the International Development Bank. 1970. 163 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £5·25.*

THIS is an updated version of 'Analisis de Mercados Latinamericanos de Capitales', published in 1969 by CEMLA. It represents the result of studies commissioned by the Interamerican Development Bank. The first part comprises a regional study; the second, ten-page summaries of six country monographs completed in 1967 and also published in Spanish by CEMLA. Two were done by Basch and the remainder by Deltec Sudamerica S.A.

An important objective of the book was to fill an informational gap. This it does admirably. For the first time we have available systematic comparative material on stock and security markets and on all forms of credit institutions. The detailed studies are of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, which account for 87 per cent of the region's gross investment. But many of the initial tables provide useful regional comparative data.

The analysis, however, although often interesting, is less satisfactory. It is brief and many points are not fully pursued. The use of concepts is sometimes over-simple, as when the balance of payments current account is used without discussion as 'capital inflow', it being unquestioningly assumed that this figure should be as large as possible, with no reference to different types of capital flows. A rather simplistic monetarist approach lies behind the whole analysis, with no apparent perception of possible complications. Inflation is assumed to be responsible for almost all ills, and only one straightforward causal link between inflation and, say, low investment is ever postulated. In certain respects the case is obviously convincing; inflation which is not corrected will clearly severely inhibit the operation of security markets, for example. But often there is too little consideration of the possible role of other factors (for instance, in the unquestioning attribution of the poor economic performance of Argentina to inflation, p. 82). And the authors do not really face up to the amount of evidence within the book itself that inflation is not quite the paramount evil they make out. Neither Peru nor Colombia are non-inflationary countries, and the fact that they have above-average savings ratios (p. 16) is never satisfactorily reconciled with this. And again, on pages 56–57, it becomes clear that monetary correction clauses have enabled Chilean savings and loan associations to prosper despite inflation.

Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the book remains interesting and a valuable source of information.

ROSEMARY THORP

Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil. By Philippe C. Schmitter. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1971. 499 pp. Bibliog. Index. £7·25.*

For the Liberation of Brazil. By Carlos Marighela. Trans. by John Butt and Rosemary Sheed. Introduction by Richard Gott. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1971. 191 pp. (The Pelican Latin American Library. Gen. ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·30.*

Brazil: The People and the Power. By Miguel Arraes. Trans. by Lancelot Sheppard. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972. 232 pp. Index. (The Pelican Latin American Library. Gen. ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·40.*

Cambão—The Yoke: The Hidden Face of Brazil. By Francisco Julião. Trans. by John Butt. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972. 191 pp. Index. (The Pelican Latin American Library. Gen. ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·35.*

PHILIPPE SCHMITTER'S attempt to relate the political development of Brazil with the formation, behaviour and structure of interest groups is a highly original, and, compared with most books on Latin America, a theoretically sophisticated work.

Like many original works it has flaws. It is too long by far and uses too much jargon. Sophisticated statistical techniques are used to derive sometimes shaky conclusions from a rather small, not very representative sample, which was asked some very general questions. There are some alarming gaps in his treatment. I suppose if any reasonably well informed observer was asked what interest groups were likely to be very important in Brazil he might reply, coffee and foreign firms. Coffee growers' associations receive only two paragraphs, though admittedly very good ones, and foreign firms not much more. Schmitter is too much concerned with the structure of existing associations and not enough with questions of power or influence, not necessarily exercised through formal associations (and hence much more difficult to analyse). The intensity of the crisis of 1964 and the change of regime are rather muted in his analysis, and his final prediction for Brazil's political future is a 'cycle of alternation between semi-competitive populist rule and repressive, technocratic military rule—both within the general confines of an authoritarian system' (p. 392). He may well be right, but the 'repressive, technocratic military rule' looks very stable and firm at the present time.

Reviewers cannot often offer constructive advice on how to read books. But in this case I can. Read the conclusions first. As an overall description of the Brazilian political system and political development they are succinct, illuminating and—to break out of the usual confines of academic cautiousness for a moment—brilliant. Reading the conclusions first helps to put the rest of the book in perspective.

His approach is unusual, though he makes out a persuasive case that it is the right one for Brazilian politics. All interest associations are treated together in relation to the demands they make on the state. Bargaining and conflict between groups—collective bargaining between employers and workers, for example—is relegated to a very subsidiary role. This enables Schmitter to emphasise more clearly the corporatist, clientelistic nature of Brazilian administration and government.

This is an important if not altogether convincing book. There is perhaps too much emphasis on the continuity of pre- and post-1964 Brazil. We do

not learn as much about the nature of policy making as might be anticipated from the earlier chapters. But his study makes you think hard about Brazilian politics, and supplies a fair number of answers to the puzzles it provokes.

The three Pelicans on Latin America are a very odd bunch. I can see little reason for publishing Marighela's volume apart from the editor's belief that anything about guerrilla movements is worth producing. Now a book about Marighela would be an entirely different proposition, for he was a leader of truly heroic proportions. These boring polemics with the Communist Party and simple advice on how to raid banks tell the reader very little about the man or about Brazil.

Miguel Arraes's book is also a wasted opportunity—and what a book he *could* have written. Left-wing Governor of Pernambuco, he was deposed in the 1964 military coup. But we share none of his personal insights, none of his unique experience, learn nothing new about the coup of 1964 or Brazilian politics. Instead we have pages of potted and oversimplified history, of attacks on imperialism, of criticism of landowners and the national bourgeoisie. Arraes was a politician of courage and integrity. Little of this comes out in the book.

Francisco Julião was and is a controversial figure in Brazilian politics. A lawyer and a deputy he founded the Peasant Leagues of Pernambuco in 1955. In this book he vividly recounts the origins and development of the Leagues. But his writing is also to some extent propaganda, for as Julião shows, the Leagues were not rural trade unions, and there were struggles between various forms of organisation in the countryside and inside the Leagues themselves. Surely the point of an introduction to this book would have been to put the Leagues in context and to have considered, even if only to reject, some of the critical writings on Julião (that he was paternalistic, ambitious and used the Leagues for his political ends). Instead of this we have one page of Preface attacking the CIA and so on. Julião's book is a moving and important document, but it needs to be read with care.

ALAN ANGELL

Latin America: A Guide to the Historical Literature. Ed. by Charles C. Griffin, assisted by J. Benedict Warren. *Austin, London: University of Texas Press for the Conference on Latin American History. 1971. 700 pp. Index. (Conference on Latin American History, Publication No. 4.) $25.00.*

This is a selective scholarly bibliography with critical annotations, sometimes signed, covering the whole field of Latin American history. In addition to books it includes articles from a wide range of periodicals. Although intended primarily for students who are only beginning their research, it should also be of value to more advanced scholars and especially to librarians.

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CORRECTION

On page 627 of the October 1972 issue of *International Affairs*, in footnote 5 to Professor Robbins's article, the dates covered by Vol. II of *Hankey: Man of Secrets* by Stephen Roskill should have been 1919–1931 not 1919–1939.

BOOKS REVIEWED, JANUARY 1973

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 49 APRIL 1973 No. 2

WEST-EAST RELATIONS IN EUROPE: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES*

Roger Morgan

IT is already clear that the mid-1970s will be a unique period in the history of postwar Europe, in that Europeans will be engaged in an active process of institution-building *both* within Western Europe *and* in the East-West or 'pan-European' dimension. This period will thus stand in marked contrast to the mid-1940s, with their optimistic hopes for East-West institution-building during the early years of the UN (of which the UN's Economic Commission for Europe—ECE—has survived since 1947 as the sole relic, and is probably destined to play a renewed role in the future); also to the mid-1950s, with their pronounced emphasis on creating institutions *within* each of the cold war blocs; and again to the mid-1960s, when the main institutional debate was an intra-Western one concerning the relations between the 'European' bodies, notably the European Economic Community (EEC), and the 'Atlantic' ones, particularly Nato.

In contrast to each of these previous periods of history, the 1970s are clearly destined to witness the simultaneous pursuit both of Western European integration, and of the attempt to establish some institutional framework for the developing pan-European dialogue. In the former of these processes, the nine member-states of the enlarged Community will be attempting to carry out the commitment made at the Paris summit conference of October 1972 to create a 'European Union' by the year 1980. Although the precise nature of the 'Union' representing the end result of this process remains shrouded in ambiguity, some of its components—including a substantial degree of economic and monetary union and a consolidation of the common commercial policy—are already fairly clear. In the years ahead, the Nine will obviously go through very considerable strains and conflicts about the nature of their West European construction, but the degree of consensus on the general direction of development is certainly strong enough to herald a period of Community-building comparable to the experience of the Six between 1958 and 1965.

* This article is an expanded version of a paper prepared for a Chatham House conference on 'The EEC and Eastern Europe' held on February 23, 1973. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the dicussions of the conference and of the study group which preceded it, but takes sole responsibility for the views expressed.

The prospects for the parallel process of institution-building at the pan-European level are vastly more obscure, partly because a number of fundamental questions are still unresolved. The point is easily confirmed by mentioning only the most obvious of them. Should the United States and Canada be represented in any new permanent organ on European co-operation and security—if indeed such an organ emerges at all from the projected conference? In fact, will the current preliminary talks in Helsinki even lead to a conference in the first place and, if so, what will be its agenda and *modus operandi*? Will the European Commission play a substantive role in such a conference (and/or subsequent standing body or bodies), or merely a symbolic one? Will the various current forms of East-West dialogue—preparations for a European security conference, MBFR discussions, and SALT II—ever coalesce, or is their well-publicised 'parallelism' to be taken literally, as implying non-convergence?

These unanswered questions—of which the list could readily be lengthened, for instance, by asking about the role of the neutrals in the whole process—indicate clearly enough that the prospects for West European integration, for all their ambiguities and uncertainties, are considerably more substantial than those for institutional development at the pan-European level.

Despite this difference in kind between the two institution-building prospects before us, it is not surprising that West Europeans are by no means unanimous about the order of priority they assign to the two processes. Quite understandably, many commentators have been inclined to see the promise of pan-European co-operation as much more significant than the prospect of consolidating the enlarged West European Community. After all, the idea of establishing pan-European institutions which would not only mark the end of the cold war but, more important, prevent any recurrence of it by binding the states of East and West into an indissoluble degree of functional co-operation, is bound to appear more exciting to many people than the mere enlargement of a group of prosperous West European countries from six to nine, and the disputes accompanying the consolidation of this new entity. It could even be argued that one of the main political arguments for West European integration—that it would render war impossible between hereditary enemies, notably France and Germany—is now totally outmoded, since Europe's diminished international power and the present low degree of integration have already achieved the desired result. If this argument is accepted, those who supported West European integration as a step to peace should logically transfer their attention to attaining a comparable degree of integration at the East-West level, where the risk of armed conflict *does* remain a reality. Even though many protagonists of pan-European institutions argue that part of their

value lies in the contribution they could make to consolidating the *West* European Community through a process of creative confrontation, representatives of this school in fact tend to give a clear priority to pan-European over West European institutions.[1] The opposing school of thought, which shares the view expressed earlier that West Europe's own integration is a more substantial prospect, which ought not to be lightly placed at risk, approaches the European security conference with the slogan '*in dubio pro communitate*', spelling this out as follows: 'Whenever there is any doubt whether what is being decided at the conference endangers our own progress towards a European union, it should be clear that this progress is an elementary need for the member States of the Community.'[2]

Before giving further consideration to the prospects for institution-building at the West European and pan-European levels, it is worth emphasising that institutions, particularly in relations between states and between nations, represent only a small part of the story. The whole history of international organisation from the League of Nations to the EEC confirms the proposition that institutions are no more than the vehicles or instruments of policies. When the member-governments of an international organisation agree about their objectives, the organisation may be able to develop a fair degree of authority; but if such agreement is lacking institutions can do little or nothing to create it. It does look of course as if the supranational authorities of the European Community will gradually come to exercise an unprecedented degree of authority over the member governments, but the experiment is still too new for a firm judgment to be made on a process which in any case is still in its early stages. The point is that even without authoritative central organs, enough agreement on major policy issues has existed among the Six, and now does among the Nine, for them to behave quite often as if they *were* subject to such an authority; whereas at the pan-European level the extent of perceived common interests is much smaller, the prospects for the transaction of concrete business are much less, and the degree of mutual mistrust is much higher. At the West European level, it may be that the degree of common purpose is firm enough to allow a progressive strengthening of the Community's institutions, which in turn would compel a higher degree of alignment of member-states' policies; the time for such a development at the pan-European level, although it may be drawing nearer, is hardly yet in sight.

[1] This is the general premise of Gerda Zellentin's important article, 'Institutions for détente and co-operation', *The World Today*, January 1973, esp. p. 10, and of her book *Europa 1985: Gesellschaftliche und politische Entwicklungen in Gesamteuropa* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag. 1972).

[2] Ralf Dahrendorf, 'The foreign policy of the EEC', *The World Today*, February 1973, p. 56.

Western objectives in the East

This is very far from saying that the political aims of Eastern and Western governments are still as divergent or contradictory as they were during the cold war. If it is asked what Western Europe's political objectives in the East are, or might be, the answer should start by a working definition of the 'political' aims of foreign policy in general, in contrast to some of the others. It may be analytically useful to classify the aims of foreign policy into three categories—although, as will be seen, they are almost impossible to separate so neatly in practice. First, a large proportion of a state's overall diplomatic activity is today concerned with establishing and maintaining structures to facilitate international economic processes, including trade, payments and investments: such structures range from the Gatt and the IMF at the global level to a variety of organs, notably the EEC, at the regional level, but they all have in common the function of *facilitating* transactions between their member-states. Second, much diplomatic activity is devoted to the maintenance of institutional structures—strategic alliances and the organisations which they may engender—designed to *avert* the eventuality of war by demonstrating enough military strength and political cohesion to deter aggression or risk-taking: the best-developed of such structures are of course Nato and the Warsaw Pact, but there are many other examples of regional alliances, both multilateral and bilateral. The third category of diplomatic activity, alongside those which maintain the co-operation-promoting and the conflict-preventing structures, may be defined as that of pursuing *political* objectives, which will vary, according to a given state's position, from activist to defensive, from the extension of its own influence to the reduction of that of others, and from risky *démarches* to the management of crises provoked by others.

This categorisation—which, broadly speaking, distinguishes between economics, strategy and politics—is of course hard to apply without qualification to foreign policy as it is practised in the real world. The bargaining involved in establishing and working the rules of 'economic' organisations is obviously a political process; the main instruments of political influence will often be economic leverage or military superiority; the management of major international crises will often entail the deployment of economic or military instruments, or both; and there may often be indissoluble links between economics, strategy and politics, as for instance in the issue of the United States' commitment to Western Europe.

Even admitting these linkages, however, and the further consideration that states may often pursue one objective as a means to another—economic prosperity as a means to military security, or vice versa—large sectors of the external policies of modern states may still be

characterised as the pursuit primarily of economic prosperity, *or* military security *or* political objectives of a less tangible kind.

If this framework is applied to the objectives of Western Europe *vis-à-vis* Eastern Europe, it is easier to discern the economic or strategic dimensions than the political—although it must be emphasised that all three are to some degree interlinked. Economically, the member-states of the European Community have a clear interest in increasing the relatively small amounts of trade and other economic activity which they now conduct with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A sharp distinction must be made between the Soviet Union, whose interest in foreign trade is extremely low (but whose richness in raw materials may offer a very promising co-operative field for Western expertise and technology), and the East European states, most of which depend heavily for their prosperity on closer economic relations with the West. Despite this distinction, the nature of Western Europe's *economic* interest in its Eastern neighbours is fairly clear; furthermore, we have now had enough experience of various means of promoting it—from the exchange of statistics through the ECE to individual joint industrial ventures—to be fairly sure which are the more promising paths to follow.

Again, the *strategic* dimension of Western Europe's Ostpolitik is relatively clear. It is true that to the emphasis on maintaining the West's own military strength, which was characteristic of Nato's first two decades, is now added concern for such 'confidence-building measures' as the exchange of manoeuvre-observers and of information on troop movements, the possibility of negotiated force reductions and the realisation that such reductions, negotiated or not, may come about in any case. However, the basic objective of Western Europe remains the same as in 1950: to deter any attack from the East—calculated or miscalculated—by ensuring an adequate defensive capacity. Just as the East-West aspects of the problem have undergone change with the introduction of the new elements referred to, so also the nature of the 'West-West' problem of Western Europe's position in Nato is also changing. However, the arguments about the desirability or feasibility of a West European nuclear force, about a European conventional defence community or procurement agency, and about the intensification of consultation through Nato's Eurogroup or otherwise, do not affect the central point: that Western Europe's strategic posture towards the East remains one of graduated deterrence coupled with readiness to consider new forms of confidence-building and crisis-management.

As might be expected, Western Europe's *political* objectives in the East are harder to formulate than those of a primarily economic or strategic character. An indication of their general tenor is given by the proposals which the West is reported to have made in Helsinki for the non-economic and non-strategic items on the agenda of the projected

conference on security and co-operation in Europe: 'the development of human contacts; broadening of cultural exchanges; contacts and exchanges in education; and a wider flow of information'.[3] Behind these relatively modest aims, however, lies a broader objective which most politically conscious West Europeans would share, though it is not one that can be expressed officially. After envisaging a policy of maximising personal contacts between Eastern and Western Europeans (starting with economic ones), and even 'a Community foreign policy aiming at more autonomy for the East European nations in their dealings with the West', a non-official observer has concluded that the Community should try 'to demonstrate what an enlightened foreign economic policy, skilfully pursued, can do to make the division between the two parts of Europe progressively less complete and less painful'.[4]

Such statements contain two distinct, though interrelated, objectives: first, the promotion of internal liberalisation within East European societies (which is already adumbrated in the official Western demands for 'the development of human contacts' and so on); and secondly the promotion of greater external autonomy for the East European states—which is not even hinted at in official statements, since it clearly amounts to a considerable and potentially counter-productive challenge to the Soviet Union. But to say that a foreign policy objective should not be openly formulated does not of course mean that it does not exist. For the governments of Western Europe, the aim of a greater degree of freedom of manoeuvre for the Soviet Union's allies is clearly a legitimate and reasonable one, even though it should be pursued according to the French maxim on the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine after 1871: '*toujours y penser, jamais en parler*'.

The slogan is, however, almost all that Western Europe's current objectives have in common with the well-defined aim of changing part of Europe's territorial *status quo* pursued by France with great tenacity until its accomplishment in 1919. One of the cardinal features of Western Europe's aims in Eastern Europe today is that the *status quo* which it aims to change is neither the territorial one nor is it related to Europe's division and incorporation into blocs led by the two super-powers. The West's discreet promotion of greater autonomy for the states of Eastern Europe (much like, as it appears, the Soviet Union's countervailing attempt to divide the member-states of the EEC by trying not to recognise the Community) is a policy which, unlike the policies of some West European states until the very recent past, explicitly accepts the territorial *status quo* of 1945 and the concomitant division of Europe into two.

The fact of this Western acceptance is not fully recognised in the East—there seems to be a general time-lag in perceptions which allows

[3] *The Times*, January 19, 1973.
[4] Andrew Shonfield, Fourth Reith Lecture, *The Listener*, November 30, 1972.

feelings of threat and insecurity to persist after their causes have been removed. It is therefore worth briefly contrasting the Western position of the mid-1970s with those of earlier phases of the cold war. The behaviour of both sides, throughout the 1950s at least, was marked by their respective and symmetrical belief that their adversary seriously intended their complete subjugation. From 1947, when the Truman Doctrine and the Cominform marked the institutionalisation of the cold war, West Europeans believed that the Soviet Union was intent on dominating them as it dominated Eastern Europe; and Soviet and East European leaders took at face value the rhetoric of the West about the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe and the 'roll-back' of communism. If the Soviet Union ever had any intention of over-running Western Europe—which appears unlikely in view of Stalin's well-known instructions to the French and Italian Communist Parties to conciliate their bourgeois allies—the execution of this intention was deterred by the military strengthening of the West. Again, as the 1950s went by and the West failed to support the independence of East Germany in 1953 or that of Hungary in 1956, the threat of a 'roll-back' of communism could hardly be taken at face value. However, West Germany's refusal to accept the territorial *status quo* raised an awkward question mark over the prospects of detente based upon this *status quo*, at least until Adenauer gave up the West German Chancellorship in 1963. It is true that West Germany's allies in Nato did not fully share its declared aim of reabsorbing the Eastern parts of Germany into a united *Reich* (this was underlined by their passivity in 1953 and again when the Berlin Wall was built in 1961), but their verbal endorsement of it contributed to the hostile character of East-West relations during this period. Despite occasional glimmerings of the 'spirit of Geneva' in the middle of the decade, the 1950s were in fact a period when the states of Western Europe consciously—and probably inevitably—gave a clear priority to consolidating their relations within their own grouping, rather than taking any chances in the pursuit of pan-European détente.

Their behaviour during the next decade stood in very marked contrast. The West European reaction against the cold war, once its end appeared to have been indicated in 1961–63 by the Berlin Wall, the management of the Cuban crisis, and the Test Ban Treaty, was in fact in many ways extreme. The emphasis on the economic and political consolidation of the West European structure was replaced by an equally determined concentration on seeking accommodation with the East. From de Gaulle's 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' to the urgency of Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1970, the emphasis was on East-West détente, despite all the differences between de Gaulle and Brandt and despite a considerable attachment to Western integration—by Brandt, of course, much more than by de Gaulle. Those who are still strongly

optimistic about the prospects for pan-European détente and co-operation may be said, from a more pessimistic viewpoint, to be still arguing within the intellectual framework of the 1960s.

It was, of course, the Czech crisis of 1968 which destroyed some of the illusions of the 1960s. Even though, as we have noted, there was an optimistic urgency about Bonn's Ostpolitik in the year 1970, and this is still shared by some commentators, the general understanding by the end of the decade was that East-West detente must be built on the blocs, rather than through an attempt to dissolve them. This clarification, coinciding with the enlargement of the EEC, points to the proper order of priorities for Western Europe in the 1970s: neither the obsessive Western consolidation of the 1950s, nor the pan-European euphoria of the 1960s, but a carefully considered combination of both. In particular, it is clear that the rosy vista of a bloc-free Europe, preached by de Gaulle and others in the mid-1960s, is a totally unrealistic objective for Western Europe for many years to come. Western Europe's principal political objectives with regard to the East—discreet encouragement of the internal liberalisation of the Soviet and East European regimes and an increased freedom of action for the latter internationally—can best be promoted, if at all, by an unambiguous acceptance of the territorial *status quo* as a whole. This implies, it must be emphasised, an acceptance both of the frontiers established in 1945—which West Germany vainly challenged in the 1950s—and of Europe's division into the two super-powers' spheres of influence—vainly challenged by de Gaulle in the 1960s.

One of the central features of the situation, however, is that the main result of this clear acceptance of the territorial and geo-political *status quo* is precisely to open the way for new political forces which are bound to have the effect of modifying its significance. In the formulation of one acute observer:

> The double paradox of the era of negotiation is that, on the one hand, all this spectacular activity consists essentially in recognising the *status quo*, but that, on the other hand, this recognition of the *status quo* can set in movement psychological and social forces which undermine it in more effective ways, albeit unpredictable ones, than any diplomatic or military enterprise could.[5]

Before returning to the precise ways in which the *status quo* may be undermined in some of its aspects, it is worth underlining that these aspects are *not* likely to include the territorial one. Even the West Germans, through the series of treaties concluded between 1970 and 1972—the accords with Moscow and Warsaw, the Berlin Agreement, and the basic treaty with the GDR—have bound themselves to accept the territorial *status quo* in the same way as their Western allies. They

[5] Pierre Hassner, 'L'Europe de l'Est, vue de loin', *Esprit*, December 1972, p. 20.

have of course reaffirmed that this acceptance does not preclude the ultimate right of the German people to choose their own future—including reunification—by free methods of self-determination, but in practice the Germans know that the international situation in which this goal might be attainable is very far away. The West Germans will naturally have an interest in promoting the internal liberalisation of the GDR (though not its international freedom of action) that is much more pronounced than the interest of any other West European state in inducing change in any other Eastern one, but their ambitions are likely to be carefully limited to this fairly clear-cut aim. It is possible to envisage circumstances in which the West Germans might after all find the partition of their country intolerable and embark on risky courses of action to end it—if, for instance, their Western partners showed inadequate comprehension of the sacrifices they are making in accepting division, or if the East German regime were to accentuate its repression of its subjects to anything like the degree prevailing in 1953. But such eventualities hardly seem likely. Even West Germany, then, with its particularly close ties to its Eastern neighbour (including very advantageous commercial ones), is likely to remain broadly in line with the prevailing West European view that the best hope of modifying and humanising the *status quo* is formally to accept it.

Will Eastern Europe get more liberal?

This leads us to three questions concerning the Western objectives already defined, and the tactics most likely to achieve them. First, is the internal liberalisation of East European societies likely to proceed *pari passu* with the growing external autonomy of East European states, or are the two processes quite distinct? Secondly, what sort of bargaining procedures should Western Europe adopt in attempting to achieve its objectives? And thirdly, what means does Western Europe (including the EEC) in fact have at its disposal in attempting to achieve its ends?

The question about the relationship between domestic liberalisation and external autonomy—summarised by Pierre Hassner in the excellent article cited earlier as 'de-Stalinisation' and 'de-satellisation'—goes back to the first signs of change in the Soviet empire immediately after the death of Stalin. For some years it was automatically assumed in the West that the two processes were inseparably linked—that East European governments seeking more autonomy from the Soviet Union would at the same time wish to give more freedom to their own subjects, if only because the pressure to attain the former came in large part from the people who would also demand the latter. As Pierre Hassner points out, however, we have since seen many cases of a clear

disjunction between the two processes: in Albania, total 'de-satellisation' has been accompanied by no liberalisation whatever; in Romania, external independence from the Soviet Union has gone very much further than internal liberalisation; and in Poland and Hungary, a fair degree of internal reform has been purchased at the price of unfailing orthodoxy in the affairs of the Warsaw Pact. In the longer run, the two processes are indeed likely to converge; for instance, the industrial manager or official who concludes an agreement with a Western firm or government is likely to demand a greater say in the domestic affairs of his own country. But there may be cases where Western governments should think carefully which of the two objectives they actually wish to promote. In this writer's view, there ought to be no doubt that internal liberalisation should have priority over external 'de-satellisation', which runs the risk of escalating into a threat to the *status quo,* and thus of provoking early and drastic Soviet countermeasures. Of course, even internal liberalisation in Eastern Europe is a delicate objective for Western states to set themselves: the process of reform must be left very largely to the East Europeans themselves, partly because any acceleration even of *this* process might lead to a repetition of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and partly because—as will be seen—the means at the disposal of the West are in fact extremely limited.

The second question concerns the bargaining posture which the West should adopt in its attempt to pursue its aims *vis-à-vis* the East. There is a school of thought which argues that a perfectly straightforward bargain is waiting to be struck: Eastern Europe (and the Soviet Union) is urgently in need of Western technological expertise and investment, while the West's sole interest in the field of European co-operation (including the projected conference on security and co-operation) lies in maximising the degree of individual freedom enjoyed by East Europeans. All that remains, therefore, is for the West to make clear to the East that the benefits of Western technology will be denied to it except in return for the specific *quid pro quo* of guaranteed improvements in human rights in the East. This scenario is not without a certain appeal, but it seems to ignore some important realities. First, the Eastern interest in acquiring Western technology is matched to a considerable extent by the interest of Western firms in providing it, so that the East figures in no way as a simple *demandeur* from whom a *quid pro quo* can be extracted. Secondly, Western authorities (the national governments and the European Community institutions) are not in a position to offer such bargains at all easily, since the pursuit of commercial activities in Western Europe is largely in the hands of private entrepreneurs. And thirdly, the Soviet and East European governments are not in the least likely to respond favourably to this

kind of demand, which appears much more likely to be counter-productive than to achieve its aim. The trade-off between Western technology and Eastern liberalisation can at best be tacit and extremely slow. The gradual multiplication of contacts between East European and West European societies will bring a greater sense of security to the rulers of Eastern Europe as they come to realise that such functional contacts do not in fact threaten their position, but only call into question certain aspects of their arbitrary power. Thus liberalisation can be expected as the end-product of technical and other contacts, and by no means as something to be demanded on a here-and-now basis. It is true that in the past there have been certain explicit *quid pro quo* deals concerning human rights in Eastern Europe—Hungary's admission to the UN was facilitated by the United States in return for an amnesty for political prisoners, and West Germany's recent basic treaty with the GDR was accompanied by similar measures—but such bargains are likely to remain the exception.

A separate, though partly linked, aspect of the tactical question is whether the West Europeans would do better to aim their diplomatic and economic activities directly at the states of Eastern and Central Europe—which are, after all, meant to be the principal beneficiaries of the activities we are considering—or whether it is more profitable and less dangerous to make a point of channelling our main efforts through the Soviet Union. Since 1968 the question has tended to be answered with the latter alternative, since the West concluded—probably rightly—that one of the contributory causes of the Soviet repression of Czechoslovakia had been the ill-considered strivings of West European states (notably West Germany under the Grand Coalition) to develop close relations with the Soviet Union's satellites without sufficiently reassuring Moscow about the limited objectives of the exercise. (It is not in fact clear that the objects *were* so limited: just as de Gaulle's flamboyant activities were specifically aimed at freeing Europe from the hegemony of the two super-powers, so the Ostpolitik of the Kiesinger-Brandt epoch could be interpreted as an attempt to encircle the GDR and thus undermine the Soviet sphere of influence as a whole.) The pendulum may now have swung too far in the direction of reassuring the Soviet Union, by concentrating a large proportion of Western economic efforts on Moscow and by constantly assuring the Soviet government that nothing threatening is being undertaken. It is of course logical for the United States to pursue its East-West dialogue essentially with the other super-power (on strategy certainly, if not on economics); it is much more open to question whether the West Europeans should follow suit, once the basic point is made clear that Western Europe's Ostpolitik implies no threat to the *status quo*.

This brings us to the third and final question of what instruments

Western Europe possesses in order to promote its—relatively modest—aims in the East. If we accept that military threats are excluded—*i.e.*, that the strategic instrument is to be used only for the strictly strategic purpose of deterrence—the answer is that the West's means of pursuing political objectives in Eastern Europe are likely to be largely economic. As we noted earlier, trade and other forms of economic co-operation tend to be pursued largely for reasons of profit, but they are also well-tried agents of political change. There are many reasons why economic exchanges with the East are likely to develop only slowly—not least among them are the striking differences in the levels of development of the prospective partners, the difficulties arising from the non-convertibility of East European currencies, and the obstacles arising from Eastern political suspicions, typified in the GDR's doctrine of *Abgrenzung*. Furthermore, it is clear that the process of *social* change in Eastern Europe is by its nature bound to be slow, unlike the diplomatic manoeuvres undertaken by, say, Romania in recent years, which for all their dramatic quality may have relatively little lasting significance.

A foreign policy aimed at encouraging certain types of social and political change *within* the countries to which it is addressed obviously needs a more subtle and diverse range of instruments than the old-fashioned type of diplomacy directed only towards influencing the interlocutor's external behaviour. Whereas the latter kind of policy could probably function largely through diplomatic *démarches*, backed if necessary by alliances and the use or threat of force, the 'new diplomacy' is new indeed, in the sense that to influence societies rather than states requires what François Duchêne has termed 'civilian' rather than military forms of power.

This is one reason why the European Community, whose external policy has only 'civilian' instruments at its disposal, may be able to play a particularly useful role alongside the efforts made by its member-states. The Common Commercial Policy (CCP), though it provides only a limited form of regulation of Western Europe's economic dealings with the East, is likely to be considerably strengthened during the next year or so by a quite fortuitous circumstance: although the Common Commercial Policy (in force since January 1973) would not normally govern the terms of East-West trade agreements until the existing ones are due for re-negotiation (in most cases only in 1974 or 1975), the impending recognition of the GDR by most West European states during the months immediately ahead will entail a new series of trade agreements with that state which will provide an early testing-ground for the CCP. It is also likely to be strengthened during the years ahead by its extension from purely commercial agreements—now no longer the main vehicle of East-West economic transactions—to

the whole range of joint industrial ventures whose economic and social significance is very much greater. With the regulation of this entire array of East-West activities by the Community, coupled with the latter's potential ability to raise the capital sums needed for really large-scale ventures and to guarantee East-West trade credits on a Community-wide basis, the role of the 'civilian' Community in East-West relations is likely to grow substantially. Whether in the framework of a conference on security and co-operation and of some ensuing permanent bodies, or without such an East-West institutional framework, the EEC is clearly destined to play a growing part in Western Europe's Ostpolitik. In this way the Community, far from being the devisive 'cold war' grouping depicted by some of its adversaries, can make a positive contribution to the process—which can only be cautious, measured, and long-protracted—of overcoming the division between the two parts of Europe.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

Michael Leifer and Dolliver Nelson

ON November 16, 1971, the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia declared jointly that the Straits of Malacca (and Singapore) were not an international waterway, although they fully recognised their use for international shipping ' in accordance with the principle of innocent passage '. This assertion of sovereign rights by coastal states over a much used sea corridor linking two oceans [1] has drawn an unsympathetic response from major maritime powers and has attracted attention to competing security interests within south-east Asia at a time when the regional power balance is in a condition of flux. Indeed, it is noteworthy, if coincidental, that the joint declaration followed by just over two weeks the termination of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement and its replacement by a less binding consultative arrangement.

In addition to the significance of the joint declaration for the security interests of both coastal states and maritime powers, this initiative has raised important questions of international law. Among these is the juridical status of international straits and in particular the situation of those straits whose waters have been claimed as parts of the territorial seas of coastal states through unilateral acts of extension. Claims of this nature carry implications for the passage of foreign vessels through such waters and for the flight of foreign aircraft through corresponding airspace. Further, as a consequence of the geopolitical outlook of one of the parties to the joint declaration concerning the Straits of Malacca, the status of waters between islands forming archipelagic states is also brought into question.

This discussion of the dispute over the Malacca Straits and attendant issues will of necessity encompass both international politics and international law. It will attempt to identify the underlying and precipitating factors in the emergence of the dispute and to assess the interests and

[1] The Straits of Malacca are a major artery for marine traffic between the East coast of the island of Sumatra and the West coast of the Malay peninsula. Together with the adjoining Straits of Singapore, which are bounded by Singapore and Malaysian territory to the north of the sea passage and Indonesian territory to the south, they provide the shortest sea route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The narrowest point of the Straits of Malacca, at the western tip of the Malay peninsula, is 8·4 nautical miles. The narrowest point of the Straits of Singapore is 3·2 nautical miles. At its eastern outlet, where it is commanded by Malaysian and Indonesian territory, the width of the sea passage is 11·1 nautical miles.

positions of the principal parties concerned. The legal implications of the dispute will be considered not only in the context of *lex lata* (established law) but also in the context of the *lex ferenda* (future law) of international straits and of archipelagos, which is of special significance in view of the forthcoming international conference on the law of the sea.

Political realities

Although the declaration concerning the status of the Straits of Malacca was a joint undertaking and reflected common interests, the initiative was more a product of Indonesian than of Malaysian priorities. Governments in Indonesia have long exhibited an acute concern about the political integrity of an ethnically diverse archipelago which had no historical existence as a political unity before the administrative consolidation of the Netherlands East Indies. It is this concern over national integration and security which has governed the position of the government of President Suharto towards the question of control of the Straits of Malacca. The Indonesian outlook was embodied as early as December 1957 in an official maxim prompted by political dissidence in the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi, which subsequently tested the integrity of the state. The maxim, which was incorporated within municipal law in February 1960, is known in Indonesian as *Wawasan Nusantara* and in English as the 'archipelago principle'. It is understood to mean that 'the seas and the straits must be utilised to bridge the physical separations between the islands, regions and the manifold ethnic groups; this is also the case with our airspace'.[2] This maxim is given added content by the Indonesian expression *tanah air* which, although translated as fatherland, has no precise equivalent in the English language. Its literal meaning is land and water. Its significance is that the notion of 'fatherland' does not permit any distinction between land and water. The latter is construed as the maritime interstices of the state.

The Indonesian government is determined to seek international recognition of the archipelago principle primarily as a means of underpinning the security of the state. Past experience of external attempts to promote the fragmentation of Indonesia by encouraging the free play of its centrifugal human forces together with an acute consciousness of current military weakness has sustained this determination. A recent indication of Indonesian intent was an agreement concluded in Manila in May 1972, between its representatives and those of the Philippines and Fiji, which set out 'principles' for the assertion of sovereign rights

[2] Indonesian Department of Defence and Security, *The Function and Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces in the Period of Consolidation and Integration* (Jakarta, 1970), p. 4.

over inland waters, sea-beds and air space by 'archipelago states' and for the control over sea passages through such waters by foreign vessels.

The Straits of Malacca (and Singapore) do not come directly within the context of Indonesia's archipelago principle because Malaysia is acknowledged as the sovereign power in the Malay peninsula. Nonetheless, the Straits of Malacca are contemplated within its context because they provide a direct channel into the maritime interstices of Indonesia. The assertion of joint control over the Straits by Indonesia and Malaysia is thus seen as a claim to restrict the strategic mobility of maritime powers which possess the capacity to pose a challenge to the security of Indonesia and to its own conception of regional order.[5] Although Indonesia's aim might appear somewhat ambitious, given the striking disparity of military resources between the archipelago state and major maritime powers like the Soviet Union and the United States, the Indonesian military, who exercise a commanding voice where a junction exists between matters of national security and foreign policy, are committed to the archipelago outlook and are of one mind in their determination to persist in asserting the rights of the coastal states.

Indonesia's perception of its security interests is not the only factor that must be taken into account in understanding Jakarta's point of view. The prospect of diverting shipping en route to Japan from Singapore to Indonesian ports, the acquisition of leverage with which to secure additional economic assistance from Japan, the exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed and a shared concern with Malaysia over pollution in the Straits and on the littoral shores are all to some extent germane. Indeed, the question of the control of pollution did serve as the precipitating issue. The Straits carry a heavy traffic of approximately 40,000 vessels annually, especially Japanese tankers of growing dimensions, which convey more than 85 per cent. of their country's oil supply from the Persian Gulf. Concern at the prospect and consequences of either a collision at sea or a tanker being holed on rocks was expressed in Malaysia after the grounding of the *Torrey Canyon* off the English coast in March 1967. The possibility of a similar experience befalling the Straits prompted an initial hydrographic survey during 1968, which revealed alarming discrepancies between actual depths and those shown on charts in regular use. In 1970 Japan, which was a party to this survey and was conscious of the importance of its oil life-line and of the cost of an extensive use of alternative routes through Indonesian waters,

[5] Indonesian interest in control of the Straits of Malacca pre-dates the establishment of the state. In July 1945 during a meeting of the Japanese-sponsored Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, Ir. Sukarno argued that 'Indonesia will not become strong or secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands. If only the West coast of the Straits of Malacca, it will mean a threat to our security.' Quoted in Muhammad Yamin, *Naskah persiapan Undang-undang Dasar 1945*, Vol. I (Jakarta. 1959), p. 204.

advocated a traffic separation scheme. The scheme was framed to permit the participation of a board of user countries through the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO), an agency of the United Nations. The manner of Japan's diplomacy on this issue and more specifically a concrete proposal from its Ministry of Transport in July 1971 for international control of navigation in the Straits annoyed the coastal states and provided the opportunity for the joint declaration of November, which might have been made earlier if the support of Singapore could have been obtained for a common tripartite position.

During the period of growing concern over the safety of navigation in the Straits, the degree of political co-operation between Indonesia and Malaysia had reached unprecedented heights. The bitterness of Confrontation had been set aside, if not completely forgotten, and effective co-operation in matters of security was under way, initially over border control in Northern Borneo. Subsequently a 'security arrangement' of 1967 was raised to the level of a 'security agreement' to cover the entire territory of both states. Indonesia had declared a twelve-mile limit to its territorial waters in February 1960. Malaysia extended its own limit to twelve miles in July 1969, in part as a consequence of joint discussions on common security problems. In October 1969, the two governments agreed to divide the sea-bed of the Straits between them and also to define their common maritime boundary in the South China Sea. A treaty providing for the delimitation of the territorial sea in the Straits of Malacca was signed in March 1970 on the occasion of an official visit to Malaysia by President Suharto. This accord questioned implicitly the long-standing status of the Straits as an international waterway.

Although Malaysia was more directly concerned with the control of navigation and the prevention of pollution, it was governed also in its attitude by the changing power balance in Asia. Indeed, in September 1970, the government of Tun Razak had proposed the neutralisation of south-east Asia in an attempt to promote a new order to serve the interests of regional states. Although Indonesia objected privately to this proposal because its terms implied an extra-regional policing of such an order, it was of one mind with Malaysia in the need to respond to external changes bearing on south-east Asia. Indonesia, with an evident aspiration for regional leadership, was determined to try to exclude any new form of external intervention which might deny such a goal. In this respect, its government was disconcerted by the Soviet-Indian Treaty of August 1971, which indicated an aggregation of Soviet-Indian power in the Indian Ocean area (and which subsequently facilitated the dismemberment of Pakistan and the preponderance of India on the subcontinent). It was influenced also by the announcement in July of President Nixon's intention to visit Peking, which facilitated

China's entry into the United Nations in the following October. Encouraged by Malaysia's regional concerns and its interest in preventing pollution, as well as the value which Malaysia placed on their cordial relationship, Indonesia sought to give notice that a power vacuum in south-east Asia was not in the making and that local states were not prepared to subordinate their interests to those of extra-regional powers.

The joint declaration of November 1971 was incorporated within a tripartite statement to which Singapore was a party and which asserted that safety of navigation in the two Straits in question was the responsibility of the coastal states and also that the problem of the safety of navigation and the matter of the internationalisation of the Straits were two separate issues. This latter point was directly related to the stand of Singapore, which only took note of the position of the Indonesian and Malaysian governments on the internationalisation of the Straits. Subsequently, in a statement before Singapore's Parliament, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Rajaratnam, explained his government's position of reserve.[4] He maintained that, although there existed a need to ensure safety of navigation and to prevent pollution through the imposition of regulations, Singapore stood for the 'unimpeded passage of all ships of all nations through the Straits'. His rationale, couched in terms of an objection to anything which might disrupt a major artery of international communications and which might serve also as a 'catalyst for a new cold war' reflected, in addition, a concern lest any concession of principle concerning the status of both Straits should increase the vulnerability of the island-state interposed between Malaysia and Indonesia, especially in the event of any radical change in government in Jakarta.

The government of Singapore contemplates provision for security not only in terms of island defence but also in the form of a multiple great power involvement in south-east Asia, which would serve to neutralise individual great power influence and also that of any potentially dominant regional state.[5] For these reasons as well as those arising from important economic considerations, Singapore has refused consistently to support the joint Indonesia-Malaysian position and has advocated that the status of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore should not be considered in isolation from all other straits which are vital links in international sea communications.

Singapore's position in pointing to the dangers of a scramble to 'carve up and to lay claim to straits and oceans in which right must be and will be largely on the side of those who have the might' reflected self-interest and also the response of the major maritime powers to the joint declaration. The most vociferous opponent of this initiative has been the

[4] Parliamentary Debates, Singapore, March 17, 1972.
[5] Note the decision of the Singapore government to grant repair facilities to Russian naval vessels, *The Times*, December 13, 1972.

Soviet Union, whose naval chief, Admiral Gorshkov, has warned that his surface and submarine fleet could destroy opponents on the high seas in any part of the world. Soviet objections were made public first and significantly in Japan. On March 3, 1972, a week after President Nixon had concluded his visit to China, the Soviet ambassador to Tokyo called on the Japanese deputy foreign minister to inquire about his government's position on the Straits and was reported as saying that Moscow regarded them as an international waterway.[6] Apart from an interest at that juncture in seeking to exploit Japan's sense of resentment towards the United States provoked in part by the manner of the announcement of President Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet government possessed a tangible stake in maintaining its right of unimpeded passage to the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Singapore and Malacca from the port of Vladivostock.[7]

The news of this expression of opinion, reported through a Japanese news agency, prompted an immediate and common response by Indonesia and Malaysia, who had been only too conscious of the movement of Soviet and American naval vessels into the Indian Ocean in the closing stages of the Bangladesh war in December 1971. They restated their stand on the question of innocent passage and a Malaysian spokesman asserted that 'the two countries reserved the right to search any ship passing through the straits and could also object to naval vessels carrying arms through the straits for use by an unfriendly country'.[8] In addition, Tun Ismail, Malaysia's deputy Prime Minister, was reported, after returning from a visit to Jakarta, as claiming that the two countries had the means to enforce their control of the Straits.[9] This resolute, if ambitious, stand by the coastal states was sustained in the face of a tempestuous visit by a Soviet emissary and ironically attracted the support of the Chinese government, which denounced the Soviet Union for 'casting a covetous eye on the Strait of Malacca'.[10]

The other maritime powers, especially the United States,[11] take a

[6] It is of interest to note that part of the joint communiqué issued on the same day by Alexei Kosygin and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the end of the latter's visit to Moscow which read: 'In supporting the generally recognized rules of international law governing territorial waters, the Soviet Union and Bangladesh declared themselves in favour of the need to lay down the limit of territorial waters in conformity with the practice of the overwhelming majority of states, as well as the need to settle relevant problems.'

[7] For a full discussion of Soviet interests, see Geoffrey Jukes, *The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy*, Adelphi Paper No. 87 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1972).

[8] Associated Press, March 6, 1972.

[9] *The Times*, March 20, 1972.

[10] *Peking Review*, March 17, 1972.

[11] A vigorous assertion of American interests came from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral T. J. Moorer, who was reported as saying that the United States must have freedom of passage through the Straits regardless of Indonesia's and Malaysia's claim that they are territorial waters. See *Japan Times*, August 8, 1972.

similar line to that of the Soviet Union. Britain, for example, expr
its support for the principle of unimpeded passage through the S
in April 1972 while the Japanese have sought to signal their pos
by exploring the alternatives of an oil pipeline and a canal acros
Isthmus of Kra in Thailand. The common, if unco-ordinated, stan
the maritime states has not led, however, to common action. In
absence of any clear intention by Indonesia and Malaysia, at pre
to try to enforce their claim by physical means, the maritime po
have set their lawyers to work and await the convening of the U
Nations conference on the law of the sea. For the time being Indo
and Malaysia have stood firm only on the question of principle alth
some diplomatic approaches have been made to try to secure
notification of the passage of naval vessels.[12] The only action t
has been in co-operation with Singapore to work out a traffic re
tion scheme which could require some form of prior notificatio
the same lines as systems of air traffic control. It has been ag
however, that this is a separate matter from that of the status o
Straits.

Legal implications

In the absence of any attempt to enforce competing claims,
issue of the status of the Straits and of the passage through the
foreign vessels, especially warships, falls largely within the prov
of international law. The law on international straits, which has
been a subject of controversy,[13] may be said to have been clarifie
relation to the passage of warships by the declaration of the Internati
Court of Justice in *The Corfu Channel Case* that:

> It is . . . generally recognized and in accordance with internati
> custom that states in time of peace have a right to send their
> ships through straits used for international navigation between
> parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a co
> state, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise
> scribed in an international convention, there is no right for a co
> state to prohibit such passage through straits in time of pea

This dictum of the Court was embodied in Article 16 (4) of
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Z
of 1958. According to that provision, foreign ships were to enjoy
right of innocent passage not only through straits used for internati
navigation and connecting two parts of the high seas but also thr

[12] This matter, broached publicly in April 1972 by Indonesia's Chief of Naval
Admiral Sudomo, was raised in discussion between the Indonesian and B
Foreign Ministers in Jakarta in July 1972.

[13] *The Corfu Channel Case*, I.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. I, pp. 43 and 137.

[14] I.C.J.Rep. (1949), p. 28.

such straits connecting one part of the high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign state. The convention sought also to define the meaning of innocent passage as that passage which 'is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state' (Art. 14). This right is somewhat limited also by Article 17 (applicable to all vessels), which imposes upon foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage the obligation to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state. And under Article 23, the coastal state is empowered to order a warship to leave its territorial sea, should it fail to comply with that state's laws and regulations. Thus, the right of innocent passage by foreign ships in international straits forming part of the territorial sea of coastal states is limited by the obligation to observe the relevant laws of the coastal state during passage.[15]

The legality of the joint declaration by Indonesia and Malaysia rests on their claim to a territorial sea of twelve miles. It can be argued that such a claim does not violate the prevailing customary norms of international law because of the substantial number of states which have adopted such a limit.[16] In its narrows, the Straits of Malacca (and Singapore) fall within the limit of the territorial seas claimed by the two coastal states. It can be submitted, therefore, that the joint declaration conforms with the *lex lata* of the seas. In consequence, foreign vessels, including both merchant ships and warships, can only enjoy innocent passage through such waters, a right which the coastal states have themselves expressly recognised.

However, despite the legal validity of the joint declaration, the law of the sea, including that portion which concerns international straits, is subject to challenge and possibly change. In the case of international straits, this is because of the common position of the maritime powers in the face of the increasing number of coastal states claiming ever wider jurisdiction than hitherto over adjacent maritime areas. The effect of the enforcement of such claims, even if restricted to a limit of twelve miles, would be to change the juridical status of those straits used for international navigation.[17] The major maritime powers are opposed in the main to such a development for strategic reasons. In

[15] Although maintaining that the provisions in the convention gave a right of free navigation to warships, Professor Baxter has asserted that 'Article 23 still contains the possibility of mischief [*i.e.*, the sanction of expulsion] for warships exercising a right of innocent passage through straits'. R. R. Baxter, *The Law of International Waterways* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1964), p. 168. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1965, p. 297.

[16] As at March 1, 1972, 49 states claimed a territorial sea of 12 miles; 18 claimed more than 12, while 36 claimed less than 12. S. Oda, *The International Law of the Ocean Development* (Leyden: Sijthoff. 1972), pp. 368–369. Reviewed on p. 266.

[17] See J. E. S. Fawcett, 'How Free are the Seas?', *International Affairs*, January 1973, p. 18.

consequence, they wish to see a change in a *lex lata* which fails to provide sufficiently for their interests.

The fear that, by a general adoption of a twelve-mile limit, several important straits would fall entirely within the territorial sovereignty of coastal states has come to dominate the maritime policies of the major powers. The United States had made clear its opposition to any extension of territorial sea limits in both the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea conferences. Arthur Dean, its delegate in 1958, has expressed his government's sense of concern in the matter as follows:

> It is in those narrows that an undue expansion of coastal states' territorial seas could entirely wipe out existing passageways over free high seas and, by creating national sovereignty over one segment of a vital route, subject to the coastal states' interference the transit of our warships or terminate transit of our aircraft in the overflying airspace.[18]

Subsequently, the United States government has adopted the position that since some states treat the right of innocent passage as a matter for their own discretion (and since, in addition, neither aircraft nor submerged submarines enjoy this right), the doctrine of innocent passage is inadequate when applied to international straits.[19] The United States government has assumed the view that the right to pass through international straits is ' an inherent and inseparable adjunct of the freedoms of navigation and overflight on the high seas themselves '. In consequence, it is only prepared to accept a treaty fixing the limit of territorial seas at twelve miles if adequate agreement were reached concurrently on rights of passage through international straits. On June 30, 1971, the United States delegate to the United Nations Deep Sea-Bed Committee submitted draft articles on the breadth of territorial seas and on straits and fisheries. Article 2 of this draft stated:

> In straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state, all ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight, for the purpose of transit through and over such straits, as they have on the high seas. Coastal states may designate corridors suitable for transit by all ships and aircraft through and over such straits. In the case of straits where particular channels of navigation are customarily employed by ships in transit, the corridors, so far as ships are concerned, shall include such channels.[20]

It is this statement which exemplifies the United States position on freedom of passage in the Straits of Malacca.

The Soviet Union has manifested equal concern over the question of

[18] Department of State Bulletin, Washington, February 15, 1960, p. 260.
[19] See United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.8.
[20] Oda, p. 219.

international straits and, as we have seen above, vocal interest in freedom of passage in the Straits of Malacca. It contends that straits in which foreign vessels have had, for centuries, the right of freedom of passage should continue to remain open to the unimpeded passage of all shipping. The Soviet Union, it appears, bases this contention on the notion of 'historic rights', since it claims that such practice has evolved into a legal norm. In consequence, the Soviet Union has proposed that straits which have served as international waterways for 'a considerable period of history' should remain open for all vessels.[21] Recently, however, the Soviet Union has moved closer to the American position, as indicated in the draft articles on straits used for international navigation submitted by it in 1972 to the United Nations Deep Sea-Bed Committee. The provisions of the draft stipulate that in straits used for international navigation there shall be the same freedom of navigation for all ships as they enjoy on the high seas. In addition, corresponding freedom of overflight for foreign aircraft is demanded.[22]

Both Indonesia and Malaysia, as coastal states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, reject what has been described as 'the high seas corridor' concept.[23] The notion of free and unimpeded passage through what they regard as their national waters is perceived as both a threat to national security and an infringement of sovereignty. Their joint position points up a wider conflict on the issue of international straits between many coastal states of the Third World and the major maritime powers. Indeed, the common attitude of many Third World countries in the Deep Sea-Bed Committee has perhaps been best exemplified in the words of the Indonesian delegate who remarked that:

> The time had come to accept coastal developing countries, such as Indonesia, as responsible members of the international community and, in consideration of their sovereignty, to acknowledge their right and freedom to regulate passage through their national waters in such a way as to protect their own interests while not interfering with the legitimate interests of the international community.[24]

Although the rights of passage of foreign warships is a critical issue for Indonesia and Malaysia, both states are concerned also with safety of navigation in the straits and the attendant problems of pollution. Thus, they view the unrestricted use of the straits by supertankers as a threat to the fishery resources of the area which could affect the livelihood of many coastal inhabitants, and are, therefore, determined to regulate their passage. Indonesia has argued that since there were not any 'clear provisions' in the Geneva Conventions of 1958 concerning

[21] UN, A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.6.
[22] UN General Assembly, Official Records, 27th Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/8721), p. 162–163.
[23] A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.11
[24] A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.31. For some other equivalent Third World positions, see Gabon (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.16) and Kenya (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.31).

the passage of supertankers through international straits, coastal states were justified in regulating the passage of such vessels.[25] However, the problem of pollution posed by the passage of supertankers does not in itself necessitate a change in the status of the Straits of Malacca from that of an international waterway. It could be approached through a formula which recognised the need for provision for safety of navigation without denying the long-standing right of the vessels of maritime powers to unimpeded passage. Indeed, such a formula was implicit in the tripartite section of the declaration of November 16, 1971 (which included Singapore) and which stated that: 'The problem of safety of navigation and the question of internationalization of the straits are two separate issues.' Indonesia and Malaysia, however, have insisted on the 'principle of innocent passage'. And it is this insistence which is the key to their major interests.

A separate if related issue in law is that of the status of waters between islands forming archipelagic states. It is open to doubt whether there ought to be any connection between Indonesia's claim in the Straits of Malacca and its archipelago principle. However, the Indonesian government does perceive the issue of the Straits of Malacca as coming directly within the context of its archipelago outlook. In consequence, it is necessary to consider the question of the status of archipelagos in international law in order to evaluate Indonesia's position in this matter.

It was on December 13, 1957, that the Indonesian government issued a declaration purporting to change the status of the waters within and around the Indonesian archipelago. This declaration read, in part, as follows:

> That all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and, therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state. Innocent passage of foreign ships in these internal waters is granted as long as it is not prejudicial to or violates the sovereignty or security of Indonesia. . . . The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12 miles) is measured from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia.[26]

The provisions of this declaration were enacted on February 18, 1960, in 'Government Regulation in Lieu of Act No. 4' of that year. More

[25] See Legislation by Canada (Arctic Waters Pollution Act 1970, Vol. 9, *I.L.M.*, 1970, p. 543) and the United Kingdom (Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, 1971, Vol. 11, *I.L.M.*, 1972, pp. 849–868).

[26] Quoted in J. J. G. Syatauw, *Some Newly Established Asian States and the Developmen of International Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1961), pp. 173–174. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1962, p. 541. It is worthy of note that a number of maritime states, including the United States, Britain, Australia and the Netherlands, protested at the Indonesian declaration.

recently, on May 26, 1972 (as mentioned above) Indonesian representatives joined those of the Philippines and Fiji in adopting a common position incorporating the Indonesian view on the status of waters 'surrounding, between and connecting' the islands of archipelagic states.

Archipelagos, which have been defined as formations of two or more islands which geographically may be considered as a whole, may be divided into two types: coastal and mid-ocean.[27] An example of the former kind is the fringe of islands off the Norwegian coast known as the Skjaargaard; among examples of the latter are the Faroes, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

As far as international law is concerned, the fundamental question is whether the territorial seas of archipelagos should be measured from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands, thus establishing a single belt of territorial sea making the waters between the islands internal waters, or whether each island within the group should possess its own belt of territorial sea. In the question of certain coastal archipelagos the answer was provided in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case*.[28] Article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone embodied the rationale of the decision in that case and indicated that a coastal state is entitled to use straight or water-crossing baselines for joining appropriate points where there is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity of its coast. It is stated further that where there exists the necessary conditions for utilising straight baselines, account may be taken in the drawing of particular baselines of economic factors which are 'clearly evidenced by a long usage'.

The status of mid-ocean archipelagos remains, however, an open and also a somewhat neglected issue. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone does not provide any particular method for delimiting the territorial seas of mid-ocean archipelagos. Since Article 10 (2) of that convention states that the territorial sea of an island shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of the convention but since also the convention itself, as we have noted, does not provide for delimitation of mid-ocean archipelagos, it is possible to suggest, as indeed Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has done, that the problem posed by groups of islands has already been resolved by implication.[29] However, whether the Geneva Convention of 1958 has disposed of the question of mid-ocean archipelagos or whether in fact there is a

[27] Jens Evensen, 'Certain legal aspects concerning the delimitation of the territorial waters of archipelagoes', United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Preparatory Document No. 15. A/Conf. 13/18, November 29, 1957.

[28] I.C.J. Rep. (1951).

[29] Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 'Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 8 (1959), p. 88. But see M. Sørensen, 'The Territorial Sea of Archipelagos', *Ned. Tijd.*, Vol. 6 (1959), p. 324.

lacuna on this matter in the convention is somewhat irrelevant given the present state of the law of the sea. The prospect of a forthcoming conference on the law of the sea has brought into relief the existing conflict of interests between archipelagic states and the maritime powers. Indonesia, for example, has argued that if each of the islands comprising its archipelago were to be treated as separate entities, acute problems would be created. The exercise of state jurisdiction and the maintenance of inter-island communication would be affected and, more important, the internal security of the Indonesian state would be imperilled. Its delegate at the Geneva Conference of 1958, former Foreign Minister Subardjo, declared that 'if the interjacent waters were to be regarded as high seas, the Indonesian population might in certain circumstances be left at the mercy of belligerent powers'.[30]

The main argument against the archipelago principle is that if put into effect, it would convert, in certain cases, vast areas of what had been hitherto high seas into internal waters. Thus in the case of Indonesia, areas such as the Java Sea and the hundred mile stretch between Java and Borneo would fall within Indonesian jurisdiction. The maritime powers, for their part, are not satisfied in this context with the safeguard that innocent passage will be guaranteed providing such passage is not inconsistent with the sovereignty, security and national legislation of the archipelago states. Such a right is viewed as not being 'equivalent to the freedom of navigation exercisable on the high seas'.[31]

The legal position of the maritime powers is not necessarily the same towards the archipelago principle and the question of international straits. Nonetheless, these powers do possess a common interest and outlook on both these issues in so far as they represent a dual challenge to the freedom of the seas.

Coastal states versus maritime powers

In the case of the Straits of Malacca, the dispute turns on the conflicting interests of the major maritime powers and the coastal states. Of the coastal states, Malaysia's position is argued with reference to the infraction of sovereignty irrespective of the strategic considerations of the major powers. Its more immediate interests are in the prevention of pollution and it has been disturbed at the reaction to the joint declaration, which has cut across its neutralisation proposal represented as a means to prevent south-east Asia from becoming a cockpit for great power rivalry. Indonesia, not affected to the same extent by pollution from oil spillage and not enamoured of Malaysia's neutralisation scheme, has the greatest direct interest in changing the status of the Straits, and at the same time advancing its archipelago claim. Unlike Malaysia,

[30] United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Fifteenth Meeting. March 14, 1958.
[31] *Ibid.*, Tenth Meeting. March 11, 1958.

which is a small state, Indonesia sees itself as the fulcrum of a regional concert which, in time, will be able to provide unassisted for the security of south-east Asia. Its intentions in this respect may be gleaned from recent statements by its Foreign Minister and its President.

In an interview in August 1971, Adam Malik explained that: 'Indonesia is attempting to create an area of goodwill, friendship and co-operation. Indonesia needs close friendly relations and mutual understanding particularly in South-East Asia, so that *the limits of common interests can be projected directly to the eastern border of India and the southern border of China and Japan*' (italics added).[32] A year later, President Suharto pointed out: 'We are convinced that the nations in South-East Asia have the ability to plan their own stability and future provided they have the moral strength and real power to avoid being dragged into an arena of conflict and the influence of other countries—particularly the Big Powers.'[33]

It is important to note, however, that Indonesia's vision of regional order underpinned by a strong sense of national pride is circumscribed, for the present, by a strong sense of national weakness. Indeed it is extremely dependent economically on the United States and Japan, two of the maritime powers who are opposed to its stand on the status of the Straits of Malacca. Its purpose in such circumstances is to assert a right to prepare the ground for the justification of its enforcement whenever that may be necessary and feasible. It is within this perspective that one should interpret the statement made by Adam Malik after the visit of the Soviet emissary, Ambassador Mendelvitch, that: 'We only want to regulate the use of the Straits of Malacca and for this we must get an international recognition of our claim of a twelve-nautical mile limit to territorial waters.'[34] In effect, the coastal states are insisting on recognition of 'the principle of innocent passage', which is in direct conflict with the notion of freedom of navigation as advocated by the maritime powers.

It is possible to postulate some mode of resolution of this conflict in the realm of international law through, say, a liberalisation for clarification of the right of innocent passage, which could be one outcome of any forthcoming conference on the law of the sea. However, the existing political dispute, which arises out of competing security interests, does not admit of any ready or easy solution given the determination of the major maritime powers and the coastal states to insist on their 'rights'. What is perhaps most relevant to its immediate management is the current willingness on the part of militarily weak and economically dependent coastal states to restrict their claim to an assertion of principle.

[32] *Indonesia Raya*, August 18, 1971.
[33] Address of state by the President of the Republic of Indonesia before the House of People's Representatives on the Eve of the 27th Independence Day. Jakarta, August 16, 1972.
[34] *The Straits Times*, March 20, 1972.

STABILITY MECHANISMS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

II. BALANCE OF POWER AND NEUTRALISATION

Phillip Darby

THE concept of balance of power is taken from the diplomatic kit of the Western realist and it comes complete with the variety of meanings and the ambiguities of the traditional literature.[1] Both prescriptively and descriptively the concept has been related to the threat posed to stability in southern Asia by the intrusion of external states. Broadly the argument runs that if power can be matched with countervailing power the likelihood of external penetration is reduced and the security of the Asian states enhanced. But from this point on, textual analysis reveals little in the way of common ground: both diagnosis and prescription vary substantially. Are we speaking of a balance of power in Asia or over Asia? A balance of what kind of power? And who is balancing whom?

The concept made its postwar début in Asia about the mid-1960s, by which time the doctrine of containment had lost what little efficacy and respectability it ever had. In the eyes of Western analysts the maintenance of regional order was dependent upon developing an alternative mechanism to hold in check the threat, actual or potential, which China was seen to pose. Among the motives for the upsurge in scholarly concern, an intrinsic commitment to the cause of stability in Asia was probably of secondary relevance. More important was the recognition that unless some headway was made in disentangling the matter of Chinese influence in the area from America's global role, the stability of the international system as a whole would be continuously at risk.[2]

Two markedly different conceptions established the guidelines for the next few years. One came from Alastair Buchan and the other from Coral Bell. As is well demonstrated by the generality of much of the subsequent discussion, their underlying assumptions were neither rigorously examined nor contrasted. In short, the Asian balance of power became a cliché employed by those who felt that some means had to

[1] For an excellent discussion of the concept, see Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House. 1962), Chaps. 2 and 3.

[2] This line of reasoning may well explain Alastair Buchan's entry into the field and the various books and papers sponsored by the Institute for Strategic Studies in the latter 1960s.

be devised to curtail the extension of Chinese influence but were far from agreed about either the nature of the threat or the appropriate response.

On Buchan's reading of the Chinese scene, it is unlikely that China will take major military initiatives both because of its limited capability and because in the past it has shown innate caution. Rather it can be expected to capitalise on existing sources of insurrection in south-east Asia and to aid revolutionary movements in the hope of extending its influence in the area. Buchan therefore concludes there is no case for creating a military bloc to bar the way of any physical advance. The real need is to maintain the morale and growth of the Asian states until the Chinese leadership changes and policy flows along less disruptive channels—as in fact was the case with the Soviet Union, although there the incentive was very largely military. The possibility Buchan canvasses is a loose diplomatic coalition of Asian states, anchored in Delhi, Canberra and Tokyo, within which each state would co-operate with others to minimise local discontent and violence. At the same time, the associated states could develop their defensive capability to cover the few areas which China might be tempted to take because of their military weakness.[5]

Although some would weight the elements differently, Buchan's diagnosis of the problem accords closely with the evidence available and contemporary analysis tends to confirm it. His prescription is more airy and has worn less well. Essentially it taps the stream of thinking about regionalism rather than that about balance of power. It is in fact debatable whether the scheme as outlined represents a balance of power in any orthodox sense at all. There would be little disagreement with the proposition that the job in hand is to defuse areas of particular sensitivity, thus neutralising China's advantage; but the tasks of developing national solidarity and resolving the problems of the civil order are greater than those of building a conventional military balance. Indeed, the widespread advocacy of a military balance springs directly from this situation. It is seen as a means of providing the key prerequisites for a programme of such dimensions: time and an atmosphere of confidence. For neither of these do Buchan's proposals offer much comfort.

The notion of a treaty of mutual co-operation between India, Australia and Japan was always unrealistic and has become more so with the diversification of the global power structure over the last few years. Although China looms large for all three, the shadows cast are in different images and different directions. India's concerns are primarily military and lie in the north and north-east. Japan's interests run

[5] Alastair Buchan, 'An Asian Balance of Power?', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 12, No. 2, August 1966, pp. 271–281 and 'An Asian Balance of Power?', *Encounter*, Vol. 27, No. 6, December 1966, pp. 62–71.

more broadly but hardly extend to the Indian subcontinent and the risk of antagonising China through an association with India. Peaceful accommodation and an adjustment of interests seem more likely than participation in some grand design. On any count, the most risky course would be to sever the link with America in favour of developing *de facto* alliances with India and Australia, which could add little to Japanese security. Further, the major rearmament programme demanded by the scheme could only heighten China's fears. Australia, once bitten twice shy, is currently reassessing the extent of its interests in Asia and might yet take a leaf from Japan's book of economism rather than cling to its inherited preoccupation with the security concerns of others.

There is a further problem implicit in Alastair Buchan's formulation. Given his mild characterisation of China, it is difficult to see why the Asian states should decide that co-operative ventures in regional diplomacy have a higher priority than guarding against the more immediate threats presented by their neighbours. On the contrary, there will be times when the interests of one Asian state appear better served by accepting and perhaps even encouraging unrest in another, thus diverting Chinese attention. India, for example, has reason to regard insurgency in south-east Asia, especially if the United States is involved, as relieving pressure on its northern borders. For similar reasons no united Asian front can be expected against any Chinese irredentist claims —witness Pakistan's policy with respect to Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency.

Perceptions and interests are thus too diverse to pin much faith on a system of political co-operation. In south-east Asia the growth of regionalism has encouraging aspects but the prospects for collective defence arrangements seem as remote as ever. The attempt to broaden the area of common security interests to stretch from the Karakorams to Korea is even more unrealistic in view of the fragmented landscape of Asian politics. Despite the phraseology, we are left not with a system of countervailing power but with a call to Asian states to strengthen the civil order and be of stout heart.

Coral Bell's conception of an Asian balance of power is firmly in the *realpolitik* tradition.[4] Her starting-point is the need to form a rival combination to China in southern Asia. Why does China need to be checked? As it happens, Professor Bell takes a rather traditional view of the evidentiary material of the past two decades concerning China's policies and intentions. But she has no need to rely on this: China's considerable power is itself a sufficient justification As the argues in an earlier analysis, the propositions that a balance of power

[4] *The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents*, Adelphi Paper No. 44 (Institute for Strategic Studies. London. 1968).

is unnecessary and/or impossible are misplaced, for they 'carry an implicit assumption that China is somehow a Power unlike all other Powers, neither needing to be checked by countervailing power nor susceptible of so being '.[5]

At this point one needs to inquire more closely into the content of China's power. Two aspects require comment. The first is its nuclear capability which seems likely by the mid-1970s to extend to the deployment of a small number of ICBMs and perhaps missiles for launching from submarines. Estimates in this area are inherently unreliable but, irrespective of the precise rate and nature of nuclear development, China's actual and anticipated capacity brings it firmly into the league of the great. Even if India or Japan should opt to go nuclear, the Soviet Union and the United States could hardly exclude China from their deterrence calculations and dialogue.

The second component of China's power takes in its capacity to exploit indigenous insurgency and promote its domestic model through Maoist ideology, aggressive diplomacy and the provision of aid in various forms. The record of the last two decades makes plain the limited relevance of the traditional units of power to counteract such a strategy. While not without its successes, such as Taiwan, the relative ineffectiveness of America's military instrument in south-east Asia serves to remind us that power has other dimensions than the military and takes us back to Alastair Buchan's formulation of the problem. The real issue comes down to the Asians' calculations as to their own best interests. The relevant criteria relate more to assessments about national solidarity and social change than to exercises involving weapons systems and drawing lines across maps. As such, the student of national development might have more to contribute than the foreign policy specialist or the military analyst. It is arguable how far a balance of power structure can be adjusted to meet these requirements. Certainly expressed in its traditional terms of alliances and military capability the concept is little attuned to the exigencies of the Asian scene.

To return to Coral Bell's initial analysis, the question of whether a balance of power is desirable must be considered in the light of the kind of balance of power which is possible. One can admit, for example,

[5] 'The Architecture of Stability in South Asia', *The World Today*, April 1966, pp. 151–160 at p. 155. On the second point she goes on to observe that the argument that China could never be expected to acquiesce in a rival power structure in southern Asia is equivalent to arguing twenty years before that the Soviet Union could never be expected to tolerate a rival power structure in Western Europe. In her later paper, Professor Bell takes the difficulties more seriously and reflects that whereas for centuries Russia had participated in the European balance of power and played according to its rules, China's traditional approach to the outside world proceeded on very different assumptions. *The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents*, p. 3.

that in general terms a rival power grouping to China has much to commend it and yet conclude that the costs of a particular combination of states would be too high. With good reason Professor Bell rejects the view that the Asian states alone could marshal the necessary will and resources and assumes the sponsorship of the United States. As she sees it, the United States, together with the like-minded in Asia, could redraw the defence perimeter to span Thailand and Malaysia-Singapore, leaving Burma and, hopefully, the Indochina states neutralised as a buffer zone between the two sides. China would have an ally in Pakistan and perhaps other assets in the system in the form of influence in Indochina.[6]

Accepting that such an arrangement is less likely now than when Professor Bell was writing, it is useful to attempt an audit. Positions of strength would be more clearly demarcated, serving at once to bolster confidence behind the line and to warn the rival grouping that military moves will be met in kind. The protagonists would be separated somewhat and spheres of influence could be established. On the debit side runs the argument that the prescription is essentially a scaled-down version of the policies of the cold war, conceding what is as good as lost and curbing the worst excesses by recognising limited Chinese interests and accepting dialogue. How far such a policy would differ from containment would depend on its workings but the cynic could be pardoned for reflecting that the difference seems more apparent than real. The gun would remain drawn with America's finger still on the trigger. The difference would be that the parties stood further apart and that words could now be exchanged. Yet the failings of containment in Asia were more fundamental and the issues went beyond the question where a stand should be made. The true cause of China's restlessness must be found in American encirclement and the neurosis of insecurity which resulted.

To extrapolate along these lines produces a ledger of heavy costs and few returns. Within the various Asian countries the revised power configuration would freeze or perhaps heighten competition between pro-China and anti-China factions. Further, the likelihood of external backing would be high. As between the Asian states it would be reasonable to expect a dampening of intra-regional tensions but at the price of impelling North Vietnam back to the Chinese fold and, in the case of Thailand and associated states, perpetuating the postwar pattern of dependence on the West. With respect to China one detects many of the elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy: at worst a power bloc *in* Asia but *of* the West might create the very threat it is designed to deter.

[6] The latter point is arrived at by deduction. Professor Bell does not tackle the issue directly.

A quadrilateral balance of power

Dating roughly from the turn of the decade, the literature has moved on from the debate about constructing a simple balance of power with China to contemplating a multipolar balance over Asia. Changing policies and changing perspectives combine to broaden the frame of reference, increase the number of players and alter to some extent the stakes involved. Most commonly the argument sees the new balance of power taking the form of a quadrilateral relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.[7] Each of the powers can be expected to pursue a more distinctively national course than in the past but at the same time, and partly as a result, each will have to weigh more carefully the effects of its moves on the interests of others. From the viewpoint of the south-east Asian states the multipolar balance is a development to be welcomed because the pressures for restraint on all sides lessen the probability of external involvement in domestic and regional concerns. It is therefore assumed that there is no case for introducing new diplomatic contrivances into the area; it is enough to encourage the emerging relationships between the great powers and attempt to harness them to the cause of regional stability.

The concept of a multipolar balance of power is open to various objections on account of its mechanistic implications and its attempt to reduce complex and disparate relationships to the pattern of a common design.[8] Admitting the dangers—which perhaps stem more from the formalistic images of observers than from the concept itself—its usefulness is precisely because it simplifies, enabling one to make suggestive generalisations. The real distortion follows attempts to invest the geometrical symbolism with a precision and technical meaning never intended.

To postulate a quadrilateral pattern is clearly something of a gamble but it draws support both from recent policy developments and from changing assessments of the nature of international power. While in the short term the triangular relationship between the three nuclear powers could make the running, to exclude Japan would be to mistake the nature of Asian issues and to place too high a premium on military power. More distant lies the possibility of a five-cornered relationship in which an outward-looking and independently minded Europe enlarged the spread of interests and relieved the pressure on China. There are, however, few signs that Europe is yet ready to make its bid

[7] See especially A. Doak Barnett, 'The New Multipolar Balance in East Asia: Implications for United States Policy', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 390, July 1970, pp. 73–86, and *A New U.S. Policy Toward China* (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1971), Chap. 4. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1972, p. 456.

[8] For criticisms along these lines see Earl C. Ravenal, 'The Strategic Balance in Asia', *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), Vol. 3, No. 4, July 1972, pp. 597–613 and Seyom Brown, 'The Changing Essence of Power', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 2, January 1973, pp. 286–299.

for the wider stage and it is better cast on the sidelines as a unit to be weighed rather than one of the weighers. Either explicitly or implicitly the assumption is made that no one state will be in a position of predominant power or of relative impotence.[9] Barring some dramatic reversal of existing lines of policy, this assumption seems well founded in the case of Russia and China. Neither seems likely to downgrade its involvement in Asia but equally policy projections hardly indicate a thrust for pre-eminence. The risk relates rather to America and Japan. As the Left would have it, though their analysis is not directed to this end, American involvement might be too great. In the assessment of the traditionalists, Japan's involvement might be too small.

The view that in the decade ahead the United States might exercise disproportionate influence in the power configuration over Asia misreads recent shifts in American policy and in any case confuses involvement with leverage. The thrust of the Nixon doctrine that America's role will be reassessed in the light of specific national interests has been obscured by the President's statement that 'The United States will keep all its treaty commitments'. According to one line of analysis, the President means what he says and the conclusion must be that the United States is to maintain the same level of political involvement but with smaller ground forces and more firepower, *i.e.*, a change in methods not ends reminiscent of the New Look of 1953. While the course of American policy in Vietnam in 1971 and 1972 lends a certain plausibility to the thesis, it underestimates both the force of changing perspectives at home and the drift of events in Asia. With respect to the textual point, commitments are seldom cut by a declaratory statement in advance. More usually what occurs is a redefinition of the circumstances in which support will be forthcoming and a revision of contingency plans within the privacy of an alliance relationship. In any event, and to return to an earlier argument, American influence in Asia has never been commensurate with the level of military involvement because will and weaponry have been different currencies.

While disengagement is clearly the dominant theme, it seems highly improbable that it will proceed to the point of complete withdrawal.[10] Although a case can be argued that America's economic and security interests in Asia are marginal and that it is relatively insulated from

[9] Hedley Bull speaks of an equilibrium between the three great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. However, while the concept is appropriate as a theoretical goal there is no reason to presuppose that the power configuration on the ground will be so neatly balanced or that it need be to ensure the working of the system. 'The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971, pp. 669–681 at p. 669.

[10] There is some evidence that China would not wish to see a complete American withdrawal as this would enable the Soviet Union, India and Japan substantially to increase their influence in the Indo-Pacific area. T. C. Rhee, 'Implications of the Sino-American Detente', *Orbis*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1972, pp. 500–519 at pp. 504–506.

developments there, global involvement as a fact and as a habit of thinking runs too deeply to be so easily overturned. The mood in Washington bears little resemblance to the isolationist temperament that characterised prewar Administrations.

With respect to Japan the questions are more fundamental. Will the Japanese leadership opt for the traditional military stance of a great power and, if not, is diplomacy unbacked by the sword a sufficient basis for a seat at the top table? On the first, opinions vary according to the focus of attention. Broadly, a 'realist' perspective tends to see a more forceful posture growing naturally from foreign involvement and the momentum of overseas events. On the other side, the student whose starting point is Japan's distinctive political culture, more usually projects a continuance of the postwar course—though there are signs that cleavages within the ruling Liberal Democratic party are now less likely to preclude decisive action. It is possible though not probable that Japan will resist the temptation of a higher military profile but in the final analysis the case for its great power status rests independently on the influence derived from economic capability and military potential.[11]

With the passing of the cold war, the growing independence and pragmatism of national policies, and the declining relevance of military capacity, it is certain that economic issues will assume increasing importance in Asia as elsewhere and that economic policies will furnish opportunities for wider influence in other areas. As the state with the world's third largest gross national product, the centrality of Japan's role in this sphere is self-evident. Its aid, trade and investment options provide valuable counters in international diplomacy, though conversely the dependence of the Japanese economy on overseas supplies and outlets makes it vulnerable to the moves of other states. Granted that statesmen have been slow to reassess the elements of national power, and in terms of influence Japan has fared poorly in consequence, recent thinking of the Japanese leadership and speculation about a permanent seat on the Security Council may be signs that change is in the air.[12]

The second factor which works to strengthen Japan's credentials is its ability to acquire conventional or nuclear armament should this be deemed prudent. Influence by anticipation is already established. Influence abjuration is a real possibility where the interests of other states are firmly opposed to an independent rearmed Japan. As Herman

[11] For a contrary view see Hedley Bull, p. 675, '. . . there is no reason to believe that Japan, or any other country, can attain the status of a great power without providing itself with the military means that have been a necessary condition of such a status in the past'.

[12] Certain lines of policy which may enable Japan to exert a major influence in international politics, without developing a large military establishment, are considered in Kei Wakaizumi, 'Japan's Role in a New World Order', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 2, January 1973, pp. 310–326.

Kahn has remarked, in the nuclear arena the important thing for Japan is status and not the objective capability of the forces.[13] A posture of self-restraint may well yield Japan a status in the calculations of each nuclear club member not far below that which it accords its fellows.

Proceeding on the supposition of a quadrilateral pattern of great power relationships, the assumption of certain writers that the parties will be less likely to risk major military involvement or to act provocatively in Asia appears broadly sound. By increasing the number of independent players the range of interests at stake has been substantially widened. Each player has more options than before and less can be taken for granted in terms of support. It is therefore probable that expansive moves would endanger too many external interests to be practical politics: each player must be careful to avoid taking action which might precipitate two other states, or even three, into closing ranks.

To illustrate by reference to China, the odds against a military thrust in south-east Asia are higher than ever before. Such action would be likely to reverse the pattern of American disengagement and bring the Soviet Union and the United States together. In addition it might lead Japan to strengthen its relationship with the United States, embark on a rearmament programme and perhaps develop nuclear weapons. It can therefore be argued that given a quadrilateral pattern, China's interests are best served by a measure of stability in south-east Asia inasmuch as instability acts as a magnet for the other great powers and encourages united action. There is some evidence at a more general level that Chinese thinking may be tending in this direction, witness its support for established governments against insurgent or secessionist groups in Ceylon and Pakistan/Bangladesh. Whatever is unique about Chinese politics, it seems unlikely to prevent Peking from coming to terms with power politics. As one New Left writer reflected after President Nixon's visit to Peking:

> In retrospect it seems remarkable that we could ever have taken the Chinese rhetoric of ideological struggle at face value, as if the policies governing 800 million people could be arrived at by some dialectical algebra from the external axioms of Marxist thought, as if political forces really were defeated by abstract refutations, or devastating quotes from Chairman Mao.[14]

For all this, in the wider world of Asian diplomacy the workings of the system would be less than the ideal. For one thing each great power has interests outside Asia and in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union they are basic. Global or European considerations could thus operate to induce concession or compromise in Asia; compare the

[13] Herman Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate Challenge and Response* (London: André Deutsch. 1971), p. 153.

[14] David Kolodney, 'Et tu China', *Ramparts* (Berkeley, California), May 1972, pp. 7, 10 and 12 at p. 7.

constraining effects of America and Russia on affairs in the Middle East. For another, Japan seems likely to have less freedom of action than the other three states because of its special relationship with the United States embodied in the Mutual Security Treaty. On balance it seems probable that the checks on interventionism would be stronger against China and the Soviet Union than against the United States and Japan. Even so, in the latter cases domestic constraints may even out the ledger.

The implications of a four-cornered power structure for intra-regional sources of instability are more obscure, but certain tentative projections can be ventured. An analogy might be drawn with the latter stages of the imperial system when the European balance of power was extended to Africa and Asia and a period of relative stability resulted. There is, however, one important difference in that in the period of partition and occupation between 1890 and 1914 the external powers were not only in Asia but there as party principals. In our quadrilateral scenario, on the other hand, the Asian states are not objects to be manipulated according to the interests and pleasures of the external powers. It follows that the course of the regional game cannot be determined in advance and from the outside. Even assuming each of the great powers prefers stability in the area, indigenous states and political movements may act on their own initiative and in ways which promote instability. To the extent that stability stems from internal social arrangements, one might argue that it is likely to be continuously at risk because of revolutionary challenge. Yet in a number of circumstances the local parties have reason to be cautious of disruptive policies and the external states have opportunities for influence. In the first place, uncertainty about whether support would be forthcoming from great powers may induce restraint on the part of their respective clients. In the second, to the extent that national elites and dissident groups are dependent upon external sources of arms and aid, the great powers by threatening to withhold supplies, or actually withholding them, can affect the course of policy.

Looked at comparatively, it can be suggested that whereas the European balance at the turn of the century provided the least likelihood of intra-regional conflicts, and the bipolar cold war system of the 1950s and early 1960s provided the greatest likelihood, the emerging quadrilateral relationship falls somewhere in between the two, but closer to the former than to the latter.

Neutralisation

Given prudent diplomatic management, the developing relationship between the great powers seems likely to lead to a 'hands off' policy in south-east Asia which is the essence of neutralisation. It may be,

however, that the independence of the area would be strengthened by formalising the arrangement and safeguarding it by setting up appropriate control mechanisms. The question must thus be posed: would permanent neutralisation by international agreement do the job better than attempting to influence the shape of the power configuration over Asia and relying on the play of power politics?

For some years the possibilities of neutralisation have been canvassed from the sidelines of debate about the future of south-east Asia. President de Gaulle floated the idea in 1963 and three years later a pioneering study commissioned by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate concluded in generally favourable terms as to its desirability and feasibility.[15] It is only recently, however, that neutralisation has attracted sufficient support, especially within the region, to become a serious candidate rather than a distant ideal. The running has been made by Tun Razak, the Malaysian prime minister, with his proposal to establish a neutralised zone of states guaranteed by the great powers. First presented at the Third Non-aligned Summit Conference at Lusaka in September 1970, the Malaysian proposal received the support of other ASEAN members at the annual foreign ministers' meeting at Kuala Lumpur in November 1971. Although subsequent statements by south-east Asian leaders have been of a more cautious nature, emphasising the political difficulties and the time required, it is clear that neutralisation is now firmly on the diplomatic agenda for the area.

In the south-east Asian context the concept has been cast in terms of an international agreement between guarantor and guaranteed states, along the lines established in Europe in the 19th century as part of the process of stabilising the balance of power. The Malaysian proposal fits this pattern although the suggestions for intra-regional stability are a response to the special circumstances of the area and have no diplomatic precedent in Europe. Broadly, the scheme is conceived on two levels. At the first, the regional states would agree to respect each other's territorial integrity (perhaps through the negotiation of a series of bilateral non-aggression pacts), devise ways of ensuring peace within the area and present a collective view before the great powers on vital issues of security. At the second, the great powers, assured that their interests would not be jeopardised *vis-à-vis* each other, would agree to respect the neutrality of south-east Asia and devise supervisory means of guaranteeing it.[16] Presumably the latter

[15] *Neutralization in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects.* A study prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, October 10, 1966 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1966).

[16] See further M. Ghazali bin Shafie (Malaysian Minister with Special Functions and Minister for Information), *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), Vol. 3, No. 1, October 1971, pp. 110–117 at p. 115.

would involve the establishment of control machinery according to the postwar practice.

In the fluid conditions of south-east Asia and in the absence of clear guidelines as to treaty provisions and the extent of the neutralised zone, the difficulties of assessing the balance of advantages and disadvantages of neutralisation are obvious and fundamental.[17] Even the Malaysian proposal is more a framework for discussion than an attempt to chart a precise course. Nonetheless, assuming a treaty along the above lines could be negotiated, the benefits might be assessed in the following terms. The likelihood of direct military intervention by external powers would be reduced because both the incentives would be less and the constraints greater. Covert intervention in the form of aid and support for indigenous insurrectionary or secessionist groups might also be curbed, at the very least because verification machinery should render external penetration more visible and push the political costs higher. It follows that south-east Asia would be insulated from the rivalries of external states to a greater degree than formerly. Thus the prospects for the people of the area choosing their own form of government and their own path of development would be enhanced—subject to the proviso that intervention in the shape of economic and diplomatic assistance to incumbent regimes is likely to continue undisturbed. For the great powers, neutralisation would offer the attraction of detaching south-east Asia from the power balance between them, thereby contributing to the stability of that balance. In addition, there would be some saving of resources which might otherwise have been employed in regional struggles of little direct relevance to their hard national interests.

These gains, substantial though they are when ranged against the record of the 1950s and 1960s, become more marginal given our projection of the changing pattern of alignment and involvement in Asia over the next decade. If, as has been argued, the emergence of a quadrilateral balance of power renders external penetration a declining feature of the south-east Asian scene, the cold war era can no longer serve as an appropriate point of reference. The very fact that the prospects for neutralisation appear somewhat less remote than formerly may be taken to reflect the growth of shared interests between the great powers and the downgrading of those interests which divide them. By and large the more likely neutralisation is to work, the less the need for it. It is true that the movement from *de facto* insulation to formal neutralisation can be expected to provide additional assurance to indigenous states and stronger checks against external encroachment,

[17] For full and valuable discussions of the possibilities of neutralisation, see *Neutralization in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects*, and Cyril E. Black *et al.*, *Neutralization and World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1968). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1969, p. 693.

but only at a price. In the case of such an extensive, volatile and potentially assertive area as south-east Asia that price may well be thought too high.

First, there are doubts and difficulties about establishing and maintaining a great power guarantee. It is by no means clear that there is a sufficient body of shared interests on the part of the guarantor powers. While there has been a growing convergence of outlook, the fact remains that interests differ in important respects and motives are mixed. This would not seem to constitute a major obstacle to the operation of a balance of power system, but if neutralisation is to be effective something more may be required in the way of a working relationship between the great powers. At present that does not seem in sight. It was partly on this basis that in a recent commentary Adam Malik, the Indonesian foreign minister, rejected both the practicability and desirability of neutralisation as a general solution to the security problems of south-east Asia.[18] The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the neutralisation arrangement places the guarantor powers on an equal footing, thus artificially excluding China and Japan from the workings of intra-Asian diplomacy. Yet these states are not solely external powers and must be expected to maintain a closer and more continuous engagement in Asian affairs than Russia and America. Since some of their involvement must therefore be seen as of regional rather than of global significance, there would be pressure on both Russia and America to maintain a higher level of involvement than would otherwise be the case—and in circumstances which cannot easily be forecast in advance and which may not be in their interests or to their tastes.

In the case of the regional states, the costs of neutralisation may be judged even less acceptable. In accordance with past practice it seems certain that in return for external guarantees the neutralised states would be required to refrain from acting in various ways. They would almost surely have to renounce the use of force except in self-defence or possibly for limited intra-regional purposes as specified in the neutralisation treaty. They would be required to sever special relationships with external powers. They would be under an obligation not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In addition to constraints on their freedom of action, the neutralised states would have to settle for a subordinate status in international affairs relative to that of their guarantors. The net effect of neutralisation on a larger scale would be to perpetuate the dominance of the great powers in a new form. These disabilities may not seriously trouble a small European state, secure in its national identity, broadly satisfied with its place in the world and preoccupied with the risk of external intervention.

[18] 'Towards an Asian Asia', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 25, 1971, pp. 31–33 at p. 32.

To the new states of south-east Asia, anxious to change the international order in some respects and to secure the diplomatic recognition which they believe is their due, such constraints and such a status may be regarded as intolerable. This is all the more likely when it is remembered that curbing external encroachment is only one of their objectives—and perhaps of declining priority at that. Other interests such as reducing the dependence of the area on the developed world and maintaining security *vis-à-vis* one's neighbours might take precedence and lead to the conclusion that neutralisation by international agreement runs against the broader interests of the region.

From the perspective of enduring stability, a further debit can be noted. In its conventional form, neutralisation appears to over-weight the interests associated with order and attempts to impose sanctions against violence which are too general, given the mechanics of change in the Third World. To renounce the right of force in settling border disputes and communal conflicts extending beyond the boundaries of one state may be to create the very conditions which make for instability in the longer term. Similarly non-interference, for all its merits, cannot stand as an absolute principle during a period of nation-building and expanding international links in the Third World.[19]

The force of these arguments relates mainly to the neutralisation of south-east Asia as a region. The drawbacks and disadvantages appear less telling in the case of neutralisation on a smaller scale, as for example in Indochina, or neutralisation of a single state such as South Vietnam. In the particular cases mentioned neutralisation may serve different purposes from those envisaged in the broader context of south-east Asia. It may provide a means of terminating or dampening hostilities pending a longer-term political solution of a different kind, or it may provide a cover for the withdrawal of an external power, the neutralisation label making retreat more palatable at home.[20] The neutralisation of select states in south-east Asia may therefore be a useful exercise in its own right while at the same time contributing to a more stable regional order.

If permanent neutralisation by international agreement seems neither likely nor desirable in the regional context, it may be possible to tap other streams of neutralist thinking and adjust them to the contemporary requirements of south-east Asia. One might speculate, for example, about a revamped non-alignment formulated in the light of a four-cornered external power configuration rather than the bipolar setting of the cold war years. In the past non-alignment has usually signified

[19] See the analysis in Part I of this article, *International Affairs*, January 1973, pp. 23–26.

[20] See further Cyril E. Black *et al.*, *Neutralization and World Politics*, especially pp. 80–90.

merely an approach to external politics, but it could be formalised and given concrete expression through an international declaration perhaps supported by legislative action within the individual states.[21]

Neutralisation along these lines might take the form of a regional agreement to exclude all external powers from security arrangements in south-east Asia and a commitment to non-interference in the external power struggle. This could be coupled with a declaration of neutrality as between the great powers and might be backed by the establishment of control machinery for observation and verification operated by the south-east Asian states themselves. There would be no provision for external guarantees though it would be desirable to encourage the great powers to put on record their intention to respect south-east Asia's neutrality.

In many respects such an arrangement is similar to the Malaysian neutralisation proposal but it involves no absolute clamp on intra-regional violence and dispenses with external supervision and enforcement. For these reasons it seems more compatible with the dignity and aspirations of the south-east Asian states, more closely attuned to the changing interests of the great powers and less likely to disrupt the process of political modernisation in the area. Clearly, some regional states like Thailand are doubtful candidates in the immediate future but there is no reason why the neutralisation of the area should be accomplished at one dramatic stroke.

Conceived in this fashion, neutralisation would strengthen the regional movement in south-east Asia and increase the gains to be derived from the changing configuration of great power relations. The neutralised states would be deprived of external support and thus have more reason to ensure the success of co-operative diplomacy. Although there would be no absolute insurance against external aggression, the *realpolitik* checks against intervention would be supplemented by the disincentive to breach south-east Asia's neutral status. In large measure, therefore, regionalism, balance of power and neutralisation might be mutually reinforcing.

[21] Parallels could be drawn with self-neutralisation undertaken in the traditional sense. See *ibid.*, p. 18.

UGANDA UNHINGED

D. A. Low

ON August 8, 1972, President Amin of Uganda held a five-hour meeting with delegations of traders from all over Uganda. 'The President informed the traders', an official bulletin stated, 'that in whatever he does for the people of Uganda God has always guided him through the right path. He cited a typical example of how the Asian issue culminated and said that early this month when he had travelled to South Karamoja District Show . . . that same night a dream came to him that the Asian problem was becoming extremely explosive and that God was directing him to act immediately to save the situation . . . after that dream he set off for Tororo very early the following morning and at Tororo he addressed the officers and men of the Seaborne Battalion where he then announced the major policy of Uganda not being responsible for the eighty thousand Asians who hold British passports and emphasised that the British High Commissioner was going to be given the responsibility of ensuring that these people leave the country within the next three months.'

When a president takes such a major decision because of a dream, his country, it may be suggested, or at all events his regime, must be in a parlous state. The direct relationship between the expulsion of the non-citizen Asians and the insidious collapse of the fundamental authority of Uganda's central government becomes palpable if, as this article will attempt to do, the decision is set within the context of the political history of independent Uganda.

There can be no doubt about the dire straits to which the country had been reduced by the summer of 1972. It is not easy to secure verifiable information on the details of the situation at that time or of the steps by which it had been reached. It seems best therefore to base what follows very largely on the official press bulletins of the Uganda Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. These were notably frank. In the first place, the economic and budgetary position was serious. In his budget speech on June 15 the Minister of Finance, Mr. E. Wakhweya, announced increases of import duty on a very large number of items, often of 40 per cent. and more. While placing some, but by no means all, of the blame for the existing position upon the previous regime of President Obote, he offered little but austerity and a tightening of belts. As long ago as April 1971, soon after President Amin's takeover from President Obote in the previous January, the

new government had already begun to be worried by the shortage of marketable stocks of such foodstuffs as groundnuts and sorghum. By January 1972 there were acute shortages of sugar, cooking fats and salt, and President Amin issued 'a stern and final warning to people in Uganda, whether they are Ministers, Army Officers, Government Servants, Citizens or Foreigners not to put money or personal interests above the interests of Uganda'. In April 1971 the President had 'strongly deplored . . . the lack of co-operation and unity that exists between the Ministry of Finance, and the Bank of Uganda and the Uganda Commercial Bank' and had warned that there was going to be a 'big reshuffle'. But a much more pointed indication of what was more probably amiss came in his announcement of November 17, 1971, that any officer who wished for a month's advance of salary to help him celebrate an important religious festival with his family had only to apply for it. No imagination is required to believe that this was not the only largesse that was provided.

Before long there was serious interference with the senior bureaucracy. For the most part the previous president, Obote, had not shown himself hostile towards them, and their readiness to serve his regime (particularly the relatively large number of them from the erstwhile kingdom of Buganda at the country's core) had been a considerable asset to it. On April 20, 1972, it was announced, however, that President Amin had compulsorily retired twenty-two senior officials, ten of them Permanent Secretaries of central government ministries. A glance down the list shows that they included many of the most experienced civil servants in Uganda, some of whom were in themselves very mild-mannered men. By this time there were indications too that President Amin had ceased to consult his civilian ministers. They certainly do not seem to have been parties to his decision to expel the non-citizen Asians, and a few days later he evidently felt it necessary to 'disclose' publicly 'that all the Cabinet Ministers are supporting him on the steps he is taking to expel Asians holding British passports from Uganda'.

Throughout this period there can be no doubt that ex-President Obote and his supporters were recruiting anti-Amin forces in Tanzania to the south. Some of these, Sam Odaka, Akena Adoko, Alex Ojera, and Pico Ali, were among Obote's former ministers and close personal associates. Others evidently fled to Tanzania to join up with the exiles because they feared for their lives at the hands of Amin's supporters if they remained in Uganda. As early as April 1971 Amin's Government claimed that 'Langi guerrillas'—that is, people from Obote's tribe—had been planning to oust him. In August there was fighting on the Tanzanian border and the body of a 'Chinese soldier' (he was nothing of the kind) was put on public display in Kampala. In the ensuing year (emulating the 'freedom fighters' operating in countries further south in Africa,

who were freely provided for in Tanzania) Obote's recruits, as Amin knew very well, were gathering in camps awaiting the day when they might return to Uganda.

Meanwhile in Uganda itself violent robbery by armed gangs, often in daylight, had become a major public menace. 'Kondos', as these gangs had come to be called, had begun to appear in Obote's time; but their activities had now greatly increased despite the sometimes draconian attempts to suppress them. As early as May 1971 President Amin issued orders to his armed forces to do everything to stop 'kondoism'. In May 1972 he went to the length of issuing decrees giving 'immunity to any security officer against proceedings arising out of any actions to maintain public order' and granting powers to 'use any force he deems necessary' against anyone believed to be committing a robbery.

Already, however, kondoism had developed into a much larger matter. In July 1972 President Amin issued a dire warning to 'high ranking officers in the Police Force and civil servants who are connected with high robbery and killing of innocent people by assisting kondos that he is going to deal with them very mercilessly', and it is clear from Amin's own statements that under cover of the kondo menace, political killings had now become a regular occurrence in Uganda. How many occurred in the countryside it is impossible to say. On several occasions the government produced those who were alleged to have disappeared—Mr. Erisa Kironde, Chairman of the Uganda Electricity Board, Mr. Abu Mayanja, Minister of Education, and Mrs. Miria Obote, among them. It could demonstrate, moreover, that some of the others were still alive in Tanzania. There was no similar attempt, however, to deny that such people as Mr. William Kalema, a former minister, Mr. Michael Kagwa, a prominent lawyer, and Mr. Anil Clerk, a prominent Asian, were dead. In September 1972 it was formally denied that the security forces had arrested the Chief Justice, Mr. Benedicto Kiwanuka, at the High Court in Kampala, but by the end of the year his acting successor had been appointed. The story, moreover, that the decapitated head of Mr. Basil Bataringaya, a former Minister of Internal Affairs, was on display in his district headquarters at Mbarara, was never even denied, and from refugees' accounts both from Tanzania and Britain it is abundantly clear that this was only a selection of those who were done to death. There is plenty of evidence too—not least from the government's denial of some of the allegations—that there were multiple killings of military prisoners at a camp in south-western Uganda in February 1972, and at a camp in West Nile District in October 1972.

Throughout there is abundant evidence too that the army was often out of control. As early as June 1971 President Amin thought it necessary to order 'that any soldier caught looting property will be

treated as a kondo and will be liable to be shot on the spot'. In December 1971 the commanding officer of the Northern Region pointedly called on all civilians 'not to fear the Military Personnel'. In February 1972, President Amin dismissed six officers for various misdemeanours including 'brutality to the public by beating them with gun butts', and in March at a large meeting at the Kampala International Centre he gave 'a very severe address' to 'all the country's top Army, Air Force, Police and Prison officers' that 'they should see that civilians got the full protection of the law of Uganda'. Yet in the months that followed there were several further public indications by Amin of the extent to which the 'Military Personnel' had become a law to themselves.

There were signs that the President was trying to assert his authority over both the army and the police. But the contrast between the treatment of the two forces was unmistakable. In August 1972, twenty-two of the most senior police officers were dismissed in terms which suggested that they were being purged, as the senior bureaucracy had been a few months previously. In October 1971 on the other hand an abortive army revolt was evidently condoned. In March 1972, Lieutenant-Colonel Obitre Gama was removed from his key post of Minister of Internal Affairs, but Amin simply announced that he would be assigned to other duties. He was obviously being very cautious in his handling of the officer corps. There were no wholesale sackings as in the civil service and the police.

The recurring issue of the Uganda Asians

What then of President Amin's decision to expel the non-citizen Asians early in August 1972? There can be no doubt of the deep animosity of Africans towards the Asian minority in Uganda because of their alleged exploitation of Africans, despite their obvious contributions to the development of the country's economy. African anger over countless episodes in Asian-owned shops and at Asian-owned produce-buying centres had run deep; and the expulsion, especially from the Buganda countryside, of Asian traders as a result of the successful trade boycott of 1959–60 stood as a reminder of what a determined campaign against them could effect. At the same time it is not difficult to discern a certain circularity in Uganda's politics; at fairly regular intervals the Asian issue has been brought back to the centre of the political stage, and in any case was always ready to hand. Amin's personal attitude was soon made clear too. In October 1971 he organised a census of the Asian population, and in December he held a two-day meeting of its leaders in Kampala at which he roundly condemned 'the Asian refusal to integrate with Africans in this country', and the fact that 'the Asian Community has continued to live in a world of its own'. During a period when he saw himself mending

other cleavages in Uganda, for example, both within the Anglican Church and amongst Muslims, his failure to make any progress in mending this breach evidently (as his 'dream' illustrated) rankled.

Then early in 1972 a precedent for the subsequent Asian expulsion was unexpectedly established. At the beginning of his regime President Amin had had close associations with the considerable Israeli involvement in the country. But as a Muslim he soon developed contacts with the Arab world which before long swung him against the Israelis. He thereupon ordered that their military mission, their intelligence agents, and those of them who were in commercial and other organisations should all be expelled by March 27. The exodus was quickly effected, and in a significant move on April 6 Amin summoned two Ugandan building contractors to his Command Post in Kampala to tell them that as a result of the expulsion of the Israelis the work which some of them had contracted to do would now 'be undertaken not by foreigners but by the Ugandans themselves'. 'The two building contractors', the official report declared, 'said they had no words to thank the President for this most enlightened policy'. From this it was but a short step to his decision early in August to expel the non-citizen Asians from the country, and an even shorter one to his decision in December to nationalise some forty foreign firms, most of them British.

Given, however, the grievous state of the general economic, administrative, security, and law and order situation in Uganda by this time there can be little doubt that central to President Amin's decision was his growing concern at the lack of authority his regime possessed in the country and his instinctive belief that, if the position was to be held, a dramatic attempt must be made to win some quite new popularity for it in the very near future. Within days of his announcement he held the five-hour meeting with deputations of traders from all over Uganda, mentioned earlier in this article—a meeting, that is, with representatives of those who would be likely to benefit most immediately from the Asian expulsion, and (equally to the point) with those who maintained an extensive network of contacts down to the remotest parts of the countryside, which so far he had not attempted to mobilise in support of his regime. Within a week, moreover, he sent his cabinet ministers to all parts of Uganda to make speeches, according to a standard text, explaining his decision and evoking popular support for it—which was soon forthcoming.

That his decision stemmed primarily from a near-desperate attempt to win popularity, and thereby a badly needed legitimacy, for his regime was borne out by his proneness in the weeks that followed to develop quarrels with external foes—with Tanzania, with Rwanda, with Britain—so that he could at the same time claim to be the defender of the republic of Uganda against all its enemies. It was also underlined

by the much overlooked fact that at the very same moment that h announced his decision to expel the non-citizen Asians, he brough forward his other decisions (which were originally to have been promul gated on October 9, Independence Day) for the most extensive re organisation of local government Uganda had ever seen. These decision created nine provinces (where hitherto there had been four), each unde a Regional Governor, and carved numerous new districts out of the relatively small number which had existed previously. By this mean Amin not only hoped to meet the aspirations of various small societies which had hitherto been pressed into unwanted associations with thei neighbours (this was particularly true in the former Toro District, but it was true of the former Kigezi District, for example, as well); he was also able to go further than ever before in breaking up the older more powerful societies. Buganda, for example, now completely lost its Masaka District to a new, and altogether heterogeneous, Southern Province.

The purpose of these changes, so President Amin himself declared, was to bring government closer to the 'grass roots'. He evidently felt the need for this acutely. The political authority of the central government of most newly independent African states is fragile enough in any case. Most of them are the creation of the last seventy-five years at the outside, and Africans have rarely been associated with their 'state' level of authority for more than twenty years. When at the same time these new states have both suffered the immense strains of multiple social and political aggregation, and the profound uncertainties of social and economic changes within an underdeveloped country, it is no wonder that the disruptive pressures have been enormous. In neighbouring Kenya the central government's authority rested initially on the alliance between its largest societies, the Luo and the Kikuyu. By the end of the 1960s it rested primarily upon the dominance of the country's 'Prussians', the Kikuyu; then upon President Kenyatta's deliberate reinvigoration of the colonial style provincial administration; and also upon the Kenyan version of what by then was the East African style of general elections (in which there was only one candidate for the presidency and one party in the state, but hard fought primaries at the constituency level). Meanwhile in Tanzania President Nyerere's authority rested (as it had always done) first on his hold upon the interstitial position between Tanzania's numerous peoples; increasingly upon his own brand of 'socialist' populism; and also upon his (original) version of the East African scheme of elections (whose distinctive feature was that two candidates from the ruling party were pitted against each other in each constituency).

The authority of Uganda's government at independence in 1962 had been quite differently constituted. It might conceivably have rested

upon Uganda's potential 'Prussians', the Baganda; but the politics of the 1950s had put paid to that possibility. The prevalence in Uganda of kingdoms, and of districts functioning as if they were kingdoms, meant that the centrally controlled administrative structures had little of the strength they possessed in Kenya. Obote, moreover (who originally led the assault on Buganda's primacy), never secured the interstitial position which Nyerere held in Tanzania. Consequently, such authority as the central government of Uganda possessed in the immediate aftermath of independence rested primarily upon a concordat between the people of the Buganda kingdom at its core and the non-Baganda majority in the rest of the country—a concordat which found expression at the pre-independence constitutional conference in London, which was institutionalised in the coalition government which brought Uganda to independence in 1962, and which was capped by Obote's support, when Prime Minister, for the election of Kabaka (King) Mutesa II of Buganda as the first President of Uganda in 1963.

The concordat, however, was always fragile—Mutesa was afraid of Obote's attempts to increase the power of the central government over the kingdoms and districts, which, like the British before him, Obote thought to be essential—and in 1966 the concordat collapsed, in mutual recriminations, in Obote's suspension of the independence constitution, and in his fateful decision to send armed forces under Colonel Amin against the Kabaka's palace.

Obote's legacy to Amin

Obote's most remarkable achievement in the five years that followed was to prevent the army from taking over completely. But having once used the army to effect a political revolution, he was primarily responsible for allowing it to become the arbiter of Uganda's destiny thereafter. During his presidency (1966–71) his most striking efforts were all ultimately directed towards establishing some new basis for the authority and legitimacy of his central government in place of the now destroyed concordat. At the outset he insisted that a new republican constitution should be discussed at length, and when it became clear that this was of little avail, he embarked during 1967–68 on an extensive series of 'meet-the-people' tours during which he harped on the unity of Uganda and on his own readiness to 'meet his masters'. When this availed little as well, he took his 'Move to the Left', and published his 'Common Man's Charter'. In May 1970 he followed this up with his Nakivubo Pronouncements, in which he proclaimed that the government would take a majority holding in the major commercial enterprises operating in Uganda; and in July 1970 he published his proposals for his own version of East African-style elections. In each instance he

was very obviously attempting to find some new way of securing support for his regime.

But on January 25, 1971, General Amin swept him aside. Shortly afterwards all political activity was banned, and all thought of elections abandoned. The noteworthy fact is, however, that President Amin was immediately faced by the same fundamental problems that had haunted his predecessor—the tenuousness of the political authority of the central government of Uganda and the urgent need to find a new basis for its legitimacy in the wake of the collapse of the independence concordat. He soon added the designation 'Dada' (grandfather) to his names (much as President Kenyatta was called 'Mzee', elder, and President Nyerere 'Mwalimu', teacher) and he was careful to call his regime the 'Second Republic' of Uganda so as to demonstrate its continuity with the past, even while distinguishing it sharply from Obote's. For the rest, however, the striking fact is not so much the differences, though these were clear, in the lines he explored from those pursued by Obote, but their fundamental similarity.

At the outset Amin made a limited bid for support by arranging for the burial in Uganda of the body of Kabaka Mutesa II, who had died in exile in London. He made it clear, however, that he would not restore the kingdoms. Then, during the rest of 1971 he went on much publicised visits to all parts of the country. Unlike Obote on his 'meet-the-people' tours, he did not propound any particular doctrine; instead he made a number of lavish promises about new hospitals and new roads. But he also soon developed his own particular rhetoric as well. Not for him Obote's concern for the 'common man'. Rather a predilection for the 'elders'. Before very long, meetings of 'representative elders' were being called in several parts of the country.

But as Obote had found, such expedients had little effect. President Amin's one notable innovation was his cultivation of Uganda's religious leaders. In May and June 1971 he had told them to resolve the divisions within their own ranks, and in the year that followed he made his own divided Muslim community elect a single Supreme Muslim Council. On December 31, 1971, it was announced that the government had donated 'Sh.100,000 each to the Muslim, Roman Catholic and Protestant Faiths'. In February Amin helped launch an appeal for a new church and office for the new Anglican diocese of Kampala. In June, money and twelve acres of ground on Old Kampala Hill was granted to the Supreme Muslim Council for their new headquarters. A few days later the President donated the whole of his June salary to build the Christian martyrs' memorial at Namugongo, and presented the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kampala with a large cheque. When shortly after he flew to Rabat for the summit meeting of the Organisation of African Unity the five figures in his official party were one of his wives

and one of his ministers, together with the Anglican Archbishop of Uganda, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kampala, and the Chief Khadi of Uganda. Cultivating these religious heads—instead of denouncing the role of religion in politics as Obote had done—obviously constituted an attempt to secure the support of those who, because of the extensive allegiance in Uganda to one or other of these faiths, did hold some measure of authority over its peoples down to the 'grass roots' level.

But the fruits of such efforts were inevitably limited and, like Obote before him, Amin now turned his mind to another expedient touching the economy. In 1971 he had rescinded Obote's decision to take a majority holding in private commercial enterprises. It would clearly have been inappropriate for him to have gone back on that. So, having in March successfully expelled the Israelis, he now in August decided to expel the non-citizen Asians and fight his 'economic war' on that front. It was an inhuman move. In his own terms, however, it seemed a shrewd one. It was likely to be highly popular with Ugandans generally, and it could be combined with an attack upon the 'imperialist' British. If successful these might do more than anything tried previously to enhance his authority. This seems to have been the conclusion reached by the exiles around Obote in Tanzania as well, who, fearful apparently of the outcome, allowed themselves to be propelled into a precipitate and disastrously abortive incursion across the Tanzanian frontier. When the British made an unexpectedly mild response to his expulsion order, Amin found it convenient to turn on Tanzania; and when that quarrel was patched up by the President of Somalia, he told the British High Commissioner that he would have to leave the country, and eventually in December decreed that most of the remaining British should leave as well.

In at least two further respects, while being careful not to emulate Obote precisely, Amin followed very closely in his footsteps. He would not hold elections; but during late 1972 he called large meetings of delegates of one sort or another from all over the country and gave orders that local meetings should be held as well. Although contemptuous of Obote's former private army, the General Service Unit, and although he took some steps to curb the murderous excesses of his troops, he passively condoned enough of these to indicate that, like Obote, he was not averse to using fear to buttress his regime's authority as well.

But the tensions under which he himself lived made it hardly surprising that in October Amin should have needed a rest in hospital, and what continues to be most uncertain is whether his successive attempts will be any more successful than Obote's in establishing a basis for his regime's legitimacy in place of that proferred by the con-

cordat created at independence, which collapsed in 1966. They may do. Certainly Obote had nothing to his credit in Ugandan terms comparable to Amin's famous victory over the Asians; and the arbitrary killings during Amin's time have unleashed a reign of terror unmatched in Obote's. Nevertheless under Amin there are much greater uncertainties about the state of the army, the police, and the bureaucracy, not to mention the state of the economy after the Asian and British expulsions. What remains surprising is the reluctance to hold East African-style elections, since to judge from experience in both Kenya and Tanzania these allow for the creation of some, however slight, positive linkages between the grass roots and the centre, and it is precisely the grave paucity of these which lies at the heart of the country's trauma, as Obote and Amin have in turn unmistakably acknowledged. Where such a vacuum persists force becomes the only authority, terror the most likely weapon. Yet both still further dispel the remaining vestiges of legitimacy; and the vicious circle continues vicious. The tragedy of Uganda—of which the murdered Ugandans, the publicly executed 'guerrillas', and the expelled Israelis, Asians and British are only the more obvious victims—is that of a state become unhinged.

THE LAST DAYS OF UNITED PAKISTAN

A PERSONAL ACCOUNT

G. W. Choudhury

AFTER a decade of 'political stability' and 'good' economic progress under Ayub Khan, when it used to be cited as a 'model' for developing countries, Pakistan faced one of its worst political crises during the winter of 1968–69. The outcome was the fall of Ayub Khan but not the restoration of democracy which had been the original aim of the political agitation. On the contrary, in March 1969, Pakistan began a second period of martial law under General Yahya Khan. The fall of Ayub has been extensively analysed, but two vitally important factors behind it have not been discussed: the Pakistani generals' loss of confidence in him and the secret deal between Z. A. Bhutto (now President of a truncated Pakistan) and Lieutenant-General Peerzada, the chief architect of the army coup against Ayub. The understanding between Bhutto and Peerzada also played an important part in the developments leading up to the disintegration of Pakistan in December 1971. Both men had been sacked by Ayub—one as Foreign Minister and the other as his Military Secretary—and they were drawn together by their common hostility to him.

The agitation against Ayub was started by a trifling incident in Rawalpindi—a scuffle between students and local police over some allegedly smuggled goods. The unrest spread rapidly all over the country, first in West Pakistan and then in the East. The leadership of the 'revolutionary movement' was assumed by Bhutto—the most well-dressed and aristocratic of revolutionary leaders. Many, including myself, wondered how he had managed to become a 'revolutionary hero' overnight. Later, after I had joined the Pakistan Cabinet (in November 1969) and had been able to talk to both Ayub and Yahya as well as to the other generals, it became clear to me that Bhutto had had a signal to go ahead from the generals before he launched the movement. Significantly, the army remained a passive spectator of the disturbances, and when Ayub turned to it for support he was told to find a political, not a military, solution. But when he arranged round-table conferences with the political leaders, Bhutto was conspicuous by his absence. On the other hand, Ayub was able to negotiate with Mujibur Rahman (now Prime Minister of Bangladesh), and they very nearly agreed on a settlement. But Mujib was tantalised by the prospect presented by

Ayub's opponents in the army, of getting power through the 'front door' (*i.e.*, through elections) rather than by the 'back door', which was what Ayub offered him. Whether or not he let himself be fooled by the generals is a matter of interpretation.

On March 25, 1969, martial law was imposed in Pakistan for the second time in a decade. But the situations in which Ayub and Yahya took this step were entirely different. When Ayub came to power Pakistan's democratic institutions had been perverted and its politicians discredited. On the other hand, when Yahya became President, there was great resentment against authoritarian rule and lively agitation in favour of democracy. So, in his first broadcast on March 26, Yahya gave a pledge that there would be a 'smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people elected freely on the basis of an adult franchise'.[1] This pledge was at first greeted with considerable scepticism; it was the sort of declaration that had only too often accompanied the emergence of military regimes in the Third World. Yahya, however, soon began a real dialogue with the leaders of the various parties; he toured the country from end to end and the politicians gradually became impressed by his sincerity.

I myself was involved in this political dialogue as a member of the three-man planning cell which was the first civilian body to be associated with Yahya's military regime.[2] Ayub's downfall was believed to have been due to his exclusive dependence on senior civil servants, most of whom had served in the old Indian Civil Service under the British raj. General Peerzada, who was the most powerful man in the Yahya government, wanted to avoid a similar 'mistake' and there made sure that no senior bureaucrats were able to get near Yahya. But when he came to realise that he and his military colleagues were not competent to run the machinery of government, he had to look for help from outside. This was how the planning cell came into existence. As a member of it, I had lengthy discussions with all the political leaders, including Mujib and Bhutto. I was also able to observe the straightforwardness of Yahya's dealings with the politicians. He devoted most attention to Mujib—rightly so, since he was the leader of the Bengalis and was very suspicious about the military regime's intentions. Mujib had never forgotten the arbitrary removal in 1957 of the Prime Minister, H. S. Suhrawardy, his political mentor and the founder of the Awami League, by President Iskander Mirza, who a year later presided over the establishment of a military regime. He showed the greatest anxiety to secure every possible safeguard against similar treatment being meted out to him if—as was bound to happen—he lost some of his popularity after

[1] See *Dawn*, March 27, 1971.
[2] My services were already seconded to the Government of Pakistan as Head of the Research Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

coming to power. Eventually, Yahya began to win his confidence and a good personal relationship gradually developed between them.

But Yahya was never master in his own house, as Ayub had been. He never had more than a limited hold over the army generals, who in fact constituted the ruling junta between March 1969 and December 1971; nor did he seem either anxious or able to acquire a position of complete dominance. Consequently what he did, or intended to do, was often torpedoed by other members of the ruling clique. Yet so far as it was possible to perceive what was really going on, things did appear to be moving in the right direction; Pakistan seemed about to show that it could carry out a peaceful transfer of power from a military to a democratic regime. Moreover, after joining Yahya's cabinet early in November 1969, I became convinced that he intended to have a genuine political settlement between the two parts of Pakistan by giving the Bengalis, who formed a majority of the population, a real share in the decision-making process within a loose federal or confederal system. On numerous occasions Yahya told me that the East Pakistanis had not had their proper share in any sphere of national life and that this must be rectified. I was greatly encouraged and hopefully began to work out the details of the scheme for the transfer of power. I also drafted the speech of November 28, 1969, in which Yahya announced his proposals for the future of the country.

Yahya's plan conceded all the demands put forward by Mujib: elections on the basis of one man, one vote; a single-chamber central legislature; and the abolition of the amalgamation of West Pakistan into 'one unit'. Although the Bengalis of the East 'wing' formed a majority in undivided Pakistan, their representation in the federal legislature had always been equal to that of the West 'wing'. They accepted this parity of representation in 1955 on condition that the principle of parity should also apply in the allocation of funds for economic development, representation in the armed services and in every other sphere. But since in practice there had been no parity except in the electoral representation of the two 'wings', the Bengalis felt justified in demanding to be released from their side of the bargain. They were also opposed to a bicameral system for the central legislature because they feared that what they gained by being represented on a 'one man, one vote' basis in one chamber would be lost if a second chamber, constituted on a territorial basis, had a majority of West Pakistani seats.

Yahya, however, was prepared to accept a unicameral system in which all matters—even constitutional issues—were decided by a simple majority vote; in his speech he merely expressed a pious hope that on constitutional matters there would be a consensus of opinion from the

various parts of the proposed federation.[3] He was also prepared to break up the amalgamation of West Pakistan into 'one unit', which the (primarily Punjabi) ruling elite had carried out in 1955 because they felt it was the best way to protect West Pakistan's economic interests *vis-à-vis* the East. It also strengthened the arguments for parity of representation in the central assembly on the grounds that the two 'wings' of the country must have equal representation. The Bengalis did not like the 'one unit' arrangement because it weakened their bargaining position; the smaller provinces of West Pakistan shared the Bengalis' fears of Punjabi domination, but under the 'one unit' system had no separate voice with which to express their feelings. Mujib could not openly demand the break-up of the 'one unit', but he made it clear to Yahya that it would be most welcome.

The most important constitutional issue of all, however, was the relationship between the centre and the provinces. Paradoxically, the Bengalis, who since they were in a majority should have had no fear of domination, were anxious to secure the maximum degree of autonomy for their province, particularly in economic and financial matters.[4] Yahya made no attempt to tackle this crucial issue. Instead he left it to the decision of the new national assembly, which was to draw up a constitution, at the same time strongly supporting the Bengali claim for maximum autonomy. Naturally, Mujib had no objection to leaving this issue to the new assembly in which there would be a clear Bengali majority.

Outside Pakistan, the world press welcomed Yahya's 'bold' and 'sincere' proposals for restoring democratic processes in Pakistan. Yahya was described as a shy and reluctant dictator. President Nixon was reported to have advised the Greek ambassador in Washington to follow the example of Yahya.[5] All those, whether inside or outside the country, who wanted to see Pakistan united and stable, welcomed his proposals for the transfer of power. In the past, the ruling elite in West Pakistan had always looked at Bengal's problems from the angle of 'law and order'. This was the first—and last—attempt to put the complicated relationship between East and West Pakistan on a sound political basis.

Many questions can be asked about a plan which aroused such strong expectations. Did the army really want to hand over power at all? Did Mujib want a settlement on the basis of a united Pakistan or did he only intend to use the elections to establish his credentials as the sole leader of emerging Bangladesh? And what were the aims of Bhutto?

[3] See the text of Yahya's speech in *Dawn*, November 29, 1969.
[4] See G. W. Choudhury, 'Bangladesh: why it happened', *International Affairs*, April 1972.
[5] From an unpublished report by the Pakistani ambassador in Washington, January 1970.

Was he bent on capturing power, no matter whether it was in a united or truncated Pakistan?

One thing that was soon apparent was that the army generals and the West Pakistani political leaders thought that Yahya had gone too far in trying to placate the Bengalis at the cost of the 'national interest' as they interpreted it. In order to protect the country against a Bengali-dominated assembly, they put forward two particular demands. First, the constitutional document, which—since the country had no constitution—had to be promulgated before elections could be legally held, must contain a definition of the limits of provincial autonomy; and secondly, in the new assembly, constitutional matters must be decided, not by a simple majority, but by a two-thirds vote, or at least 60 per cent. of the total membership. It was argued that there was no reason why Yahya should not take a definite decision on the extent of provincial autonomy, just as he had decided on the basis of representation and the break-up of 'one-unit'. The non-Awami League leaders from East Pakistan took this line as well as the West Pakistani leaders and the military junta.

Yahya between the generals and Mujib

The matter was thrashed out at a series of meetings of the 'inner cabinet' which was composed of Yahya; his principal staff officer, General Peerzada; the Chief of Staff, General Hamid, who began to entertain hopes of succeeding Yahya as the country's third military president; two military provincial governors and the two deputy (provincial) martial law administrators of East and West Pakistan. I myself was the only civilian present and I attended not as a cabinet minister but as a constitutional expert. Eventually, it was almost decided to accept the demand for a two-thirds majority on constitutional matters and to define the extent of provincial autonomy in the constitutional document or 'Legal Framework Order 1970' (popularly known as LFO). But Mujib made it clear through the Governor of East Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan, that to do so would mean the end of negotiations and the beginning of an armed confrontation.

Yahya was in a real dilemma. The generals seemed to prefer to have a confrontation before elections—*i.e.*, before Mujib could consolidate his position in East Pakistan. But Ahsan, the only member of the junta who understood the political realities in the East 'wing', assured the President that a united Pakistan would not survive a confrontation with Mujib. In an attempt to find a way out of the impasse, I proposed at a meeting of the inner cabinet in January 1970 that instead of trying to define the extent of provincial autonomy, the LFO should define the minimum requirements that were essential for the existence of *one* Pakistan. This proposal surprised Yahya and angered the hawks among

the generals. But it was strongly supported by Ahsan, and I was allowed to elaborate it. Surprisingly, and to the great relief of Yahya, Ahsan and myself, it was eventually accepted by the generals. But although the crisis seemed to be over, subsequent events showed that it had only been postponed for a year.

The LFO, which was at last published on March 31, 1970, contained five points or principles which were regarded as the minimum requirements for a united Pakistan. (1) Pakistan must be based on Islamic ideology—Mujib was neutral on this issue. (2) The country must have a democratic constitution providing for free and fair elections—no one could object to that. (3) Pakistan's territorial integrity must be upheld in the constitution—Mujib could not object to this because, whatever his ultimate goal, he could not openly challenge the 'oneness' of the country. (4) The disparity between the 'wings', particularly in economic development, must be eliminated by statutory provisions to be guaranteed in the constitution—again, Mujib could have no objection. (5) The distribution of power must be made in such a way that the provinces enjoyed the maximum degree of autonomy consistent with giving the central government sufficient power to discharge its federal responsibilities, including the maintenance of the country's territorial integrity. No doubt the intention was to set up a conventional federal system. But since the wording of this stipulation was deliberately vague, it was capable of more than one interpretation; it allowed Mujib to base his election campaign on his Six Points while those who wanted a united, federal Pakistan could still hope that they had got it.[6]

The LFO was criticised, particularly in East Pakistan, as a retreat from the plan put forward by Yahya in November 1969. In a sense this was true. But those who knew the inside story of how the document had been drawn up realised that some compromise was essential and were not dissatisfied with the outcome. Mujib, who learned what had gone on from Ahsan, accepted the outcome, and when the Awami League council demanded that he should boycott the elections because of the 'new restrictions' in the LFO, he refused to agree. He was reported to have told his 'inner cabinet' that his sole aim was to win the elections by capturing 99 per cent. of the Bengali seats. Who could then—he was said to have argued—ignore his plan for Bangladesh? He was also reported to have predicted support from 'outside sources'.[7]

The elections were originally fixed for October 1970. But after disastrous floods in East Pakistan in August they were postponed for two months. In November East Bengal was devastated by a cyclone and

[6] For details of the Legal Framework Order and its significance, see my forthcoming book, *The Last Days of United Pakistan.* (London: Hurst).

[7] This account of Mujib's speech to his inner circle was reported to Yahya by his intelligence service. For some reason he decided to ignore it.

there were demands for a further postponement of the elections. Mujib, however, threatened to revolt if the elections were delayed any longer, and Yahya agreed that they should go ahead. This decision finally destroyed Mujib's doubts about Yahya's sincerity and made the relationship between them even more cordial; in November 1970 they had three secret meetings and Yahya cheerfully told me that the new Pakistani constitution would combine Mujib's Six Points and the five principles laid down in the LFO. He had just completed his triangular tour of Moscow (June), Washington (October) and Peking (November), and it was widely believed that he had already reached an understanding with Mujib that he should continue as President while Mujib became Prime Minister.

Meanwhile in West Pakistan, where right-wing parties had always been strong, Bhutto was winning more and more support. The main theme of his election campaign was a 'thousand years' war with India to restore the national honour which Ayub was alleged to have sacrificed at the Tashkent conference in 1966 under pressure from the Soviet Union. More significant—and ominous—were Bhutto's growing links with the generals. They turned to him to protect the so-called 'national interests' because they realised that they had been deprived of their confrontation with Mujib. Far from rejecting the LFO, he now seemed to have a better understanding than ever with Yahya on constitutional issues. Moreover, it was clear that Mujib was going to win at the polls and that his victory would be all the greater because the highly emotional Bengalis were furiously angry with the central government for its alleged failure to deal adequately with the cyclone disaster.

The elections held on December 7, 1970, were by any standard completely free and fair. As expected, Mujib had a landslide victory in East Pakistan, gaining an absolute majority in the national assembly by capturing 167 out of the 169 seats allotted to the East 'wing'. He enjoyed a similar success in the provincial assembly at Dacca. What was surprising about the election results was the total defeat of the right-wing and orthodox parties in the West 'wing' and the emergence of a non-Punjabi, Bhutto, as the leader of West Pakistan, or, more precisely, of the Punjab.

Bhutto's success boded ill for the future of a united Pakistan. There was no love lost between him and Mujib; on the contrary, they shared a mutual distrust and dislike, if not hatred. More important, neither possessed any broad perspective or vision. Unlike such Congress leaders as Gandhi and Nehru, or Muslim League leaders like Jinnah, neither Mujib nor Bhutto possessed any of the qualities of a leader whose aim is to achieve his objectives at a minimum cost in terms of human suffering and loss to society. In a sense both were products of Ayub Khan's authoritarian regime; both flourished on negative appeals to

the illiterate voters of Pakistan—one by whipping up regional feeling against Punjabi domination and the other by whipping up militant national feeling against India. Neither had any constructive or positive approach. The third party in the political equation, the army, unlike the British authorities in 1946–47, also seems to have been insincere, bent on retaining the absolute power which it had enjoyed for the past eleven years. Only Yahya, Ahsan and a few other generals, particularly among the younger group in the Pakistan army, really seemed to want a genuine political settlement. But their hand was weakened after the election when the country began to drift inexorably towards a confrontation.

Drift towards confrontation

In the LFO Yahya had provided that the new national assembly must complete its task of framing a new constitution within 120 days. This time limit was accepted by all the political leaders. It had taken two constituent assemblies nine years to frame a constitution for Pakistan between 1947 and 1956, and everyone wanted to prevent a repetition of this tragic delay. It was also agreed that the majority group or groups responsible for producing a constitution would show the draft to the President before formally presenting it to the assembly. Mujib had already solemnly promised Yahya, during their secret talks in November, to show him the Awami League's draft constitution.

Yahya, who was anxious to begin talks with the newly elected leaders as soon as possible, invited Mujib to come to Rawalpindi. Mujib declined, but invited the President to come to Dacca instead. Yahya accepted and asked me to go with him so that he could have expert advice on Mujib's draft constitution. The two leaders met on January 12 and talked for more than three hours. But Yahya emerged from the meeting a bitter and frustrated man. Mujib, he complained, had gone back on his word and refused to show him his draft constitution on the grounds that, as leader of the majority party, he and he alone was responsible for the new constitution. Mujib also demanded the immediate summoning of the assembly, otherwise the consequences would be dire. It seemed plain that the confrontation, which had been avoided with such difficulty in 1970, could no longer be prevented.

Yahya went on from Dacca to hold talks with Bhutto in his home town of Larkana. Bhutto had also begun to show signs of intransigence. He started to issue press statements declaring that the 'Punjab was the bastion of power' and could not be ignored in any future government or in the making of the constitution. He also made it clear that he would 'not play the role of a loyal opposition leader'; and that since the Awami League victory was confined to one region (East Pakistan), 'two majority groups' must be recognised and 'two prime ministers might

be necessary'. An impartial reading of Bhutto's utterances, together with his active lobbying of the hawks in the Pakistan army, would lead one to conclude that if he had to make a choice between two 'Ps'—Power or Pakistan—he would choose the former.

At Larkana Yahya and prominent members of the junta, including General Peerzada and General Hamid, enjoyed Bhutto's hospitality and held long conferences with him. I myself was not present at these talks but I learned about them afterwards from reliable sources.[8] It seems that they were fatal for the prospects of a united Pakistan. Bhutto exploited to the full the sense of frustration left in Yahya's mind by his meeting with Mujib in Dacca. He was strongly supported by his old friend, Peerzada, who enjoyed Yahya's unlimited trust and confidence.[9] The result was that while still at Larkana the junta, ignoring Bhutto's provocative utterances, decided to prepare a contingency plan in case Mujib persisted 'in his uncompromising attitude'. At a meeting on February 14 it also decided to dissolve the Pakistan cabinet, apparently because the Bengali ministers and one non-Bengali minister (who was a close friend of Mujib) were working hard to find a compromise. At the same meeting it was also decided that Admiral Ahsan (who had in fact expressed a wish to resign) should be replaced as Governor of East Pakistan by a hawk, General Tikka Khan.

In the meantime India had stopped all flights between East and West Pakistan because of the alleged hijacking of an Indian plane by Pakistanis at Lahore. While negotiations over the incident were still going on between the Indian and Pakistani governments, Mujib publicly described it as a 'conspiracy' to postpone the transfer of power, while Bhutto declared that the so-called hijackers were 'national heroes'. Mujib's remarks were resented by the generals, who began to describe him as an 'Indian agent'. At a farewell party given for members of the cabinet, General Hamid told me that his 'boys' (*i.e.*, soldiers) were 'getting restless for action'. When I pointed out the dangers of such a course of action, he retorted: 'I could fix it up in 72 hours'.

On March 1 the national assembly, which was due to meet on the 3rd, was indefinitely postponed after Bhutto had threatened that he would boycott it unless Mujib came to terms with him. But by now their mutual suspicion and hatred made this impossible. In East Pakistan there was a violent reaction to the postponement. Mujib described it as non-co-operation, but it was not the Gandhian type of

[8] I had left Pakistan for a tour abroad.

[9] Peerzada had remained on the sidelines during the constitutional debates in the inner cabinet over the drafting of the LFO. He wanted to keep his options open for a Yahya-Mujib understanding because if the right-wing parties in West Pakistan, which some of the generals were supporting, won the elections, his personal future would not be secure. But after Bhutto's conclusive victory at the polls, he came down strongly on his side.

non-violent non-co-operation. It was an open revolt which virtually amounted to a unilateral declaration of independence for Bangladesh. Cries of *Joy Bangla* (victory for Bengal) were heard everywhere, and what was almost a parallel government began to function under Mujib's instructions. Between March 3 and 25 the central government's writ did not run in East Pakistan.

This explosive situation was mainly created by Bhutto's boycott of the assembly. Many people still feel that if it had not been postponed Mujib might still have been able to produce an agreed constitution with the help of West Pakistani deputies who did not belong to Bhutto's party and who had already arrived in Dacca for the opening of the assembly. But Bhutto was now the junta's most influential adviser; he was even reported to have prepared Yahya's various statements, including the decision to postpone the assembly.

Even at this late stage, however, Yahya and Mujib were still talking to each other on the telephone and still seemed anxious to negotiate. Mujib appeared to be getting nervous about the activities of his own extremists while Yahya still hoped to go down in history as the man responsible for a voluntary transfer of power from a military to a civilian regime. On March 15 he went to Dacca and next day began a crucial series of talks with Mujib. The negotiations were carried on at two levels: at a summit level between Yahya and Mujib, with Bhutto joining in later; and at an expert level between three teams—Yahya's advisers, led by his former Law Minister (now law adviser), Justice Cornelius and General Peerzada [10]; the Awami League team, led by Tajuddin (who subsequently acted as Prime Minister of Bangladesh before Mujib's return from detention in West Pakistan) and Dr. Kamal Hossain (now Bangladesh's Law Minister); and Bhutto's team, consisting of members of his party secretly advised by senior Punjabi bureaucrats.

By March 20 the press was reporting that a compromise constitutional formula, incorporating most of the fundamentals of Mujib's Six Points, had been agreed. The reports turned out to be too good to be true. Next day Mujib rejected the compromise formula and on the 23rd a new formula, drawn up by the Awami League team, was presented by Dr. Hossain. There was in fact—as Dr. Hossain himself was reported to have said—very little difference between the two drafts. Both preserved the unity of Pakistan; both restricted the powers of the centre, as far as East Pakistan was concerned, as much as possible. All the same the Dacca talks broke down, and on March 25 the Pakistan army took

[10] Yahya asked me to take part, first as an official adviser and then as a private citizen. I declined both offers because it seemed to me that neither side was prepared to compromise and therefore the talks were a futile exercise. But I was very well briefed on what happened by Justice Cornelius, in whose integrity I have full confidence. For a full account of the talks, see my forthcoming book, *The Last Days of United Pakistan.*

matters into its own hands. The resort to force was bound to destroy a united Pakistan and the end came with the entry of a triumphant Indian army into Dacca on December 16, 1971.

Since both drafts envisaged one Pakistan, why did not the army and Bhutto accept the Awami League's constitution? And since both conceded the Bengalis' demand for autonomy on the basis of the Six Points, why did not Mujib and the Awami League accept Yahya's draft? During two visits to Pakistan in 1971 I sought the answers to those two crucial questions, but failed to find any satisfactory or definite explanation. Perhaps the break-up of Pakistan was made inevitable by the growing tension, suspicion and even hatred between the ruling elite of West Pakistan and the Bengali intelligentsia—although it came as a great shock to many, like myself, who had cherished the ideals behind the Muslims' demand for a separate state in the 1940s. But could not the terrible bloodshed connected with the emergence of Bangladesh have been avoided? Gandhi and Nehru committed themselves to full independence for India, yet they showed great statesmanship in accepting Dominion Status and even a British Governor-General so that a smooth and quick transfer of power could take place.[11] Unlike Shubash Bose, who invited Japan's help during the Second World War, they stuck to the path of negotiation. Could not Mujib have shown the same wisdom and prevented the killing of (according to his estimate) three million Bengalis? Could he not have avoided a situation which led inevitably to the introduction of foreign (Indian) troops and the destruction not only of the country's economic infrastructure but also of its social fabric?

I cannot vouch for what happened at the final Dacca talks in March 1971, but I can certainly state that when Yahya went to Dacca in January he was prepared to accept Mujib's Six Points without reservation. I may further disclose that he asked me to prepare a formula on the relationship between the centre and the provinces. I drafted a plan for a confederal solution on the basis of the Six Points, which after the elections I knew was the only way to preserve a united Pakistan. Yahya wrote on my draft: 'What is the difference between your scheme and the Six Points?' Yet he accepted it and took it with him to Dacca in January. Mujib's fatal mistake was his refusal at that meeting to honour his pledge to show Yahya his draft constitution. But the story is incomplete without a reference to Bhutto and his friends in the army like Peerzada and Hamid. When the full story of Pakistan's dismemberment can be told, they may well be found to have the prime responsibility for the failure of the final Dacca talks and the tragic consequences.

[11] The bloodshed, of course, came later. But it arose, not out of the struggle for independence, but out of the tensions between the two communities—a problem which the British left the country without solving.

BOOKS

MODERNISATION WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

W. Klatt

Modernization without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study. By Norman Jacobs. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1971. 420 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £7·75.*

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TRADITION and change are in constant conflict with each other. Where modernisation proceeds with undue haste, tension can easily build up to such an extent as to tear society apart. Yet, critics are often all too readily to hand where the process of modernisation is delayed. So far, the attempt to adjust traditional institutions to modern needs has rarely been fully successful. After the end of the Second World War, civil engineers, building bridges and dams, and economists, drafting national development plans, had a head start over other craftsmen in the new development profession. By comparison, social and political scientists were at a disadvantage. The untried governments of newly independent countries, while welcoming technical advice and tolerating economic arguments, had little use for what was bound to seem interference in accepted social and political patterns, considered strictly internal affairs in any state worth its sovereignty.

The economic techniques applied to development 'models', such as

material balances, inter-sectoral matrices, marginal capital-output ratios and cost-benefit calculations, have become the accepted tools of indigenous planners and foreign advisers alike, though there has not been the same consensus on the most suitable development strategies: profit maximisation and welfare services, public sector control and private initiative, domestic industrial expansion and international division of labour, and—last but not least—balanced and unbalanced growth have invariably vied for the planner's favour. Generalisations are to be avoided in a situation where experiments in development are being compressed into the short span of a mere three decades, yet extended over a whole continent. Just the same, at times it has seemed as if the question of the right timing of one or the other remedy has been sacrificed to the choice of the view held by the most fashionable school of academic thought. More serious still, concern for the social and political pre-conditions and implications of change has often been at a discount. Indeed technical and economic solutions have at times been accepted as welcome excuses for deferring overdue social reforms and for preserving outmoded political institutions, although these usually present far more difficult hurdles on the road to modernity than some of the economic constraints with which every development specialist is familiar.

In an effort to proceed with speed and to be able to report success, industrial growth, however ill-timed, has frequently been equated with development, and change, of almost any kind, has been treated as evidence of modernisation. If one follows the definition, presented by Norman Jacobs, of modernisation as the maximisation of the potential of a society within the limits set by its goals and its structure, while development takes place regardless of such limitations, one has to accept his verdict that there is in Thailand—and no doubt elsewhere in Asia—modernisation without development. No doubt, the author's observation is right that all too often only the formal relation between the political elite and the general public has changed. Officials consider themselves above and apart from the public, thus perpetuating a traditional patron-client relationship, irrespective of any trimmings reminiscent of parliamentary democratic accountability. In the case of Thailand no colonial overlord can be held responsible for this situation, in which economic flexibility can exist perfectly well within a system of social conformity. But is it altogether the fault of the Thai leaders if they believe that they can gather the fruits of development without paying the price of institutional change? Have not all too many Western advisers helped to create an illusion by talking of the forms of development rather than of its substance? In Professor Jacobs's view, in Thailand 'patrimonial means [are being used] to achieve patrimonial goals' (p. 133). While individual mobility is not excluded from such a society, there is little scope for the activities of such groups as tenants' associations, trade unions or political parties. The early collapse of the latest experiment in parliamentary democracy could thus have been predicted by any reader of Professor Jacobs's perceptive analysis. Properly purged of some of its unnecessary professional jargon, an abridged version of this book could well be of service to some of Thailand's new generation of students still struggling with the language of the politics of development and modernisation.

Comparative studies of development can have considerable advantage over some of the general theses of the early postwar period, which tended to treat the less developed countries in Asia—in the words of Professor Hagen—as an undifferentiated mass. Professor Mya Maung has chosen for

his comparative study the most recent decade of development in which the creation of state monopolies of trade and industry in his native Burma coincided with the liberalisation of central controls in Pakistan. The author treats Pakistan as one unit rather than as two antagonistic entities held together by a religious myth; he finds it 'both impossible and irrelevant to delve into cultural plurality and ethnolinguistic differences' (p. vii). Had Professor Maung not disregarded these differences, he could hardly have concluded that Pakistan had been better able than Burma to resolve the dilemma of social change confronting traditional societies. The reader searches in vain for proof that Pakistan underwent 'a kind of Protestant Reformation' (p. 154). The author rightly criticises present-day Burma for its economic stagnation, caused largely by an inward-looking policy designed to fulfil the goal of distributive equity as set out in Ne Win's 'Burmese Way to Socialism'—a concept even more costly than that of his devout Buddhist predecessor. However, the author, like many a contemporary student of development, is wrong in overestimating the benefits derived from Pakistan's development policy allegedly directed at efficiency and productivity. In so far as these were achieved, they were the result of the army, the civil service and the leading industrialists ruling as an omnipotent autocracy without due regard for a minimum of welfare for the underprivileged sections of the community, whether they were the ethnic majority of the Bengalis or the professional majority of the cultivators of the country. Even if one stretches the term to its limits, one can hardly subscribe to the author's presentation of Pakistan as an open society. Had he compared the status of women in the two countries, he would probably have felt the need to qualify his views. In comparing the economic performance of the two countries, the author would also have done well to set Burma's refusal to accept foreign aid against the handsome contributions made by taxpayers in communist and non-communist countries to Pakistan's industrial development.

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The most tempting comparison in Asia is that between India and China, both of subcontinental dimensions and both predominantly agrarian in character, in fact becoming more so, since the industrial sectors absorb only a small portion of the annual growth in population. In handling their political directions and in managing their social commitments, the two countries differ so much that any detailed comparison should be most rewarding for the student of development. This is all the more so, since earlier studies by Eric da Costa and Wilfred Malenbaum are by now badly out-of-date and the recent volume edited by Kuan-I Chen and Jodingar S. Uppal consists merely of extracts taken from papers written for purposes other than comparative analysis. The dissertation of Dr. Jain, now a Director at the Indian Ministry of Agriculture, fails to live up to the undertaking to provide a comparative study. In spite of its setbacks in the Great Leap Forward, China's agricultural experiment emerges from Dr. Jain's book as an unqualified success. If one is to believe the author, only India can learn from China; there does not seem to be any area in which China could learn from India. Dr. Jain knows all the frustrations which work in the Indian countryside entails, but of China he has discovered even less than what China's controlled media allow him to know. However much the reader may share the author's frustration with India's failure to tackle agrarian reforms, his innocence about the facts of life in China is at times disarming. Those gleaned from the provincial press, readily available in translation, are

unknown to him. The carelessness with which the book has been produced is most disconcerting; for example, the communes are described as 'all embracive' institutions. Chinese as well as English names are misspelled in many instances, *e.g.*, Chou-Ming Li for Choh-Ming Li, Dandokar for Dandekar, Andre Domithrone for Audrey Donnithorne and Zenderman for Zauberman. All in all, Dr. Jain's book cannot be recommended. A satisfactory analysis of China's and India's agrarian structures and agricultural performances has yet to be written. In a rapidly changing world, any hasty, short-term assessment of Asian societies is likely to be overtaken by such unexpected calamities as the collapse of Yahya Khan's Pakistan or the excesses of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

In his comparison between West Pakistan and East Bengal, the forerunner of Bangladesh, Dr. Azizur Khan gives the by now familiar account of the colonial exploitation of Bengalis by Punjabis. At its peak, the annual flow of capital to East Bengal was $1 per capita against $8 in the case of West Pakistan. Dr. Khan has written a highly readable book which contains all that is needed to plan the economy of the new state. The author is the Research Director of the Institute which Yahya Khan transferred, in the last phase before Pakistan's disintegration, from Karachi to Dacca, where it has now been reconstituted as the Bangladesh Institute of Development Economics. Though, no doubt, written in a hurry, the book is the result of long and painstaking research. Besides recording all the relevant economic data available for East Bengal, Dr. Khan applies the econometric tools of his profession, perfected while working as a Fellow at Nuffield College, to a critical analysis of past industrial activities. He judges these by their social, rather than their economic, rate of return. In the conditions of high population pressure prevailing in Bangladesh, the author favours labour-intensive, small-scale manufacturing industries. He also proposes a reduction of the birth rate to half its present level within five to ten years—a courageous stand on the part of a citizen of a Muslim country in which birth control is still a subject rarely mentioned. As to the countryside, the author considers as highly desirable a reversal of the policy of discrimination against agriculture. He also pleads for a redistribution of land owned in units substantially larger than the low national average of 2½ acres per household. A ceiling of three times the average could provide enough land to raise the size of the smallest units to about half the average. Dr. Khan is right in stressing that economies of scale have little relevance in intensive paddy rice areas and that modern packages of farm inputs are divisible and thus within reach of the owners and tenants of small holdings. The need for social change in support of economic growth is rightly stressed. Earlier studies of the Institute have shown that the yield per acre is larger on the smaller holdings, even though, owing to high intensity of labour, the reverse may apply to the profit per unit of land and per man working in the field.

Having been closely associated for many years with rural settlement in Israel, Ranaan Weitz has always approached the problems of development in a pragmatic manner. He recently summarised his experience in a 'strategy for development',[1] the most 'revolutionary' aspect of which is his insistence on the need for rural, as distinct from agricultural, development. This is also the subject of the book edited by Weitz in which some

[1] *From Peasant to Farmer*: A Revolutional Strategy for Development. (New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1971). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1972, p. 655.

thirty-odd contributors review development and planning, including such subjects as farm sizes, agrarian reforms, co-operatives, extension services and the interdependence between industry and agriculture in advanced and backward conditions. The general section is supplemented by some case studies. The canvas is large, the brushes differ widely, and the painting does not belong to one school only; one is thus left without a fully satisfying picture. However, most of those contributing are experienced practitioners, some of them are outstanding by any standard. Among them one finds Arthur Gaitskell, Professor V. M. Dandekar, Professor Edmundo Flores and the editor of the symposium himself. These and others contributing to the volume under review are in search of what Gaitskell calls 'via media', the middle way between capitalist and communist solutions, aiming at productivity without neglecting equity. Weitz himself, though versed in the use of mathematical models, does not ignore those factors which only at the risk of distortion lend themselves to evaluation in quantitative terms. 'Comprehensive' regional planning, one of the editor's specialities, can serve as a corrective of development planning on a global scale.

* * *

Arguments about the role of international trade have generated a good deal of heat among those committed to national development. Those devoted to the concept of comparative advantage have failed to convince those aiming at self-reliance, and vice versa. Some, though not all, countries practising international division of labour to a high degree and earning a comfortable amount of foreign exchange have done well. Some others, deciding on a programme of autarky, have paid a high price in social terms. However, the extremes are rare; reality usually lies somewhere between them. This is true even of China, one of those countries of almost continental dimensions that can largely do without other countries' goods and services. As one of China's Foreign Trade Ministers put it some years ago, export is for import, and import is for the country's socialist industrialisation. Less committed political leaders are unlikely to quarrel with this philosophy. As Professor Eckstein's collaborators show in their assessment of China's trade prospects, the strategic trade embargo was little more than an irritant when China wanted Western goods and know-how badly enough. By comparison, the withdrawal of aid and expertise by China's ally, Soviet Russia, was far more painful. Whilst more than marginally important in special areas, the lack of full international division of labour is unlikely to be decisive at this stage of development. This is not only true of China. In the present climate, countries in Asia will do well if they manage to maintain their share of world trade. Only when they have advanced to a degree of diversification attained in, say, Taiwan, can they hope to gain substantial benefits of which they are deprived at the present level of foreign trade.

Of more immediate significance is the creation and extension of an internal trade structure which is often little more than rudimentary. In Asia this infra-structure ought to include feeder roads and feeder canals and all the other paraphernalia of a modern market mechanism. The deep-seated belief that merchants, often belonging to an alien race or caste, are bound to be rogues has led to some of the most costly experiments in trading by government. Five decades of communist incompetence in the service sectors have apparently failed to demonstrate that even devoted public servants are institutionally unsuited to marketing perishable consumer goods. Mrs. Uma Lele shows in her painstakingly researched analysis that grain

marketing in India is no exception to this rule. Although the Indian commercial class is perhaps not always as competent or honest as Mrs. Lele implies, government officials have hardly proved to be a suitable substitute. Of this, ample proof was provided by the distortions which occurred under the Indian government's procurement and fair price distribution system. To say that there was no choice is no valid argument. In an emergency, such as India faced in the mid-1960s, Britain's wartime food procurement and enforcement policy might well have served as an alternative, provided it had been suitably adjusted to Indian conditions and implemented with the co-operation of the traditional trading community, rather than to their detriment.

Of course, in the final analysis, the working of the market depends on the volume of products available for distribution. So production continues to be a matter of the first priority. As the slim volume issued by the International Rice Research Institute shows, rice production, though increased by the use of high-yielding varieties in fields properly watered and manured, is still far from certain, whenever the monsoon fails. Where controlled irrigation is available, as in the Institute's plots at Los Banos in the Philippines, Professor Bradfield has demonstrated that by multi-cropping and inter-planting four to five crops can be grown every year, resulting in up to ten times the present returns, in volume and values, of food. However, before these results can be expected from cultivators' fields, social relations and political institutions in the rural areas will have to undergo drastic changes. As Dr. Barker, the Institute's economist, rightly stresses, the introduction of the new technology has accentuated the need for institutional reforms. Unless these are carried out, technical and economic modernisation without social and political development may result. This would not be a tenable position for long.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War. By Sir John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 878 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £12·00.*

In intention and achievement this is a comprehensive, thorough and well-documented account of the peace treaties made after the Second World War. Since the keystone of the peacemakers' arch, the treaty with Germany, was never added, the structure of the book is naturally less elegant than its authors would have wished. They have done their best to fill the gap with a clear exposition of the course of events leading to the German situation as we know it today.

Inevitably the narrative of these matters has led the authors into the controversy surrounding the origins of the cold war. They have no doubts on this, and emphatically reject the revisionist thesis according to which Soviet provocations since 1945 have been a defensive reaction to policies of the Western powers dictated by hostility to or suspicion of their communist ally. They are of course right to dismiss the thesis in so far as it carries implications of Soviet innocence. But to explain the development of the Western political and military system in these years as simply or primarily a response to Soviet actions is a similarly dangerous simplification. The United States and its allies were engaged in looking after their own interests: properly so, for this is the business of governments, including the government in Moscow. British policy in Greece, for instance, can only be put in a different ethico-political category from Soviet policy in Romania on the hypothesis that policies are to be judged in terms not of their appropriateness to the circumstances but of the cause they ultimately serve. Under this system of thought, however, agreement between East and West could have little meaning.

The cold war was (or is) not the outcome of a passive protagonist's response to the pressure of an active one. It was a clash between two positively motivated power systems. Perhaps the clearest example of their intrinsic incompatibility was seen in the attempt made by the United Nations in the first year of its life to deal with the new problem of atomic weapons. Much has been written on the Baruch plan and the Soviet counter-proposals, but the simple fact is that there was never the slightest possibility that either could be accepted by the other side.

The authors of *The Semblance of Peace* might have modified some of their conclusions if they had examined the motivation of Soviet policy with a more neutral eye. It is true that the atavistic secretiveness of Russia's rulers and the impossibility of serious public discussion in the Soviet Union put every obstacle in the way of the study of Soviet policy from within its own assumptions.

The same cannot be said of France, however, and the authors' treatment of French policy is also somewhat external and dismissive. They do not explore in any depth the predicament of the Fourth Republic in the early 1950s. French policy, like Russian policy, is seen essentially from the point of view of its effect on American and British aims. The approach, in fact, is unashamedly Anglo-Saxon, and the book has not only a range of moral priorities but also a hero, in the person of Anthony Eden, now the Earl of Avon. Since Suez this has come to seem a surprising accolade, but justice is surely served by the refusal of Sir John Wheeler-Bennett and Mr. Nicholls to allow the events of 1956 to eclipse Mr. Eden's achievements as Foreign Secretary and the qualities of clarity of purpose, resourcefulness and professional skill which he deployed in that office.

The creation and some of the subsequent activities of the United Nations form another theme which is approached with limited sympathy. A reference to 'the chronic and inveterate irresponsibility of the General Assembly' (p. 444), for instance, invites questions as to the attribution of collective qualities to the Assembly and as to the meaning of responsibility for the individual representatives of sovereign states of whom its meetings are composed.

The book covers the Far Eastern as well as the European settlement. Its value is enhanced by an introductory discussion of the settlement after the First World War, and by 170 pages of documents.

HAROLD BEELEY

East Europe in Search of Security. By Peter Bender. Trans. by S. Z. Young. *London: Chatto & Windus for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1972. 144 pp. £3·00.*

Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? By Joseph Korbel. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 302 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

THESE two books provide interesting and useful reading for anyone trying to assess the value of a European security conference. They are complementary. Peter Bender, a West German journalist who wrote his book while a Research Assistant at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, examines the attitudes of the East European states towards security, and so also to East-West detente; Dr. Korbel, once Czechoslovak ambassador to Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia, now Professor of International Relations at Denver University, examines the attitudes of the West European states to detente, and so also to security.

Both perhaps fail to distinguish sharply enough between governments and peoples—a failure which is inevitably much more serious in Herr Bender's book than in Dr. Korbel's, since the gap between government and governed is so much wider in Eastern Europe than in the West.

Herr Bender grapples more successfully with another problem peculiar to Eastern Europe. The vast majority of West Europeans are fairly clear that they want security against the Soviet Union rather than against the United States. In Eastern Europe things are much more complicated. Herr Bender poses the questions (1) security against what kind of danger? (2) security for whom? (3) security against whom? (p. 2). His answer is that what East European governments fear from the West is far less military aggression than 'softening up' or 'muffled aggression'. This fear is particularly acute in East Germany, as he shows in his careful analysis of Ulbricht's problems and policies, but decreases rapidly in intensity in proportion to geographical distance from the East-West dividing line, becoming virtually non-existent in Romania. (Herr Bender's book, originally published in German before the conclusion of Bonn's treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and East Berlin, has been updated in the English edition to take some account of these events, but he has not been able to examine fully the fresh internal and external dangers which they present to the East German regime.)

However, the nub of the problem, probably for most East European governments and certainly for most of their peoples, is security, not against the West, but against Soviet intervention, or at least a fresh tightening of Soviet controls; and this has become particularly acute since the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine. For the governments (except perhaps in Romania) there is a special dilemma: they want to prevent Soviet intervention, yet not to lose the Soviet support which they need to keep themselves in power. Herr Bender does a good deal to clear a way through the resulting double-talk and confusion. He shows how difficult it would be for formal East-West agreements to deal with the East Europeans' dual security problem, and—very sensibly—sees the only real hope in the gradual raising of economic achievement in Eastern Europe to somewhere near the West European level, which would give the East Europeans greater confidence in their dealings with both the West and the Soviet Union. But will Moscow allow this?

Dr. Korbel's answer is that 'Moscow may permit them [the East Europeans] to cultivate contacts with Western Europe within the framework of certain ideological restrictions and under Soviet guidance but never to the detriment of Soviet interests or the ideological substance of their regimes' (p. 26). He believes—and Herr Bender would agree with him—that after the invasion of Czechoslovakia some East Europeans felt that 'the continued existence of NATO served as a deterrent to increased Soviet controls over their own countries' (p. 74).

Most of Dr. Korbel's book is however taken up with a rather pessimistic analysis of the differences between the West German, French and British approaches to detente. These he sees as a source of weakness, thinking that Moscow will miss no opportunity to use detente to exploit it (p. 249). He analyses de Gaulle's record in East-West relations with a certain admiration but ultimate scepticism; his account of Bonn's Ostpolitik is sympathetic and approving but shows traces of a certain nervousness. He accuses the British of being 'overcautious' in their attitude to developments in Eastern Europe (p. 61) and of standing 'aloof from the possible political implications of detente' (p. 249). This judgment is surely less than fair: during the 1950s the British were pioneers in the field of

detente, though they gained little from it, and between 1964 and 1967 the Labour government pursued detente with a great deal of energy and a certain success. British caution since then has been at least partly due to preoccupation with the EEC.

Dr. Korbel thinks that British entry into the EEC may encourage the political cohesion of Western Europe, but adds that this may 'deepen the artificial division of Europe and in terms of detente may well become counter-productive' (p. 250). He sees the only hope in the slow liberalisation—political as well as economic—of Eastern Europe, but 'in what year or what decade this will happen, no one can say' (p. 251).

ELISABETH BARKER

Peaceful Change in Modern Society. Ed. by E. Berkeley Tompkins. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1971. 158 pp. (Hoover Institution Publications 101.) $6.50.*

Change and the Future International System. Ed. by David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1972. 109 pp. £3·80; paperback: £1·40.*

THESE two collections of essays (the Columbia and the Hoover, as I shall refer to them) are not among the best of their *genre*, but of the two the Hoover, celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Institution of the same name, is far and away the better.

A fitting respectability is lent to the Hoover collection by Lord Avon and Charles J. Hitch, writing with conviction upon what have now become their respective specialities, the dangers of appeasement and university politics. But these subjects, enthralling though they may be to some of us, are not precisely at the centre of current political inquiry. Much more appositely to serious contemporary problems, Bertrand de Jouvenal takes as his theme the pursuit of power and directs our attention to what he claims is the minority position in international society now occupied by liberal democratic regimes. He is probably right in saying totalitarianism is an unusually permanent form of government and warns against its evil effects. But he gives no guide for action.

Sidney Hook, taking up the theme in his study of political violence, sees anarchy induced by civil violence as the intermediate stage in the progression of a society from democracy to totalitarianism. He may be right but I fancy his view of a peacefully ordered democracy is almost as romantic as the view of violence held by many of those campus revolutionaries and others whom he castigates. Certain features of totalitarianism are found in, and are essential to, every democracy—all elites have certain exclusive features, and most justice is rather rough.

The one other outstanding piece is by Sir Percy Spender, the Australian international lawyer, who takes as his topic international institutions, in particular the United Nations. He brilliantly exposes its weaknesses and inadequacies and yet in the end, in the fashion of international lawyers, hesitates to condemn it or even to suggest specific remedies.

In spite of the extraordinary eclecticism of the editor's choice of contributors—in addition to those already mentioned there is an orientalist, a biochemist and a Norwegian parliamentarian—or perhaps even because of it, the Hoover compendium almost rises to the occasion.

The Columbia collection by contrast ranges in quality from the indifferent to the absurd. In the former category even Bernard Brodie is found nodding. In postulating that there is an asymptotic process at work in technological change, which will make inventions subsequent to those of the first half of the century likely to be of relatively smaller social impact than those that have gone before, he is surely giving a hostage to fortune. What is interesting about the future and what is important about it is that it will contain major surprises, and there is no law ruling out a future technological surprise as great in its consequences as the nuclear one.

Edging some little way nearer absurdity, Robert C. North and Nazli M. Choucri, writing on population and resources, labour and bring forth the extraordinary mouse that international conflict sometimes occurs when some states covet the wealth and accomplishments of others, and on this basis ask for 'fairer shares' to be given to the covetous group. What is 'fair' in such a context, and why poor states should be thought of as deserving (especially when their power to upset international order is, as Brodie realises, feeble), are questions to which no answers are given. In another article where we might again have expected something better, Herbert S. Dinerstein writes on the force of ideology and its consequences for the future with complete inattention to its rediscovered power as a force for change within domestic society.

After these articles, which the editors almost seem to have placed at the beginning to tempt the uncertain reader, the collection goes swiftly downhill. Eugene B. Skolnikoff, in dealing with the effects of technology on international co-operation, is a model of modern muddle-headedness. Gone and obscured for ever are the deep cleavages of interest amongst states, great and small, in a smog of pollution and the crush of population. Common interest in cutting down the mercury content of tuna by 8½ per cent. will ride roughshod over the paltry divergences of ideology and national interest that have kept the world 'disunited' for so long. And wisely tucked away at the back of the collection Tilden J. LeMelle and George W. Shepherd Jr., wearing very large humanitarian hearts on their sleeves, firmly proclaim racism as an underlying cause of both Soviet and Western 'imperialism'. Wasting little time in trying to convince those sluggards among us who remain unblinded by the brilliance of this revelation, they set in motion a tiresome harangue about the virtues of the poor states and the wickedness of the rich. It will come, I am sure, as a surprise to the two authors to learn that when certain approaches to international politics are neglected, as theirs has been hitherto, it is more often as a result of good judgment than of oversight.

The Columbia collection, then, manages to combine in a slim volume almost all that is second-rate in modern American international relations thinking, and nothing of the considerable amount that is good. United States-centredness, pseudo-science, furious scrambling on to the band-wagons of pollution and overpopulation, and obligatory bouts of anti-American self-flagellation are the very antitheses of good scholarship. The Hoover volume does not escape these fads and fancies untouched—the last article by William G. Pollard is of the 'space ship earth' variety—but for the most part sanity and cool-headedness prevail. All the same it is about time that simple-minded faith in demographic statistics as guides to future population size, and the nonsensical view that physical resources are measurable (they are measurable only in the narrow sense

that the total number of atoms of material on earth is approximately fixed, not in the degree to which human ingenuity and inventiveness may be applied to the collection of atoms), which led poor Malthus astray, ceased to be part of the mental equipment of apparently responsible adults.

IAN BELLANY

International Conciliation. By Jean-Pierre Cot. Foreword by Suzanne Bastid. Trans. by R. Myers. *London: Europa. 1972. 349 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

PROFESSOR COT has written what must rank as the definitive modern work on international conciliation. While this reviewer has to confess that she did not find the book terribly interesting or stimulating, the explanation lies in the subject and not in Professor Cot's treatment of it. Any comprehensive description and analysis of the process of conciliation between states must inevitably present material of a pedestrian and unexciting nature. Professor Cot reaches the same conclusion as have other recent commentators (including Mrs. Hazel Fox in the David Davies Memorial Institute study, *International Disputes: The Legal Aspects* [1]) namely, that bilateral conciliation is most successful in disputes of a secondary and 'legal' nature. On the other hand, there have been several worthwhile results from conciliation within, or sponsored by, an international organisation, for example, the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states and the success of the UN Commission for Indonesia. This type of conciliation is classified as 'an extension of mediation' (p. 297). Conspicuous failures also occur, such as repeated attempts to mediate in the Kashmir dispute (the faint prospects of an improvement there flow from political and military changes and actions which combined to bring the parties to direct negotiations). The essence of conciliation, as every student of international law, industrial law or political science knows, is that it depends upon the goodwill of the parties, and commits them merely to presenting their dispute, in its factual and, usually, legal aspects, to a conciliation commission appointed by mutual agreement. They are not bound to accept the proposals for settlement which the commission produces. Indeed, these proposals, if not accepted, must remain strictly confidential to the governments concerned and to the members of the commission. A dispute must not be 'pre-judged' by the publication of unacceptable findings or proposals.

Professor Cot devotes two-thirds of the book to bilateral conciliation after three brief introductory chapters on definition, sociological elements, and lessons to be learned from private law, especially industrial law. He has studied the practice since the Bryan Treaties thoroughly and has given us a detailed and useful reference work. The last third of the book concerns conciliation in international organisations including the fairly extensive United Nations practice and more 'technical' procedures such as those within the Council of ICAO, the 'Panels' of Gatt, the committees set up by Unctad, and the Commissions of Inquiry of the ILO. The translation by R. Myers reads well, and the book is adequately

[1] 2nd rev. ed. London: Europa Publications. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1973, p. 99.

indexed. Its value as a work of reference would have been enhanced by a table of particular 'cases' or disputes referred to conciliation. Treaties are included in the general index.

GILLIAN WHITE

War: Patterns of Conflict. By Richard E. Barringer with the collaboration of Robert K. Ramers. Foreword by Quincy Wright. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The M.I.T. Press, 1972. 293 pp. Bibliog. Index. $13·95. £6·30.*

War: Patterns of Conflict. Technical Manual. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The M.I.T. Press. 1972. 127 pp. $5.95. £2·80.*

THIS book is a technical report on the methodology and conclusions of a computer-based study of 18 conflicts which terminated in organised violence. It is based on three major assumptions. The first is that conflicts evolve through a number of stages (pp. 20–21), and that these stages are related to each other in a clearly defined manner. Second, all conflicts are 'essentially *bi-lateral* phenomena; that is . . . only two principal parties . . . are involved' (p. 26). Third, all conflicts are assumed to be a product of four sets of factors: the existing state of relations between the parties, their internal environment, the methods of conflict resolution and prevention available to them and the nature of the environment in which the conflict occurs (pp. 23 and 24). In the study, these were subdivided into 300 items of information, which were collected for the eighteen conflicts at the points at which they passed from one stage to another.

The author himself admits (p. 33) that a major criticism of these assumptions is that no concept of causation is involved in them. Rather, it is implicit in the study that conflicts are determinist in their nature, and issues of chance and accident can be ignored. This is reinforced by the data collection and processing methods used. These produced a number of sets of 300 items of information at the points at which one stage changed to another in all eighteen conflicts. These sets were then compared with the data at the preceding or succeeding transition points to isolate the variable factors peculiar to that transition point. The variable factors identified at similar points in different conflicts were then compared to produce further sets of common factors. The whole process was computerised, and the *Technical Manual* explains how this was done.

This procedure is open to a number of criticisms. First, the eighteen conflicts are a statistically insignificant sample, and therefore any conclusions derived from them are of heuristic value only. Second, the conflicts chosen involved eventual hostilities yet many conflicts do not reach this stage, making the sample a highly selective one if the intention is to study conflict in general. Third, the procedures involve no evaluation of the importance of different factors at each transition point and thus give no indication of the causal importance that ought to be attached to the common factors uncovered.

Three major substantive conclusions emerge from the study. First, interstate conflict is directly linked to internal instabilities within states (p. 105). Second, 'third-party conciliation attempts . . . come too late, if at all in local conflicts' (p. 111), and third, 'the single most influential

factor in conditioning the outbreak of hostilities . . . was great power activity, particularly involvement and support' (p. 112).

This volume serves to demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of adopting a more formal rigorous approach to the study of conflict. On the one hand the assumptions and methodology are explicit and the reproduction of the data base and manipulative techniques means that this work can be easily criticised, extended or modified by other scholars. On the other hand, the conscious rejection of any investigation of causality, and the limited number of examples upon which the study is based means that only a limited degree of reliability and relevance can be attached to the results obtained. One ought, therefore, to regard this work as an interim report rather than a finished product which will serve as a valuable reference work for university libraries and for scholars having an active interest in research in this field.

JOHN SIMPSON

The United Nations in Perspective. Ed. by E. Berkeley Tompkins. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1972. 155 pp. (Hoover Institution Publications 110.) $7·50.*

The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace. By Vratislav Pechota. *New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1972. 92 pp. Bibliog. (A Unitar Study: PS No. 6.) $2.50.*

To commemorate the 25th anniversary of the first meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations the Hoover Institution held a public conference in January 1971 at which papers were given by a number of eminent statesmen and diplomats and some well-known academics. Justifiably, the event drew a large audience, and no doubt it was very worthwhile: the opportunity to hear and, presumably, question such a gathering of experience and talent was not one to be missed. However, as sometimes happens, the publication of the conference record is an altogether less impressive affair. The men who have made their names in public life had little to say in their lectures which is worth preserving—and, after all, why should they? Scholarship is not their calling. The academics were more disciplined, but even they, in this context, were offering largely familiar wares: Charles Burton Marshall subjected a number of popular opinions at the UN to critical analysis; Inis Claude on peace-keeping was, as usual, cool and smooth; and Peter Bauer was iconoclastic about foreign aid. The volume concludes with the UN Charter (strangely, in its original, unamended form) and the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

The second book under review is in a different category. It is the sixth in a series of monographs on peaceful settlement emanating from the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. Earlier publications in this series include Vratislav Pechota on the various methods of third-party settlement,[1] F. Y. Chai on *Consultation and Consensus in the Security Council*,[2] and Berhanykun Andemicael on the roles of the UN

[1] *Complementary structures of third-party settlement of international disputes* (New York: UNITAR. 1971).
[2] New York: UNITAR. 1971.

and the Organisation of African Unity in the settlement of intra-African disputes.[3] Now Dr. Pechota makes a further contribution with his study of the UN Secretary-General's good offices role—those 'informal contacts and friendly suggestions' (p. 2) in the cause of pacific settlement which, the author suggests, can go beyond the traditional idea of good offices in international diplomacy. Dr. Pechota concentrates on activity of this kind which the Secretary-General has undertaken on his own responsibility and, in terms of time, puts his main emphasis on U Thant's period of office. He also confines himself to what he calls the visible part of this particular iceberg. Nonetheless, he is left with a good deal of little-known material—which, it is worth noting, hardly provides support for the widely-held view that U Thant was quiet to the point of passivity.

Dr. Pechota analyses his subject-matter in an elaborate, perhaps an over-elaborate, way. He examines the Secretary-General's authority to engage in good offices, the type of activity which is covered by that phrase, the conditions in which it can be exercised, the Secretary-General's role where interests conflict, and the manner in which his good offices have been employed. As a result, the same incident is often mentioned, from different angles, in several places, which, in this relatively short study, does make for some disjointedness. Moreover, in view of this approach and the amount of ground covered, it is particularly regrettable that the book contains neither an index nor any cross references. However, it is a most useful work, which will be greatly appreciated by students of the UN's political role. Not all of them will fully endorse Dr. Pechota's conclusion that the Secretary-General's 'conciliatory assistance' (p. 15) has been 'an invaluable asset to the United Nations in dealing with difficult situations of great potential danger to world peace' (p. 81). And some eyebrows may lift at his suggestion that human rights 'may soon become one of the major fields in which good offices are exercised' (p. 61). Nevertheless Dr. Pechota has made a notable addition to a very worth-while series.

ALAN JAMES

U.S./U.N.: Foreign Policy and International Organization. By Robert E. Riggs. *New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1971. 347 pp. Bibliog. Index.*

THE main objective of this book is to evaluate the utility of the United Nations as an instrument of American foreign policy. To this end the author analyses American behaviour in the principal organs, the effects of American activities on the UN's internal politics and on its role in world politics, and the resulting impact on the attainment of American foreign policy goals. Despite the intentional emphasis on American perspectives Riggs also tackles the problem of the political significance of the UN in the quarter century since 1946. Two organisational devices are used to structure the argument. First, three main areas of UN concern provide the chapter headings: Power (175 pages on political issues arising out of the cold war or in the 'noncommunist world'); Welfare (44 pages on economic and social matters); and Community (46 pages on the UN as the cornerstone of an embryonic world community). Secondly, the

[3] *Peaceful Settlement among African States* (New York: UNITAR. 1972).

functions of the UN are identified in foreign policy terms as legitimisation, negotiation and the provision of material support for particular national interests.

Few of the author's empirical or normative conclusions are new. He demonstrates that the United States was highly successful in obtaining the UN's collective legitimisation of American goals on East-West issues from 1946 to 1954. But he also points out the unfortunate by-products of such American domination: an emphasis on conflict rather than on co-operation in political style as manifested in the United Nations; an increase in Soviet distrust of the world organisation; a more pronounced non-alignment on the part of Afro-Asian members; and an eventual crisis in the American public's attitude to the UN in the late 1950s when the United States lost its control over General Assembly politics. However, a decline in the legitimising function of the UN for American policy-makers was matched by an increase in its contribution to negotiation, particularly in the areas of arms control and outer space.

The main contribution of this book is its record of American behaviour in the United Nations. There is almost no account of how or why American foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the United Nations acquired its major characteristics. Such an account would have been more useful than the frequent evaluation of the United Nations' performance in diverse situations from the 1946 Iranian crisis through to the 1968 Czech crisis because such evaluations are commonplace in the literature on the United Nations. The acute limitations on the UN role in world politics forces the author into a high degree of generality when making conclusions, for example: '. . . American policies have been broadly consistent with expanding UN capabilities, but in specific instances the United States has not hesitated to follow an opposite course in pursuit of the national interest' (p. 293). Perhaps the lack of impact of such (acceptable) conclusions explains the author's determination finally to evaluate the UN role in terms of political science jargon. The chosen model is Deutsch's 'security-community'; we are assured that the UN system 'has done something to increase the volume of transactions among states', and that it may also have helped 'to increase the expectation that international disputes will be resolved without violence' (p. 305). Such tentative conclusions are at best unnecessary. However, Riggs has made a valuable contribution to the history of American involvement in the United Nations.

PETER FOTHERINGHAM

Diplomacy and its Discontents. By James Eayrs. *Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1971. 198 pp. £6·00; paperback: £1·70.*

I MUST declare interest at the start of this review. As an ex-career diplomat, I may not be able to contemplate Professor Eayrs's work objectively. It is a collection of re-issued and enlarged lectures and articles, dating from 1965–70. The author writes as a 'practical idealist', or committed intellectual, who from a considerable height condemns politicians for immorality and diplomats for a pretentious impotence which is even more contemptible. Diplomatic bureaucracy for him is in a class by itself. Any foreign office normally reacts to new ideas only by wishing them

and the Organisation of African Unity in the settlement of intra-African disputes.[3] Now Dr. Pechota makes a further contribution with his study of the UN Secretary-General's good offices role—those 'informal contacts and friendly suggestions' (p. 2) in the cause of pacific settlement which, the author suggests, can go beyond the traditional idea of good offices in international diplomacy. Dr. Pechota concentrates on activity of this kind which the Secretary-General has undertaken on his own responsibility and, in terms of time, puts his main emphasis on U Thant's period of office. He also confines himself to what he calls the visible part of this particular iceberg. Nonetheless, he is left with a good deal of little-known material—which, it is worth noting, hardly provides support for the widely-held view that U Thant was quiet to the point of passivity.

Dr. Pechota analyses his subject-matter in an elaborate, perhaps an over-elaborate, way. He examines the Secretary-General's authority to engage in good offices, the type of activity which is covered by that phrase, the conditions in which it can be exercised, the Secretary-General's role where interests conflict, and the manner in which his good offices have been employed. As a result, the same incident is often mentioned, from different angles, in several places, which, in this relatively short study, does make for some disjointedness. Moreover, in view of this approach and the amount of ground covered, it is particularly regrettable that the book contains neither an index nor any cross references. However, it is a most useful work, which will be greatly appreciated by students of the UN's political role. Not all of them will fully endorse Dr. Pechota's conclusion that the Secretary-General's 'conciliatory assistance' (p. 15) has been 'an invaluable asset to the United Nations in dealing with difficult situations of great potential danger to world peace' (p. 81). And some eyebrows may lift at his suggestion that human rights 'may soon become one of the major fields in which good offices are exercised' (p. 61). Nevertheless Dr. Pechota has made a notable addition to a very worth-while series.

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to go away. Foreign service officers are the abominable no-men of diplomacy (these are slightly condensed quotations). On Vietnam, Professor Eayrs thought it worthwhile (last summer) to reprint the following, with reference to Dr. Kissinger's plea early in 1969 for a year's further patience: 'His year is up. His game is up.'

These examples are typical of style and substance. The book also contains many minor errors. To choose at random, 'Barataria', which becomes '*Barateria*' only a page later, is a fiction not of Sir Val Duncan but of Sir W. S. Gilbert; and Sir Anthony Eden's apprenticeship was not served in career diplomacy. Small instances, but typical of the approach of this book.

All these faults are no doubt tolerable in short-term journalism for a local audience, and there is of course plenty of room for serious thought about the role of diplomats, the manner and numbers in which they perform it, and the relation of international affairs to private morality. The author's remorselessly bright style and uncritical outlook however seem to create an impenetrable curtain between him and the practical and moral problems with which diplomats are faced. He quotes the opinion of a former Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union that the practitioner of foreign affairs should on no account read these lectures, since they would only raise his blood pressure without giving him the slightest moral or practical help. I would rather recommend that young diplomats be forced to read them, and be transferred to some other profession if they could not produce cogent and detailed criticism. But I cannot advise an individual to invest £6·00 in Professor Eayrs's book, or even £1·70 for a paperback edition. There is nothing wrong with trying to sell the same horses twice, but the distinguished university presses concerned should know better than to charge so much for such old and defective creatures.

DUNCAN WILSON

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Administrative Theories and Politics: An Inquiry into the Structure and Processes of Modern Government. By Peter Self. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 308 pp. Bibliog. Index £4·00; paperback: £2·50.*

PROFESSOR SELF sets himself a very difficult task in his new book—that of bridging the gap between, on the one hand, concrete and factual studies of public administration and, on the other hand, often highly abstract administrative theory. The result is not a systematic textbook on administrative theory, but an eclectic use of existing theories to illustrate issues of contemporary government. It is a reflection upon the conflicts of values inherent in certain administrative issues and therefore leaves the impression of being an 'incomplete' book, though a book that certainly raises many questions for future research students to investigate.

The problem with theory in the study of public administration is that one either borrows it from existing organisation and management theory, most of which was developed in the context of private sector organisations, or seeks to formulate theory specifically for the public sector. In turn, this problem raises the question of whether public administration is a

distinctive field of study or just one facet of administrative science and organisation theory. Self states that public administration can claim to be a distinctive field of study, which would seem to explain why old and new theories of administration are often of limited relevance to public sector issues. Unfortunately, we continue to wait for the development of theories of public administration in order to legitimise the coherence and distinctiveness of the study.

If public administration is to establish itself in this way, it must begin to release its preoccupation with efficiency and focus upon theories of democracy and the public interest as providers of the framework for public sector activity. Only in this manner will a 'firm centre' be given to the study. Efficiency in the public sector can only be understood in a political context, and that means attention to political theory and strengthened links with political science. In fact, one of the best sections of Self's book is his discussion of changing notions of accountability in administration.

It emerges clearly from Self's study that much organisation theory (*e.g.*, the classical principles) and decision theory (*e.g.*, Lindblom's concepts of marginal incrementalism and partisan mutual adjustment) offer little specific guidance to the administrator; concepts and principles tend to be too general and vague to answer the important questions of degree in administration (*e.g.*, how much centralisation or polycentricity, how much competition and conflict). In fact, it tends to be the latter, institutional questions which have been badly neglected in the literature. Self's book provides no simple answers to these administrative issues, only a recognition that there is no 'one best way'. There are different organisational systems, each with its costs and benefits (usually incommensurate and intangible), with one's choice among them being shaped by one's values. Under the impact of empirical studies such as those of Burns and Woodward, dogmatism is on the decline in organisation theory.

The strengths of Self's book result from the facility with which he handles theory and from his treatment of many questions which are badly neglected in the literature. Some sections are excellent, for example, on the factors shaping 'agency philosophy', administrative reorganisation, and his study of the dilemmas of modern administration. His chapters on politics and administration (chap. 5) and administrative appraisal and expert advice (chap. 6) are full of insight. The weaknesses of the book result from the difficulty of the task which he sets himself—that of applying either formal abstract theory based on questionable assumptions or theory derived from empirical research on private sector organisations to contemporary issues of public administration. There are also some important oversights; why no mention of the 'New Public Administration' theorists in the context of changing notions of accountability, and why so little attention to Dror and the policy scientists who merit greater consideration? Moreover, there is occasionally a carelessness in the use of concepts—for example, having distinguished between efficiency and effectiveness, he goes on to distinguish goal efficiency from resource efficiency without explaining whether goal efficiency means effectiveness or not.

Self's book will undoubtedly occupy a high place on future reading lists and along with the recent books by R.G.S. Brown and Desmond Keeling helps to make public administration an intellectually challenging subject.

K. H. F. Dyson

Towards an Open World Economy. Report by an Advisory Group. By Frank McFadzean *et al. London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. 1972. 181 pp. Bibliog. £3·95.*

Realities of Free Trade: Two Industry Studies. By Duncan Burn and Barbara Epstein. Introduction by Harry G. Johnson. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 273 pp. Index. £3·00.*

A SPECTRE is haunting the members of the advisory group of the Trade Policy Research Centre in London, the spectre of protectionism. This may seem rather surprising. For, following six rounds of multilateral negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (Gatt), of which the Kennedy Round of 1967 was the last, the average level of duty has been greatly reduced and is now 8·3 per cent. for the United States and the European Community, 10·2 per cent. for the United Kingdom and 10·9 per cent. for Japan. These tariff cuts have helped to promote over the last decade a doubling of world trade, which indeed has been expanding twice as fast as world income. Yet there is deep concern over conduct. There has occurred a deterioration in the rules governing trade in agricultural products; the loss from agricultural protectionism amounts to about 6 per cent. of the income of the less developed countries. Moreover, the enlarged European Community which, by the use of association status and other preferential agreements draws about 60 per cent. of the free enterprise world's trade into its orbit, is compelling the Americans to reconsider their adherence to the principle of non-discrimination. Discontent deepened when the United States began to pursue inflationary policies, instead of raising taxes or cutting other public expenditures, in order to finance the Vietnam war, which its Nato allies were unwilling to underwrite. The growing deficit in its balance of payments ultimately forced the United States to impose a 10 per cent. surcharge on imports and to cut the link between gold and the dollar. By thus throwing the world monetary order into turmoil, it induced the rest of the world to carry out a more realistic realignment of currencies. So serious was the crisis of 1971 that an escalation into an open trade war could have ensued. Sensibly the leading countries agreed to undertake a fundamental reform of the trade and monetary system and to begin, in 1973, multilateral negotiations for the further liberalisation of international trade.

In anticipation of the forthcoming negotiations and to exorcise the spectre of protectionism, the advisory group of British experts has submitted for consideration a report which recommends the elimination of all tariffs on industrial products traded among developed countries. Realistically, it proposes that bargaining should proceed among the major trading entities and that the negotiated reduction of barriers should not be unconditionally available to all countries subscribing to Gatt as in the past, but only to those who accept its terms and offer reciprocity in a broad sense. Such reciprocity should not however be demanded of the developing countries. It recommends that governments should set up a working party to examine the effects of agricultural price support schemes and to suggest alternative ways of redistributing incomes in favour of farm populations which would eliminate the present disruptive effects on world trade in agricultural products. It deals with safeguards against market disruption, with general rules of competition to cover non-tariff interventions and advocates a much closer co-operation between existing

bodies dealing with trade, finance and development. Throughout this report, which appeals to reasoning, it is emphasised that a prerequisite for an effective round of trade negotiations will be a reform of the international monetary system to permit greater flexibility of exchange rates.

In examining the implications of liberalisation, *Realities of Free Trade* highlights, in two industry studies, the non-tariff factors which influence the course of international trade. Duncan Burn's thoughtful study of the chemical industry shows that, in the determination of competitive strength, differences in technological superiority, research expenditures and scale economies are more important than differences in labour costs and that comparative cost advantages, rather than any artificial impediments, are the forces now most affecting trade in chemical products. Barbara Epstein's systematic analysis of the technical and economic problems facing the heavy electrical engineering industries emphasises that international competition is dominated by government policy rather than by economic forces. In discussing the obstacles in the path of free trade in heavy industrial equipment, her brilliant study underlines the need for a harmonisation of government procurement policies and of national technical standards.

H. C. HILLMANN

The Common Market and World Agriculture: Trade Patterns in Temperate-Zone Foodstuffs. By Francis Knox. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 138 pp. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £5·25.*

PERHAPS the one generalisation about agricultural trade which would command universal support is that present arrangements are unsatisfactory. On the characteristics which are at fault, the responsibility for their existence and the nature of a solution, there is very widespread disagreement. In the United States and in Britain it has become common in recent years to place a considerable share of the blame on the EEC and to insist that any solution must hinge on a radical reformation of the Common Agricultural Policy. Mr. Knox's book then is addressed to a topic of great immediate interest and sensitivity.

Written before the outcome of negotiations to enlarge the Community, the book traces trends in world trade, reviews the agricultural trade issues as they affect the Six, Efta and the United Kingdom and discusses the scope for international commodity agreements. A chapter on the measurement of efficiency in agriculture precedes the conclusion in which prospects for a liberalisation of world trade are discussed. Twenty-nine tables are included, the most recent presenting data up to 1970. The notes at the end of each chapter provide a brief list of references which the reader will find helpful.

Mr. Knox traces the tendency of high cost producers to increase their share of the market under the shield of protective agricultural policies. This leads, he argues, to a misallocation of resources and to lower living standards than would otherwise prevail. The tendency of the CAP to encourage a more rapid growth in intra-Community trade than in trade with third countries is well documented. The problems facing Britain as a candidate for full membership are outlined in terms of Commonwealth

trade, the impact on Britain's cost of living and the effect on its balance of payments. To some extent this discussion has been outdated by the conclusion of the negotiations—along somewhat different lines than Mr. Knox anticipated. The examination of world negotiations concerning agricultural trade—in commodity agreements and Gatt—reaches the important conclusion that, once the large differences in efficiency between producer countries has been recognised, such phrases as 'prices reasonable to producers' or prices that provide producers with a 'reasonable return' can be seen to be meaningless. Mr. Knox argues that the only satisfactory basis for comparisons of efficiency must be the prices actually received by producers. He recognises some limitations of this criterion—input subsidies, high feed costs as a result of high protected cereal prices and exchange rate variations. In conclusion the author discusses the prospects of moving towards more liberal trade arrangements on the basis of a modified application of the *montants de soutien* proposals of the EEC in the Kennedy Round. He is modestly hopeful.

This brief summary inevitably does less than justice to Mr. Knox's work but it would be wrong to conclude this review without expressing some reservations. First, the argument appears to accept the basic comparative advantage doctrine as a guide for practical policy. To do so, however, implies not simply a demonstration that factor returns in a particular industry are different in various countries but that the ratio of costs in this industry and other industries in each country are different. It is therefore necessary to have a more comprehensive review of the economies of the countries concerned before conclusions about desirable trade flows can be drawn. Even if the cost ratios do differ, it is still necessary to be sure that resources made redundant in importing industries can find alternative employment; this is often difficult in agriculture. In so far as they do not, the economic gains from freer trade will be reduced and the social problems it creates intensified.

Second, although the book is well printed, equipped with numerous tables of a useful character and generally written in a readable style there are too many small slips. Two examples will suffice. On page 73 the population of the EEC is said to be 84 million and on page 78 the National Plan was said to forecast an extra demand by 1970 of some '200 million of temperate-zone foodstuffs'.

The book is expensive. Much of its statistical material will date rather quickly and its arguments could probably have been developed in a more effective form had publication been delayed to allow for a more considered discussion of the consequences of enlarging the EEC. There is still scope for another text on this theme.

J. S. Marsh

The Frontiers of Development Studies. By Paul Streeten. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 498 pp. Index. £7·50.*

In this book Paul Streeten has collected together some thirty essays which have appeared in a variety of publications mainly over the past five years. For some readers Professor Streeten's title will suggest 'the existence of a boundary within which the light of established knowledge shines and beyond which the darkness of ignorance, prejudice, and error reigns' (p. xiii). Certainly development studies have become a battle ground for

conflicting concepts, modes of thought and approaches. Professor Streeten does not set out to demolish established orthodoxies but rather to see how sound they are. The first part of the book is largely concerned with method and examines the limitations of Western concepts in the study of societies in different stages of development. The second covers the international movement of the factors of production and foreign investment and government aid. The third deals with such policy issues as project appraisal, the conflict between employment and growth, and the transfer of technology. The final part reviews the future of the Commonwealth with particular reference to Britain's relations with India.

In the past decade the developing countries have been much exposed to academics, and it is unusual for their peoples and problems to be discussed as sympathetically as they are in these pages. The material presented fits together into a coherent whole. The exception is chapter 15, 'Overseas Development Policies under the Labour Government', which was written in conjunction with Dudley Seers. The economic planning staff at the Ministry of Overseas Development was originally under the direction of these two authors. Like other 'outsiders' working in government departments at that time they were frustrated by the overriding priority given to the correction of the balance of payments and the unrealities of the National Plan. What the chapter does bring out is the difficulty of starting up a new ministry from scratch and of defining its purpose. In this case the ODM remained a department of aid rather than an all-round development ministry.

The development problem is about societies which are deeply divided with 'inequality not only in income and wealth, but also in technology and productivity, in education and health' (p. 25). This dualism is reinforced in many cases by a division along racial, ethnic and religious lines. Comparisons between countries in different stages of development on the basis of available statistics 'depend largely on guess-work for transactions in the large traditional sector of the economy' (p. 27), and much misunderstanding would be avoided if this fact was clearly recognised. Professor Streeten is well aware of the gap between theory and practice. He reminds us that growth is generally unbalanced and that 'disequilibrium calls into existence remedial forces and this process pulls along the economy which would not have been activated had it not been for the series of disequilibria' (p. 43). In other words, in development the end follows the means.

In chapter 5, 'Use and Abuse of Models in Development Planning', Professor Streeten indicates the need for caution in considering concepts formed by aggregation. For example, increased employment 'presupposes a fairly homogeneous mobile labour force, willing and able to work and responsive to incentives' (p. 55). Again, 'education, which is now often advocated as a panacea, may simply result in a group of educated unemployed and unemployables' (p. 57). This is certainly true of India. Chapter 7 deals sympathetically with the problem of the transfer of technology. Here it is important to beware of the simple transfer of fairly sophisticated concepts from one country to another without 'close scrutiny of the institutional differences' (p. 127). Nor is it surprising that the governments of developing countries often insist on having the latest technology rather than something more modest which might better suit their needs.

In dealing within the Commonwealth (chap. 23), Professor Streeten decides that in spite of difficulties it provides the basis for 'further con-

structive action' (p. 404). He hopes that a multilateral Commonwealth 'based on growing common interests, would no longer have its fulcrum in London and, for that reason, Britain's contribution could be greater' (p. 405). One reason for thinking this is that just as the Commonwealth cuts across divisions of race, religion and wealth, it also 'unites industrial and agricultural economies, countries with plenty of capital and labour scarcity, and countries with a surfeit of labour and capital scarcity' (p. 406). Arising from this in the fields of training and technical assistance, private investment, capital aid and monetary reform, common interests can be identified and co-operatively pursued. Professor Streeten sees no need for serious conflict between Britain's position and interests in the Commonwealth and in Western Europe. However, careful thought and imagination will be needed in order 'to resolve spurious conflicts and resist well organised vested interests' (p. 412).

Professor Streeten does not allow dedication to the cause of development to obscure basic commonsense. On human rights he says 'premature attempts to aim at the best now may lead to sacrifices later and in some cases to sacrifices by others now' (p. 166). The attempt to transfer at once alleged universal principles from rich to poor countries always carried with it the danger that it would do more harm than good. 'The economist, if he knows anything, knows that scarcity imposes choice and that choice has to lay down priorities. Rather than advocating the immediate implementation of long-term aspirations, the economist will be biased in favour of getting better value from the existing system' (p. 168).

One small criticism of the presentation is that it is not easy to find out where the different essays first appeared and when.

RICHARD BAILEY

Foreign Investment and Development: Swedish Companies in India. By Klas Markensten. *Lund: Studentlitteratur. 1972. 294 pp. Bibliog. (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. 8) Kr. 60.*

The Economics of Business Investment Abroad. By H. Peter Gray. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 249 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

MARKENSTEN'S book is an invaluable study of the impact of the six majority-owned Swedish subsidiary companies in India. He starts from a firm analytical base and closely examines their economic, social and political activities. The result is a fine book, which not only probes deeply into the workings of one particular part of the foreign-controlled sector of the Indian economy, but whose analytical framework is a model for similar studies of overseas direct investment.

His companies contrast neatly. The Swedish Match subsidiary, WIMCO, has had factories in India since the 1920s, competing against a fairly healthy cottage industry. The other five companies, which all started production in the 1960s, represent modern, technology-intensive kinds of investment like compressors (Atlas Copco), ball bearings (SKF) and dairy machinery (Alfa-Laval). Whereas all the latter are located in Poona, the older-established WIMCO has five factories dispersed widely round the country.

Markensten's analysis splits into two parts. He begins with a look at the companies' impact on employment, labour conditions, education,

culture and politics. Their activities, on balance, are shown to be beneficial, though their impact is often less than might be expected. Probably the most doubtful area lies in their use of labour-saving technologies. He analyses the arguments about appropriate technology with skill, but one is still left contemplating the thirty–forty jobs in the match-making cottage industry whose production is equivalent to a single worker in WIMCO. Otherwise, their industrial relations policies seem relatively civilised (there is a frightening quotation about the fate of union organisers in a competing Indian company). They try to ignore the caste system, though the author's statistics show how pervasive it remains. They keep an extremely low political stance, although, of necessity, they have to keep 'expediters' in New Delhi to harass the bureaucracy (they do not, however, seem to use bribery as a tool).

Markensten's final chapters go carefully through all the economic evidence. He examines inflows of foreign capital, relative profitability, export and import policies, transfer pricing practices, dividend and royalty flows, tax payments, reinvestment ratios, etc. It is hard to see how this could have been done better, and he even makes a convincing effort to establish what might have happened if the Swedes, or some other foreigners, had not invested in these industries. Even taking fairly heavy opportunity costs into consideration, the discounted benefits still outweigh overall costs. The main benefit from the five new companies has been the foreign exchange inflow, while the longer established WIMCO has mainly contributed a benefit through relatively high wages.

The highest compliment one can pay this book is to recommend that it be put on library shelves next to Kidron's *Foreign Investments in India.*[1] Both combine a good awareness of the issues with extremely hard empirical analysis.

Gray's book suffers in comparison. It sets out to offer a conceptual approach to the problem of the social and economic implications of direct investment. It is written clearly and should be quite useful to students approaching this subject for the first time. However, its analysis of the experience of host countries like the Ivory Coast, Canada and Puerto Rico is definitely uninspired in Markensten's company. Moreover, the author's grasp of the existing literature is only middling. Can one discuss the Canadian experience, for instance, without at least mentioning Safarian's work?

LOUIS TURNER

International Trade Unionism. By Charles Levinson. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 402 pp. Index. £4·75; paperback: £2·50.*

CHARLES LEVINSON is an important phenomenon. He is not only a leading international trade unionist and scourge of multinational companies, but he is also an extremely knowledgeable and articulate spokesman for the anti-multinational forces. He writes from his Geneva base as Secretary-General of the International Federation of Chemical and General Workers Unions (ICF). This gives him a suitably geocentric vision and access to excellent sources of management information.

[1] London: Oxford University Press. 1965. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1966, p. 542.

This book is the first in Allen and Unwin's Ruskin House Series in Trade Union Studies. In it, Levinson tackles a wide range of topics, from outmoded theories about inflation (his last book dealt with this at length [1]), the rise of the multinational company, the resultant trade union reactions, East-West trade and the unions, the growth of union demands for industrial democracy and asset formation, and the training needs of less developed countries (he has directed vocational training institutes in a number of African countries).

This is an essential book, even if by strict academic standards it is sometimes infuriating. He presents an incredible amount of information but gives virtually no references. The facts, however, are reliable and there are sections which are particularly excellent. In the chapter on the trade union answer to multinational companies, he suggests a three-step process in which unions will first of all give company-wide support to a single union in dispute with a foreign subsidiary; they will then move toward multiple negotiations with a company in several countries at once; finally they will integrate bargaining around common demands. He can see all the difficulties, but looks at how various international trade union bodies have moved along this road. He draws on evidence from international trade secretariats like his own ICF, the metalworkers (IMF) and the food and allied workers (IUF), and from some purely national unions like the American chemical workers (ICWU). He is realistic enough to accept that even the ICF's much-vaunted 1969 confrontation with Saint-Gobain was only a faltering step on the second stage of trade union development (he gives a detailed history of this affair).

I was interested in other sections on the position of trade unions in Eastern Europe and a world-wide summary of the extent to which industrial democracy has been achieved in various countries. But there is a great deal of much more valuable information in this book and browsing is made easy by a notably comprehensive index. However, the definitive book on international trade unions has still to be written. What this book misses is a sense of history and of the power relationships between various union institutions. For instance, just how have the relationship of the international trade secretariats with national unions and bodies like the ICFTU fluctuated over time? What about the demarcation disputes between international trade secretariats? What has been the international role of major national unions like the UAW or IG Metall? These could well be questions that no union leader can yet answer. In the meantime we should be grateful that Levinson is writing books like this. Perhaps one day he will let his hair down and write his memoirs.

LOUIS TURNER

Trade Union Foreign Policy: A Study of British and American Trade Union Activities in Jamaica. By Jeffrey Harrod. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 485 pp. Bibliog. Index. £8·00.*

A STUDY of this kind could be made from the viewpoint of the foreign unions or that of the developing country. The earlier parts of this book

[1] *Capital, Inflation and the Multinationals* (London: Allen & Unwin. 1971). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1972, p. 476.

suggest that the former approach is predominant. Part I studies the possible motives for international activity by unions and outlines the structure of British and American unionism. Part II sketches the Jamaican background and outlines the activities of British and American unions in Jamaica. Part III analyses these activities and gives some attention to their impact on the Jamaican scene.

British intervention in Jamaica was through the TUC, whereas American intervention was confined to a single union, the United Steelworkers of America. The motives were different. On pages 330–331, Harrod quotes without comment the view that USWA became involved because it organised similar workers in the United States and that its Jamaican activities were necessary for the protection of these workers. (However, on pages 346–347 he rejects this generally accepted view and argues that low wages in Jamaica were not a threat to their American counterparts.) British unions had no such direct interest and ideological considerations were more important. Both British and American unions established relationships with the Trades Union Congress of Jamaica or (later) the National Workers Union and ignored Bustamente's Industrial Trade Union, despite its size and importance. It is, perhaps, not surprising that in a country of two cultures, the foreign unions should have supported the organisation that was part of the imitative culture rather than the one that belonged to the evolved or native culture. This preference for the one union rather that the other was bound to have a considerable impact on the economic and political life of Jamaica (where the link between unions and political parties is much closer than in Britain or the United States). Here Harrod states important conclusions in his final chapter, but the supporting evidence is rather thin.

The USWA intervention was an important factor in securing high wages for the Jamaican bauxite workers, who at all levels were paid at least twice as much as workers in any other industry. Such a situation inevitably gives rise to serious problems. Any study of the impact of foreign union intervention should have considered these problems in some detail rather than dismiss them with a passing reference.

This is an interesting study, and its chief weakness is that it attempts too much. The motivation of the unions in advanced countries for intervening in underdeveloped countries and the study of the impact of such intervention are both big enough topics to call for independent rather than combined study.

J. M. JACKSON

The Politics of Environment. By Stanley P. Johnson. *London: Tom Stacey. 1973. 240 pp. £2.95.*

AN admirable short study of the way in which one country, the United Kingdom, has been attempting good management of the environment. The book has the unusual merit of putting the technicalities in their place and concentrating on the main question: what political and administrative instruments are needed for good management? Towards an answer, the book describes with lucidity and great practical sense the evolution since 1963 of legislation, regional planning, and local government reform, and the establishment of the Department of the Environment.

LAW

The International Law of the Ocean Development: Basic Documents. **By** Shigeru Oda. *Leyden: Sijthoff. 1972. 519 pp. Fl. 87.00.*

The Search for Peace. By D. W. Bowett. *London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972. 236 pp. Bibliog. Index. (World Studies Series.) £2·50.*

BOTH these volumes use documentary and other source material to illuminate international law and relations, although they differ somewhat in their purpose and method of presentation. The first volume is confined to documents, comprising the Law of the Sea Conventions; resolutions of the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC; and a number of draft articles, proposals and reports, both governmental and non-governmental, on ocean development. Also included are a large number of intergovernmental agreements on continental shelf limits, and conventions on marine pollution.

The second volume is addressed to students in sixth forms, colleges of education and universities, and, though the author describes the task he has set himself as impossible, the book disproves it. It is divided into seven parts: the sovereign state and the resort to war; the peaceful settlement of disputes; peacekeeping by the UN; the great powers and 'brinkmanship'; technology, aid and development; arms control and disarmament; and the future structure of international society. In each there are basic documents and extracts from articles or statements by a remarkable and fascinating range of political leaders, as well as leading authorities on international law: Khrushchev, Guevara and Ho Chi Minh all have their say. These selections give the book unusual and valuable perspectives, supported by well-pointed suggestions for study in each section.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

WESTERN EUROPE

The European Adventure: Tasks for the Enlarged Community. **By** Altiero Spinelli. *London: Charles Knight. 1972. 194 pp. Index. £3·00.*

Industrial Relations in the Common Market. By Campbell Balfour. *London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972. 132 pp. Bibliog. £2·00; paperback: £1·00.*

West European Politics since 1945: The Shaping of the European Community. By Roger Morgan. *London: Batsford. 1972. 243 pp. Index. £2·90; paperback: £1·40.*

SIGNOR ALTIERO SPINELLI is surely the most articulate exponent of the European idea as embodied in the Brussels Community. Founder of the European Federal Movement in Italy, he had his reward in his appointment, in 1970, to be a member of the European Commission. Who better than he could provide a 'strategy for the construction of Europe' (the title of Part I) in a book which appeared in the very week of the summit conference in Paris?

Based on the assumption that at the end of 1969, with the first summit conference, the European theme became revitalised, this tract

for the times is tantamount, as Signor Spinelli claims, to an agenda for the 1970s. When his admirable study of the Eurocrats appeared (in translation) in 1966,[1] the author was in a somewhat chastened mood. Now, while conscious that national inhibitions, the obstacles to a clear run for federalism, are still immense; while recognising that only in periodical moments of crisis are governments likely to pay heed to European activists like himself and his colleagues, he nevertheless feels that the innovators are over the hump. Hence the accents of scorn which he allows himself, in his conclusions, for the 'pragmatism' of the politicians and their specious doctrine of inter-governmental co-operation. There are, there must be, he says, more efficient decision-making procedures than the *concertation systématique* of the Council of Ministers.

Signor Spinelli talks sound sense about the prospective European monetary area, with the *écu* as the unit of account and intervention currency; regional policy—'the Rome Treaty conception is totally inadequate in the context of economic and monetary union'; reform of the Common Agricultural Policy; a common policy for industrial development, to include the establishment of a European science foundation, and so on. But the necessary restructuring, he seems to say, is so much whistling in the wind as long as 'politically speaking, the Community . . . is mute and headless'.

Signor Spinelli makes a powerful plea *pro domo suo*. He himself likens it to 'what were once called "political pamphlets"'. How potent the national differential still is, however, emerges clearly from Mr. Campbell Balfour's background study in his special field. (The author teaches at University College, Cardiff.) Britain, for example, has to find its own remedy for its economic malaise, particularly with regard to labour relations: joining the EEC will provide no magic ointment. If, in terms of its record on strikes and productivity of its labour force, Germany shines in comparison with the others, it is because of the *national* factor, because those concerned are Germans, not on account of any 'system'. There is indeed, as the author says, no common norm of industrial relations: multinational trade union activity is still at the conference and policy discussion stage. Mr. Campbell Balfour usefully brings together the relevant facts, country by country, on economic growth, labour relations, income policies, industrial democracy and social security regimes. It is a well-documented primer—without any preaching.

With Dr. Roger Morgan we are in the thick of the practical politics which Signor Spinelli sidesteps. His subject can be summarily described as the recovery of Europe from the devastation of the Second World War. Like Signor Spinelli he recognises, and applauds, the fact of a genuine catharsis (Signor Spinelli's word) in the continental countries which suffered invasion and occupation. Britain was the odd man out. In six states of Western Europe, by the grace of America, the supranational concept won through. Industrialists, bankers and others responsible for economic policy were very soon convinced that the nation-state could no longer provide an adequate framework for postwar reconstruction. And hopes rode high among the political leaders, too: significantly, the new constitutions—French, Italian and West German—'each made specific provision for sovereign powers to be transferred to a future United States of

[1] *The Eurocrats* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1966; London: Oxford University Press. 1967). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1968, p. 330.

Europe'. It was too much to expect, however, that national interests and motives would just fold up and fade away; the evolution sketched here by Dr. Morgan is thus interaction all the time at two levels, the European and the 'lower' level. The author succinctly describes and explains the vicissitudes of the cold war, the setbacks of the new Europeans, the disputes between federalists and functionalists—as well as developments in national policies. In the end he is constrained to admit that, for all the progress made in sector integration, Willy Brandt's description some years ago of the Federal Republic as an economic giant but a political dwarf applies no less to the European Community.

W. HORSFALL CARTER

The New Politics of European Integration. Ed. by Ghita Ionescu. *London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1972. 278 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in Comparative Politics) £3·95.*

THIS book, in the series of Studies in Comparative Politics published in association with *Government and Opposition*, contains material taken from the July 1967 and October 1971 issues of that quarterly. Some of the contributions are, therefore, a little dated, while others seem to be out of place. Of the fourteen contributions, five are historical. Altiero Spinelli reminds us of the important wartime contribution of the federalist Resistance leaders and points out that 'without their faith in a European federal democracy, the slow, difficult and tortuous process of unification would probably have petered out' (p. 9). This conclusion is bitterly reinforced by the personal recollections of Denis de Rougemont. Richard Mayne's coy account of the role of Jean Monnet obscures more than it reveals and reads like a trailer for a future official biography. Stephen Holt's contribution usefully debunks one of the Churchill myths, but attempts to cover too much ground. Michael Wheaton's contribution duplicates passages earlier in the book and is little more than cursory journalism.

Of the remaining contributions only seven justify the rather pretentious title of the book. Emile Noel and Henri Etienne point out that 'new elements (in the Community) should be sought not in the texts, but in the role and daily functioning of the institutions' (p. 105). H. Vredeling's contribution is a *cri du coeur* from a long-suffering and disenchanted Dutch member of the European Parliament who believes that 'the direct election of national delegations to the European Parliament in countries which are willing to adopt this course seems to be the only way left of making a start on the much needed democratisation of the European Community' (p. 133). This leads on to Michael Steed's thoughtful contribution, in which he foresees that the success or failure of direct elections will depend very much upon there being a common date, a common electoral system and adequate broadcasting arrangements. Jacques-René Rabier's incomplete but interesting inquiry in the field of public opinion needs to be taken further. Stanley Henig offers an instructive and now topical case study of the Mediterranean policy of the European Community. Helen Wallace directs our attention to some of the important implications for national administrations which result from the new Community dimension. She shows how the elitist character of those most concerned with Community affairs, coupled with the technical

nature of the matters involved, has effectively minimised public participation and, hence, public enthusiasm for the further development of the Community. Terkel Nielsen's case study of COPA (*Comité des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles*) is informative, particularly in the passages dealing with the practical working of the CAP. Michael Wheaton's bibliography is idiosyncratic and often inaccurate—as in the misspelling of H. T. Heiser and R. J. Lieber on page 243 and P. Gallois on page 245. Finally, any list of Command Papers should include No. 4715 produced by the present government in July 1971, and it should be made clear at the beginning of the appendix that it is the so-called Vedel Report of March 1972 from which the extracts are drawn.

NIGEL FORMAN

Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. By Gordon Smith. *London: Heinemann. 1972. 403 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·00; paperback: £1·80.*

THERE are two sorts of comparative politics textbook. The first is the country-by-country book: a host of familiar, mainly American, names spring to mind, though for EEC-Europe we have Stephen Holt's *Six European States.*[1] I do not wish to discuss the merits of this approach here beyond saying that I believe that some understanding of countries-as-such is an important prerequisite to any comparative study. Often, however, such books depend for their own comparative effect on a formal patterning which rests uneasily on the material itself; except in introductory and concluding chapters, moreover, such volumes allow little scope for comparative generalisation. The second approach focuses on themes rather than countries and necessarily disintegrates the countries themselves; indeed, how else could one cover the 140-odd polities that qualify as states today?

This approach to textbook writing, however, depends entirely on the author's framework: unlike the country-by-country arrangement such a book can have no other structure than the author's theories about the political system. At best, like Blondel's *An Introduction to Comparative Government,*[2] it is idiosyncratic and fruitful of generalisations, at worst, simply idiosyncratic. If the author's purpose is to offer advanced students an interpretation of politics to be read beside others, this is excellent. The problem arises when such a book is sold as a texbook in a field where there is little consensus among teachers and each feels honour-bound to develop his own lecture syllabus.

This is a roundabout way of introducing a new textbook on comparative politics in Western Europe by Gordon Smith. It reflects, in the first place, no doubt, the growth of European studies at B.A. level—often in academically more flexible or market-orientated polytechnics—and at the taught B. Phil/M.A. level in universities. Such studies are often widely based and politics is studied as one of several background subjects. Recent years have seen a host of background-to-French-and-German-studies books covering, for example, history, literature, society and politics—often for students with a major interest in language. The Common Market, even

[1] London: Hamish Hamilton. 1970. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1971, p. 817.
[2] London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1969.

before Britain's entry, stimulated European studies for intending businessmen, interpreters and even Eurocrats. Mr. Smith's book will serve their needs admirably, for it combines background information with a theoretical approach to politics—an academically important intellectual exercise.

But Mr. Smith's book also—and this for the straight political science student—meets some of the criticisms that are easily made of other 'genuinely comparative' texbooks. It avoids the country-by-country approach. At the same time, by concentrating on the countries of non-communist Europe, it covers a manageable number of polities (even allowing for the inclusion of Malta) and thus does not swallow their identity. These countries, moreover, have a good deal in common and this makes comparison more meaningful in detail than the comparison of wholly disparate systems from all corners of the globe (this remains true despite the inclusion of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which get a chapter on 'non-democratic variants'). The most important fact, however, is that the author avoids the danger of losing his audience by too personal a structure. The framework of *Politics in Western Europe* is almost old-fashioned, limiting itself to a number of standard themes in a generally acceptable order, and is all the better for that. The author starts with the social bases of politics (the bases of division: linguistic, religious, socio-economic) and has an excellent section on party systems. He goes on to the 'constitutional balance', assembly-government relationships, the executive and 'the central-local axis'. A section on political integration is included rather unnecessarily at the end, though it probably relates to European studies courses, if not the more orthodox politics syllabus. An appendix offers brief 'political profiles' of all the countries concerned.

In his introduction Mr. Smith says:

> I have had two aims in mind. The first is to give a rounded account of European politics; frequently one finds the political affairs of the smaller countries neglected in contrast with the generous coverage extended to, say, Britain and France. To remedy this I have taken a wide variety of examples in the hope that the reader will gain an insight into the politics of several states. The second aim is to provide a link between the study of individual countries and the requirements of a more general comparative perspective; in this I have sought to show the similar patterns and trends, without at the same time glossing over the real differences in national traditions and political institutions. . . . Throughout the book the emphasis is on making an across-the-board comparison, and in doing this it would not be feasible to give a detailed account for the political structures of the individual states. However, within each of the major themes I have tried to strike a balance between general interpretation and the provision of sufficient background information.

This is worth quoting at length because, within the limit of the themes he has set himself (probably enough for a lecture course), Mr. Smith fulfils his intention—and that is more than can be said of many an introductory promise.

To my knowledge, *Politics in Western Europe* is the only book to cover this field in this way, excellent by any standards. It will also serve as a textbook for general Introduction to Politics courses where a European focus may offer more meaningful points of reference than the dispersal of effort involved in studying a range of dissimilar polities, exotic to the student if not exotic in themselves. In the standard phrase—and what more can one say?—I am glad to recommend it.

F. F. RIDLEY

Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy. Ed. by Michael Leifer. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1972. 210 pp. Index. (Acton Society Studies 2.) £5·00; paperback: £2·90.*

THE aim of this collection of essays, commissioned by the Acton Society, is declared in its introduction to be to 'look at problem areas in British foreign policy and seek, in particular, to point to factors of constraint which have served and persist still to constrict its practice': factors arising from both external circumstances and 'the force of domestic demands' (p. 13). There follow eleven contributions from British academics. Geoffrey Goodwin provides a clear and straightforward description of the painful evolution of British policy towards Europe since 1945, noting both the gradual loss of faith in the American relationship and in the value of the Commonwealth, and the changing context of domestic pressures under which the government operated. David Coombes and Avi Schlaim discuss the European Communities, giving rather more weight to the Communities themselves than to their effect on British interests; Stephen Kirby contributes a similar article on Nato. Three essays by Michael Leifer, Coral Bell and Peter Lyon discuss, respectively, the long retreat from East of Suez, the evolution of the special relationship, and the slow disillusionment with the Commonwealth. Two contributions on economic constraints, by John Williamson and Louis Turner, are unfortunately too brief to give more than an outline of their influence on policy. There is one excellent case study, an examination by John Day of the 'failure of foreign policy' over Rhodesia.

The high quality of many of these contributions makes it the more regrettable that the volume as a whole is so loosely integrated. The one conceptual essay, by Alan James, on 'The Contemporary Relevance of National Sovereignty', asserts 'that sovereignty is an absolute and not a relative concept' (p. 18); yet the majority of the other contributors refer explicitly to sovereignty in relative terms. In the absence of any editorial definition or typology of constraints, the different authors treat the question of constraining influences diversely. Peter Lyon sees both 'Whitehall orthodoxy' and 'prevailing fashions in ideas' as significant constraints, an approach shared less explicitly by Michael Leifer and Coral Bell; but most of the remaining essays are focused upon the pressures exerted by limited capabilities, existing commitments, and the external environment. Few deal in any detail with domestic restrictions on the foreign policy-maker's freedom of action, beyond the limitation imposed by the electorate's unwillingness to bear too heavy a burden of cost. There is no conclusion to draw the contributions together, beyond a general *tour d'horizon* by F. S. Northedge.

This book will nevertheless serve as useful supplementary reading for academic courses concerned with British foreign policy, pitched as it is at an introductory level. Some of its contributions will interest and stimulate the general reader. But both the student and the general reader must infer from the various essays the relative weight of the various factors touched upon in influencing or determining the course of British foreign policy.

WILLIAM J. L. WALLACE

Spatial Planning in the Small Economy: A Case Study of Ireland. By Helen B. O'Neill. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1971. 221 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £6·25.*

THE object of this interesting and in parts controversial study is to highlight the importance of the spatial element in the growth process, especially as it affects the development of small, open economies. A 'stages' model of sectoral and spatial growth is formulated and used as a framework in which to examine the development over the last forty years of Eire and Northern Ireland. A wide range of data is employed to demonstrate the two major problems facing the Irish: namely, the external polarisation of foreign trade and investment towards Britain and the internal spatial polarisation resulting from the continued growth and dominance of Dublin and Belfast.

The book argues that the industrial and urban concentration around these two cities is evidence of the power and success of polarised development, and as such, should be encouraged and replicated rather than reversed or restricted. Although both Eire and Northern Ireland have recently introduced development programmes that rely heavily on growth centres, these are criticised and rejected both because of their mutual exclusiveness and because of the ridiculously large number of settlements that each has designated for expansion. Instead, the author advocates a policy which logically treats the whole island as a single planning unit and suggests a strategy based on the encouragement of five growth centres at Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Londonderry and Galway which will, it is hoped, help solve the '. . . principal spatial problems while, at the same time, proving consistent with the primary objectives of economic policy in both parts of the island' (p. 157).

The relevance of this book has been heightened by the accession of Eire and the United Kingdom to the EEC. It deserves to be read by those likely to be involved in preparing the regional development strategy in the enlarged Community. The importance of co-ordinating regional policies both spatially and sectorally, and of relating them to the broader development efforts of other nations is well illustrated in this examination of the Irish experience; and the lessons should be heeded by a Community where so far regional policies have remained persistently nationalistic. The conclusions reached in the study also have some contribution to make to the current debate on Irish reunification, in that it shows that the continued duplication of development programmes by both governments is both expensive and wasteful of real resources and an encouragement to continued divisive thinking. While the adoption of the strategy outlined is largely dependent upon a prior measure of reunification, there can be no doubt that the end result would be a much faster rate of economic growth for the whole island, which would in turn make true reunification that much easier.

Although the study represents an interesting and provocative first step into a hitherto unexplored area, the overall impression is disappointing. Specifically, there are a number of criticisms that can be levelled at the book and its arguments. First, little reference is made to the large and specialised literature on both the theory and practice of growth centres which has appeared over the last decade. Consequently, neither the full implications of adopting concentrated investment strategies, nor the lessons of experience are fully explored. Thus, for example, industrial complexes

are accepted as a tried and tested method of fostering rapid industrial development: yet there is much evidence showing that deliberately planned complexes rarely achieve their aims, while natural ones, epitomised by the linkages found in large cities, have exceptionally long gestation periods. Secondly, while the final chapter admirably sets out the spatial policy necessary to achieve the specified objectives, relatively little is said about the associated economic strategy. It is not clear whether it is to be based on the continued inflow of foreign capital (p. 158), which has its own problems, or on the utilisation of local resources and skills (p. 159), or some combination of the two. Thirdly, no indication is given as to whether the attractiveness of growth centres to new or migrant industry can be maintained purely by heavy public sector investment in social overhead capital, without some measure of differential grants and/or tax concessions, both of which are deliberately excluded (p. 161). Infant industry arguments, which are part of accepted growth centre theory, suggest otherwise. Fourthly, the large effort put into the examination of individual manufacturing firms in chapter four, and the results stemming from this, upon which much of the industrial policy is based, is largely wasted: no indication is given, for example, of the sizes of the firms involved, and thus the concepts of clustering, or net new firm creation mean little. Simple tabulations of the numbers of firms tell us very little indeed about the processes of urban growth. Further, no definition is given of 'exporting firms'. The use made of statistical material throughout the book leaves much to be desired, and in many cases the evidence offered does not adequately support the conclusions drawn from it; for instance, the tables on page 18 simply do not show what the author states. Finally, although there is a good bibliography, I find it inconceivable that any serious academic publication costing £6·25 can be issued without an index. Praegers seem to make a habit of this type of skimping in this series: perhaps somebody should tell them what indexes are for.

JOHN R. FIRN

French Nuclear Diplomacy. By Wilfrid L. Kohl. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1971. 412 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

IF an understanding of the past can lead to a better organised future, then this volume may be Wilfrid Kohl's contribution to the problem of finding a common framework for the future of the three Western nuclear forces. *French Nuclear Diplomacy* is a sound, well written, well documented, book, which adds appreciably to the literature that is now becoming available on small 'independent' nuclear forces, their creation, and their impact upon the foreign policy of the states possessing them. Regrettably, however, in this study no effort has been made to examine separately the phenomenon of independent nuclear forces.

The volume is in three sections. The first deals, chronologically, with the development of the nuclear programme under the Fourth and Fifth Republics—the important role of the technocrats and the military in the pre-Gaullist era is given full credit—to the point of French entry to the 'nuclear club'. This is followed by a section devoted to the rationale for the force, and the evolution of French strategic doctrine. The final section reverts to chronological form in an examination of the impact of French nuclear policy upon France's allies, in particular Nato and the

United States, Germany, and Britain. The separate treatment of these three relationships leads to a degree of repetition that is the more irritating in view of the fact that the major elements of these relationships are already familiar from the first section.

Much of the drive for the French force—certainly its projected size and its exacting development schedule—stemmed from the person of de Gaulle and his unique conception of foreign policy. Thus Kohl, in the belief that '. . . the nuclear striking force was not an ordinary weapons system. It went far beyond defense' (p. 8), rightly devotes much space to Gaullist foreign policy and especially to the European-Atlantic element within it. What emerges is 'sympathetic' to France and exudes a certain admiration of de Gaulle. One wonders whether this sympathy is justified in view of the general's grossly overambitious aims, which were pursued to the considerable detriment of the quality of the other arms of the French forces (see p. 199) and of other elements within French society. Certainly de Gaulle was sometimes ineptly handled by the Anglo-Saxons, but he himself was not always consistent and there were fundamental contradictions in the aims of his foreign policy.

With the failure of these aims, as a consequence of the 1968 troubles in France and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, a new role for France and its nuclear force has yet to emerge fully. The changing European and North American situations raise the question whether France can, will, or should continue to support an independent nuclear programme. Indeed, in the light of the post-1968 need for economies in all arms of the French services, the question arises whether budgetary constraints will allow even for co-operative nuclear programmes, given the need for the ever increasing sophistication—and cost—of nuclear weapon systems.

ROGER CAREY

The French Economy 1913–39: The History of a Decline. By Tom Kemp. *London: Longman. 1972. 183 pp. Index. £2·50.*

HISTORICAL works in English on European economies are so few and unsatisfactory that all Mr. Kemp's recent publications are very useful books. This latest one, much slighter than its precursors, is an interpretative essay on the French economy in the interwar years, which concentrates heavily on the author's main interest, the political economy of France. There is very little economic information and nothing new. For that we still have to turn to the equally opinionated but more substantial work of Sauvy.[1] It is to be hoped very much that works of this kind, which are essentially works of political argument, will eventually stimulate some genuine economic historical research into the French economy in this period. While any ultimate explanation of its behaviour must be a politico-economical explanation, political economy without the economics breeds bad history, and what is really lacking at the moment is a good account of the economic forces which operated on the French domestic scene in those years.

[1] Alfred Sauvy, *Histoire Economique de la France entre les Deux Guerres.* Vols. I and II (Paris: Fayard. 1965 and 1967). Reviewed in *International Affairs,* April 1969, p. 337.

The villain of this book is 'the bourgeoisie', which is responsible for 'the decline' mentioned in the title. The low levels of production in the 1930s are explained as 'the crisis of bourgeois society'. Bourgeois fears and selfishness operated on monetary policy by promoting deflation, on investment by diverting it into non-productive sectors or outside the country and on entrepreneurship by rendering it timid and inadequate. The bourgeoisie is even blamed for creating a demographic pattern unfavourable to growth. If that were blameworthy the blame would certainly have to be more widely distributed by the 1930s. There are certainly much more discriminating economic reasons for what happened in the 1930s. The whole book is coloured by the author's main argument, so that the period 1913–29 is presented merely as the prelude to 'a decline'. But what was 'the bourgeoisie' up to in those years of economic success, not to mention the postwar period? The bias of the book means that the better chapters deal with the period of the popular front government. But even here the author strains to show that the Blum government had to incur higher economic costs as the only alternative to a revolution. Given the international situation in 1936, if there was any real revolutionary possibility in France the revolution would have come from the right not the left, as indeed it almost did four years later.

Unlike the author's earlier work this book is rather rambling and seems hurriedly constructed. It is like an abandoned attempt at baroque icing for a wedding cake. What everyone is actually waiting for is the cake. Maybe Mr. Kemp will bake it.

ALAN S. MILWARD

Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries. By Lawrence L. Whetten. *London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1971. 244 pp. Bibliog. Index. £1·75.*

Bonn's Eastern Policy 1964–1971: Evolution and Limitations. By Lazslo Görgey. Foreword by Richard L. Walker. *Hamden, Conn.: Archon for The Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina. 1972. 191 pp. Bibliog. Index. (International Relations Series No. 3.) $8.50.*

THE wish of a contemporary historian to be first in the field can do him a disservice. Both these books seem premature, in that they seek to analyse Bonn's Eastern policies before the full scope of these had been revealed. This is a serious drawback, since future analysts may well regard what Brandt achieved between 1969 and 1972 as no less important than what Adenauer achieved between 1949 and 1955. Professor Whetten appears to have completed his book some ten months earlier than Dr. Görgey, yet it is the latter's book that seems the more dated.

Both authors analyse the evolution of domestic politics in the Federal Republic, but while Professor Whetten concentrates on the SPD and CDU/CSU, Dr. Görgey devotes a whole chapter to the NPD, which by the autumn of 1969 had ceased to be a significant factor either on the domestic or international scene. Neither pays much attention to the leftward shift of the FDP. Both authors review developments in the Warsaw Pact, with Professor Whetten emphasising Romania's 'key role in reinterpreting the socialist definition of the German threat' (p. 35).

Dr. Görgey deals at greater length with the Prague Spring, but without always carrying conviction. His suggestion that in the summer of 1968 a grouping 'reminiscent of the Little Entente of the interwar period' was in the making is surely exaggerated (p. 137). General Prchlik's criticism of the Warsaw Pact is mentioned without the corrective that he was at once disowned by the Prague government. The supposed threat to Soviet security was the pretext for intervention, not the cause. Professor Whetten has a useful survey of changing, and often conflicting, attitudes within the Warsaw Pact towards a European security conference. This important factor in modifying the Soviet attitude towards negotiations with the Federal Republic is scarcely mentioned by Dr. Görgey.

Neither book takes in the signature of the four-power agreement on Berlin of September 1971; but Professor Whetten has a useful run-up to the negotiations and recognises that 'for Bonn, Berlin was the cardinal issue for normalization with the East' (p. 140). Dr. Görgey inexplicably fails to discuss the Berlin negotiations, although the first substantive four-power talks took place as early as March 1970. One can only conclude that, faced with even the speculation that these talks might prove fruitful, Dr. Görgey might have felt obliged to modify the negative and pessimistic tone of his final chapter. What other explanation can one find for his equally inexplicable omission of the Warsaw Treaty of November 1970, which Professor Whetten rightly describes as 'one of the most historic documents since World War II' (p. 159)? When Dr. Görgey went to press, he could not have known, of course, that Honecker would displace Ulbricht and that before the end of 1972 a treaty between East and West Germany would have been signed; but common prudence might have led him to hedge his bets. His book is replete with highly debatable judgments. What can be the basis for the bald statement that Ulbricht's 'interests have always been identical with those of Moscow' (p. 158)? In an apparent attempt to denigrate the SPD-FDP coalition, he quotes Brandt's verdict on the Moscow Treaty ('Nothing is lost with this treaty that was not gambled away long ago') and comments that 'neither the SPD nor the FDP can claim innocence in the so-called "gambling away" process' (p. 165). Does he not realise that Brandt was referring to Hitler's invasions of Poland and Russia, which took place at a time when neither the SPD nor the FDP was effectively in existence? Perhaps Dr. Görgey should read more German history before writing it.

Professor Whetten has some useful texts in his Appendices. One hopes that from the vantage point of the edifice of Ostpolitik, as it now stands, he will expand his valuable book and bring it up to date. It would then be an indispensable handbook for those participating in, or commentating on, the European security conference.

R. Cecil

Auf dem Weg nach Europa: Erinnerung und Ausblicke. By Alfred Müller-Armack. *Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich; Stuttgart: C. E. Poeschel. 1971. 268 pp. Index. DM 26.*

Alfred Müller-Armack's memoirs are not a day-by-day, blow-by-blow account of his political activities, such as Adenauer provided in his four volumes of *Erinnerungen*; by comparison, his book is a short, slight work. But his sidelights and comments on Bonn's economic policies and relations

with other West European countries during the decade 1953–63 are often interesting and sometimes illuminating.

A distinguished economist, he was brought into the Federal Economics Ministry at the end of 1952 by Dr. Erhard, with whom he remained closely associated; from 1958 to 1963 he was State Secretary dealing with European integration. He was therefore personally involved in the early years of the Coal and Steel Community's work, in the abortive negotiations for a European political union in 1953, the drawing up of the Rome Treaty of 1957, the abortive negotiations for a European Free Trade Area in 1957–8, and the hammering out of the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy in 1961.

Two things in particular emerge from his book. One is the irreconcilable clash between Adenauer, intent upon the tightest possible integration of Western Europe, and Erhard, with his economic liberalism and sceptical attitude towards the EEC. As a result, German negotiating teams were usually split between the 'institutionalists' of the Foreign Ministry and the 'functionalists' of the Economics Ministry, which naturally weakened German influence very seriously. The other is the special French method of negotiation, ante-dating de Gaulle's return to power, described by Müller-Armack as 'the French policy of "difficultés" and "conditions préalables"' and as 'the French strategy of always manoeuvring on the brink of a breakdown of negotiations' (p. 71).

Müller-Armack also reveals a certain gullibility in the Germans. He represented Bonn in the peculiarly difficult negotiations on EEC agricultural policy, concluded on January 14, 1962 after the Germans had made significant concessions on the assumption that in return France would accept Britain into the EEC. This assumption was of course proved false, in January 1963. Müller-Armack then told Erhard that he could not go on conducting negotiations in which he was compelled by his government to yield to France without bringing Germany's full influence to bear in favour of a 'great European solution'; the French, he thought, should be told frankly that they could not go on demanding one-sided concessions without delivering the counter-concessions promised (p. 241). He in fact left the Economics Ministry some months later.

ELISABETH BARKER

Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945. Serie B: 1925–1933. Vol. 5: 17th March–30th June 1927. *Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. 1972. 670 pp. Maps. Index. DM 47.00.*

AN uneventful period for Germany in international affairs, and a period of political calm at home, these months in 1927 during the Chancellorship of Marx, who led the first coalition majority in the Reichstag since 1925, were untypical of the Weimar period as a whole. Nevertheless, for those interested in the evolution of Stresemann's foreign policy, the diplomatic documents in this volume provide valuable evidence of his purposeful approach to affairs during such a slack period. In January the Allied military control of Germany had been ended and Stresemann had won a grudging acceptance of his Locarno policy from the German Nationalists. Yet the further prospect of a Rhineland evacuation and a return of the Saar to Germany, arising out of the Thoiry conversations with Briand the previous September, was proving increasingly elusive because of Briand's

evasive tactics. The improvement in the financial position of the French and their impending elections in 1928 made them unco-operative and forced Stresemann to look elsewhere for some improvement in the German position. Through the documents in this volume one can trace a shift of emphasis in German policy towards Eastern Europe, particularly to Poland, and to the problem of disarmament inequality, even though Germany had little interest in the 1927 Geneva naval conference.

Documents produced during uneventful periods have a particular interest for the historian and those contained in this volume are no exception. Statesmen, officials, and private citizens are much more likely to expound their views internationally during slack periods than at a time of crisis when they are too suspicious and busy. By using the superb index, footnotes, cross-references, and helpful appendices provided by the editors of this series, one can identify influential men behind the scenes such as Montagu Norman, Massigli, and Bassenheim, and trace the nature of their views. In this respect these volumes compare favourably even with the high standard achieved by the *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932–1945*.[1] This is the fifth volume in the German documents; although each volume covers only a few months, the editors deserve every encouragement to maintain their painstakingly high standards rather than giving priority to speed of publication.

NEVILLE WAITES

Helmuth von Moltke: A Leader Against Hitler. By Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 388 pp. Illus. Index. £5·95.*

IF the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) embodied the worst elements in German political life, the Kreisau Circle, which took its name from Moltke's East Elbian estate, represented most of the best elements still surviving by the time war broke out. It is one of the tragic features of postwar Germany that so few members of this loosely knit community of the spirit should have survived the NSDAP's vengeance in 1944–45. But an ample documentation outlived the human holocaust; the authors of this book have had access not only to the Circle's hopeful thoughts about the future shape of Germany, but also to Moltke's revealing and voluminous letters to his wife, who survived him. This material has been admirably employed to construct a biography in the best historical tradition: that is, one which not only brings to life the central figure, but throws abundant light upon the times in which he lived.

Both authors knew Moltke personally and, like all who did so, acquired a deep respect for his quality as a human being. This attitude in a biographer, however comprehensible, is not without its dangers; but Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby have preserved their critical sense and avoided the traps of hagiography. At the same time they present a reasoned defence of the members of the Circle against the two main charges against them, namely that they represented no more than the upper crust of prewar German society, and that their activities never rose above the level of ineffectual theorising. The answer to the first charge is, in brief, that 'only people who had some financial independence or could obtain some kind of official protection in the armed forces, civil

[1] Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.

service or Foreign Office' could by the middle of the war still constitute a potential opposition (p. 256). It is perhaps more difficult to refute the second charge that the plans and meetings of the Circle were meaningless at a time when only action could speak. No one was more aware than Moltke of the need to strengthen the wavering resolution of the generals, through whom alone his plans could acquire substance; but meantime it was also necessary to hold together a nucleus of like-minded men, whose common sense of purpose would be required, as he plausibly thought, if after the final collapse the mistakes of 1918–19 were to be avoided. As the authors put it, 'Men of spirit cannot be expected to observe evil without wanting to do something about it' (p. 306). A detailed account of Moltke's work in the *Abwehr* also enables the authors to demonstrate that, in addition to convening meetings, he took significant steps to alleviate the gross inhumanity of war as waged by Hitler.

Moltke was a hero of tragedy in the sense that his greatness of character impelled him to act in a situation in which he was liable to lose his life and could expect to achieve little or nothing. But such men must be measured not in terms of political achievement, but in terms of their spiritual stature. Moltke raised his own memorial. He has been fortunate in the two biographers who in this book have delineated and interpreted it.

R. CECIL

Politics in Austria. By Kurt Steiner. Foreword by Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman and Lucian W. Pye. *Boston: Little, Brown. 1972. 443 pp. Index. (The Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics).*

THIS is a comprehensive political, constitutional, and social handbook to contemporary Austria—the Second Republic—set against the historical background of the First Republic (1918–38) and the pre-1918 Habsburg Monarchy. It contains plenty of interesting and illuminating information on the extraordinarily complex, intricatedy balanced and closely woven web of Austrian public life, in particular the political parties and the various associated interest groups and the relationships between them. It explains Austrian practices such as the *Proporz* (the proportional representation of the parties in non-political as well as political bodies) and the *Junktim*, or trading of a concession in one field against a counter-concession in some other unrelated field. (The *Junktim* is of course not peculiarly Austrian and has been commonly practised in the EEC; but the Austrians have developed special skills in its use.)

The main drawback of the book for the ordinary reader is that it is one of a Comparative Politics Series and the organisation of its material suggests that it was written on the basis of an exhaustive academic questionnaire, requiring the use of the appropriate jargon in response. This means that the same set of facts has to be examined and re-examined several times in slightly different contexts, which becomes tiring to all but the indefatigable academic. It also leads to long-winded obscurity. Instead of writing that one of the big differences between the First and Second Republics was the change in the personal relations between rival party leaders, the author is obliged to write: 'one of the important factors in the development from the centrifugal democracy of Austria's First Republic to the consociational democracy of the Second Republic was a

change in the political culture of the top elite' (p. 172). Two hundred and fifty pages further on (p. 422) he expands the point: 'A number of factors support the coalescent behavior of the top elite. Important among these is the continuing influence of the paracoalition on socio-economic policy' (this presumably means the Parity Commission on Prices and Wages). Are American academics compelled to write for fellow academics only?

ELISABETH BARKER

Greece without Columns: The Making of the Modern Greeks. By David Holden. *London: Faber. 1972. 336 pp. Index. £3·00.*

Greece Under Military Rule. Ed. by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. *London: Secker and Warburg. 1972. 272 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·00.*

Memories of a Mountain War: Greece 1944–1949. By Kenneth Matthews. *London: Longman. 1972. 284 pp. Illus. Index. £3·50.*

DAVID HOLDEN is an experienced foreign correspondent and his book is a piece of high-class journalism. What makes it of particular interest however is that, in effect, it combines two undertakings of very different character—an essay seeking to debunk what the author calls 'the myth of Supergreek' and an analysis of modern Greek politics with particular reference to the post-1967 period. By 'the myth of Supergreek' Mr. Holden means the idealised Western interpretation of the cultural and political achievements of ancient Greece, the corresponding disregard of earthier influences in the formation of the Greek people, and the consequent artificial, unrealistic judgment of modern Greek politics. The warning is salutary, if not entirely novel; but it turns out that the Colonels themselves have fallen into the trap. For all that these provincial bumpkins have wrought, in Mr. Holden's words, 'a truly Boeotian vengeance upon Athenian cultural and political snobbism', their stress on 'Hellenic-Christian' values reveals the influence upon them of 'our old friend Supergreek' (pp. 261–262).

Mr. Holden's own analysis is to a considerable extent derivative. He himself confesses in his Acknowledgements (p. 331) that he has 'milked . . . shamelessly' six books which he considers the best contemporary works in English about Greece. Nevertheless, he has used his own professional eyes in the country and his reasoning, especially in chapter 15 ('Colonels and Critics'), on the controversial issues of the extent of the use of torture and of American involvement, is honest and dispassionate.

It would be unreasonable to expect the eleven contributors to *Greece under Military Rule*, of whom seven appear to be Greeks or of Greek origin and all of whom are closely acquainted with Greece, to be dispassionate. Nevertheless, the book, publication of which was timed to coincide with the end of the Greek military regime's fifth year in power, amply justifies the editors' claim that it is a straight descriptive study of the regime's record in a wide variety of fields. Certainly, 'a broad consensus emerges that the military dictatorship was neither deserved nor desired by the Greeks' (p. viii), but the kind of mechanical dogmatic criticism resented by Mr. Holden will not be found in this volume. The editors wisely decided to leave aside the emotive issue of torture; while Mr. Maurice Goldbloom, in his essay 'United States Policy in Post-War

Greece', rejects, no less than Mr. Holden, the belief that the United States engineered the 1967 coup (p. 240). On the other hand, the view underlying Mr. Holden's argument—and often advanced by commentators —that inherent weaknesses in the Greek political system made some such outcome inevitable is firmly and convincingly rebutted by Mr. C. M. Woodhouse in his admirably succinct opening essay on the historical context of the coup. In his view, the Papandreous, father and son, and certain other politicians on one side, and the King and his advisers on the other side, share responsibility for the 1967 crisis, but 'objectively, the Greek political system was not at fault' (p. 15).

One of the book's merits is to draw attention to some of the less well-known facts about the Colonels' regime; for example, both Mr. Woodhouse and Mr. Clogg (in his essay on the ideology of the 'Revolution') point out that a number of the regime's most dedicated supporters are ex-communists, while Rodis Roufos (one of the contributors writing from within Greece) describes the triumphant putting to the test by a group of liberal writers of the new (1969) Press Law (which abolished literary 'pre-censorship'). It is hard to characterise such a singular regime: Mr. Clogg does his best in one of the most effective contributions, explaining convincingly why the label 'fascist' will not do, but the formula of 'pseudo-fascist paternalist dictatorship' for which he opts (p. 53) is less helpful than his specific historical parallels—the Metaxas regime and Kemalism.

Kenneth Matthews has produced a delightful evocation of both grim and gay aspects of life in Greece during the Civil War, which he covered for the BBC. Despite the passage of more than twenty years since the events described, his recollections—of communist chieftains, of upper-class Athenian girl fellow-travellers, of his own kidnapping in Mycenae— are vividly presented; more seriously, the justification for their publication lies in his own comment: 'For me, ironically, what remains memorable today consists very largely of what I left out of my despatches' (p. 31). One of the many memorable anecdotes concerns the definition of liberty offered by a small girl at a hostel in Bulgaria for Greek children deported by the communists which Mr. Matthews and an American journalist succeeded in visiting: 'It means to go back home and eat cherries!' (p. 182).

This is a perceptive and deeply humane book, marred only slightly by the farcical effect of the author's over-literal reproduction of Greek idiom in reconstructed dialogue (for example, on pp. 49, 173, 255).

MARCUS WHEELER

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies: Applications of Behaviorally Oriented Political Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Ed. by Roger E. Kanet. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1971. 376 pp. Index. £5·00. $9.95.*

IN so far as there is a behaviouralist school in political science, membership of it can more easily be defined in subjective terms, of people feeling that they belong to it, than by objective criteria. Nevertheless, it is

possible to view behaviouralism as a reaction against a number of perceived weaknesses in the academic study of politics: first, against the concentration of study upon political institutions instead of on the way people actually behave; secondly, against the lack of precision in the language and concepts of political science; thirdly, against the failure to make use either of quantitative methods or of mathematical models as other sciences do; and, fourthly, against the accumulation of a great deal of unrelated knowledge without any attempt at systematising it by the construction of theory.

As long ago as 1961 Robert Dahl argued that what he called the 'behavioral mood' was becoming 'incorporated into the main body of the discipline' and that it could be expected to disappear not because it had failed, but because it had succeeded. Since its impact had been so widely felt, the battle between 'the behaviouralists' and 'the traditionalists' was becoming a somewhat artificial one. So far as the study of communist politics is concerned, however, it could very reasonably be argued at the beginning of the 1960s that this was a field which the 'behavioral mood' had scarcely affected and that communist studies were in danger of becoming increasingly cut off from intellectual developments within the discipline of political science. For better or worse this situation has now changed and, as the editor of the work under review, Professor Kanet, notes: 'In the past few years, increasing numbers of scholars—primarily younger men who have been trained both as area specialists and as political scientists—have begun to apply to the study of Communist systems some of the approaches and hypotheses that have been generated in systematic political science' (p. 7).

The work which has been produced in the process, including those samples of it which Kanet has included in his compilation, is, not surprisingly, of uneven quality and interest. At its best, it advances scholarship in the field of communist studies by corroborating, with the aid of new techniques, the findings of 'traditionalist' scholars, by analysing different types of data from those utilised in the past, and by occasionally, and best of all, producing a really fresh interpretation of communist politics, At its worst, it employs a fanfare of trumpets to herald the appearance of a mouse of an argument, unnecessarily denigrates previous (and, in some cases, more solid) work, and becomes more obsessed with methodology and the nuts and bolts of technique than with genuine illumination of the way in which various communist political systems work.

Among the approaches and techniques to be employed by the various authors in Kanet's book are elite analysis, content analysis, the study of career patterns through the collection of aggregative data, the policy process orientation, organisation theory, role theory, a 'developmental perspective', and 'correlation analysis'. A number of the contributions have previously been published as journal articles and two of the more useful essays (Paul Shoup's survey of the field, 'Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach', and Schwartz and Keech's case study, 'Public Influence and Educational Policy in the Soviet Union') were in addition published a mere two years previously in a collective work edited by Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences*,[1] which is concerned with much the same issues and aimed at the same readership as Kanet's book. Such duplication wastes both space

[1] Chicago: Rand McNally. 1969.

and the reader's money, for anyone buying one of these books might well wish to buy the other. It may, though, be indicative of the fact that there are not as yet enough 'behaviorally oriented' essays on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of the *requisite quality* to fill more than a very few books in this field.

Techniques such as content analysis can only be applied to the Soviet Press with very great caution. Given the degree of censorship and control from above which exists, it is a much more risky enterprise to attempt to measure by these means the attitudes to participation of various Soviet 'elites' (party, economic, legal, military and literary), as Milton Lodge does (pp. 79–101), than to study 'Soviet Elite Perception of International Regions', the theme of Charles Gati's essay (pp. 281–299). Gati bases his analysis of space devoted to particular international regions in the pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* in the years 1954–58 and 1964–68 on the not unreasonable assumption that the coverage of particular regions and events by these newspapers reflects the importance attached to them by the Soviet political leadership at that time. The results may be unsurprising, but they usefully complement more 'traditional' approaches to the study of Soviet foreign policy. One of the best essays in the book is that by Erik P. Hoffman on role conflict and role ambiguity within the Soviet bureaucracy (pp. 233–258), for Hoffman combines the use of a Western social scientific concept with an understanding of the realities of Soviet political life. Without some 'feel' for the political situation, the most apparently rigorous analysis can remain arid and unilluminating. An example in this book is the essay by Don Karl Rowney on 'The Study of the Imperial Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Light of Organization Theory' (pp. 209–231). Here we find a maximum of technical jargon combined with a minimum of elucidation of concrete reality.

On the whole, the book can be welcomed, for it brings together a number of useful articles and generally avoids the worst excesses of self-conscious 'behaviouralist' analysis. It contains, however, fewer really stimulating pieces of work than its predecessor edited by Frederic J. Fleron, mentioned earlier, and anyone looking for a single book with the purpose of acquainting himself with contemporary trends in the study of communist politics would probably find Fleron the better buy.

A. H. Brown

Political Opposition in One-Party States. Ed. by Leonard Schapiro. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 289 pp. Index. (Studies in Comparative Politics). £4·95.*

This book is a compilation of articles and review articles concerned with the Soviet Union and the other communist countries of Europe which have appeared in *Government and Opposition* since the journal's inception in 1965. The only articles excluded are those on purely historical themes and those which have been published, or are due to be published, in book form. Automatic rather than selective inclusion perhaps forms a risky basis for compiling an anthology; moreover, since the arrangement of the articles follows chronological order by date of publication, something of a jumble of themes and places inevitably results.

This, be it said, is no fault of the editor, who sets out in a substantial introduction to posit, as an element of continuity, the theme of opposition,

but it should be borne in mind by a reader who looks to this book foı systematic treatment of opposition in communist countries that no su exhausive treatment is intended, and that, on the other hand, some of ı material of the book is concerned only in the broadest sense with oppositic Thus, for example, if the influence of groups on communist politics is be gathered into the category of opposition, the reader must look el where for the larger part of the discussion on this topic.

It seems wise to this reviewer not to attempt to assess each individı article included, but to indicate which of them, in his view, are ı valuable ones, and then to say something about a major conceptual po which arises from the work as a whole: what counts as opposition?

Three articles on totalitarianism (Seton-Watson; Friedrich; Schapiı are obvious candidates for material which will retain its value for soı years to come, although the views of both Friedrich and Schapiro do ı diverge from their views expressed in fuller works published elsewhe Among the other more durable articles must be included Brown's ess on political change in Czechoslovakia, which makes an all-too-rare atten to apply the concept of political culture to a communist country transition; David Holloway's excellent article on the changing relationsł between science and political power in the Soviet Union; and Baumaı contribution on 'second generation' Poland. The last is most valual for its treatment of 'illusory and actual conflicts' in which the time-wo dichotomy between party functionaries and managers is replaced by tł between 'specialists' and the 'non-specialists'.

As for the question of what counts as opposition, Professor Schapi suggests five categories: (1) outright rejection of communist ru (2) power struggles among leaders; (3) apolitical dissent; (4) interest gro activity; (5) pragmatic dissent. I would like to devote the little spa here available to question whether the fourth of these categories c fruitfully be treated as opposition, on the grounds that if one subtra from discernible group activity in the communist world the editor's thi and fifth categories, what is left is indeed a very interesting, and nov aspect of communist politics, but an aspect which is more contributo than oppositional.

In making this distinction I must make also a number of allowanc First, oppositions can, in opposing, contribute; such is the case of t British institutionalised opposition. But the 'opposition' which Profess Schapiro has in mind under category (4) is presumably more akin British pressure groups than to HM Opposition, and in *their* case it sure makes more sense to talk in terms of a contribution to policy-makir though they may, of course, oppose certain policies on certain occasioı Perhaps the major point is that, precisely, they oppose policies and n people. Secondly, it must be allowed that political norms in the coı munist world are unsettled. One does not have to be a dialectician to drawn into talking of novel political activities as opposition, since in obvious way they oppose the *status quo*. But again this might best seen as organic, contributive, activity.

To all this the anguished discussion over totalitarianism is relevaı especially that component of the concept concerned with (in Friedricł terms) 'monopoly control of the three major forms of interpersor confrontation in an industrial mass society' (p. 251). The fact of ce tralised control of more or less everything is obviously of prime significanc but what Friedrich never really analyses is the nature and spread of tł

control. Control by whom? Or is there an element, or more than an element, of systemic self-control? The answer to the first question is now not easy to sort out (and in sorting it out the article by Bauman mentioned above is a major contribution). As for systemic self-control, there is an illuminating footnote on page 174 in which Holloway quotes an ex-Soviet science journalist as saying that Soviet scientists 'regard the political and economic systems as working, in cybernetic terms, without feedback and with an enormously high level of noise'. The task, presumably (if systemic self-control is the aim), is to get opposition out of the noise category into the feedback category. And this, despite the quotation, seems to be what is happening, slowly and spasmodically, as the work by Skilling and Griffiths on Soviet interest groups,[1] foreshadowed in Skilling's article in this volume, shows. And since that process is what we should all be looking hardest at, we must be as precise as possible as to what *is* systemic, and what still counts as opposition.

MICHAEL WALLER

Profit, Risk and Incentives under Socialist Economic Planning. By J. Wilczynski. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 231 pp. Index. £5·50.*

THIS book deals with the status of profit and related categories, as established in socialist economies in recent years. As a matter of fact, the concept of profit has never been consistently disowned, either in the Soviet-designed prototype of economic mechanism or in its imitations in other socialist countries. But the strong emphasis on *physical*, rather than money-term, planning and control left little room for that concept; in any case the official doctrine on it has been very confused indeed. One of the main features of the reformist drive in some of the socialist countries has been a drastic cut in the number of traditionally developed performance indicators (as often as not conflicting with each other), and the promotion of profit to the rank of *the* principal indicator; at the same time its role as the computation basis for incentive rewards has been strengthened. Dr. Wilczynski usefully describes in considerable detail the position accorded to, and the operation of, tools based on these concepts, and related concepts (rate of interest, risk allowances), in the practice of the countries concerned. Many Western commentators —Dr. Wilczynski validly remarks—'guided more by wishful anticipation than by an accurate understanding of the issues involved, triumphantly acclaimed the socialist adoption of profit as a return to capitalism' (p. 222). What is happening in the view of most socialist thinkers (he goes on to say) is 'that Marx's ideas are being reinterpreted in the light of new developments and partly adapted to the exigencies of new situations which Marx had never anticipated (and partly ignored where expedient)' (also p. 222). One can see here yet another example of a pragmatic attitude towards Marx.

It stands to reason that the working of profit as *the* efficiency index rests on the efficiency prices in which it is calculated. The reforms have failed to provide the economies with this kind of price (this observation should be qualified, in different degrees, in the cases of Yugoslavia and

[1] H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press for the Center of Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto; London: Oxford University Press. 1971). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1971, p. 832.

Hungary). That is but one of the causes of a certain dose of disillusion with the post-reform profit regime that has been observed in the countries concerned since this book was written.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

The Market in a Socialist Economy. By Wlodzimierz Brus. *London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972. 199 pp. Index. £2·50. $8.25.*

Habent sua fata libelli. When this book was first published (in its Polish original) it was in the centre of a debate in the author's country as to the feasible and desirable lines of economic reforms. For reasons on which I shall not expand, it is no longer so. But Brus's work has retained its importance as a contribution to its theme; and it is all to the good that at last its translation into English could appear. Its substance is the workability of what is usually referred to as 'decentralisation' or, as one may also term it, devolution in economic decision-making in planning and running a socialist economy. (In the history of economic thought, the subject—one hardly needs to say—is usually identified with the famous contribution of Brus's compatriot Oskar Lange on 'Market Socialism'.)

Brus's central tenet is that socialism as such is compatible with a set of alternatives in operational 'models'. The choice of any of them should, in this view, depend on circumstances of time and place. Among the virtues of devolution—operating a competitive type of market—stress is put by the author on 'democratic centralism', a rather vague concept borrowed from the Soviet political-economic vocabulary and used and abused in literature throughout the socialist world. Here it is given some clarity. Brus, himself understands it as a dialectical category: one reflecting the immanent contradictions between the two 'objective' needs of a socialist economy, *viz*., the need for centralism in steering and for democracy in methods of controlling it. Another merit would pertain to reconciling the 'self-interest' of groups (for example, the staff of enterprises) and of individuals; in a word, to the potentialities in efficiency stimulation—the incentive effect.

Neither of these properties has for Brus an absolute significance. Indeed—on our reading—for him it is the conditions of a given environment which should determine the *degree* of centralism (decentralism). Thus, he explicitly postulates a greater dose of centralism for phases of social-economic structural change, generally for periods of strains and stresses—a point of clear common sense. A far more complex and still insufficiently explored area concerns the problems of the working machinery, of shaping the relations within the decentralised socialist economy along both diagonal and vertical lines; and the related matter of instruments in the operational mechanism, first and foremost prices corresponding to efficiency.

Since the work was written—at the beginning of the 1960s—its subject-matter and the related problems of feasibility and efficiency have become the domain of a vast literature, in West and East, of formalised mathematical analysis (which also tends to support a relativistic stand). We believe it is fortunate that at this stage the problems involved have been admirably presented in 'prose'—for the use of the non-mathematical student and in fact also of the general reader.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

Class and Society in Soviet Russia. By Mervyn Matthews. *London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 1972. 366 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

'ANYONE who sits down to write something in the nature of a "sociological" analysis of the Soviet Union must expect trouble', writes the author in his Preface (p. ix). He will not be surprised, therefore, at finding it: from sociologists for his bold conclusions on so narrow a factual basis, from Sovietologists for his versatility and lack of temporal profundity in such widely different 'preserves' as education, demography, ideology, the Party, agriculture and economic planning, and from Soviet social scientists (from whose investigations the author draws much of his material) for traducing their results. To students of Soviet society, however, this is a useful book, not least for its wealth of empirical information from Soviet sources previously available only in Russian, and for its challenging interpretations of it. The data mainly emanate from the annual statistical handbooks published since 1956, the All-Union Census of 1959, the burgeoning sociological surveys of the 1960s and Soviet periodicals. To these the author adds his own observations from three years' residence in Moscow.

As the title indicates, the main object of the book is to examine Soviet social structure. More specifically, the first half deals with stratification according to income, education and occupation, and the second half discusses three topics of special interest to the author: the first is an analysis of the Party in terms of political sociology; the second examines the relationship between various educational institutions and social groups from the viewpoint of social mobility; the third is concerned with the placement of young people in full-time employment and its social consequences. The misnomer 'Soviet Russia' in the title is, nevertheless, apposite since the book deals largely with that European enclave of the USSR.

It is logical that the book should open with a review of the outstanding demographic features of Soviet society; it seems illogical, however, that a book published in 1972 should eschew the All-Union Census of January 15, 1970, whose results are so fundamental to a work of this nature. To give one example, Matthews uses 1959 data to support his thesis that 'Soviet society is, despite all the political draperies, still basically European in nature and shares "western" values' (p. 23). Whether by 'western values' he means 'competitive capitalist', 'urban-industrial' or 'European' is unexplained. But he might have modified his conclusions on the rate of Europeanisation of the country and 'the quiet suppression of national languages (in non-Russian areas)' (p. 22) in the light of the 1970 census figures. These show, first, the very disparate growth-rates for Soviet Europeans (2 per cent. for Estonians, for example) and for Soviet Asians (53 per cent. for Uzbeks and Tadjiks) between 1959 and 1970; and, second, the very high percentage of non-Russian groups giving their native language as their mother tongue (over 98 per cent. of each of the five major Central Asian peoples and more than 95 per cent. of each of the three Baltic peoples). A similar question-mark must hang over the figures cited from S. P. Figurnov's book based on material assembled in 1960 and described by Matthews as 'the most revealing of our examples' (p. 87); the figures are used to illustrate poverty among the Soviet working class. But surely living standards have improved more rapidly in the last dozen years than in any other period of Soviet history?

As indicated by the author's previous magazine articles, one of his principal concerns is the life-styles and life-chances of the Soviet working class. In the present volume, approximately one-third of the text and over 50 of the 120 tables are devoted to the structure, 'dynamics' and 'social behaviour' of Soviet workers—their regional distribution, productive diversity, working conditions, sources and dimensions of income, standards of living and education, as well as their spending patterns, time-usage and attitudes towards work and society at large. Simply determining who falls into the category of working class—or any class—clearly poses a problem for a non-Marxist sociologist (like Matthews) who is applying Western sociological concepts to Soviet society, yet at the same time is utilising statistics compiled by social scientists using a Marxist framework. It also raises the question of the overall validity of Western urban sociology in the Soviet context—and this inevitably impinges upon the interpretation of the statistics.

This point is worth making because the author aspires 'to throw a sympathetic, and to our mind objective, light on the structure and development of a predominantly European society' (p. xviii). While appearing to give conscientious treatment to a number of serious problems, however, he starts from what many sociologists would regard as questionable premises. It is debatable, for instance, whether *income* acts as such a paramount yardstick for measuring positions in the stratification-hierarchy as it does in the West, because there is less coincidence of political, economic and social status in the Soviet Union—that is, there are more things money cannot buy. Yet Matthews introduces his chapter on 'Soviet Workers, Rich and Poor' with the assertion that 'It has long been a commonplace among Western sociologists to regard a person's income as an important—sometimes the most important—factor in determining his place in society. This is a sufficient reason for beginning our survey of the structure of the Soviet working class from that angle' (p. 72). Similarly, it would seem to him axiomatic that 'membership of the CPSU is obviously associated with a "better life"' (p. 225). When one recalls Khrushchev's disclosures that 70 per cent. of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress were subsequently purged, the risk of being 'posted' at any time to a 'bear's parlour', the long hours in meetings, the demanding emulatory work and the uncertain status in the eyes of one's fellow citizens, it may not be so 'obviously' all *frais de representation*.

In addition to these contentious starting points, the author tends to make such unsociological generalisations (on the evidence of 'public opinion') as 'the children who attend most of them [nurseries] are badly behaved' (p. 259). The trouble with 'public opinion' is that it depends which section of the public you speak to; certainly, this 'opinion' is at variance with the findings of the American social psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner—or even of myself, having had two children in a Moscow creche and kindergarten for three years. Factual errors include the assertions that White Russia was acquired by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (p. 14)—only Western Byelorussia was; that the Second World War is synonymous with the Great Patriotic War in Soviet conceptualising (p. 15) —only that part of the war involving direct Soviet participation, from June 1941–45, is regarded as the GPW; that S. P. Pavlov is First Secretary of the Komsomol (p. 298)—S. Arutunyan is the present incumbent, Pavlov having been transferred to the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport in 1968.

Technically, the book is excellent, a model that all Soviet authors especially should follow, with separate bibliographies of Soviet and Western publications and a six-page subject index. My one regret here is that the book does not contain a compendious concluding chapter that would draw the main threads together and help the reader to gain some perspective after 'digesting' so much material. Despite the deficiencies —perhaps inevitable in a book that tries to do so much—this is a valuable addition to the growing number of Western works on Soviet social processes and institutions.

JAMES RIORDAN

The Trial of the Four: The Case of Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova 1967–68. By Pavel Litvinov. Ed. by Peter Reddaway with a foreword by Leonard Schapiro. *London: Longman. 1972. 432 pp. Index. £6·25.*

PETER REDDAWAY'S herculean labours of the last few years in the field of Soviet studies came to abundant fruition in 1972, with the publication of two exhaustive books, *Uncensored Russia* [1] and *The Trial of the Four.* The first, an analysis of the unofficial Moscow human rights journal, *Chronicle of Current Events,* is in a sense a companion volume to this. *Uncensored Russia* analyses the integral progress of the emerging human rights movement in Russia; *The Trial of the Four* documents in meticulous detail one of the most important milestones passed in that progress. It appears in time to form a memorial to Yuri Galanskov who died in December 1972, aged thirty-three, having been denied the specialised medical attention which would have been necessary to ensure the survival of his frail constitution in prison camp conditions.

It seemed during Khrushchev's period of office (1956–64) that the Soviet Union was, however erratically, moving towards a concept of the rule of law. Stalin, and Lenin before him, had ruthlessly used law not to protect the individual, but as an instrument of Communist Party policy, denying the Soviet citizen even the most elementary protection of his rights. When Mr. Khrushchev exposed the evils of Stalinism at the 21st Party Congress, this seemed to open the way to a more just basis for society.

It was therefore all the more devastating when Brezhnev and Kosygin once again firmly began to relegate law to its old place of subservience. This can be dated from the trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966, and was continued with the trial in January 1968 which forms the subject of this volume. The heart of it is a translation of a reconstruction of the trial itself, at which Ginzburg, Galanskov, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova were given sentences of between one and seven years imprisonment for handing over documented information on the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel for publication abroad.

This book is essential reading for everyone who wishes to understand the place of law in Soviet society, but its human interest gives it a potential appeal to a much wider audience and it is therefore a pity that it is so highly priced. The reconstruction and basic collection of documents was done in the Soviet Union itself. Pavel Litvinov, grandson of a former

[1] London: Jonathan Cape. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs,* January 1973, p. 118.

foreign minister under Stalin, was the key figure in the enterprise (his determination to plead with the Soviet authorities to adopt a more just course internationally, as well as domestically, led him to demonstrate against the invasion of Czechoslovakia later in 1968, which resulted in his own trial and conviction).

The treatment by the Soviet authorities of their own citizens who show dissent demonstrates a surprising insecurity. The chain reaction of repression, protest, further repression of the protesters has continued since the events related in this book, varied recently by the new ploy of expelling a few of the chief activists from the Soviet Union altogether. This reinforces what the reader of this book will feel: there can be no lasting European security while internal injustices of the kind reported here are rife in the society of one of the major powers and these facts should be at the fingertips of all Western negotiators.

MICHAEL BOURDEAUX

Oil and the Romanian State. By Maurice Pearton. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. 361 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·00.*

Ceauşescu's Romania. A Political Documentary. By Julian Hale. *London, Toronto, Sydney: Harrap. 1971. 208 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £2·20.*

INTERNATIONAL historians have long been aware of the absolute dearth of serious work on the international politics of raw materials. Even oil, after uranium possibly the most strategically important of all raw materials, is only scantily served by such books as Benjamin Shwadran *Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers*,[1] a work whose archival basis is almost entirely American. The wealth of material in the British and German archives has hardly begun to be exploited as yet.

Similarly, the international political behaviour of the great international trading and extracting companies, which, as was pointed out by this reviewer in the 1950s,[2] behave in very many respects like states, is equally ill covered by historical work of any importance. For all these reasons, the appearance of Maurice Pearton's London Ph.D. thesis, a study of the relations between the state of Romania, the international oil companies and the foreign governments most interested, must be welcomed as the pioneer work in this field it is. Dr. Pearton did not have the benefit of much unpublished British governmental material. On the other hand he has used the German archival material and the published diplomatic documents of Britain, France, the United States, Italy and Germany to great effect. He is clearly very familiar with the Romanian material. He has also, according to the preface (p. ix), been able to call on the archival material of at least one major international oil company at any rate for the earlier part of his story, the whole of which extends from the genesis of the Romanian oil industry in the mid-19th century to its nationalisation in 1947.

Dr. Pearton's theme is original and complicated. Basically he traces the peculiar development of the industry to the interaction between the nationalism of the dominant political parties in Romania and their accompanying

[1] New York: Praeger. 1955. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1956, p. 386.
[2] *Documents on the Suez Crisis.* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1957, p. 376.

political necessities and the economic and technical necessities of the oil industry itself both in Romania and in the world outside. That interaction was itself shaped and influenced by the course of great power relations in two world wars. The first produced an interplay between the proposals for a national Romanian oil company or companies and the international oil companies. The other created the opportunities for oil nationalism to translate its ideas into action, and to discover how economic and technical realities obstinately thwarted the successful realisation of those ideas.

Dr. Pearton's thesis may be thought by some to throw a scholarly cloak over the industrialists' usual conservative plea for the exclusion of politics from business. This would be to mistake an erudite and accomplished contribution to a body of writing which is both scarce in itself and often badly in need of these qualities.

Mr. Hale's theme is the Romania of today, an easily written and easily readable political travelogue which genuflects perhaps a little too obviously before the sacred cows of the present regime, but otherwise discusses Romania's position today with a reasonable degree of intelligent realism.

D. C. WATT

The Economics of Workers' Management: A Yugoslav Case Study. By Jan Vanek. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 315 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·80.*

MR. VANEK'S enthusiasm for the cause of worker-management is well-known, and this book, while purporting to be a thorough study of the Yugoslav worker-managed enterprise and its implications for the economy, fails to avoid the 'pitfall of systematic eulogy' identified by the author on page xvii of the introduction. The first part, almost half the book, is devoted to general background, consisting mainly of grandiose claims for the transcendency of worker self-management. The second part, which is considerably more valuable, looks at various models of enterprise behaviour, and enterprise attitudes to capital and investment.

The book seeks to show that there can be no definitive model for worker-managers, and no absolute rationality. This it does best through a graphical representation of the various conflicting influences on the worker-managers, their final course of action depending on their particular preferences at any one time. These being unquantifiable, the model is illustrative only, and not predictive.

This is reasonable as far as it goes, but many questions are unasked, let alone answered. Do workers really manage, or has a managerial-technological elite taken over? What is the role of workers' self-management in the Yugoslavs' exceptionally high levels of inflation and unemployment? Any 'thorough study' of workers' management should at least consider these problems.

More clearly and concisely expressed, the ideas in this book would do much to advance the understanding of a complex subject; in the current work they are unfortunately somewhat obscured by what at times amount to pretentious claims on behalf of a system which has more faults than Mr. Vanek recognises.

JOHN C. WALLER

The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917. 2nd ed. Ed. by Lionel Kochan. Introduction by Leonard Schapiro. *London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Jewish Affairs. 1972. 377 pp. Index. £3·50.*

THE second revised edition of a book first published in 1970 and reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 429. The book has been updated to take account of the recent change in the attitude of Soviet Jews, and of the statistics of the 1970 census. An additional chapter, '"The Jewish Question" in the Open, 1968–71', has also been added.

MIDDLE EAST

Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Middle East. Ed. by Jacob M. Landau. *London: Pall Mall. 1972. 532 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

PROFESSOR LANDAU has assembled a collection of extracts on social and political change in the Middle East, both in the Arab countries and in Israel. The book is divided into two sections, 'State and Politics' and 'Views of Society and Man'. The authors are practising politicians, writers and scholarly critics of the scene. The articles chosen are mostly reprinted in full and therefore give a reasonable representation of the authors' points of view. The collection does not minimise the complexities of the situation, and in this lies its greatest value, although it makes it a difficult book to read and use. The editor states in his introduction that he has the 'intelligent, curious reader in mind', but this individual has not been given enough in the way of linking comment between the articles, nor has he been shown clearly why these articles have been chosen rather than any others. But as a reference collection of articles reassembled from a wide range of publications it can be recommended to teacher and student.

In the first section the Arab nationalists are represented by the intellectual Edward Atiyah, who explains his reasons for reacting against his British education; 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Bazzaz, who gives the credo of an early tragic nationalist; and Nasser, who describes the Egyptian revolution. There is nothing written by Arab nationalists later than the 1950s. Israeli political thought is represented by a speech of Abba Eban. The other articles in this section comment on the role of political parties generally in the Middle East and analyse the contributions of some individual groups to the politics of their countries. Professor Landau himself has contributed an interesting piece on the Al-Ard group, a minority Arab party in Israel. Naseer H. Aruri's article, 'Politics in Kuwait', makes some valuable points about a modern Middle Eastern country under the stress of rapid development, where the introduction of an elite from outside, albeit an Arab one, has caused dissensions.

The articles in the second section range unevenly from comments by professional sociologists and anthropologists to chattier pictures on women's role in society. The problems of town versus country, the position of the religious minorities, the role of Islam, the purpose of education are touched upon. The traditional world of the Bedouin is contrasted with work and commerce in Tripoli. Ze'er Goldberg writes on the 'Kibbutz Utopia Materialising'. Here again more comment by the editor on the choice of material and the necessary omissions would have been valuable. The reader is irritated into asking more questions than the book answers. The bibliography goes some way towards providing satisfaction, but perhaps in a book

of this sort a critical book list is required more closely related to the articles. In this way the inevitably partial choice of material could be balanced.

ANN WILLIAMS

The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role. By Rouhollah K. Ramazani. *Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia. 1972. 157 pp. Bibliog. Index. $7.50.*

MOST book-length studies of Iranian foreign policy have concentrated on Iran's relations with the Soviet Union and other great powers. Recent developments have however awakened Iranian interest in the Gulf: Britain's withdrawal from its Gulf bases in 1971 and the assumption, in Professor Ramazani's words, that 'neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is at present bent on acting as the British legatee in the Persian Gulf' (p. 102) leaves Iran as a major power in the region. This short but informative book thus appears at an appropriate moment.

The author begins by examining the historical background to Iranian policy in the Gulf from the days of the Sassanians to those of Reza Shah. He then turns to Iran's current political interests in the Gulf, describing the emergence of the present cold war between Tehran and Baghdad, the occasionally ludicrous episode of the Iranian claim to Bahrain and the settlement of this dispute in 1970. Iran's occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs and its results on Irano-Arab relations are also discussed. A chapter on Iranian economic interests in the Gulf region demonstrates the overwhelming importance of the southern Iranian ports and oilfields in the country's foreign trade. It is followed by a resumé of the Gulf security problems, including a tabulation of the relative military strengths of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and a final chapter on future possibilities. There are five documentary appendices on the Bahrain and Abu Musa disputes, together with a press interview with the Shah in which Iran's ruler makes the interesting admission that 'CENTO has never been really serious, you know' (p. 146).

Arab and pro-Arab readers may criticise Professor Ramazani for adopting a frankly Iranian viewpoint, for maintaining boldly that Iran 'compares favourably with Iraq and Saudi Arabia in almost every category of capability' (p. 96), and for assuming that a higher gross national product and a larger weapons stockpile automatically create preponderant political power. It may also be suggested that a head-on collision between Iran and the existing Arab states of the Gulf is rather less likely than Professor Ramazani seems to imply. The uncertain future of the Union of Arab Amirates and the current fighting in Oman do however pose the possibility that to preserve its security in the Gulf Iran may find itself sucked into inter-Arab disputes in the area. Professor Ramazani fails to discuss these possibilities in any detail but his book should nevertheless serve as a useful source of reference for observers of the Gulf scene.

WILLIAM HALE

Kuwait: Prospect and Reality. By H. V. F. Winstone and Zahra Freeth. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 232 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

THIS handsomely produced volume is claimed in the publisher's blurb to be 'the first comprehensive modern portrait of a country whose future, once

guaranteed by Britain, remains vital to the economic interests of both hemispheres '.

Kuwait did not exist before the 18th century but the authors have dug deep into the prehistory of the area and they begin their portrait with the discoveries of archaeologists who, in the 1950s, uncovered the traces on Failaka island in Kuwait Bay of a civilisation of the third millennium BC and also, after a time gap of 2,000 years, of a Hellenistic trading colony. A passing reference to the pre-Islamic civilisation of South Arabia leads them on to a brief account of the beginnings of Islam and of the unchanging pastoral life of the Arab tribes. Here Mrs. Freeth has been able to draw on her own childhood and on the writings of her parents. Her father, Colonel H. R. P. Dickson, was Political Agent in Kuwait between the wars and a life-long student of the desert Arab.

Even after its foundation early in the 18th century Kuwait's history remained remote and peripheral, at least until Shaikh Mubarak, who ruled from 1896 to 1917, began its association with an expanding British Empire as a guarantee against his principality being absorbed in practice, as well as in theory, into 'Turkish Arabia'. The real meat of the book is the detailed account of the complicated negotiations leading to the signature of the Kuwait Oil Company Concession in 1934. The book is notably weaker on political developments since then than on Kuwait's economic growth, and it seems to this reviewer to suffer from taking too much care not to offend either the Kuwaiti or the oil 'establishments'.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process. By Michael Brecher. *London, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 1972. 693 pp. Maps, Bibliog. Index. £7·00.*

MICHAEL BRECHER has undertaken a mammoth and most original task—to analyse, down to what seems to be very minor detail, the foreign policy 'system' of a single state. The state which he has chosen, Israel, is small in area and population but rich in foreign policy problems; to analyse its foreign policy 'system'—if, indeed, such a thing exists—is vastly complex. What the author has set out to do is to examine the whole field of the causes, considerations and aims of Israeli foreign policy, to show how far this is moulded by Israeli society and how far by the political and geographical circumstances of Israel's strangely isolated position, and to examine the elements, and actual individuals who make significant contributions. This book, in fact, is based on the belief that foreign policy is a neglected science, because it is never put under the microscope.

Only one thing is expected of the reader, that he is genuinely interested in Israel. If he is, the book makes fascinating reading, for it contains a vast accumulation of knowledge which is never dead or even dull. The author combines freshness of outlook with depth of knowledge and sureness of judgment. Especially good are his studies of the Israeli leaders who have made, and are mostly still making, a major contribution to the formulation and conduct of foreign affairs—Golda Meir, Dayan, Eban, Allon, Sapir, Peres and, in the past, Ben Gurion and Moshe Sharett. Behind these leaders, again, are a 'Foreign Service Technical Elite' and a 'Parallel Technical Elite'—quite small bodies of men who have formed a bridge between government and the completely new civil and diplomatic service

which has had to be built up since 1948. Brecher lists only about 150 members of these two 'elites', most of whom have been active almost since the state of Israel came into being.

On page 124 there is the best diagrammatic picture of the Israeli political parties, and their twenty-five years of activity within the state, which I have ever seen. There are excellent studies of strategic and tactical military planning, of the workings of the Israeli press, and of the make-up and aims of the political parties. It is the author's contention that matters of this kind should never be divorced from foreign policy, for they impinge directly upon it. No foreign policy is, or should be, made by technocrats in a vacuum. It is therefore all the more surprising that the author has next to nothing to say about the Palestinians in the occupied territories, or the Palestinian activists. The influence of both on the making of Israeli foreign policy is considerable. And it will grow.

There are one or two other small flaws or omissions. Is Shimon Peres really a 'technocrat'? To some he would appear to be far too much of an individualist and a thinker in his own right to rank as such. Should Libya be placed in the 'outer ring' of states involved in the Middle East, more remote from its storm-centre than Turkey, Ethiopia or even Cyprus? Should the West Bank and Gaza be so largely ignored? Their present administration, and their political future, are intimately bound up with the planning and implementation of Israeli foreign policy. It is almost certainly wrong to say that Soviet military equipment captured in 1956 'was enough to ensure a margin of military superiority for some years'. The Israeli armed forces were becoming largely dependent on French, and to a lesser degree, American weapons; Soviet and Czech arms were only of transitory value. Nor is it entirely correct that Herut joined forces with the General Zionists 'in Gahal' in 1965; the merger was with the Liberals, as such.

The principal conclusion drawn is that Nahum Goldmann was right when he said that Israel lacked an overall political plan. Foreign policy, run mainly by men brought up in the Anglo-Saxon world, has been mostly a matter of improvisation and expertise. In the author's view this has resulted in a lack of historical vision, a recurring 'Fortress Israel' mental block, in a degree of over-dependence on the United States, and in much impatience with the UN. The author does not doubt Israel's 'passionate desire for peace'; he is therefore all the more surprised that Jewish leaders, traditionally perfectionist, should not have come to grips with what he regards as the basic problem of finding a settled place and policy in and towards the Arab world.

TERENCE PRITTIE

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970's. By The Asian Development Bank. *London: Longman. 1971. 684 pp. £8·00.*

TECHNOLOGY, economic and social pressures, and political factors are inducing great changes within and between the countries of south-east Asia. But will the 1970s genuinely be a watershed in the development of south-east Asia? It was in order to tackle this many sided question that the fourth ministerial conference for economic development in south-east

Asia requested the Asian Development Bank in April 1969 to undertake a study of 'Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970's'. A small initiating-cum-advisory committee of twelve experts was convened to advise and appraise the ADB of likely 'major problem areas' (see, especially, pp. 678–684). Thereafter particular experts were canvassed and commissioned to write reports on some of the selected topics from the committee's agenda. This book contains these reports, and they are preceded by a synoptic overall survey written by Professor Hla Myint, the distinguished former Rector of Rangoon University, now of the London School of Economics. To know something about the genesis of these reports and the nature of the sponsorship is an aid to some understanding of their character.

The six specialised chapters are on: the green revolution; the manufacturing industry sector; foreign economic relations; the impact of foreign private investment; aspects of population growth and population policy; and the 'impact of the end of Vietnam hostilities and the reduction of British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore'. Each of these chapters is of some 60 to 100 pages in length, clearly set out and written, policy-oriented and most of them culminating in a summary with some practical recommendations. Despite its size the book has no index, but it is provided with a very full table of contents. Caution but a practical concern is the keynote of most of the chapters. Each of them will be of interest to experts, but each is written in a way which any moderately intelligent student of south-east Asian affairs will be able to comprehend. There are no abstruse arguments, elaborate mathematics or ingeniously protracted modelling. The main thrust of the book is not to recommend comprehensive planning or more regional organisations. Indeed, the prevailing tone is to warn against panaceas and quick remedies, or even any expectation that major economic advances can derive from greater doses of foreign aid or from substantial changes in trading regulations. The prospects for economic improvement depend mostly on decisions taken by the countries of south-east Asia themselves to exploit effectively two kinds of existing and fundamental resources: first, those raw materials indigenous to the region which are becoming relatively scarce in world markets but are extensive in quantity and variety (and for which future local and international demand is assured) and, secondly, agriculture which needs the full benefits of a genuine 'green revolution'.

Though it comes first in the book, Hla Myint's survey chapter was written afterwards in the light of the six more specialised reports, and the structure of his chapter reflects this division of responsibilities. The rest of this review refers to this hundred-page essay, and the relatively impecunious will be glad to know that it can now be bought separately in a paperback edition.[1]

The phrase 'green revolution' often conjures up the idea of a fundamental irreversible transformation, converting forever former importers of foodstuffs into self-sufficient suppliers of staple domestic food needs. But Professor Myint gives a warning that preoccupation with national production alone may only have the effect of leaving the country concerned with a highly protected agricultural sector, producing high-cost foodstuffs, burdening the economy rather than stimulating it and with consequences injurious to hitherto more productive and efficient neighbouring exporters. The

[1] *Southeast Asia's economy: development policies in the 1970s.* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972.

course advocated in this book is to recommend more efficient and cheaper food production rather than merely increasing output. It is cogently argued that this is the way in which the 'green revolution' can best assist economic development.

In many respects this book underlines the fact that there is a very strong world demand for south-east Asia's raw materials—and that this will probably increase during the next decade. Even granted the lowest estimates, exports generally should grow by over 7 per cent. in the 1970s and structural changes in the Japanese economy could raise this considerably. Given such opportunities, Myint criticises those countries which regard mineral resources as part of a national heritage which it is somehow preferable to under-utilise with one's own limited resources rather than to develop to the full with the assistance of foreigners. Myint argues that a country does itself more good by allowing foreign investors to enter a sector they are keen to develop (providing the terms on which they enter are clear and sensible) whenever international demand exists for such development.

Myint's general conclusion is that there is considerable scope for policies to reduce economic disparities, but 'apart from the desire of south-east Asian countries to maintain national autonomy, the case for the more ambitious plans for regional co-operation, such as the creation of common markets, a regional payments union and plan harmonization is not very strong even on ordinary economic grounds' (p. 105). This book is a lucid and well-argued, if somewhat patchy, analysis of why there was not one single south-east Asian economy in the 1960s, with some thought-provoking proposals as to what this region might become in the 1970s.

PETER LYON

India's Democracy. By A. H. Hanson and Janet Douglas. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1972. 236 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Modern Governments: Gen. Ed.: Max Beloff.) £2·95; paperback: £1·25.*

Role of the Opposition in the Indian Parliament. By H. S. Fartyal. *Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House. 1971. 260 pp. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 32.*

Socialism in India. Ed. by B. R. Nanda. *Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas. 1972. 299 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Issued under the auspices of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.) Rs. 35.*

THE successful working of parliamentary institutions in India—the largest democracy in the world—has been discussed and analysed by both foreign and Indian authors. But although many volumes have already been published on it, the late Professor Hanson and Dr. Douglas's *India's Democracy* is a very useful addition to the subject. The main aim of the book is defined as 'to describe a set of political institutions and to throw some light on the way in which they work'. The authors have succeeded admirably. The book begins with a resumé of the salient characteristics of Indian society, dealing with such topics as caste, the differences between the urban elite and the rural masses, the poverty of the people and so on. It provides readers with a good socio-economic background to the political institutions of the country. Then it gives a lucid account of the Indian constitution. Although there is no dearth of books on this subject, the authors have made their account of the constitution, elections, political parties and pressure groups very useful for the student and all those who are interested in understanding the Indian political system in an abridged

form. Equally good and interesting are the chapters on the working of India's parliamentary government and the relationship between the centre and the states. The authors have not confined themselves to a mere discussion of the parliamentary and federal systems in India but have brilliantly analysed the actual workings of the political system. There are also useful discussions on economic planning, administration and local government.

The concluding chapter raises some fundamental and thought-provoking issues concerning India's economic policies and problems and the growth of unemployment. It rightly points out that India's experiment in combining political democracy with economic development is of deep concern for the Third World as a whole, and particularly for the Asian part of it.

In contrast to Hanson and Douglas's *India's Democracy*, Fartyal's *Role of the Opposition in the Indian Parliament* can hardly be said to make any useful contribution to the understanding of Indian political institutions. The title raises expectations which the book itself does not fulfil. There are a number of chapters with important headings but the standard of discussion in them is poor. The last four chapters, on 'relations between the government and the opposition'; 'members and their behaviour'; 'pressure groups'; and 'quest of a national opposition' are better than the rest of the book, although these aspects of India's parliamentary institutions have been dealt with in other works in a far superior way. The book fails to make any new contribution to either the description or analysis of parliamentary institutions of India.

Socialism in India deals with a different subject in modern India. It is a collection of essays submitted at a seminar organised by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; the theme of the seminar was 'Socialism in India, 1919–39'. A number of Indian scholars traced the growth of socialist doctrines in India during the national Movement for Freedom under the guidance of Gandhi. Although socialism is the most widely and keenly debated issue in Indian politics today, for a number of reasons socialist ideas found little scope during the nationalist movement. One of the great limiting factors was the attitude of the leader of the Indian national movement, Gandhi, towards Russian communism and its violent methods. The work refers to Gandhi's observation that India 'did not want Bolshevism. The people are too peaceful to stand anarchy.' The national movement was so preoccupied with gaining freedom from foreign domination that not much attention was paid to the social or economic issues which would confront India after independence. Gandhi's tactics were to gather under his leadership the various left- and right-wing groups in order to work for what he considered to be the supreme goal—the *swaraj* (independence).

But there was some development of socialist doctrines in India before 1947 and this has been admirably dealt with in this book. The editor, Nanda, gives a lucid account of the growth of socialism in India between 1919 and 1939 and also explains the factors which were responsible for its haphazard development, such as the internal contradictions of the left-wing parties, the limitations imposed by their imperfect grasp of political realities and the charismatic and dynamic leadership of Gandhi. There are interesting chapters on the rise of the Soviet Union and Indian socialism; British labour and the Indian left; Nehru and socialism in India; socialism and foreign policy thinking. The discussions are stimulating and provide a

helpful background to the contemporary debate on Indian socialism. The book is well written and altogether a welcome addition to the literature on modern India.

G. W. CHOUDHURY

The Politics of Afghanistan. By Richard S. Newell. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1972. 236 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·55.*

ALTHOUGH the political and military history of Afghanistan, interpreted either from the British or Russian viewpoint, has been amply described, Professor Newell is right in his assertion that the recent development of the country, especially since the constitution of 1964, is practically unrecognised and unknown in the West. For this reason his book is to be welcomed, providing as it does a clear and interesting, if at times a rather too idealised, introduction to the present political, economic and social trends. The trouble, however, with all such books is that they so quickly get out of date, and although Professor Newell is at his best when dealing with the economic developments of the 1950s and 1960s, the reader may feel that these have already been superseded to some extent by more recent history.

The first two chapters setting the geographical, historical and social scene make good, if over-simplified, background material. Newell stresses the limited horizons of Afghan interests and the innate difficulty of transforming a patriarchal rural society into a modern state. Perhaps he neglects the cultural heritage of the country too much, the emphasis being certainly on foreign policy. The last three chapters on the structure and functions of the government, the economy and recent political developments (1964–71) are the heart of the book. His account of the expansion of the economy, based first on Russian and American grants and subsequently on loans, is excellent. In his final chapter he highlights the herculean task confronting the Afghan government in order to utilise the new capital investments for the benefit of the people as a whole, stressing in particular the need for government agencies and officials to accumulate experience in modern planning and infrastructure, the importance of not imitating 'instant' foreign models and the need for greater education.

Professor Newell is, however, far too sanguine in his expectations of the 1964 constitution. It is highly debatable whether this represents in any sense 'an experiment in democracy'. His view that its preamble 'gives eloquent expression to a commitment to a new era', based upon 'the ideals of western liberal democracy and the spirit of Afghan traditional tribal councils' (p. 100) is, alas, no more than wishful thinking. Afghanistan is still in many respects a feudal country, the power of the landlords is still almost absolute, slavery and serfdom still exist, there is as yet no 'middle class intelligentsia' worthy of the name; but Professor Newell's book does at least make us aware of some of the political and economic problems, elicits our sympathy and points a possible path to an eventual solution.

PETER WILLEY

North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival. By Jon M. Van Dyke. Foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer. *Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books. 1972. 336 pp. Maps. Index. $10.50.*

IT would be surprising if the North Vietnamese government, having published no statistics about its national life since 1960, should bare to overseas

gaze the true effects of American bombing. Consequently any attempt to find out necessitates detective work and the evaluation of oblique indicators. Of the latter, the most promising group are to be found in the translations from the North Vietnamese Press circulated for a great many years now by the US Joint Publications Research Service. The value of the hundreds of volumes that have been issued is not only that they are in English, but also that they extract from periodicals whose originals are very hard to come by outside North Vietnam. Professor Van Dyke has based his study of the effects of the bombing between 1965 and 1968 principally on a selection of about 3,000 items from this source, supplemented by the reports of well-wishers whom the North Vietnamese have invited to Hanoi from time to time to influence American public opinion against the bombing.

Professor Van Dyke's general picture of life in North Vietnam before the bombing is of a severely regimented existence, in which individual choice has been eliminated from just about every activity: 'A democracy', says one of the quotations, 'cannot deviate from leadership'. It was to be expected that mobilisation of labour to repair bomb damage would be eased by this circumstance, but Professor Van Dyke on the whole prefers the view, stated in Professor Reischauer's foreword, that the decisive factor has been the stiffened personal determination of individual Vietnamese under attack. The Party's frequent exhortations found in JPRS reports not to make the bombing a pretext for slackness in 'labour discipline' have escaped attention here. Professor Van Dyke hazards no estimates of casualties, about which the North Vietnamese have kept silent; but here again one notes frequent Party exhortations to people in the towns always to take shelter, and not to argue 'we are not a military target, so there's no need'. Professor Van Dyke elicits much incidental information about the economy, especially the dispersal of light industry (the extent of which he thinks the Hanoi authorities have deliberately exaggerated), but also evidence that shortfalls in agriculture arose from collectivisation rather than bombing, just as the irrigation dykes have been battered more by floods than by the American air force.

There are some fascinating details here: imported Chinese labourers rushing home from Haiphong in 1965 when the first bombs fell and getting ticked off by Premier Chou En-lai; Chinese munitions workers making a *feu de joie* of the anti-aircraft shells meant for the defence of Hanoi; Russian guards riding on Chinese munitions trains during the Cultural Revolution; Air Marshal Ky devoting his time to smuggling opium in American official aeroplanes. But, alas, when one looks for the sources, they turn out to be, not the JPRS, but cuttings from the *New York Times*, whose actual texts sometimes (in the last case, for example) contain reservations Professor Van Dyke has not taken into account. Quite a number of his confident assertions have no authority at all; one wonders, for instance, how he can really know that 'the North Vietnamese do not trust the Russians'. And has it truly been a case of 'strategy for survival'? President Johnson more than once undertook to do nothing to threaten the survival of the communist regime—out of commonsense recognition of the strategic interests of China, if not out of honour of the United States promise at Geneva in 1954. Perhaps we have more cause to thank Professor Van Dyke for his research than for the inferences he draws from it.

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

Every Fifth Child: The Population of China. By Leo A. Orleans. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1972. 191 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (The China Library.) £2·95.*

NOBODY knows the true size of China's population, not even the Chinese. Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien confirmed this a year ago in a much-quoted interview when he said 'Some people estimate the population of China at 800 million and some at 750 million. . . . Officials at the supply and grain department are saying confidently "The number is 800 million". Officials outside the grain department say the population is "750 million only" while the Ministry of Commerce affirms that "the number is 830 million". However, the planning department insists that the number "is less than 750 million".' In fact, this book does not concern itself much with projections and estimates, but with population policy and the possible rate of growth of population, which, given the dearth of statistics, is probably more constructive. It is a serious introduction to the subject, intended for the intelligent reader who wants the background to any figures the Chinese may publish now they are members of world organisations.

Besides the problem of enumerating so many people, assessing China's population has always been difficult for traditional reasons, such as not counting women because they were not important or children because it was unlucky. In this country, until the communist takeover, no one had sufficient control to carry out such a huge administrative task. The communist census, which started in 1953, arrived at a figure of around 587 million, and this has been accepted as roughly reliable, although the margin of error is enormous. In the mid-1960s the population probably rose to over 700 million, and in the early 1970s it could be anywhere in the range put forward by Mr. Li.

The total population size is not in fact the most crucial issue, since it is pretty clear that the Chinese have managed to feed their people adequately over the past twenty years. More important is the rate of increase and Peking's capacity to provide productive occupations in the future. Birth control is gaining ground; since the Cultural Revolution the 'barefoot doctors' in the rural areas have been able to spread family planning advice, and visitors to China have come back most impressed with what has been done. The Chinese government avoids saying that too large a population is a bad thing, but it does maintain that the increase must be regulated. Mr. Orleans, who has been an observer of the Chinese scene for a long time, believes the current rate of growth is around 1·7 per cent., but he also gives the United States bureau of census estimate which is much higher—2·1 per cent.

Whatever the true figure, though, he believes that with the 'walking on two legs' programme of industrial development, China ought to be able to absorb all the teenagers annually joining the workforce, and he praises the educational system which gives a wide spread of basic knowledge to a very large number of children. The more scientific approach to farming which the government is now pressing can be undertaken by a more educated peasantry, so that food production will rise to keep ahead of population growth. Since it is certainly true that the Chinese have made impressive progress in handling their problems since 1949, despite traumatic political upheavals, this optimistic view is probably justified.

COLINA MACDOUGALL

China's Changing Map: National and Regional Developments 1949–1971. Rev. ed. By Theodore Shabad. *London: Methuen. 1972. 370 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

THIS has always been a useful book. First published in 1956, a new edition is very welcome. It is a mine of facts about population, crops, transport, power, industrialisation and output, set against their appropriate background of climate, natural resources and physical configuration. Any businessman or serious traveller will find quick answers to questions about the size and location of, say, China's non-ferrous metals industry or the growth of its ports. The methodical arrangement makes the facts easy to find, while the attractive layout and the maps make what is basically a textbook into a comparatively readable guide to Chinese geography.

However, as a mere revision, not a totally rewritten version, the new edition still focuses too much on the growth of the 1950s. Although the foundations of modern China were laid at that time, a very great deal has changed since then—far more than can be summed up easily in additional lines and paragraphs here and there. This seems to have affected the perspective of the book; although Mr. Shabad has mentioned the excellent estimates made of Chinese production since 1960 by outside observers, they do not seem to get quite the prominence they deserve in comparison with the official Chinese figures for the 1950s. Although the author quotes figures for 1970 production which seem to be those reported by Edgar Snow, he is not mentioned by name with the authority that that would give them (Snow, after all, received the figures from Premier Chou En-lai).

Curious items have been overlooked, for instance, the change of name of the Shihchingshan steel plant outside Peking (p. 69), which several years ago became the Capital steel plant. In the chapter on Szechuan, the reference to the 'reported' construction of a fertiliser plant at Luchow—with the doubt that adjective implies—reads a little oddly, since it was put up by British engineers from the firm of Humphreys and Glasgow (p. 222). There is not enough reference to the programme for local industrialisation, which has produced a remarkable spurt in the fertiliser and cement industries, and even in coal mining and steel production. Of course, it would have been far from easy to sum up this very widespread form of development within the book's existing format, and it would certainly have required a very great deal of work. But the result is that it already seems somewhat dated.

Shabad's final chapter on trends and prospects concludes that, in the immediate future, China's investment will be concentrated in Eastern China, unlike the 1950s, when there was a pronounced move to the West, influenced perhaps by close relations with the Soviet Union. However, if he looked again at the development reported recently from south-west China and the apparent amount of investment in the autonomous regions (Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and others) he might have revised this view. Current stress in China on improving roads, railways and air services also suggest that Peking is in fact bent on opening up the resources of the interior as fast as possible.

However, this is basically a geography book, not an economic one, and it may be that the writer thought it appropriate to avoid too much detail about current economic policies when these can be subject to sudden change. It is now more than a year since the book was finished, and post-Cultural Revolution trends are much more clearly defined. Nevertheless it would

have been a more valuable book if it had given a better idea of the present impetus of economic growth and the changes in the map which recent capital construction, both small and large-scale, are likely to produce.

COLINA MACDOUGALL

China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy 1949–1970. By Stephen Fitzgerald. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1972. 268 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions: Gen. Ed. Patrick Hanan and Denis Twitchett.) £5·90. $19.50.*

A major mistake of the non-communist world in south-east Asia has been to see the communities of the Overseas Chinese, scattered throughout the region's countries, as so many fifth columns, tools of Peking, waiting for the Chinese communists' orders to start riots and revolution. This is one of the myths ably exploded by Dr. Stephen Fitzgerald in his discussion of Peking's policy towards the Overseas Chinese from 1949 to 1970.

The supporters of the fifth-column theory received some credence in 1967 when they were able to point out that the centres in which there had been almost simultaneous rioting—Hongkong, Macao, Mongolia, Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia—had in common the presence of Chinese representatives. But Dr. Fitzgerald considers that even if these riots were sparked off by the stirring news of the Cultural Revolution, they were not plotted or managed by Peking. In a Peking still suffering from the Red Guards and their aftermath, it is very unlikely anyway that anyone had the time or authority to plot and manage riots among scattered and independent communities.

Since the mid-1950s, Dr. Fitzgerald believes, Peking has found the Overseas Chinese on the whole an embarrassment in domestic as in foreign affairs. He points out that the term Overseas Chinese is usually used in China to describe the dependents—roughly ten million of them in 1949—of those Chinese who had emigrated. To begin with, these dependents were given substantial privileges—special goods on sale to them only, extra rations, preferential treatment in education, and even in judging the families' class status and land holdings. In return, the cadres, who distributed the remittances from overseas, pressed relatives to write glowing accounts of the new China and its policies, and to press for more money. Similarly, students from south-east Asian Chinese families, and Chinese returning to retire or settle in China were given special status. Some returning emigrants who brought skills the new China needed, as well as foreign exchange, were particularly welcomed.

Peking however discovered that the remittances depended more on family feeling than on approval of the new China; that letters from China to south-east Asia failed to win the region's sympathy for the communist government; and that too many difficulties—ranging from college indiscipline to the refusal of some families to join in agricultural labour—attended the granting of privileged status. Dr. Fitzgerald traces the curtailment of this status in the late 1950s.

Meanwhile in foreign policy the Overseas Chinese got in the way of Peking's post-Bandung policy of friendship with south-east Asia. Most of the region's nationals were in any case jealous of the business and

professional success of their country's Chinese communities. Chinese clannishness—what Peking denounced as 'chauvinism' and 'contempt for other peoples'—roused resentment; to this was added unjust blame for Peking's 'support' for insurrections in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. But Peking had little control of the individual Chinese living in these countries. Since the mid-1950s its advice has been that the south-east Asian Chinese should integrate, abide by their new country's laws, learn its language and use its schools. It was a dramatic change from the old imperial and even the later Kuomintang interpretation of *jus sanguinis*—once Chinese, always Chinese, and in theory, however little in practice, answerable to China and protected by China.

This newly realistic policy of Peking's was predictably denounced during the Cultural Revolution as Red Guards pointed to Peking's failure to support the cause of international revolution. The bureaucracy concerned with Overseas Chinese affairs was broken up, the propaganda tone became for a time more strident, but policy here as elsewhere did not change permanently.

Peking's policy, Dr. Fitzgerald writes, is one of 'decolonisation'. Like other ex-imperial powers, China has renounced any attempt to retain political control either of the south-east Asian countries or of their Chinese minorities. But China would like to retain some of the economic benefits of empire, such as south-east Asian investment. China, again like other once great powers, has protested at the ill-treatment of its nationals, but protests have stopped short of a breach of relations, even in Indonesia, where the Chinese have been most persistently persecuted. Recently China appears to have despaired of modifying south-east Asia's racialist policies. It is now offering to repatriate those Chinese who retain their nationality, and thus to solve a problem that from Peking must look irritating but minor.

Students of Chinese affairs have come to expect high standards from the Far Eastern department of the Australian National University where Dr. Fitzgerald is a Fellow. His book is concise, but predictably well-documented, detailed and completed by exceptionally full notes, appendices and a bibliography.

LOIS MITCHISON

China and Japan at War 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration. By John Hunter Boyle. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1972. 430 pp. Bibliog. Index. £8·25.*

THIS fascinating study of the complex wartime relationships between Japan and China reminds us that history is by no means a simple black-and-white affair. Professor Boyle starts by showing how Japan's leaders in the 1930s were deeply divided in their attitudes to China and Chinese nationalism, while China's ruling elites were equally divided in their responses, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei both being aware in differing degrees of the necessity for some sort of compromise settlement with Tokyo. In Japan the 'China incident' which began in July 1937 and Premier Konoe's announcement of the following January that he would have no truck with Chiang soon came to be regarded as mistakes. As basic disagreements among the policy-makers continued unresolved, con-

flicting strategies were followed: while the military campaigns continued and local puppet regimes were set up in China, the Japanese kept discussions going with a wide range of Chinese. Finally, disappointed at the lack of response from Chiang in Chungking, Tokyo concentrated its efforts on a single national collaborationist government. With a combination of adroitness and duplicity, the Japanese persuaded Wang Ching-wei to desert Chungking in December 1938 and head a Reorganised National government in Nanking in March 1940. Wang, the long-standing rival of Chiang, calculated that Japan would win and, even when his dreams were shattered after Pearl Harbour, continued to collaborate—but with a sense of disgrace—until his death in 1944. The Japanese had a similar sense of failure: despite all their propaganda to the contrary, they could not resolve the deadlocked China war, politically or militarily.

In unfolding this exceedingly complicated story, the author presents a wealth of new and interesting detail. Some of his evidence based on memoirs and recollections is doubtless open to question; but he offers a credible account of a controversial issue. One of the most enduring controversies surrounds the personality of Wang himself: why and how did a popular patriot accept the role of a Japanese stooge? Here the author has some valuable reflections on the nature of Asian collaboration and offers a plausible account of Wang's motives. Then there is the controversy over the seemingly immobile Chungking government. Boyle reminds us that 'no matter how affectionately Tokyo paraded its fiancée [Wang] in public, . . . [Chiang] remained the more alluring partner' (p. 286). But Chiang, who was scarcely understood by the Japanese in wartime, seems to have kept aloof from Tokyo's approaches.

This is an authoritative study which, keeping close to the recent researches of the leading Japanese scholars, is not likely to be faulted on the Japanese side. It expertly focuses attention on the diplomacy of the army towards China (though one might have wished for a little about the diplomacy of the Foreign Ministry) and distinguishes between those who were prepared for concessions to Chinese nationalism and those who were so obsessed with ideas of mission that they had no conception of concessions. On the Chinese side of the story, there are naturally limitations to what can be learnt about Wang, and even more so about Chiang, from Japanese sources. If therefore this study cannot be said to be the final assessment, it serves an important purpose in clearing the way for a new estimate of this sensitive period of China's recent history.

I. H. Nish

Japanese Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Pacific War: A Soviet View. By Leonid N. Kutakov. Edited with a Foreword by George Alexander Lensen. *Tallahassee, Florida: The Diplomatic Press. 1972. 241 pp. Bibliog. Index. $15.00.*

The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War 1941–1945. By George Alexander Lensen. *Tallahassee, Florida: The Diplomatic Press. 1972. 332 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $15.00.*

Except that Kutakov deals with Japanese foreign policy from the 1930s down to the close of the Second World War, whereas Lensen concentrates

on Japanese-Soviet relations during the years 1941–45, both of these works cover much the same ground. Lensen's is the more objective of the two, but Kutakov's analysis of the attitudes and actions of the five countries mainly concerned is of special interest, as it reflects the Soviet point of view. Time and again his interpretation of the developments he is discussing bears out Lensen's comment, that all countries tend to misconstrue the actions and intentions of potential enemies.

Examples of this are to be found in Kutakov's misinterpretation of the motives of the British, French and American delegates at the 1937 Brussels Conference for discussing Japan's actions in China, and in the alleged skulduggery of Britain and others on a number of other occasions. Such expressions as 'the negotiations between Ugaki and Craigie . . . for the joint plunder and division of China' (p. 77), and 'the British government, engaged as it was in anti-Soviet intrigues in Europe' (p. 89), are frequent. They are in line with the assertion elsewhere that Britain hoped to mediate for peace between Japan and China after both contestants were exhausted and then to secure its own pickings. That the Russians, in the eyes of some observers, seemed equally hopeful of seeing the two exhausted so that Moscow would be left as master of the Far East, is never even suggested. Nor does Kutakov appear to appreciate how eyebrows may be raised by his contention that 'imperialist deals and backstage bargains were alien to the Soviet Union, which was determined to . . . liberate the peoples of Europe and Asia' (p. 229).

While, however, it is easy enough to disagree with Soviet interpretations of other countries' actions or to smile at such examples of Soviet self-righteousness, it is always salutary to see ourselves as others see us and to bear in mind that we, too, are apt to pat ourselves on the back at times without good cause or to misinterpret the actions and motives of others. But, misinterpretations apart, there is much of value in Kutakov's book which, like Lensen's, deserves attention.

In his study of the various phases of Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union during the war years, Lensen studies in detail the ins and outs of the border clashes, the fishery disputes, and the wrangling over the Sakhalin oil and coal concessions before the way was cleared for the signing of the Neutrality Pact. The main interest, however, lies in the second half of the book, from April 1945, when Moscow gave the necessary year's notice for ending the pact, down to the launching of Russia's surprise blitzkrieg eight months before it was due to expire.

The title of the book, *The Strange Neutrality*, is as apt as that of John Deane's volume on American partnership with Russia during the war, *The Strange Alliance*,[1] which was published some twenty-five years ago. As Lensen shows, the neutrality of the pact was as flexible as the American-Soviet co-operation of which Deane wrote. In the circumstances this was perhaps inevitable, as the allies of the two signatories were fighting each other while they themselves were at war with each other's allies. To the Japanese government's credit, it refused to fall in with Matsuoka's urgings, made almost before his signature on the pact was dry, to take advantage of Hitler's invasion of Russia to strike out at it. Stalin, on the other hand, had no such compunction; at an early stage he was

[1] New York: Viking Press; London: John Murray. 1947. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1948, p. 303.

already indicating his readiness to join his allies against Japan, once the Germans had been defeated. It remained for Yalta to make his offer operative.

In tracing the developments from this point onwards, Lensen deals with Molotov's evasiveness in replying to the Japanese ambassador's queries about Russia's continued adherence to the pact and to Japan's subsequent request for its mediation. While, however, the author makes no attempt to condone Moscow's bad faith, he tends to show rather more sympathy for Russia than for Japan, but otherwise is thoroughly sound and fair in his observations.

MALCOLM D. KENNEDY

Asia and the Pacific in the 1970's: The Roles of the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Ed. by Bruce Brown. *Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1971. 253 pp. Index. $A5.00.*

IN current international politics the designation of regions usually exhibits artifice following nature. Definitions follow practice, and plausible or implausible parameters are conjured up to suit some topical political or intellectual purpose. Asia and the Pacific is one currently fashionable region, though so vast in its singularity that it is better considered as a complex of interlocking regions. Recent shifts in American, Japanese, Chinese and Russian policies (to mention only the most prominent) have made this a highly speculative and conjectural subject as the present book under review amply reveals.

The book consists of the texts of ten papers originally prepared for a conference held in Canberra at the end of February 1970 to consider Australian-New Zealand-United States relations and the common problems which the three ANZUS countries might face in the immediate future. Once again it is the subtitle, rather than the main title, which more accurately depicts the contents. This follows from the fact that only Australians, New Zealanders and Americans took part in the conference, and from the preoccupation of the participants with their three countries' mutual relationships and overlapping interests. Thus the conference was, and the book is, concerned with this triangular relationship and its ramifications in the sub-regions of east, south and south-east Asia and in the south-west Pacific (one chapter on each of these). Then follows two chapters on economic prospects and four chapters on political and strategic relations. The book also includes summary accounts of what the editor (who was at the time Director of New Zealand's Institute of International Affairs) called some of 'the other robust discussions' (p. v). These *hors d'oeuvre variés* are introduced by the editor and topped off by two final review comments—one by Alexander Macleod, a New Zealander, on political and economic aspects, the other by Hedley Bull, an Australian, on strategic aspects. Selected excepts from the 'Nixon doctrine', in so far as it was articulated in the Presidential Report to Congress of February 18, 1970, are appended at the end.

Overall, this is a useful series of statements and assessments of three national viewpoints expressed by rather soberly conservative academics and officials ruminating and arguing together. Inevitably there is some unevenness of quality and treatment. Of the major outside powers, what is said

about Japan is more shrewd and discerning than what is said of either Russia or China. If any general conclusion or consensus emerged it was the reflection that the crust of order, whether domestic or international, is dangerously thin, and that the world is less manageable than was once—quite recently, if one thinks of some American advocates—supposed.

PETER LYON

Papua/New Guinea: Prospero's Other Island. Ed. by Peter Hastings. Photography by Kerry Dundas and others. *London: Angus and Robertson. 1971. 226 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £6·00.*

EXCELLENT colour plates and clear print combine with a lucid text to make this volume, of all recent publications on Papua-New Guinea, the easiest to read and digest. The 12 essays cover the territory's geography; plants, birds and animals; history; the people and culture; the innumerable languages; social change; cargo cult and politics; the economy; race relations; political development; future prospects; and changing Australian attitudes. The objective, according to the editor, was not only to ' give the serious but non-academic reader a factual, descriptive background of the problems and conditions obtaining on Prospero's Other Island ', but also so ' illustrate the radically different assumptions made by Australians and New Guineans about social, political and economic development. Do New Guineans regard these things in exactly, or even approximately, the same was as Europeans? '

The contributors all write with authority, and the result is an informative, responsible and readable guide to one of the world's few remaining colonial territories. Papua-New Guinea's manifold problems, not the least of which being its relative proximity to the Australian mainland and its strategic significance in Australian eyes, are well described, though the differences over the Queensland frontier, which runs close to Papua's coast, are neglected. With self-government now pending, it is interesting to recall the cautious policy of the Australian government towards the territory only a decade ago. In some ways, the accelerated advance of Papua-New Guinea to self-government is an illustration of the effectiveness of the pressure of international opinion on a colonial administering power that for decades was distinguished principally for dilatory complacency masquerading as political realism. This handsome volume is a useful introduction to the changed circumstances of the 1970s and to the problems of a fascinating country on the threshold of independence.

TREVOR REESE

Twentieth Century China. 2nd ed. By O. Edmund Clubb. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1972. 526 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·65.*

THE second, revised edition of a book first published in 1964 and reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1964, p. 757. The new edition has been updated to take account of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, of Communist China's entry into the United Nations in October 1971, and of some salient features of ' Mao's China ' as seen today.

NORTH AMERICA

The United States and the Industrial World: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970's. By William Diebold Jr. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1972. 459 pp. Index. £5·75.*

MR. DIEBOLD is a rare bird and his book does not fall into any familiar category. As Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York he is a distinguished scholar and an academic without students. He is an economist but, perhaps because of the formative and exciting years he spent in the mid-1940s in the State Department, he is less interested in theory than in practical politics. His concern with the full range of foreign economic policy is, in itself, pretty rare. There are specialists by the hundred—economists mostly, and lawyers—on international trade, on international monetary matters, on foreign investment, on business structures, on agricultural economics and on problems of domestic demand management. There are few, outside journalism and politics, who are brave enough to grasp the whole gamut, and fewer still sufficiently well-informed to take in the political dimension as well as the economic and to indicate with authority the possible lines on which national and international policy might develop.

The book is aimed chiefly at American policy-makers and American readers and is the first volume of a trilogy, to be completed with two others on United States economic policies towards developing countries, and towards the communist countries. It is therefore naturally more aware, if not considerate of, American special interests and American perspectives and may be felt by non-Americans sometimes to be a little indifferent to those of others. It starts with a section considering important special links between the United States and Western Europe, Canada and Japan. The two last are the best; note especially the intriguing account of the negotiation of the United States-Canadian automotive trade agreement (pp. 81-91). The West European chapter could, in my opinion, have usefully been divided into studies of the special American relation with, above all, West Germany, but also with Britain, with France and indeed with Italy. To lump all the West Europeans together like this is to underplay the very real differences between these three key relationships, and to overstate the practical application in American policy of declared principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Mr. Diebold then takes the four main fields of foreign economic policy—trade, investment, monetary arrangements and agriculture—and looking at the present and future problems of American policy in the perspective of the past, considers 'what blend of change and continuity responds to the needs of the '70s and beyond' (p. 5). In each field, Mr. Diebold is very conscious that he is writing at the end of an era when the certainties of Bretton Woods multilateralism no longer suffice; when on almost every issue governments face the much more difficult task of co-ordinating domestic policies—or at least of avoiding treading on each others' domestic economic toes; and when, lacking an international authority to do the job, they must still find *ad hoc* substitutes by which to regulate and control in the public interest the accelerating expansion of the international economy. Especially in the mixed category of activities that can be labelled 'industrial policy', Mr. Diebold finds that 'govern-

ments face problems arising from the fact that a largely private international economy has developed that in many ways escapes the effective supervision of national governments or can be dealt with by them only in ways that impose undesirable economic costs. To assure the dominance of public interest over private interests and at the same time reap the benefits of business dynamism and the ability of entrepreneurs to produce and distribute efficiently in the contemporary, interpenetrated world, governments will have to find new ways of working together' (p. 338).

Just how this is to be achieved—even if there is agreement on what constitutes the public interest—is a question that rightly bothers Mr. Diebold a good deal and he does not pretend to have a neat answer. On balance he concludes that the global organisations inherited from Bretton Woods (Gatt and the IMF especially) ought to remain the centrepieces of much international economic co-operation. But he finds that they have to be supplemented by a considerable strengthening of the OECD and probably other means of closer co-operation among the industrialised countries may have to be devised as well (p. 357). In this task, one difficulty which the author perhaps underplays is the asymmetry in international economic diplomacy created by the importance of the United States to all other national economies—the promises of reward held out by its affluent market, and the dreams of development realisable only through American corporate investment. Thus he may be right to say that a precondition for successful initiatives in both trade and monetary co-operation in future is an improvement in the economic condition of the United States (p. 440). But this is more because of the negotiating power conferred by American economic strength than because the United States has any inherent or moral right to a trade surplus or indeed to an open market in Western Europe for (for example) its agricultural surpluses. And curiously, it is on agriculture that Mr. Diebold bangs the free trade drum hardest. He admits that it is because American farms and farmers are so highly capitalised that they have such a competitive advantage. But by comparison with the steel industry, he is much less ready to admit that, these days, liberalisation is not enough and that markets must be reasonably orderly as well as competitive. On steel, he concludes that a different approach must be attempted 'in the hope that something like an international industrial policy for steel may result' (pp. 169–170).

Mr. Diebold's typescript was caught at the printer by Mr. Connally's broadside of August 15, 1971. He has justifiably added an epilogue, using the 1971 crisis and its resolution to point up the underlying message of his book. To over-simplify drastically a complex and complicated argument, he says that the affluent countries have now reached a point where they must somehow make great efforts to go forward if they are not to slip dangerously far back into economic nationalism. His own acute appreciation of the domestic political constraints on United States administrations—and perhaps especially on that of President Nixon—cannot allow him to be as sanguine about the chances of success as for example Richard Cooper was in *The Economics of Interdependence.*[1] Yet most readers will concede that he is right about the penalties of failure and will put the book down, enlightened, yet profoundly disturbed by the thought that we are in a transitional limbo, caught between old certainties and simpli-

[1] New York: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1969, p. 322.

cities that we have already more than half abandoned and new principles and procedures which we have not yet been able to discover.

SUSAN STRANGE

Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy. By Francis E. Rourke. Foreword by Robert E. Osgood. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1972. 80 pp. (Studies in International Affairs No. 17.) Paperback: £0·90.*

Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform. By I. M. Destler. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 329 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

THE heart-searching which the Vietnam war has provoked among American academics continues to be reflected in a flow of studies of the American foreign policy process: some seeking for villains, others for scapegoats, yet others preserving sufficient balance to ask how far the failures which hindsight distinguishes in American foreign policy-making were avoidable, and to what extent mistaken policies arose from political perceptions and pressures as against administrative inertia. Both of these studies preserve a certain balance; both usefully discuss the by now extensive literature on the subject before adding their own diagnoses and preferred remedies.

Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy is a short essay, concerned to criticise the theory of bureaucratic determinism which has gained some popularity in American interpretations of foreign policy, and to examine the relative weight of presidential and administrative forces in shaping foreign policy. 'The purpose of this inquiry is to examine the kinds of power that bureaucratic organisations exert in the area of foreign policy—the sources from which such influence is derived and the channels through which it shapes governmental actions. Our major goal is to put this power into proper perspective' (p. 10). Professor Rourke proceeds from an examination of the changing fashions in academic interpretations of American foreign policy-making to a discussion of the sources of influence available to the administrative apparatus, from its control over information and the interpretation and presentation of information to its technical expertise and responsibility for the detailed interpretation and execution of the policy-makers' decisions. He concludes by comparing the weight of presidential influence with that of bureaucracy, finding the President's role in providing political direction to have been underrated by the bureaucratic determinists.

Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy is a more weighty and more organisationally orientated study. The underlying themes of Professor Rourke's essay are directly related to the current debate: that the burden of responsibility for the Vietnam involvement and for other failures cannot be shifted from political shoulders to officials, as he implies apologists for the Kennedy Administration, like Schlesinger and Galbraith, have attempted to do, and that the response of the Nixon Administration to the chaos of official Washington—centralising the control of foreign policy in the White House—is likely not to improve matters but to 'subject the foreign policy process to an equally serious set of vices associated with government by the palace guard' (p. 70). Mr. Destler takes a rather longer-term perspective. He begins with a discussion of the 'thirteen major studies' of the Washington foreign policy-making machine since the Second World

War, noting the similarity of their various recommendations and the similar way in which their proposals have come to nought. He goes on to examine the strategies adopted by the last three Presidents, in accepting that the State Department in its present shape could not impose the desired coherence and direction on external policy, and in response strengthening the machinery of the White House: a process carried to its logical conclusion under President Nixon, with the virtual bypassing of the State Department and the concentration of authority in the President and the presidential adviser. After considering some of the attempts to use modern management theories and techniques to improve the coherence of official policy-making, he concludes with the by now familiar recommendation that the most desirable solution, on grounds of organisational efficiency, to the present reduplication of functions among competing administrative hierarchies would be to strengthen the role of the State Department and to re-establish the Secretary of State as the President's main aide in foreign policy-making. Professor Rourke reaches a similar conclusion for more political reasons: that presidential control of foreign policy is making the process more secretive and less responsive to public opinion than bureaucratic inertia ever led to, and that it adds a dangerously unstable element in the relatively unfettered play it allows for presidential personality.

The analysis of the American foreign policy process offered in these two studies is profoundly disturbing. Successive Presidents have despaired of being able to reform the administrative structure sufficiently quickly to serve their purposes, and so have added to the confusion with *ad hoc* groups. Johnson's suspicions of his subordinate officials was replaced by Nixon's conviction that many of them were 'personally antagonistic to him' (Rourke, p. 56). Morale in the State Department is low, administrative procedures slow in the extreme. Both studies, however, are stronger on their analysis of what is wrong than on their prescriptions for righting the situation. Neither considers the problem of Congressional obstacles to administrative reform; only Destler considers the human problems involved in shaking up the huge administrative apparatus. The conclusion one must draw from both their diagnoses is that reform can only come from firm presidential direction. Neither provides any evidence that the present President has any desire to set such a reform in train.

William J. L. Wallace

President Kennedy and Britain. By David Nunnerley. *London, Sydney, Toronto: The Bodley Head. 1972. 242 pp. Index. £2·50.*

Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy. By Richard J. Walton. *New York: The Viking Press. 1972. 250 pp. Bibliog. Index. $7.95.*

Dr. Nunnerley is a young academic, trained in politics and government, who must have still been at school when President Kennedy was assassinated. This is his first book. Richard J. Walton is an experienced journalist, writer and teacher who, from 1962–67, served as principal United Nations correspondent for the Voice of America. In style and purpose their books are as different as their backgrounds.

Nunnerley is concerned to demonstrate that the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States not only continued during the Kennedy presidency but was 'a positive process' in international relations. His method was the 'systematic interrogation of as many as possible of the principals involved' (p. vii). He lists persons interviewed yet states that he cannot name them all; and he makes no distinction between those interviewed and those who responded by letter or telephone. There is no collected bibliography, but brief end of chapter notes indicate some of his other sources, including two of the Oral History interviews for the Kennedy Library in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He makes his case with almost unmitigated enthusiasm. Short, snappy chapters tell us again of the Kennedy family, of 'Jack's' experience as a student in London, of his relationship with Macmillan and of his deep friendship with Ormsby-Gore, 'a special relationship within the Special Relationship'. He comments briefly on the foreign policy highlights of the period: Cuba and Berlin, the nuclear test ban treaty, Skybolt and the Nassau conference. Africa and British Guiana share one short chapter, and one must therefore presume that the British had neither interest in nor conversations about the Alliance for Progress and Kennedy's general Latin American policy. There is much of interest in this book and it is unfortunate that the author does not display surer historical instincts. Too ofen does he allow Kennedy 'successes' that change the course of history. Too often is he led to make statements such as that about Vietnam: 'It is almost inconceivable that he [JFK] would have made the miscalculations made by Johnson' (p. 229). Too often does he over-write and emotionally cloud his analysis: certainly the British press immersed the nation in the Kennedys, including baby Patrick, but so did the French, German and Italian press, and doubtless others. *President Kennedy and Britain* contributes as much to the Kennedy legend as it does to our objective understanding.

It is precisely this legend that Walton, starting from Sorensen's concern lest Kennedy's martyrdom 'make a myth of the mortal man', explores in his book. Using the full range of published sources, and also the Oral History interviews, his thrust is to analyse Kennedy's statements, political and diplomatic, to explore his general world view and his considered reaction to events as they occurred. The major crises are, understandably, the same as for Nunnerley but there are significant differences in treatment. Nunnerley dismisses Vietnam in less than two pages; Walton regards the administration's south-east Asian policies as central to its foreign policy, devotes a chapter to Vietnam, and considers the war as Kennedy's most lasting legacy. For Nunnerley the Bay of Pigs invasion is an episode for which the inexperienced President was not really responsible, and from which he learned. For Walton it is profoundly revealing, demonstrating that Kennedy was excessively preoccupied with communism, was ignorant of the nature of revolution, and determined to impose an American solution even at the cost of violating another people's national sovereignty. The essential theme of Walton's book is the ambivalence of Kennedy's words, and the hard-line nature of his policies. Although devoted to the cause of freedom, he defined the great revolution in the history of man, the revolution of those determined to be free, in American terms, and committed himself to the survival of the system 'regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril' (cited Walton, p. 53). In his policies, from Cuba to Vietnam, Walton suggests that Kennedy too readily was tempted to pursue military rather than political

solutions—often against advice from the British. His conclusion, and one senses that he comes to it rather unwillingly, is that 'whatever he might have done later, John F. Kennedy as President was Cold Warrior and counterrevolutionary' (p. 234). Critics of different persuasion, such as Dr. Nunnerley, must at least come to terms with such revisionist views.

D. K. ADAMS

LATIN AMERICA

Change and Development—Latin America's Great Task. Report submitted to the Inter-American Development Bank. By Raúl Prebisch. Foreword by Felipe Herrera. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall, in co-operation with the Inter-American Development Bank. 1971. 293 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £7·25.*

A Latin American Economic Community: History, Policies and Problems. By Nino Maritano. *Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press. 1971. 265 pp. Bibliog. Index. $9.95. £4·70.*

L'Amérique Latine: Économies et Sociétés. By Denis-Clair Lambert and Jean-Marie Martin. *Paris: Armand Colin. 1971. 411 pp. Maps. Index. (Série 'Sciences économiques et gestion' dirigée par J. Le Bourva.) 34F.*

THESE three books cover much the same ground, diagnose similar problems and all three arrive at much the same conclusions. Raúl Prebisch needs no introduction to economists or to students of Latin America. He has distinguished himself as Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, as Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and as Director General of the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning and Special Adviser to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank. It is in this last capacity that his book came to be written, as a report submitted to the Inter-American Development Bank. The report is comprehensive, lucid and frank, at times to the point of being brutally blunt. Dr. Prebisch does not hesitate to criticise the Western world for giving insufficient attention to Latin America and the urgent need for continued aid, but at the same time he does not neglect to castigate the failings of the Latin American nations and to underline the imperative need for radical change in their political and industrial structures. He is, above all, concerned with the lack of dynamism in the Latin American economy, its social and political effects in the light of the explosive population growth rate, and the structural changes which in his view are indispensable if the problem is to be overcome. Dr. Prebisch burkes no issues, least of all the 'dissidence and rejection' which, as he rightly says, 'are keynotes of the growing unrest among the youth of Latin America'. He adds: 'It would be a grave mistake, however, to see this unrest among the younger generations simply as a reflex of what is happening elsewhere. No contagion would spread, except in a superficial and incidental fashion, if all were going well. But things are going far from well in Latin America' (p. 216).

In many respects this report takes a pessimistic view of the path now being followed by Latin American countries. And yet, there is an under-

lying optimism; for Dr. Prebisch is that rare international functionary who combines a strong emotional element in his character with a fully realised capacity for cool and objective appraisal. No Western statesman, including those of Latin America, should fail to read this report. The statistical appendices are judiciously chosen but it is a pity there is no index.

Dr. Nino Maritano's book traces the history, examines the policies and analyses the problems of Latin American and Caribbean attempts to integrate their economies. It is a sober and well-documented account of a development which owes much to the drive and persuasive ability of Dr. Prebisch when he was Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America. Like Dr. Prebisch, Dr. Maritano underlines the formidable obstacles that have to be overcome, among which are the structural bottlenecks which plague the economies of most nations. He pays particular attention to the role of agriculture and to the achievements and failures of the 'Alliance for Progress', and argues that a broader alliance, an Atlantic Partnership for Progress, is required to help solve the problems of Latin America. But, in his own way, he too stresses the need for more dynamism in Latin America: 'In the final analysis, of course, no amount of foreign aid, no new mechanism of foreign trade, and no form and dimension of international cooperation can substitute for Latin American national and regional determination and effort to develop' (p. 227).

This is a very useful and objective study. One could wish that a little more attention could have been paid to the Andean sub-regional group conceived at the Bogota conference of February 1968 between nations who, though all members of LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association), traded little with each other and have succeeded in increasing their mutual trade substantially since the Andean Charter was signed in May 1969. Dr. Maritano does not hesitate to suggest that political as well as economic integration should be an inevitable development.

The analysis of Latin American economies and societies by Denis-Clair Lambert (Professor of Political Economy at the University of Lyon II) and Jean-Marie Martin (a research director of the Centre national de la Recherche scientifique) is a reminder that there is in Lyon a nucleus of scholarly expertise about Latin America. An admirable study of social structures and political institutions in Latin America by Jacques Lambert (father of D.-C. Lambert) was published in France in 1963 [1] and later Pierre Léon produced what amounts to a history of Latin America through a study of the problems of the development of its economies and societies from 1815 to 1967.[2] It is to be hoped that European union will see greater contact between scholars and students of Latin America throughout Western Europe. In the meantime D.-C. Lambert and J.-M. Martin's book is an admirable and scholarly introduction to Latin American studies in France. Inevitably the problems loom larger than the solutions, but there is, here too, an underlying optimism. The authors make a plea that Latin American nations should not be judged on their capacity to

[1] *Amérique Latine*: Structures Sociales et Institutions Politiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1963). Published in English as *Latin America*: Social Structure and Political Institutions. (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1967; London: IBEG. 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 477.

[2] *Economies et Sociétés de l'Amérique Latine* (Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Superieur. 1969).

maintain a rapid economic growth for a few years. 'La face cachée de ces économies,' they write, 'celle qui n'émerge point, est souvent la plus importante' (p. 383). They draw attention to the fact that the industrial awakening of the temperate zone of the area, of Mexico and of Brazil, dates back to the 1930s. And they end by suggesting that the emergent nations of Asia and Africa will have much to learn from the experiences of Latin America. The book is well indexed.

J. A. CAMACHO

The Origins of Socialism in Cuba. By James O'Connor. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1970. 338 pp. Index.*

The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba. By Richard R. Fagen. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1969. London: Oxford University Press. 1970. 271 pp. Illus. Index. £4·00.*

AFTER the first flush of sympathy for the Castro revolution, political thinking on Cuba in the United States was sharply divided; there were those who condemned Castro, pointing to his growing friendship for communist countries and his final declaration in December 1961 that he was and would remain 'a Marxist-Leninist until the last days of my life', and those who still considered Castro to be a heroic liberator and utterly condemned American policy. The former exaggerated the relatively few excesses of the revolution and advocated the greatest help and collaboration in Castro's overthrow, and the latter praised his every action and lauded his reforms and the new institutions he created. These extremes have given way to more sober and objective appraisals which, without concealing the bad, assess the achievements and take a realistic view of the hold that Castro continues to have on the majority of the Cuban population and the undeniable fact that he is now, in spite of admitted failures, as firmly in control as ever.

These two books both belong to this last school of thought. Professor O'Connor traces the causes of socialism in Cuba back to pre-independence days in the 1890s. He describes objectively the economic situation of the island and attributes the lack of economic growth to a 'growing cartelization and monopolization of Cuba's agricultural production'. The heart of the argument, he writes: '. . . is that Cuban socialism was inevitable in the sense that it was necessary if the island was to be rescued from permanent economic stagnation, social backwardness and degradation, and political do-nothingism and corruption' (p. 6).

Professor O'Connor supports his argument with moderation and well-documented facts. It is clear that in his view socialism has come to stay because 'Cuban socialism has survived for positive rather than negative reasons' (p. 315). But he takes no romantic view of its achievements, soberly drawing attention as much to its failures as to its successes. An invaluable book for the student of Cuban affairs. The index is barely adequate.

In general attitude, Professor Fagen's is a book of much the same stamp, though he is concerned only with post-revolutionary events and less with economics than with institutions, for in his view '. . . the significance of the Cuban revolution lies not in the many ways its consequences can be viewed, but rather in the nature of the social and political transformations it has wrought' (p. 1).

Professor Fagen sets the scene and examines in turn the campaign against illiteracy, the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction. He concludes that the maintenance of the Castro regime owes too much to the personality of Castro himself and to the revolutionary impetus of the July 25 movement. But, he writes: 'What is clear is that the revolutionary élite has demonstrated an impressive capacity for mobilizing the Cuban citizenry' (p. 151).

The book is well indexed and there are some useful appendices.

These two books leave the reader with the impression that if shortages are overcome and the promise of higher standards fulfilled, revolutionary fervour may decline and Cuba become one more institutional communist state. If, on the other hand, the promised prosperity is not achieved, disillusion may set in; but by then a high proportion of Cuba's population will have been brought up in a society that has rejected bourgeois values.

J. A. CAMACHO

Foreign Enterprise in Mexico: Laws and Policies. By Harry K. Wright. *Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press. 1971. 425 pp. Index. (The American Society of International Law: Studies in Foreign Investment and Economic Development.) £7·50.*

THIS book is the fourth in a series of five, which—to quote the foreword by Stephen M. Schwebel, Executive Director of the American Society of International Law—has as its aim 'to describe and analyze the legal institutions and practices that govern the participation of foreign capital and technology in economic development, through thorough consideration of the experience of five key countries'. India, Colombia and Nigeria have already been covered; the final book, on Japan, is still to come. In each case the author is assisted by an advisory committee. As far as Mexico is concerned, the work has been admirably and comprehensively done. Professor Wright traces the role of foreign investment in Mexico from the beginning of the country's independent history briefly but competently and goes on to examine the restrictions on foreign investment, legal and political, and many other aspects of Mexican commercial law, including even patents, trade marks and licensing agreements. He also deals, among other aspects, with the entry and status of aliens and foreign enterprises, taxation, labour and social security.

The book goes a long way towards explaining how it is that, in spite of a climate of opinion strongly opposed to it, foreign investment in Mexico rose from about $450 million in 1940 to nearly $1,750 million in 1965, mainly from the United States, whose investments amounted to $1,342 million by 1967; it was essentially a change of policy on the part of President Avila Camacho, and even more so under his successor, Miguel Alemán. Mexican governments have since pursued the goal of industrialisation, particularly in the area of import substitution products; it is significant that American investment in manufacturing, negligible in 1929, was substantial in 1967 at nearly $900 million, whereas American investment in agriculture is now negligible and in extractive industries and utilities has sharply declined. One point that Professor Wright valuably and sensibly emphasises is that it is not enough to consider statutory regulations: 'More and more,' he writes, 'relations between private persons and the state are governed by a policy system rather than a statutory system'

(p. 361). This is even more the case when the private person or enterprise is a foreign one. But Professor Wright is eminently fair to the Mexican authorities and points out that restrictions on foreign capital and foreign employees have stimulated domestic capital formation and the training of skilled Mexican workers. Within its limited purpose this is a very good book, with a minimum of economic and legal jargon. It is most competently indexed.

J. A. CAMACHO

U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru. Ed. by Daniel A. Sharp. *Austin, London: University of Texas Press for The Institute of Latin American Studies. 1972. 485 pp. Index. £4·40. $10.00.*

THIS book is the first major statement in English of the political and social policy of the Peruvian government since it came to power in 1968. In format it is a series of papers dealing with all the principal aspects of United States policy towards Peru, and Peru's relations with the United States. As such it would be essential reading for anyone interested in the diplomatic history of Peru during the last four years and, by extension, for any policy-maker seeking to understand this area of concern in depth. But it gains added significance from the unusual circumstances of its origins, which deserve a wider circulation than that normally to be expected of a work dealing primarily and in detail with the politics and international relations of a single country.

The book is in fact the product—though not the sole product—of a project backed by the governments of both states, with the twin aims of creating a 'constituency' of leading citizens in the United States for the purpose of creating and analysing United States policy towards Peru through study, discussion and dialogue with policy-makers, and of improving relations between the two countries. It owes its origin to Dr. Sharp's own experience as director of the Staff Training Center of the Peace Corps and as director of the Latin American and Education Programs of the Adlai Stevenson Institute, and it was under the auspices of the latter body that it was put into effect. But the original inspiration came from the dictum of Barbara Ward that 'bad foreign policy derives partially from the lack of a constituency' (Preface).

It was an essential part of the project that it should result in effective communication of ideas, and that neither disagreements nor a lack of consensus would be concealed in the language of compromise. Groups were kept small, discussions were confidential and interpreters were not employed, for the same reason. It was intended that papers should be 'policy-orientated', seeking to identify the results of past policy and the possible alternatives to it, and, on the evidence of this book, this appears to have been in the main accomplished. An outstanding example is the important paper on the fisheries dispute by David C. Loring, to which is appended a critique by Vice-Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa, Peruvian Navy (retired). Two other excellent examples are Luigi Einaudi's assessment of United States relations with the Peruvian military, and the study by Bruce A. Blomstrom and W. Bowman Cutter of the role of he foreign private sector.

How well has the project succeeded? Certainly, from the recent course of relations between the two countries, there is reason to suppose that it has been beneficial, for communication on both sides has been more

effective than the potential for confrontation would have suggested. There is still a long way to go, however, and a wider circulation of the issues involved is in itself an essential part of a successful outcome.

PETER CALVERT

Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina. By Jeane Kirkpatrick. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The M.I.T. Press. 1971. 262 pp. Index. (M.I.T. Studies in Comparative Politics.) $12·50. £5·85.*

A BOOK about Peronist Argentina should have been of special significance at a time when Perón apparently was attempting to stage a political come-back. But this book would not have helped the reader to assess his chances of success. In fact, the subtitle, which suggests a study of Argentina while Perón was in power, is misleading in that it is mainly concerned with *Peronismo* in the mid-1960s. The study offers a competent survey of the historical background and goes on to an extensive analysis of an opinion poll based on a massive questionnaire; between the main questions and subsidiaries it called for close on 200 replies. The operation was carried out in 1965 with an adequate and carefully selected sample of over 2,000. Appendices list the questions and describe the highly professional way in which the poll was carried out. The chances are that the results are as accurate as those of any other opinion poll as properly conducted; but many of these results hardly add to what was already known. It did not require a poll to discover that the bulk of the support for *Peronismo* comes from the working and lower middle classes. Any competent observer, as long ago as 1945, or during the election of early 1946, could have said as much. Professor Kirkpatrick properly devotes considerable attention to the church. But again, a poll is hardly necessary to discover that the bulk of the population of Argentina is Catholic, that there are more free thinkers among the relatively rich and better educated than among the poor, and that regular attendance at mass is more frequent among the wealthy, for whom, as in most Catholic countries, it is a social act as much as a devotional exercise. It would have been interesting to know how many women approved Perón's promise of religious instruction in state schools; it certainly led, in 1946, to parish priests electioneering at the church door at the end of Sunday mass. It would have been equally interesting to learn something about the effect of his attempt to remove the legal disabilities of illegitimate children (his first disagreement with the church), of his legalisation of divorce and prostitution and his proposal to separate church and state. But these questions were not asked. Nothing in the book suggests that an astute military politician like General Lanusse, who spent four years in gaol after an attempt to overthrow Perón in 1951, would be willing to take the risk of allowing the ex-president's return, in the expectation, perhaps, that Perón would destroy himself; that self-destruction may have begun in Rome when he failed to obtain an audience with the Pope on the eve of his return to Argentina.

Professor Kirkpatrick's conclusions, expressed in a manner so elaborate as to be almost obscure, are no different from those of other competent observers. Briefly, Argentina's political leaders are more concerned with imposing their own opinions than in reflecting those of the mass of their countrymen; in some respects Perón came nearest for a time to reflecting

mass aspirations. But, in general, intransigence rather than compromise is the keynote of their performance. It is perhaps a legacy of hispanic *machismo*. It was Clémenceau who said that Argentina was a country which would progress in spite of its leaders. The book is competently indexed.

J. A. CAMACHO

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations. By H. Duncan Hall. Introduction by Sir Robert Menzies. *London, New York, Melbourne: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 1971. 1,015 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £10·00.*

THIS monumental study is a fitting culmination to the work of its author, as historian, and observer, and one might say practitioner, of the Commonwealth: for as a senior official of the League of Nations from 1927 to 1939 he had many missions to Commonwealth countries, he served on the British Raw Materials Mission in Washington during the Second World War, and attended most of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conferences after it as a special adviser.

Sir Robert Menzies observes in an introduction to the book that 'Duncan Hall is, by instinct and practice, a student. He digs deeply for the facts. His source materials must be authentic', and he goes on to describe the book as 'a masterpiece. . . . As one much involved in Commonwealth affairs over many years, I have learned so much from this book that I can never be sufficiently grateful for it.'

After this tribute, a reviewer must content himself with a description of the work. It is constructed as a history, but the problem of choice between a survey of the Commonwealth moving forward in time on a broad front and an analytical study of certain determining themes is well solved by the introduction of the second at key points in the first. The first six chapters take the story from the middle of the 19th century through the first Colonial Conferences to the emergence of the Commonwealth from 1911 to 1918. The consultation and decision on the prolongation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911 is taken as the first Commonwealth act and a remark of Grey in this context is quoted: 'If there is to be a common foreign policy, it is obviously one on which the Dominions must be taken into consultation, which they must know, which they must understand, and which they must approve.'

Here the author turns aside to describe the name and naming of the Commonwealth, and the first phase from 1907 to 1946 of India's unique position in the Commonwealth. Three chapters then cover the Peace Conference 1919, followed by an account of the Smuts proposal for Commonwealth constitutional reform, which looked forward in part to the Statute of Westminster, but proved to be still premature in 1921. A long chapter follows on the handling of foreign policy in the Commonwealth from 1911 until 1952, the accession year of Elizabeth II, and serves as a thematic introduction to the remainder of the book. Here the evolution of the Commonwealth is traced from 1923 to 1957 with special attention to the transfer of power in India and Pakistan and the departure of Burma and Ireland.

It is significant that, apart from some brief references to events in the 1960s, the story is brought to an end in 1957 and the Afterword (chapter XXVIII) offers neither judgment on the contemporary state of the Commonwealth nor prediction on its future. Perhaps the judgment of the historian is that those were indeed the closing years.

There is hardly a page on which there is not some memorable or thought-provoking judgment, and the fine scholarship brought to bear on many Commonwealth negotiations—often with new material, as in the fascinating comparison of drafts of the Balfour Declaration—makes the work a mine of information. But it is sustained too by an unusual economy and elegance of style. Short and beautifully balanced sentences, salted with sharp and often witty perceptions, make the book a pleasure to read; and the whole has, in the handling of issues and the judgments made, a pragmatism which expresses, as few books have done, the very spirit of the Commonwealth.

J. E. S. Fawcett

The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, The League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933. By Christopher Thorne. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1972. 442 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £6·95.*

Contemporary historians and political scientists will find this book compulsive reading. Those interested in the Manchurian crisis of 1931–33 will welcome a succinct account of the military conflict in the Far East, together with an analysis of reactions at Geneva and in the main Western capitals based on careful and extensive research in important public and private sources of evidence, several of them opened to research within the last five years. Those interested in the wider issues of the origins of the Second World War will welcome a critical examination of the significance of the Manchurian crisis in relation to other so-called 'turning points' such as the Rhineland crisis of 1936. Those with interests lying outside the interwar period will welcome a book which breaks with the conventions of the narrative monograph in order to study the interplay between public opinion, national policy and international affairs; moreover, the study is constructed according to a belief that 'theoretical models . . . provided they are flexible enough always to respond to and be refined by the material to which they are applied . . . can at least assist the student in recognising and finding his way through the plethora of considerations to which foreign policy gives rise' (p. xiv). The author hopes to contribute a little to bridging the gap between historians and others interested in international relations (p. xv), and he has succeeded admirably. The book is original in three important ways; in its use of new evidence, its new interpretation, and its conceptual organisation.

One of the main conclusions reached by the author is that 'without accepting a high risk of extensive costs there was little that the United States, Britain and France, singly or even together, could do to make the Japanese surrender over Manchuria. At the same time there were those powerful considerations on the other side that made it impossible to accept what was being done with total indifference' (p. 416). This was the nub of the Manchurian crisis so far as the Western powers and the League were concerned, and it accounts for the title of the book, which is in three parts. Part I describes Far Eastern problems, policies and influential personalities, as well as impersonal economic and military forces, then summarises

Western policies and attitudes over a period dating back to the 1921 Washington naval conference and beyond. A world view of the background to the Manchurian crisis is thereby created with an imaginative yet firm grasp of the situation (see, for example, pp. 15–16). The crisis itself is examined in Part II, but it cannot be taken separately because many details on personalities, policies, military equipment, etc., vital to an understanding of events are to be found in the earlier part of the book. Although Part II is basically chronological, chapters are subdivided into summaries of events in the Far East, official reactions in the West, analyses of how decisions were reached or attitudes formed, and finally theoretical discussions of the total situation. Part III contains a discussion of the significance of the Manchurian crisis in the light of later events such as Pearl Harbour, together with conclusions on the outcome of the crisis itself.

In the light of new British documents released under the thirty-year rule, there was a need for a study of British policy to replace R. Bassett, *Democracy and Foreign Policy*,[1] published twenty years ago. One might have wished for a more detailed discussion of Lord Reading's policy and motivations at Geneva, but otherwise British policy is handled well, Simon in particular being cleared of long-standing charges of cynicism while not being whitewashed (for example, p. 95). French policy is also treated convincingly in spite of the continued closure of important documentary sources, though one feels that divisions among directors of French policy and in particular Briand's inadequacy through illness are over-emphasised by the author in view of his evidence (see, for example, pp. 78, 142, 146–147). American policy has been more widely researched in recent years, but the author has used all the important American sources to such advantage that he has been able to reach independent judgments on a number of important points (see, for example, pp. 108, 170). League actions are examined in the light of new material from archives at Geneva made available under a forty-year rule, and one finds a careful analysis of League methods together with a sympathetic assessment of its inadequacies.

The author has exercised a rare combination of skills in handling sources scrupulously as a historian while discussing the significance of principles underlying foreign policy as a political scientist. His bibliography is a testimony to the extensive research and systematic thought that went into the making of this book.

NEVILLE WAITES

The War Hitler Won: September 1939. By Nicholas Bethell. *London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 1972. 472 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·00.*

Britain Alone: June 1940–June 1941. By Herbert Agar. *London, Sydney, Toronto: The Bodley Head. 1972. 227 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·50.*

NICHOLAS BETHELL'S book is a study of the first two or three months of what was to become the Second World War, and attempts to describe the effect of Hitler's war on Poland on the diplomatic and military situation of the major powers in 1939: Germany, Poland, Russia, Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and the Dominions. The subject is an important and

[1] London: Longmans Green for the L.S.E. 1952. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1953, p. 229.

timely one, for what has been needed for some time is a comprehensive and fully documented study of how the *Blitzkrieg* that was unleashed on September 1, 1939, became the overture to the Second World War and not merely an isolated event on its own, or even a different kind of 'Munich', with the military events this time preceding the formal political 'sell-out'.

It is also a complex subject, covering an extremely wide canvas, and for a writer to do it full justice on this scale would have required deeper original research than the recently available British Cabinet and Foreign Office material in the Public Record Office. The author, who is not an academic historian, has restricted his original research to the PRO papers, and consequently his book is largely about British and French reactions to the new military and political situation created by the events of September and October 1939. In view of this he might have produced a better book had he restricted the scope of his study to the changes effected in (and on) British and French policy and titled his book accordingly. As it is, an obvious lack of balance has crept into the book because Bethell has tried to cover too wide an area without, in many cases, sufficient documentation to balance what he has used from the PRO. This is particularly true with regard to three topics. His account of Russo-German relations at the time is rather general, even though it is based on Series D of *Documents on German Foreign Policy*.[1] Yet in a study of this nature one could have expected that the published documents would have been supplemented by unpublished papers from the German Foreign Office, while surprisingly enough the author makes no reference at all to Gerhard Weinberg's important study of Nazi-Soviet relations. The German campaign in Poland as well, especially in view of its revolutionary nature in the history of warfare, deserved a thoroughly documented account based on German military documents. Even Anglo-American relations and the changes in American policy are viewed largely through PRO eyes. Unaccountably the author failed to use the important series of published documents of *Foreign Relations of the United States*.[2] One could also have wished for a better account of Russo-Polish relations during the first fortnight of September, and certainly much more on Anglo-Russian relations at the time.

Although Bethell has brought out some interesting points regarding the conflicts and counter-arguments in British policy and Anglo-French relations at the time—the appeasement-minded group around the Duke of Westminster, useful information about Anglo-Irish relations and the ports question, Britain's relations with the Dominions, and the mischievous undertakings of the pseudo 'peacemaker' Dahlerus—one could, nevertheless, have expected a more controlled narrative throughout. We have the choicest titbits from the PRO, with even choicer (and at times unnecessary) commentary from the author, but presented in such a way that one rapidly loses all real sense of the timing of different political and military moves and their effect upon the essential *evolvement* of policy. Different pieces of the jigsaw are to be found in different chapters when they could so easily have been drawn together more coherently, and in fact should have been. In short, the book is a disappointment and one can only hope that a definitive study of the subject will one day emerge.

Herbert Agar's book is also disappointing. A journalist, he was one of those Americans who actively supported the notion of American involvement

[1] 1937–41. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
[2] Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

in the European struggle on the side of the democratic powers. Instead of using the opportunity to write a vivid memoir of his own experiences and struggles, and of American politics at the time, he has chosen instead, unwisely as it turns out, to write a rehash of other histories of the period. Only one chapter specifically describes the American scene, and one has to be careful not to miss Agar's few references to himself in the narrative.

JOHN P. FOX

A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919. By Sir James Headlam-Morley. Ed. by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna Cienciala. *London: Methuen. 1972. 230 pp. Index. £4·60.*

ONE could easily be misled by the title of this book into supposing that it contains Sir James Headlam-Morley's general impressions and recollections of the Paris peace conference, which he attended as a representative of the British Political Intelligence Department. In fact it is a detailed account of his activities during the whole period of the conference, based on official minutes and memoranda, private letters and diary extracts collected together by his capable secretary, Miss Mary Hughes, and edited by his daughter Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna Cienciala. Publication has been delayed by the Foreign Office, in which Headlam-Morley served as historical adviser from 1919 until his death in 1929, which has only recently granted permission for some of the material to be made available, presumably in the wake of the introduction of the thirty-year rule. Unfortunately, there is virtually nothing in the book which has not already been recorded elsewhere or which sheds new light on British attitudes and policies during the peace negotiations. Indeed, unless the reader is familiar with the proceedings at the Paris peace conference as recorded by Mantoux, Hankey, Lloyd George and other major participants, he will find it difficult to relate Headlam-Morley's diary extracts and memoranda to the actual decisions taken at the conference, or to assess the significance of his contribution to the final peace settlement.

During the course of the peace conference, Headlam-Morley, with no official duties and time on his hands, was 'called in by the Prime Minister to advise both about the Saar Valley and Danzig' (p. 78), on which questions he was greatly interested. As the pace of the conference quickened, he found himself 'day after day . . . producing drafts' concerning the future administration of the Saar and Danzig, 'which are rejected even more quickly than they are brought to life' for reasons which were not always clearly explained to him (p. 81). As he ruefully remarked in a letter to Philip Kerr, 'I am a little in the dark as to the attitude of the Council of Four with regard to Danzig' (p. 72). In view of Headlam-Morley's ignorance about high-level decision-making, it is not surprising that his papers do not reveal the precise nature or extent of his contribution to the final Saar and Danzig settlements, or to the minority provisions embodied in the peace treaties, with which he was also concerned.

What does emerge, however, is a distinct impression of the unorganised and haphazard way in which the delegates framed the peace treaties, starting at a painfully slow pace and finishing up, in a madly undignified scramble, with a treaty which Headlam-Morley castigates as 'quite impossible and indefensible' (p. 103), because although 'a defence can be made of each

one of the individual clauses, . . . if any responsible person had read through the whole at leisure, he would have felt that the cumulative effect would be such that a thorough revision must be made' (in a letter to Smuts, May 1919, p. 118). Headlam-Morley had earlier suggested such a procedure, but like many of the constructive and sensible proposals recorded in his papers, it went unheeded.

Though Headlam-Morley's comments are interesting, they lack the breadth and sparkle of Nicolson's diary extracts in his *Peacemaking, 1919*,[1] or the pungency of Keynes's contemporary criticisms. Nor do his papers contain any invaluable records of high-level meetings of British Empire delegates or of Allied representatives. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the brief introductory summary of Headlam-Morley's life by his daughter, and one wishes it had been longer and the peace conference extracts shorter. A brief acquaintance with many of his Foreign Office memoranda of the 1920s, a few of which were published in his *Studies in Diplomatic History*,[2] leads the reviewer to believe that a collection of papers embodying his views on British foreign policy in the 1920s would be of far greater interest than this slim volume on such a well-worn theme as the Paris peace conference.

RUTH HENIG

Walther Rathenau and the Weimar Republic: The Politics of Reparations. By David Felix. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins Press. 1971. 210 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·30.*

THE short life of the Weimar Republic was burdened, in many cases virtually to breaking point, by the tremendous problems created for it by the Treaty of Versailles. It says something for the German character that in this time of adversity so many tremendous personalities came to the fore in German public life. The author, an ex-journalist and then an intellectual historian, has chosen to write about two closely knit examples of the problems and personalities of the Weimar Republic: reparations and Walther Rathenau, the latter being of particular note as a public figure because he was a Jew. Based on an impressive list of archival and bibliographical sources, Felix covers the years 1921 and 1922 when Rathenau, first as Minister of Reconstruction and then as Foreign Minister until his assassination, was most intimately concerned with the problem that was crippling Germany's economic life at the time.

Although he gives a general description and outline of the main developments connected with reparations in the first two or three years of the life of the Treaty of Versailles, the end result of Professor Felix's labours is, however, far from being totally satisfactory. Certainly, it cannot be denied that both subjects, reparations and Rathenau, are complex and difficult to analyse and describe clearly. Nevertheless, two things appear to have contributed to make this book fall short of the standard it should have achieved. The first concerns the title and what one really finds in the book. It appears that Professor Felix was not sure himself whether he should be writing a general study of Anglo-French-German negotiations on the reparations problem, with a consequent analysis of British and French policy and

[1] London: Constable. 1933.
[2] London: Methuen. 1930.

motives in the whole exercise (as Edward W. Bennett did so successfully with his study *Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, 1931* [1]), or whether he should in fact be proceeding more strictly along the lines indicated by his title. What he has done is to fall between two stools by attempting both at the same time, with a consequent lack of depth in his analysis and documentation of either.

The second point really follows on from this, and concerns Professor Felix's technical approach to his subject. Too often the reader is left hanging in the air about what was actually said or discussed at important international negotiations, or even in German cabinet meetings. The student of modern diplomatic history should expect something more than continual references to 'see so and so for the details', and the substitution of somewhat facile 'analytical' comments for the real meat. Even if he had simply used the published version of the *Tagebuch* to better effect, the reader would have learnt more about Rathenau's discussions with Loucheur in June 1921 and about his visit to London at the end of November. These examples are duplicated throughout the book, and become particularly irritating when press articles, memoirs and even cabinet conclusions are preferred to the proper documentation essential in any study involving international diplomacy. Too often, then, one longs to know exactly what were the particulars of Rathenau's stand and the development of his arguments in his negotiations with the British and the French.

All this is a pity since a concentrated study of Rathenau's role in the reparations question would have been a valuable contribution to the history of the 1920s. As it is, what Professor Felix has produced is a general study, which at times fails to make either Rathenau or reparations clear or understandable. Moreover, at times Felix adopts a too overtly mocking tone towards the personalities he deals with, and in one case, that of Alfred Hugenberg, mistakenly refers to him as Hitler's Vice-Chancellor. The author also goes much too far in one of his analytical comments—when he attributes the ultimate success of Nazism to Rathenau's failures over reparations in 1921 and 1922. However, until somebody updates Karl Bergmann's classic work,[2] Professor Felix's book will have to remain a somewhat unhappy substitute study of German reparations policy at the beginning of the 1920s.

JOHN P. FOX

Peace and Counterpeace: From Wilson to Hitler. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. *New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row. 1971. 585 pp. Illus. Index. $12.95.*

'OUR office will be in New York, and there you will sit and do things.' When the first editor of *Foreign Affairs*, A. C. Coolidge, wrote these engagingly simple joining instructions in 1920 to his young assistant, he no doubt judged that he had made a good choice. But he could hardly have guessed that Hamilton Fish Armstrong would be 'doing things' from his base at *Foreign Affairs* for half-a-century, during which time he would make it one of the world's most distinguished and influential international journals.

[1] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1962. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1963, p. 445.
[2] *History of Reparations* (New York: Houghton. 1927).

This large book covers only the first dozen years, a period when American internationalists found themselves swimming against a strong tide of isolationism. A journal advocating virtually any American involvement in European affairs was not only attacked but accused of engaging in party politics. It is one of Mr. Armstrong's major achievements that he built up his journal's reputation for truthfulness and balanced views without paying the price of becoming merely platitudinous.

To make the necessary international contacts for *Foreign Affairs*, he travelled widely in Europe, backed by all the necessary introductions to political circles. The issues which concerned him have long since passed into history and most of the relevant documents are available to scholars. Presumably Mr. Armstrong used a good deal of this material himself in books and articles written at the time. In this period, 1920–32, he remained very faithful to his first love, the new Yugoslavia, where he knew everyone who mattered from the king downwards and was able to exchange intimacies more effectively than elsewhere. Nevertheless the leading actors in other countries were available to him, from Wilson and House, Mazaryk and Benes, Venizelos and Sforza in the early years to Hitler and Mussolini at the end. Western Europe is less fully covered though he knew Poincaré and Tardieu fairly well and met Austen Chamberlain, Robert Cecil and others in Britain.

The story is pleasantly and unpretentiously told, even if, so long after the events, some of the high-level chat seems doubtfully worth recording at such length. The practical product of these journeys was of course a stream of articles for *Foreign Affairs*, written by the leading actors on the European stage, which helped a limited but important section of American opinion to penetrate the curtain which then separated most of the United States from external and especially from European developments. In achieving this, Mr. Armstrong and his journal did much to prepare the next generation of Americans for the tremendous international responsibilities which were to fall upon their shoulders in the Second World War and after.

KENNETH YOUNGER

Diplomat: Memoirs of a Swedish Envoy in London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Washington. By Gunnar Hagglof. Foreword by Graham Greene. *London, Sydney, Toronto: The Bodley Head. 1972. 221 pp. Index. £2·50.*

THIS is an attractive book by Gunnar Hagglof, the doyen of Swedish diplomats, for nineteen years Swedish ambassador in London, and one of the principal negotiators of the trade agreements with Germany and Great Britain during the war. He was part of the *jeunesse dorée* of his day, and he came into the diplomatic service, where he served with great distinction, almost by accident. He carries his story down to VE Day.

What is interesting about this book is the way in which the author skates lightly over the Swedish acquiescence in the German demand that a German division should be allowed transit through Sweden on its way to Russia. With the wisdom of hindsight, one must admit that Swedish neutrality during the war was a pearl of great price. But the Norwegians saw it as a betrayal; just as the Finns saw it as a betrayal when the Swedes refused to take action against the Russians in the winter war of 1939–40; and as the Danes felt

betrayed when the Swedish-Norwegian monarchy in the end declined to come to their help against Austria and Prussia in 1864. All these political acts can be convincingly defended.

About Graham Greene's introduction, the less said the better. 'In the last war,' he writes, 'Denmark lost a few lives in a token resistance and afterwards collaborated with the Germans hardly less than Vichy' (p. 7). This reviewer has some knowledge of what the Danish resistance movement did during the war, and has no hesitation in describing Graham Greene's remark as rubbish. Just to take one point: how does he imagine that the Jews got out of Denmark and into Sweden during some of the Nazis' worst excesses?

THOMAS BARMAN

Brytningsar: Erindringer 1923–1953. By John Lyng. *Oslo: Cappelens Forlag. 1972. 260 pp. Illus. Index.*

A LAWYER turned politician, what could be more ordinary? Yet John Lyng, prime minister of Norway in 1963, in the first non-socialist government after the war, makes an interesting story of it. It is true that he stops this volume in the year 1953 and deals therefore only with his early life. But he tells of his experiences with a straightforward simplicity that is endearing.

He began as a young radical, under the influence of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, with near-communist sympathies. But he gravitated to the Conservatives and in 1953 became the vice-chairman of the Norwegian Conservative Parliamentary Party. He played a prominent part in the Resistance in his native town of Trondheim, but he had to seek safety, most reluctantly, in Sweden in 1943, where he was given a legal job in the Norwegian Legation, as it then was. In 1944 he came to London and worked in the Department of Justice. He compares the situation of the Norwegian 'emigrants' in London with that of those in Sweden. In Stockholm they felt more free than in London, partly because of the overwhelming presence of the Norwegian government in London. By comparison with other governments in exile, the Norwegian had a strong position in London and this led it to have a somewhat domineering relationship with the emigrants. On his return to Norway in 1945 he became prosecutor in one of the big treason trials. And he comments: 'Up to April 9, 1940, generation after generation had lived in this country without experiencing a single trial of a Norwegian for treason.'

THOMAS BARMAN

Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification. 2nd ed. By Irving Louis Horowitz. *New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1972. 556 pp. Index. £6·75; paperback: £1·80.*

The second revised edition of a book first published in 1967 and reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1967, p. 742. Our reviewer then said: 'The author, a sociologist, adopts a multi-disciplinary approach and is concerned with the full scope of his subject. Analysing "development" within the contexts of the American, Soviet and the Third Worlds, he identifies major economic, social and military facts which could provide a useful basis for an attempt at the "international stratification" promised in the subtitle.'

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

International Bibliography of Air Law 1900–1971. By Wybo P. Heere. Foreword by Eugène Pépin. Leyden: *Sijthoff; Dobbs Ferry: Oceana. 1972. 569 pp. Index. Fl. 78.00.*

This bibliography is excellently produced and easy to use. It contains some 10,000 classified references to books and articles on air law, from Europe, the Americas, Japan and Australia, with author and subject indexes. It does not include the law of outer space. Within each section the entries are arranged by publication date, a system which facilitates the study of the development of the subject. Supplements are planned as new material becomes available.

The Middle East and North Africa 1972–3. 19th ed. *London: Europa. 1972. 931 pp. Maps. Bibliog. £8·50.*

This very useful reference book contains, among others, articles by Lord Caradon and Michael Adams on the Arab-Israeli dispute and by Michael Field on oil in the Middle East and North Africa.

There follows a section on regional organisations and nearly 700 pages of country surveys. Instead of the general bibliography at the end, it might be more useful to list only recent books with perhaps a brief annotation.

Handbook of Latin American Studies: No. 33. Ed. by Donald E. J. Stewart. *Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1971. 542 pp. Index. $25.00.*

In spite of the ever increasing number of publications on the social sciences in Latin America, the editors have, by rigorous selection, kept this excellent bibliography to a manageable size. A welcome improvement is the greatly enlarged and more detailed subject index.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

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CHUANG, Richard Y.: *The International Air Transport Association*: A Case Study of a Quasi-Governmental Organization. Leyden: Sijthoff. 1972. 185 pp. Bibliog. Index. Fl. 35.00.

HADLEY, Guy: *CENTO: The Forgotten Alliance.* Brighton: University of Sussex, Institute for the Study of International Organization. 1971. 47 pp. (ISIO Monographs. First Series, No. 4.) £0·75. $2.00.

HARBOTTLE, Michael: *The Blue Berets.* London: Leo Cooper. 1971. 157 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £2·50.

JORDAN, Robert S. (Ed.): *International Administration*: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications. New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1971. 299 pp. Bibliog. Index. £1·80.

KAFKA, Alexandre: *The IMF: The Second Coming?* Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University. 1972. 43 pp. (Essays in International Finance, No. 94.)

LYON, Peyton V.: *NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument.* Foreword by Ronald S. Ritchie. Toronto: Atlantic Council of Canada. 1970. 38 pp. $1.00.

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NORTHEDGE, F. S.: *Order and the System of International Politics.* Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. 1971. 94 pp. (Lecture Series No. 2.)

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CORRECTIONS

On page 99 of the January 1973 issue of *International Affairs* the price of *International Disputes*: The Legal Aspects. Report of a Study Group of The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies (London: Europa Publications for The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. 1972) was wrongly given as £5·50. It is £3·50. We apologise for the error.

The reference to the Report in the footnote to page 52 of the January 1973 issue of *International Affairs* should have read: A limited number of copies of the Report are available on request to Chatham House for 50p plus postage.

BOOKS REVIEWED, APRIL 1973

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 49 JULY 1973 No. 3

THE RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF AN INDIVIDUAL TO ENTER, STAY IN AND LEAVE A COUNTRY *

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IT is commonplace to speak of the right of freedom of movement as a human right. What we mean by a human right, or how we identify a human right—in contradistinction to mere social or political aspirations—is another question. While it is possible to advance a variety of definitions,[1] I myself find acceptable the view that human rights are 'a compilation of those claims of individuals and groups respecting their relation to authority and society which most contemporary societies perceive as basic and which the claimants assert with particular energy'.[2] A less relativist definition may be preferred by those holding a different philosophy. In any event, the very subjectivity of the criteria, together with the manner in which human rights claims are in fact formulated (often in the meetings of international organisations, sometimes directly addressing the issue at hand, and sometimes indirectly through the handling of other agenda items) have inevitably meant a continuing pressure for the expansion of the 'list' of human rights. The 'list' looks somewhat larger today than in 1948. The many newly independent countries have caused a greater emphasis to be placed on claims that were already classified as human rights,[3] and made efforts for new rights to be accepted.[4] Again, scientific developments and technological changes have made even more important certain other human rights.[5] Thus the social context influences the

* This article is based on a lecture given to the Yale Law School in April 1973.

[1] See M. Cranston, *What are Human Rights?* (New York: Basic Books. 1963); Castberg, 'Natural Law and Human Rights', I *Human Rights Journal* 14 (1968); R. Bilder, 'Rethinking international human rights: some basic questions', II *Human Rights Journal* 557 (1969), pp. 559–561.

[2] Bilder, p. 560.

[3] For example, the claim to self-determination was dealt with in 1950 by the General Assembly in resolution 421 D(V), and the decision to include such a right in the projected International Covenant or Covenants was taken in resolution 545(VI) in 1952. Similarly, provisions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources were drafted for the Covenants in 1952 by the Commission on Human Rights. But the assertion of these rights has become politically and legally more important.

[4] For example, the granting of prisoner-of-war status to guerrilla groups. This has been under consideration both in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and at a conference of experts on human rights in armed conflict convened in 1972 by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

[5] Including the right to privacy, mentioned in Article 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

importance which we place upon certain human rights. But, this being said, the right to enter one's country, to stay in a country which one has legally entered, and to leave any country including one's own, have been perceived as basic since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948.

When individuals claim human rights relating to freedom of movement, they are referring to the same facts and situations that states are concerned with when they assert jurisdiction over their own nationals and over resident aliens. The international law of jurisdiction is the means by which states allocate competence, between themselves, for the prescription and application of authority over events inside and outside their national boundaries. And this allocation of state competence [6] is the obverse side of the coin that we normally perceive as 'human rights relating to freedom of movement'. It is salutary to remind ourselves of how the issues present themselves from the perspective of the state. A state needs, within certain limitations, to control the movement and behaviour of individuals and corporations. It seeks to control incoming and outgoing shipping and aviation, the importation and outflow of capital. The state's interest in the movement of individuals is, from its perspective, just one small part of this large process. From the point of view of the individual—whether he is a Soviet Jew seeking to go to Israel, an Arab wishing to return to Palestine, or an East African Asian expelled from Uganda—he is trying to assert certain fundamental human rights.

The rights of entry, sojourn and exit are indivisible: the denial of any one makes the assertion of the others a chimera rather than a reality. Moreover, they flow inexorably from the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a state. Further, these rights of mobility are inextricably intertwined with certain other human rights.

As early as 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated that 'everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State' (Article 13 (1)). Article 13 (2) went on to refer to 'the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country'. These broadly stated standards are bolstered by the prohibition against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Article 9); the provision that everyone has the right 'to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution'; the stipulation in Article 15 (1) that everyone has a right to a nationality and, in Article 15 (2), shall not be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or denied his right to change his nationality. Yet other Articles of the Declaration have an important bearing on the right of freedom of movement enun-

[6] Which includes, of course, denials of responsibility, for example, for a stateless person.

ciated in Articles 13 (1) and 13 (2): we may mention Article 3, on personal liberty, Article 4 on slavery, Article 7 on equality before the law, Article 8 on the right to an effective remedy, Article 10 on fair trial in the determination of rights and obligations, Article 14 on asylum, and Article 17 on property. Above all, on the topic of freedom of movement we must mention the prohibition against discrimination set forth in Article 2 of the Declaration, for the most frequent reason for the departure of decisions from the standards of Article 13 is discrimination. Yet discrimination is there declared prohibited on grounds of sex, race, religion, political opinion or national origin.

On December 16, 1966, the General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 12 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

> 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
> 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
> 3. The above mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (*ordre public*), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in the present Covenant.
> 4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

Furthermore, Article 5 of the 1967 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires states parties to provide equality before the law for all, without distinction as to race, colour or national or ethnic origin, notably in the enjoyment of the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country.

Freedom of movement within a territory

Although the Soviet Union and South Africa are notable exceptions, this is a widely accepted right. The direction of labour is not unknown in wartime in Anglo-American history, but states seem to feel that the control they normally require over persons does not necessitate or entitle them to restrict the movement of nationals—save, no doubt, into highly sensitive areas being used for military planning purposes. If government control of residence, for racial or other reasons, is unusual, *de facto* segregation is, as we know, an all too pervasive problem. The position that states take with regard to the internal mobility of corporations is comparable to the extent that there seems to be a general prohibition against the forced location of companies in specific areas.

When governments have economic reasons for wishing corporations to be located in particular areas (for example, depression and high unemployment in those areas) the norm will be for persuasion to be used. In the United Kingdom such persuasion has, in recent years, been through labour cost subsidies, investment grants, tax allowances and depreciation allowances. But the government retains the right to forbid location in congested areas—the mechanism of planning permission swings into action, first at the local level, and with the decision ultimately in the hands of the Secretary of State.

The right to enter a territory

Although freedom of travel is a widely proclaimed objective, and although many instruments both urge and provide for the abolition of visas as between the signatories, there is no general right for an alien to obtain entry into another country. If he is escaping persecution, he has the right to seek asylum; but no state is obliged to give it to him, save in so far as its own traditions of hospitality dictate.

Is there a general right of entry for a national? We may recall that Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration stipulates the right 'of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country'. The 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, mindful of the possibility of the existence of passport holders who had never yet been to their country of nationality, spoke of the right not to be 'arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country'. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination again reverts to the phrase 'to return to one's own country'.

It is wholly exceptional—and contrary to international law—for a resident national to be refused re-entry to his country on political grounds.[7] But clearly that does not dispose of the matter. In the United Kingdom it is only recently—in the Immigration Act of 1972—that statutory confirmation has been given to the right of resident United Kingdom citizens to re-enter at will. This codifies what presumably was previously a common law right. As another writer has pointed out,[8] it is something of a new departure for UK legislation on citizenship to go beyond the formalities of acquisition and loss of nationality, and to deal with the rights and duties of citizenship.

But if it is now made clear by statute that resident citizens can enter at will, what is the position of non-resident passport holders?

[7] The position of those who left the United States in order to avoid military service in Vietnam is not entirely comparable. There is no bar upon their return to the United States in formal terms; but the absence of an amnesty is an effective bar, because the consequences of re-entry may well be imprisonment. But this is true of all categories of fugitive offenders.

[8] J. E. S. Fawcett, 'British Nationality and the Commonwealth', *The Round Table*, April 1973, p. 260.

This is a complex question, admitting of what appear to be somewhat different answers on the levels of international law and domestic law respectively. In the days of Empire, when the Crown was undisputed head of the Commonwealth and Great Britain the motherland, birth within the Empire (including the Dominions) necessarily entailed allegiance on the one hand and a right to enter Britain on the other. They were all British subjects. But four of the Dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa—did not, by contrast, treat all British subjects equally. To some they denied a right to entry or residence. Further, as more and more territories became independent, they too closed off the automatic right of entry into their territories claimed by other British subjects around the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom continued the idea of a common UK citizenship, in order to avoid statelessness when Commonwealth territories became independent, issued their own nationality laws and some British subjects proved ineligible. But in 1962, for the first time, totally free entry from the Commonwealth into the United Kingdom was limited, being now reserved for a person who was born in the United Kingdom or was a UK citizen holding a UK passport. Immigration for those not falling in this category was to be on a quota basis, with a queue for applications.

In Kenya and Uganda the new independent governments allowed all residents there to choose between British nationality and Kenya or Uganda nationality. Many of the large group of persons of Indian origin who lived there, and were nervous of their future under black African rule, chose to retain their UK citizenship. In 1968 both the Labour government of the time and the Opposition argued that they fell outside those entitled to automatic entry under the 1962 Act. A small band of Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists opposed this view: they supported Iain Macleod, at one time Conservative Colonial Secretary, when he insisted that there had always been a clear understanding that the retention of UK passports by these Asians in Kenya and Uganda would entitle them to entry into the United Kingdom.[9] However, a majority was prepared to vote for the 1968 Immigration Act, which expressly excluded this group of passport holders from an automatic right of entry, and put them on the same footing, so far as immigration was concerned, as other Commonwealth citizens. The policy of Africanisation in Kenya and Uganda was making the position of British passport holders of Asian origin insecure. With uncertain prospects in East Africa, they found themselves unable to enter the United Kingdom. The domestic legal position appears to be that a passport does indeed carry with it a right of entry—but that the 1962 and 1968 Acts allow the United

[9] 'An open letter to Duncan Sandys from Iain Macleod', *The Spectator*, February 23, 1968.

Kingdom government to control the order and speed of the exercise of that right.[10]

A passport may, under UK domestic law, entitle a holder to enter the United Kingdom subject to the controls of the 1962 and 1968 Acts; whether a passport entitles the holder to claim a right of entry *under international law* is debated. Some would claim that it does. The United Kingdom believes otherwise, stating that the passport holder himself has no right under international law, though the United Kingdom has an obligation *vis à vis* the country in which its passport holder resides to accept that passport holder.[11] In other words, it is said to be an obligation as between states, and not a claim which the individual can make against the state issuing the passport (save only insofar as the domestic law of the latter provides). It is of course highly doubtful whether the United Kingdom has any such obligation in respect of a country manifestly in breach of international law by its wholesale and discriminatory expulsions. In other words, if country X wishes to expel an individual holding a UK passport, international law requires the United Kingdom to honour its obligation to country X and accept him. But if President Amin expels all British passport holders of Asian origin, this action being in itself unlawful, Britain has no obligation to Uganda to accept them. In the event, and to its great credit, the present government permitted, with maximum assistance and firmness of spirit, the entry of some 26,000 Asians expelled by General Amin, and holding British passports. But this it did on the grounds that their property and lives were at risk,[12] and not because, it is said, their passports *per se* entitled them to immediate entry or because any international law obligation was owed to Uganda.

Some of those from Kenya who were denied entry by the Labour government on the basis of the 1968 Act decided to take their case to the European Commission of Human Rights. They raised their application

[10] The United Kingdom position seems to accept that a passport carries with it a right of entry; but not necessarily (in the wake of the 1968 Act introduced by the Labour government) a right to enter immediately. Thus, the Home Secretary, Mr. Carr, said in October 1972, speaking of the UK passports that certain East African Asians held, 'such a passport, whether issued in London, or whether issued by our diplomatic posts overseas, carried and carries with it a right to come to Britain. . . . [In 1968] Parliament passed an Act which gave us the power, not to take away this basic right, but to control the speed at which it could be exercised.' Speech to Blackpool Conference 1972, Fourth Session.

[11] According to Lord Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor, 'in international law a state is under a duty as between other states to accept in its territories those of its nationals who have nowhere else to go.' 355 H.L.Deb., Sept. 14, 1972, col. 497.

[12] This position flowed from a response given in 1968 by James Callaghan, then Foreign Secretary, to those opposing the 1968 Immigration Act. Their question, his reply, and the subsequent firm action thereon by the Conservative government in 1972, saved the position for Uganda Asian passport holders expelled by Amin. Callaghan said: 'I was asked what we would do about a man who was thrown out of work and ejected from the country. We shall have to take him. We cannot do anything else in those circumstances.' 759 H.C.Deb., Feb. 28, 1968, col. 1501.

within the European Convention of Human Rights. This Convention, modelled on the Universal Declaration of 1948, with certain detailed rights specified, allows (for the parties accepting it) both an individual right of petition to the Commission and recognition of the ultimate jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The applicants complained of a prevention of family life (a right guaranteed under Article 8), that they had been denied liberty and security of person (under Article 5), and degrading treatment (Articles 3 and 14). The question has also arisen as to whether the provision in Article 5 (1) that 'everyone has the right to liberty and security of person' is tantamount to a right of entry as such for a passport holder. The right of an individual to enter or return to the country of which he is a national is certainly not explicitly accorded by the Convention; and the United Kingdom has denied that the Convention carries such an obligation. A fourth Protocol to the Convention itself is now in existence. This Protocol expressly provides for a right of entry for citizens. It is in force as between seven countries, but the United Kingdom is not a party. The fact that the right is expressly guaranteed by this Protocol is evidence, asserts the United Kingdom, that it is not guaranteed by the Convention.

The European Commission has already answered affirmatively on the admissibility of the applications. It has now conducted a series of private meetings with the British government and perhaps a clearer answer on the right of entry may emerge in the course of the next few months.

European constitutional practice on the right of entry is widely varied: we may contrast the British view with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, which expressly guarantees the right of entry of its nationals. The diversity of European practice on the specificity of a right to enter under national laws represents an experience that is universal. In 1962 Mr. José Ingles prepared an admirable study on discrimination in respect of the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. This was prepared for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.[13] In it he records that, so far as the right of a national to return to his country is concerned, in twenty-four countries the right is formally recognised in constitutional texts or laws and in twelve countries by judicial legislation. Forty-nine countries do not expressly recognise the right in their legislation. But Mr. Ingles correctly reminds us (and this is true of the right to leave as well) that the formal recognition of a right is not enough to ensure its employment. The law in practice may hedge the right with so many conditions as to make it nugatory. On the other hand, the absence of formal legal

[13] E/CN.4/Sub.2/220.

recognition does not necessarily negate the existence of the right. Som sixteen other countries indicated that they recognised, in effect, the righ of a national to return, despite the absence of a constitutional text.

The injunction on entry, of the Universal Declaration, the Covenan on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination o All Forms of Racial Discrimination, is clear. We may also add para graph 13 of the Schedule to the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons which entitles a stateless person who is the recipient of a trave document, under Article 28 thereof, to re-enter the territory of th issuing state at any time during the period of the validity of the docu ment. Equally clear is that of Protocol 4 of the European Conventio on Human Rights, even if the Convention itself provides ambiguou evidence. In formal terms, though, these instruments are of limite application. Nevertheless, on the general point of return of nationals the great bulk of national practice accords with the standards set i these Conventions, at least to the following extent: the great majorit of governments will not refuse a right of re-entry, nor indeed unequivo cally proclaim their right to refuse re-entry, to nationals normall resident. For resident nationals there is a legal right to return—a fac of paramount importance in the underpinning of the right to travel, an in the effective opening up of frontiers between nations.

What is the relevance, in legal terms, of a 'substantial link' with the country to which entry is claimed? This leads us inexorably into the area of nationality. If nationality is the concept by which people 'belong to states, it is perhaps not unreasonable for states to wish to insis upon some genuine link. The notion of genuine link in nationality is of course, by now well explored. The International Court of Justice has asserted [14] that a state may not be able to pursue the claim o its national against another state unless it can show some genuine link with its national—and a link greater that that which the claimant has with the respondent state. Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the Law of the High Seas speaks in somewhat broader terms of the necessity of a genuine link between ship and country of registration. We are speaking here of the proclaimed need of the international community, for the orderly allocation of competing claims of competence, to require some linkage between nationality and the granting state.[15] There is no comparable international stake in the insistence by a state that its nationals cannot enter immediately as of right save if they show some real and close link. (Under the UK 1972 Immigration Act, this link is that of residence of more than five years,

[14] In the *Nottebohm Case (Leichenstein* v. *Guatemala)*, ICJ *Reports*, 1955, p. 4.
[15] An examination of the desirability or otherwise of the notion of a genuine link is far beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say, however, that this writer is not sympathetic to the genuine link notion, and prefers the dissenting opinions to the majority opinion in the *Nottebohm Case*.

or the ability to show a parent or grandparent holding UK citizenship by birth, adoption or registration.) The objective, in requiring this 'substantial link' if nationality is to entitle one to immediate entry, is clearly a desire to control population inflow on grounds of colour. To be sure, non-patrial Australian passport holders are also denied a right of entry save through the immigration quota system; but the objective is to forestall a wave of immigration of Asians from East Africa and Chinese from Hong Kong.

It would be tempting at this juncture to make a detailed detour into the specific problems and practices concerning rights of entry of refugees. This is a vast topic in its own right, however, and must be resisted. Let it suffice to make the following brief remarks: aliens, including foreign nationals and stateless persons, are normally required to possess a valid passport or passport substitute when crossing a frontier. Where a refugee cannot fulfil these conditions, and indeed when he is obliged to enter illegally or clandestinely, then he may be subject to penalties, but will not normally be returned to the country where he faced persecution. Article 28 (1) of the Refugee Convention of 1951 provides for the issue of travel documents to refugees lawfully staying in the territory of a contracting state.[16]

In the meantime, regional arrangements go ahead for the enlargement of a right of entry to groups of non-nationals. Thus the nationals of the four Scandinavian countries may now travel freely throughout the region without travel documents; and comparable steps are evident in Article 29 of the 1961 Convention of the *Union Africaine et Malgache*. The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC of course also provides for the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital. Articles 47 and 48 stipulate free movement of workers who are nationals of member states. Two regulations and two directives—directly binding upon members—spell out how this shall be done. After three months, an EEC migrant who has a job must be issued with a residence permit. Further, once he has a job, he may bring in his family.

If international law indeed supports the right of resident nationals to re-enter their country, does this assist the Palestinians who wish to return to the lands where once they and their families lived? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights both speak of the right to return to one's country. Let us look at the question in its broad context, rather than resting on the precise legal status of these two instruments, or Israel's standing in relation to them. The preparatory work (*travaux préparatoires*) of both these instruments indicates that the phrase 'country' was

[16] Those wishing to pursue the particular problems of refugees can usefully refer to the excellent study by A. Grahl-Madsen, *The Status of Refugees in International Law* (Leyden: Sijthoff. 2 Vols. 1966–72).

understood to mean the state of which one is a national or permanent resident. It may therefore be argued that Israel is not 'their country' within the terms of the Declaration or Covenant (a point which stands quite separately from any evaluation of the rights and wrongs of 1948, or an understanding of how deeply Palestinians regard the land that was Palestine as 'their country'). Further, a right of return by a non-national can perhaps not reasonably be claimed when the country of one's residence is still in conflict with the land of one's origin. But it should also be realised that it is all too easy for a government to deprive a citizen of his nationality, thus depriving him of his right to return to the country of which he is a national. There is no avoiding a contextual examination of the circumstances in which nationality was lost. The refugee problem is indeed a necessary part of any overall political settlement in the Middle East; and it will only be resolved by a political, not a legal, solution.

The right of sojourn

The right of sojourn is reflected in the provisions, to which we have already referred, of Article 13 (1) of the Universal Declaration, namely 'Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State'. We may also recall that Article 3 stipulates that 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person'. The European Commission of Human Rights will shortly pronounce upon the issue (in the context of its own Convention, which contained comparable provisions) of whether this right of security refers only to physical security, or security in respect of one's liberty, family life, education and so forth. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration provides that 'no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile'. This does not seem to prohibit exile as such, but does perhaps indicate that a national shall not be denied the right to return to his country. But contemporary trends would certainly indicate that exile is not considered an appropriate form of punishment. A national whose presence is wholly undesirable in his own state cannot with reason or comity be wished upon another state. *De facto* exile can of course exist—in the sense that nationals abroad may fear punishment upon return. Here one has to look at the reasonableness of the penal measures that he fears. Is the 'exile' of those who avoided military service in Vietnam qualitatively different from those who left, and fear to return, because of an activity more generally accepted as 'criminal'? The social climate, rather than a legal rule, will give the answer.

An alien resident is entitled, in the matter of his sojourn as in others, to a minimum international standard; and thus he has a measure of protection against arbitrary expulsion, the sovereignty of the territorial state notwithstanding. He would thus seem to be able to claim

relief against expulsion that is arbitrary—in the sense of not having previously been convicted of having infringed the local law, or of having acted in a manner contrary to security or the public welfare. He can also with reason claim that expulsion on grounds of race, religion or ethnic origin is discriminatory and impermissible. A state, in seeking to exercise control over persons and resources, may deport an alien in breach of its laws and indeed decide, so long as it has reasonable grounds, to remove any individual on grounds of public policy, so long as due process of law is observed. What is not permissible is for a government to order the mass expulsion of a group of persons for discriminatory reasons. One can sympathise with the desire for Africanisation in newly independent African nations. But let it be said that Amin's expulsion of 40,000 Asians, simply on account of their Indian origin and because they held an important position in the commercial life of Uganda, was illegal.

Some additional protection is provided to refugees. The Refugee Convention of 1961 prohibits the forcible return (*refoulement*) of a refugee to his country of persecution. This principle is followed by the great majority of nations, whether parties to the Convention or the Status of Refugees Protocol of 1967 or not. Two brief points: first, there is a widespread state practice to the effect 'that, once physically within a territory—whether legally or not—a refugee is entitled to use the legal system of the state, including the application for a writ of habeas corpus'.[17]

The second simple point is that the issue most often arises in relation to a controversy as to whether an offence which the refugee has committed in the country from which he is fleeing is political. If it is (or if he belongs to a persecuted category of persons) then his forcible return to that country would be contrary to accepted practice. All students of international law will be familiar with a string of cases which identify criteria for distinguishing political from common crimes. The truth of the matter is that the distinction is often notoriously hard to make, especially in the contemporary world.[18]

[17] The United States, unlike the United Kingdom, has interpreted this strictly in the past, in the sense that an alien held on Ellis Island has been deemed not to be 'within the United States' for purposes of the law. A more liberal interpretation is perhaps to be expected since the accession of the United States to the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967. See also Grahl-Madsen, Vol. II, p. 344.

[18] A recent case illustrates the point. The House of Lords, in *Cheng* v. *Governor of Pentonville Prison*, dismissed an appeal by Tzu-tsai Cheng against extradition to the United States. Cheng had claimed that the offence in question—a conviction in the United States of attempted murder of Chiang Kai-shek's son—was political. A Formosan, he was the executive secretary of a movement dedicated to 'expose the corruption and oppressiveness of the Chiang Kai-shek regime to the public'. The House of Lords found that an act was not 'an offence of a political character' unless the only purpose was to change the government of the state in which it was committed. Cheng's activities had not been directed against the United States. (*The Times* Law Reports, 17 April 1973.)

This is not the occasion for a major digression into the law of extradition; but it is commonly conceded that, in the absence of a treaty, extradition for non-political offences is voluntary. The traditional law of extradition was based on the notion of the sovereignty of states. The granting of extradition was regarded as a rare concession, in which the element of reciprocity was very strong. There does exist a common European Convention on Extradition, which confirms that extradition shall not be granted if the offence in respect of which it is requested is regarded by the requested party as a political offence, or as an offence connected with a political offence (Article 3 (1)). And Article 3 (a) stipulates that the same rule shall apply if the requested party believes that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.

So far as nationals are concerned, it is generally understood that a requested state may refuse to extradite its own nationals (and this too is confirmed by the European Extradition Convention). It is less clear whether a national has the right, *vis-à-vis* his own government, to expect not to be extradited to another country for a criminal offence.

Finally, on the question of a right of sojourn, we may note that although states may grant and deprive nationality as they will, there is a substantial degree of consensus—as evidenced in the 1961 Convention on Stateless Persons, although it has not yet entered into effect—that departing nationals should not be deprived of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds, unless they have in the meantime acquired another nationality. There is a high common stake in the limitation of new creations of statelessness.

The right to leave one's country

International instruments show a considerable degree of universality in supporting the notion that everyone is free to leave any country, including his own. By contrast, practice is unfortunately very divergent. It is worth recalling the terms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 12 (2) provides 'Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own'. Article 12 (2) continues: 'The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (*ordre public*), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. . . .' These exceptions were not identical to those included in the earlier Declaration of Human Rights. Article 29 (2) of the Declaration provided:

> In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of security, due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of

others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

In the Covenant the term 'general welfare' is not used. We may note too that *ordre public* approximates to public policy, whereas 'public order' means absence of physical disorder. Thus these qualifications could well be used by a state to prevent a national from leaving his own country, or a foreigner leaving the country of his sojourn. The excellent and thorough study prepared by Mr. José Ingles[19] for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities shows clearly the ways in which this can and does occur. Both contemporary international standards, and the terms of other provisions of the Covenant itself make it imperative to interpret the qualifications in a liberal, humane manner. For example, it clearly is not open to South Africa to proclaim that 'public order' requires the necessity of apartheid, and hence limitations on the free movements of the African. Some governments are reluctant to allow travel abroad if the applicant's activities would endanger the state's external relations. One can only look at all the circumstances, and particularly at whether any discrimination is taking place. The United States government has on occasion refused permission to leave to persons thought likely to engage in activities abroad prejudicial to national security. In the past —though not more recently—the right to go to Cuba, China and North Vietnam has been denied to applicants. The grounds of public order, health and morals, as possible exceptions to the general rule in favour of mobility, are perhaps easier to define objectively. Restrictions are commonly extended to internationally known criminals and drug-pushers; and a person may quite reasonably be prevented from entering or leaving a country until he has complied with certain health regulations. But clearly we can say that it is an unjustifiable infringement upon a person's liberty for him to have to present good reason for his journey before the passport is issued. Equally clearly the Berlin Wall is an illegal deprivation of the right to leave one's own country—an attempt to use bricks and wire to secure control over one's population. By contrast, it is perfectly acceptable for an individual to be refused a passport to leave the country if there is evidence that he intends to evade certain legal obligations by going abroad.[20]

In some countries the departure of skilled persons is restricted. One can understand the desire of a developing nation to retain needed specified skills, and here the needs of the state and the freedom of the

[19] See footnote 13.
[20] The UN Convention on Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, 1956, makes it possible to secure from nationals abroad payments of orders of maintenance.

individual are sharply counterpoised. In developed countries, the retention of people because of their skills usually arises in the form of a prohibition upon travel of scientists engaged on vital national defence projects. Such a limitation on freedom should be in the terms of the contract of employment, if at all.

The right to travel abroad is effectively tied to the ability to obtain a passport. Some countries exercise an area restriction upon travel movements in this way—passports are issued as being valid for only certain listed countries. Thus travel to other parts of the world becomes prohibited. Some countries require a foreigner to obtain an exit visa before permission to leave is granted. The need for a passport arises from two factors: the need of the receiving state for some identification, and its desire for some guarantee that there is a country to which a received visitor can return. An acknowledged passport substitute for refugees or stateless persons helps in the former case, and in the latter to the extent only that other nations too recognise them, through treaty or otherwise. Article 28 of the 1951 Convention on Refugees obligates contracting states to issue travel documents to refugees within their territory, and especially to persons who are unable to secure such documents from the state of their lawful residence. Article 28 of the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons similarly obligates the contracting parties to issue travel documents to stateless persons lawfully within their territory. Paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Convention entitles a stateless person who is the recipient of a travel document under Article 28 to re-enter the territory of the issuing state at any time during the period of validity of the document. We may also mention Article 11 of the Hague Agreement on Refugee Seamen, which facilitates the admission of a person in this category to the territory of contracting states, without the necessary documents, and requires them to issue him with a travel document.

There is also a surprisingly large number of people who have renounced their own citizenship, and declared themselves 'citizens of the world'. An organisation of that name issues them with a world citizen passport. In some countries this document is vital to them to secure their departure. In all countries it is relevant for their entry. Yemen, Laos and Brazil all recognise such passports. The United Kingdom takes the position that it is unable to do so, as they provide no guarantee that there is a country willing to accept the return of a visitor bearing one.

A government can also find other indirect ways, if it wishes, to prevent nationals from leaving. It does not always require the physical presence of a wall, as in East Berlin. In order to obtain his passport, a person may be required to provide documents that he cannot acquire

relating to reasons for his travel, tax matters, religious belief, national origin and so forth. An exorbitant passport fee may be charged. A financial security may need to be placed to ensure the return of a travelling national. Some nations may deprive him of his nationality if he leaves his country—a very effective sanction. Currency regulations can also be used to restrict the freedom of exit of both national and foreigner.

José Ingles, in the report referred to above, usefully makes the following summary:

> Because a passport or other travel document is a legal and a practical necessity, the long accepted discretionary power over its issuance is a matter of increasing concern to the international community. Countries continue to be jealous of their powers over the movement abroad of their nationals, and to a lesser extent, over movement of foreigners out of their countries. Further there are many reasons of an economic, social or political nature. Rightly or wrongly, most countries also regard the rights under study as intimately connected with their foreign relations and conduct of their foreign affairs. Moreover, the supreme interest of the country, its national security, is everywhere considered as overriding all rights, privileges and obligations. It is also as well to remember the persisting of international tensions and conflicts; they are real, intense and dangerous.
>
> It may thus be necessary to accept the inevitability of the exercise by governments of some measure of discretionary powers. But, on the other hand, the legitimate and paramount interests of the individual must also be recognized and protected. It is true that in a number of countries, procedures have been developed which attempt to do justice both to the cause of the State and to the cause of the individual. But it is a sad commentary on the present state of the world that only a very few countries, if any, have achieved a happy balance between these two interests.[21]

The position of Jews in the Soviet Union has particularly attracted attention, and we may briefly refer to it here. In the Soviet Union one is obliged to have an ethnic origin. And ethnic origin, like race, but unlike religion, cannot be chosen. If both parents are of a certain ethnic origin, then the child also belongs to it automatically. At the age of sixteen he receives his passport—identity card—and his ethnic origin, or nationality as it is termed, is there marked.[22]

While it is compulsory to belong to a national group in the Soviet Union, the Jewish national group is denied organisational facilities to promote and pass on its heritage, culture and traditions. Here one may contrast the realities with the prescriptions of Soviet law. According

[21] E/CN.4/Sub.2/220, pp. 79–80.

[22] For a detailed description of what happens when a person has parents of two different 'nationalities', and how attempts can then be made to mask Jewish origins, see Binyamin Eliav, 'The Jewish Problem and the Soviet Union', Vol. I, *Israel Yearbook of Human Rights* (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University. 1971).

to Soviet law and repeated official statements, the Jews, like other officially recognised ethnic groups,[23] should enjoy certain positive rights to cultivate their language and culture. In addition to the Soviet Constitution and to resolutions of the Supreme Soviet and the Congresses of the Communist Party, which reiterate every person's right to preserve his national culture, there are also administrative regulations.

Nonetheless, these rights are widely denied in practice; and there has been a considerable upsurge of Jewish applicants to leave the Soviet Union for settlement in Israel. The Soviet reaction to the desire to emigrate has, of course, been influenced by the complications of the Middle East situation. Russia's relations with the Arab countries could be adversely affected if it appears to promote increasing immigration into Israel. But this can hardly be acceptable as a reason for refusing the right to leave—especially if that desire to leave is both caused by, and causes, denigration and discrimination. Jews who emigrate put at risk not only themselves and their families, but are also required to leave behind their property and assets.[24] Interestingly, it is common for those who wish to leave to invoke Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which refers to the right of every person to leave any country, including his own. This Convention has been ratified by the Supreme Soviet, and is thus Soviet law. There is now considerable evidence that pressure from other nations has led to an upsurge in the number of persons which the Soviet Union has permitted to leave for Israel and elsewhere.

Freedom of movement: the present position

Over the years the UN Commission on Human Rights has failed to get to grips with the problem of freedom of movement. It did, of course, hand the matter to its Sub-Committee on Discrimination; and this Sub-Committee (composed of individual government experts) authorised the preparation of the report by José Ingles to which I have already referred. But with dismaying regularity, for nearly a decade, this report has appeared upon the agenda of the Human Rights Commission, sent up by the Sub-Committee, only to be put aside until the next session 'due to lack of time'.

Of course, the real reason has been the political inconvenience of having to deal with the matter. At the end of last year the same pattern was repeated. However, at long last the log-jam seems to have been moved, if one reads the signs aright. A resolution urging governments

[23] There are more than 100, of which the Jews are the eleventh or twelfth in size.
[24] During his visit to the United States in June, Mr. Brezhnev stated that the exit tax had been lifted from most categories and claimed that this year the number of applications to leave had declined sharply.

to heed UN views on the right of anyone to leave a country, including his own, and to return to his own country, was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on March 23, 1973. The vote was 25 to 0, with 4 abstentions.

If there is now a sufficient consensus to make modest progress in this area, the opportunity must be seized. The Ingles report spoke eloquently of balancing the legitimate controls needed by a state with the aspirations of the individual. But perhaps it is not helpful to look at this in terms of a delicate balancing act. Rather, we should remind ourselves that it is only through a liberal interpretation of the dignity of the individual and his freedom from arbitrary restraints that, in the long term, the state will hold the loyalty of its citizens, and be able to function to maximum advantage internationally.

OUTER SPACE: NEW PERSPECTIVES

J. E. S. Fawcett

FOUR years have passed since Neil Armstrong set foot on the Moon. Is it, like other great leaps forward, proving to be less than the giant step that it seemed? One by one the grandiose schemes for the exploration and occupation of the Moon and the planets are being cut down to size or abandoned. The Apollo programme has been terminated, and the 'grand tour '[1] of the outer planets reduced to the voyage of *Pioneer 10* to 'fly by' Jupiter; while Venus has shown herself so inhospitable that even unmanned landings are precarious.[2] Windswept Mars, with its desert landscape, volcanoes and canyons, still attracts, and unmanned landings are contemplated by the United States in 1976, and are to be repeated by the Soviet Union; but manned landings, practicable in 1983–86, are likely to require a peak annual expenditure of $8–9 billion.[3]

All in all, then, space activities in the next decade are likely to come down to Earth and to be concentrated on the operation and use of Earth satellites. The American Space Task Group recommended balanced programmes 'directed towards the application of the nation's space capabilities to a wide range of services, such as air and ocean traffic control, world-wide navigation systems, environmental monitoring and prediction (weather, pollution), Earth resources survey (crops, water resources, oceanography), and communications . . .'. The international sweep of these satellite applications is plain to see. Earth satellites have been likened to international shipping in the extensions of movement and accessibility that they offer, and analogies have been drawn between the freedom of the seas and the freedom of outer space, declared unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1963 and in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. But the operation of Earth satellites, and still more their manifold applications, are international and transnational in ways that far transcend the most evolved shipping. So Puck to Oberon[4]:

> Oberon: Fetch me this herb; and be thou here again
> Ere the leviathan can swim a league.

[1] Announced by the US President in March 1970.
[2] On the surface of Venus, the temperature is close on 500° Centigrade, and the atmospheric pressure ninety times that on the Earth.
[3] US President's Space Task Group Report (September 1969).
[4] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Scene 1.

Puck: I'll put a girdle round about the earth
In forty minutes.

Satellites now girdle the Earth with incomparable rapidity, and are 'visible' and accessible to vast regions. Of necessity their operations must be internationally co-ordinated, and their impact and potential value cross all frontiers. But since Earth satellite operations need great technological sophistication and the investment of much capital and industrial resources, only a handful of countries can undertake them in the immediate future. It is to these countries that most of the world has to look for the benefits to be derived.

The uses of Earth satellites

It is of interest then to review against this background the present state of Earth satellite operations, the planned hopes for the future, and their implications for international organisation.

First, the uses of Earth satellites may be briefly described. A distinction has come to be made between 'applications satellites', devoted broadly to the purposes set out by the United States Space Task Group, and scientific investigation satellites; but when it comes, for example, to meteorology, the distinction is not easy to maintain. Here it may be simpler to describe Earth satellites by their functions in communications, surveys and transport.

As instruments of communication, satellites provide telecommunication services in the strict sense of radio or telephone messages and data distribution, for example, radio and television broadcasting, 'hot line' messages,[5] air and sea navigation 'fixes', and stock market prices. For communication in wider senses, satellites may be given regulatory functions in air traffic control or weapons control, and have vital tasks as vehicles, by radio and television, for education, information and persuasion. The survey functions of satellites belong more to scientific investigation, such as astronomical observation by means of telescopes and other instruments in orbit, though some are directly related to practical needs.

Surveys of the upper atmosphere and beyond, combined with cloud surveys and atmospheric measurements, constitute the World Weather Watch, established in 1964 and elaborated by the World Meteorological Organisation in 1967, with its principal centres in Washington, Moscow and Melbourne. Surveys of Earth resources, particularly sea fish stocks and mineral deposits on land, are now being developed, adding a new dimension of pollution and environmental change. Finally, there is the

[5] By one of the agreements of May 1972, emergency exchanges between Washington and Moscow can now be made through a telecommunications satellite, each side designating the satellite it will use.

surveillance of each other's territory and other strategic areas, which the United States and Russia conduct by means of satellites. Equipped with sophisticated cameras, yielding photographs of objects smaller than a car from an altitude of 100 miles, with means of intercepting and recording radio signals, and with instruments for the detection of 'heat' processes through the infra-red,[6] surveillance satellites, with active lives of up to 25 days, are in continuous operation; and there is probably no significant military movement or enterprise that can escape their notice. It is said that this constant mutual inspection by the powers makes a large contribution to strategic stability.

Transport by satellite, or for servicing satellites, is still in the future. But the notions of the space station and space shuttle are gradually, but not without setbacks, taking practical form. The Soviet Union has constructed the *Salyut* space station, which has carried out space docking operations with *Soyuz*, though its success was marred by the deaths of three astronauts, and *Salyut* 2, launched on April 3, 1973, fell into uncontrolled 'tumbling' in orbit. *Skylab*, the American version, was launched on May 14, 1973, into almost circular orbit at a distance of 435 kilometres. Major defects developed, but were largely overcome.

The NASA plans for a space shuttle are well advanced and call for a short description. The shuttle is, in appearance, a stolid delta-winged 'aircraft', but it is to be capable not only of reaching an orbital altitude of 100 miles, and remaining in orbit from 7 to 30 days, but of returning to land on a runway with a payload as high as 40,000 lb. It will be taken up to orbit by two solid-propellant 'boosters' to which it is attached, but which separate at an altitude of 25 miles and descend by parachute to be recovered. The shuttle can carry two spacecraft in addition to cargo: a space tug and a 'sortie lab'. The space tug is released in low orbit and is then capable under remote control of lifting payloads into higher orbits to space stations; its use is also contemplated for retrieving satellites for repair or servicing, and perhaps some of the debris now in orbit.[7] It might also be used for disposing of radio-active waste in outer space. The 'sortie lab', or 'sortie can' as it is called in the United States, would be a manned laboratory module for astronomical research, and the investigation of the behaviour of organic and inorganic materials in prolonged states of weightlessness. The space shuttle system would make possible the regular relief of space station crews and space laboratory teams. The first orbital test of the system is planned by NASA for 1978. The United States and

[6] Tracking of a nuclear submarine, even in deep water, may be possible by satellite.

[7] On a recent estimate, over 6,000 objects are now orbiting the Earth, including operational and 'spent' satellites.

Russia have agreed [8] to attempt joint docking operations with satellites in 1975.

The satellite business: how it has developed

The conflicts of interests and objectives—political, social, economic and technical—raised by the operation and use of Earth satellites are so interlinked and complex that a brief review can do no more than try to illustrate some of them. This may be done by first recalling some characteristic developments in the Earth satellite business since the beginning of 1971.

In March 1971 China launched its second satellite into orbit. In May, agreement was reached on a permanent structure for the Intelsat system, which had rested on provisional agreements since 1964. In August the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO), as a corporate unit, concluded an agreement with the United States Federal Aviation Administration to develop a satellite-based air traffic control system. In October the United Kingdom launched satellite *Prospero* at Woomera, using *Black Arrow* as launcher, for technological research; but it had already been officially declared that *Black Arrow* would be discontinued and that, for future launchings, the United Kingdom would rely on the American *Scout* and *Thor-Delta* rockets. In November the agreement setting up the Intersputnik organisation, which had lain on the table in draft since August 1968, was finally adopted by Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Roumania and the Soviet Union. In the same month the UN General Assembly adopted [9] a Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, and recommended it to UN members for ratification. In 1972 Canada launched its own satellite, *Anik*.[10] Towards the end of the year the prospects of direct satellite broadcasting were given attention both by Unesco [11] and the UN. Both Russia and France had submitted draft declarations of principles to the UN, which invited its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to prepare a convention on the subject.[12] In December the European Space Conference decided to amalgamate the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) and ESRO in a new European Space Agency. In January 1973 it was announced that M. Pompidou and Herr Brandt had agreed that the Federal Republic would make a financial contribution to the development of the French launcher L-3s, already approved by the ESRO Council. In May the American satellite

[8] US-USSR Space Co-operation Agreement (May 24, 1972).
[9] GA Resolution 2777–XXVI (November 29, 1971).
[10] An Eskimo word meaning 'brother'.
[11] Declaration on Satellite Broadcasting (November 15, 1972).
[12] GA Resolution 2916–XXVII.

ERTS-A was put into orbit to carry out extensive Earth resource surveys, the results of which are to be distributed to selected researchers in twenty-two foreign countries as well as in twenty-eight states of the United States.

If we look at the background to this apparently random selection of events, some patterns can be discerned. They are the ways in which national space enterprises or administrations, and international organisations, have responded to the need for some division of labour, particularly in launching satellites, to the problems of joint production and operation of satellites, and to the need for regulation and control of their use.

The dependence of European space programmes, at least in the earlier stages, on launchers provided by the United States has had conflicting results. It has been for the United Kingdom a disincentive, and for France a stimulant, for the production of national launchers capable of putting the larger satellites into orbit. This in turn has led to disunity of policy in ELDO, which, together with the dismal performance of its launchers, has left Europe many years behind the United States and Russia in space operations.

Under the initial ELDO programme, the construction of the launcher *Europa* 1 (ELDO-A), capable of placing a payload of 1,000 kilograms in low orbit, was to be completed in 1967, at a cost of £70 million. It was to be a truly joint effort, the United Kingdom providing *Blue Streak* for the first stage, France the second stage with *Coralie*, and the Federal Republic the third stage, called *Astris*. Italy was to manufacture the test satellite, while Belgium provided a down-range guidance station and the Netherlands was to be responsible for telemetry. In July 1966 a project for *Europa* 2 (ELDO-PAS) [13] was adopted, with the same three stages plus two further stages, the first to place the satellite in more or less circular orbit at a distance of 300 kilometres and the second to move it into geostationary orbit,[14] at the standard distance of 36,000 kilometres (approximately 22,500 miles). Rising costs and constructional delays made the United Kingdom and Italy hesitate about the whole programme, and their proposals that their financial contributions should be reduced led to deadlock in ELDO in 1968. The European Space Conference, formed in 1966 at ministerial level to bring some co-ordination into the affairs of ELDO and ESRO, met at Bad Godesberg in November 1968 and reached three significant decisions: first, that a ceiling for expenditure in the ELDO launcher programme

[13] Perigee Apogee Satellite, to describe the near and distant orbits reached by the fourth and fifth stages.

[14] The satellite revolves around the centre of the Earth, in its equatorial plane, at the same velocity as the Earth itself. The orbit is therefore called *synchronous* and also, since the satellite necessarily maintains the same position in the sky over a given point on the equator of the Earth, *geostationary*.

should be 626 million dollar units, which enabled the ELDO ministerial conference to reach an agreed revision of contributions by its members early in 1969; secondly, that launchers of European construction should be used provided their cost did not exceed by more than 25 per cent. those available in the United States; and finally, that a high-level committee should be appointed to evolve a better co-ordination of European space activities.

In the same month the first firing of *Europa* 1 with all three stages 'live'[15] was to take place at Woomera, but was prevented by 'minor technical faults' in the second stage (*Coralie*: France). In July 1969, at the next test, the third stage (*Astris*: Federal Republic of Germany) failed to ignite and the launcher fell into the Pacific. At the next, the ninth test in the whole series, in June 1970, all stages fired successfully but the heat-shields of the Italian satellite did not detach themselves, and the satellite failed to enter the prescribed polar orbit. To conclude the story, *Europa* 2 was fired in the tenth test from the French Guiana base of Kouru in November 1971, but exploded three minutes after leaving the launching pad and fell into the Atlantic. The eleventh test was also a failure and the twelfth was postponed.

The integration of the British, French and German stages of *Europa* was plainly as difficult for the engineers as it was for their monetary colleagues of sterling, the franc and the mark. But French influence in ELDO was strong and in April 1970 it decided to embark on the development of *Europa* 3, with the French *Diamant B* substituted for *Blue Streak* as the first stage; and it also began to give attention to the idea of a space shuttle. But the United Kingdom was drawing away. In November 1970 the Minister of Aviation Supply said in the House of Commons that the cost of participation in heavy launcher development was too high 'in relation to the limited number of launchings at present foreseen'; and in the following year it was decided, as already mentioned, to rely on American launchers for British satellites. In December 1971 the United Kingdom reduced its participation in ELDO to that of an observer, formally denouncing the agreement later, with effect from the beginning of 1973. France, however, pressed forward with a proposal for a new launcher, L-3s, in place of *Europa* 3, offering to contribute 60 per cent. of its cost, though its ELDO partners were inclined to prefer participation in the construction of a space shuttle system, to which the United States had invited them as part of its post-Apollo programme. In December 1972 the European Space Conference adopted both ideas, the Federal Republic now offering a contribution of 20 per cent. to the proposed French L-3s launcher, but the conference stated that both for this project, and for collaboration

[15] It was the seventh in the series of actual tests of the launcher. It should perhaps be recalled that about 40 per cent. of US launchings failed in the period 1957–63.

ı the construction of a manned spacecraft in the American post-Apollo rogramme—a task for ESRO—'the participation and means of nancing will be settled later by each country'.

The conference also took the long-needed decision to amalgamate ıe functions of ELDO and ESRO in a new European Space Agency. 'or the two organisations had plainly fallen between two stools, neither utting the common financial and industrial effort primarily into ıtellite development and relying upon the United States to provide ıunching facilities, nor developing national or European launchers ıpable of putting satellites into the required orbits within a time-table ıatching Canada or China, let alone the United States and Russia. In ıct the division of labour and resources, both national and inter-ational, had been only partial and unsatisfactory, though of course ɔme use had been made of American, and even Russian, launchers. ut there were political and financial obstacles in the way of both lines f approach, which made choices difficult. The fact that the European ıunchers envisaged were either partly or wholly capable of military use :d several countries [16] that might have made significant contributions) refrain from participating in ELDO except as observers. The invest-ıent and development costs of *Europa* 1 and 2 then fell on six countries. 'hese costs were admittedly small when set against, for example, the IASA budget, but the telecommunications and the aerospace industries 'ere competitors for funds. Oceanic cables have remained fully com-etitive with Earth satellites for telephone communications, where the affic has been going up by 20 per cent. each year in recent times, and ıvestment in the laying of cables is in fact increasing. Even some uplication of satellite and cable services is contemplated in North ıtlantic and North Sea areas.[17] Further, both sounding rockets and igh-altitude balloons can perform a number of Earth or atmosphere ırveys as efficiently as satellites, and certainly much more cheaply.

he operation of satellites: co-operation and conflict

Joint co-operation in the production and operation of Earth satellites ıay be found at different levels, these being interconnected. So there intergovernmental co-operation, the linking of public authority and rivate enterprise, and the formation of industrial consortia, both ational and international. These forms of co-operation are well lustrated by some of the events since the beginning of 1971 already :scribed: the agreement between ESRO and the United States Federal viation Administration for an air traffic control system; the launching

Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland.

A new cable linking Canada and the United Kingdom, with 1,800 channels, is to be laid in 1974; and a transatlantic cable from the United States to the French coast, serving a number of countries, with 4,000 channels is to be added in 1976.

of the Canadian satellite *Anik* and the United States satellite ERTS-A; and the reorganisation of Intelsat and the formal establishment of the Intersputnik system.

Most interesting perhaps are the conflicts of interest that may arise between public authority and private enterprise and the ways in which they are resolved. The Canadian White Paper, introducing what became the Telesat Canada Act 1969, said that: 'A satellite system is a natural monopoly. To ensure fair treatment of all users, an impartial method of assessment of proposed rates and practices is necessary.' It was recommended that Canada should develop, own and operate its own satellite system, there being great obstacles—geographic and financial—to an extended ground radio system in Canada. There would be one geostationary satellite, launched however in the United States, with one in reserve, and three ground stations. The possibilities of buying a larger American satellite, or of leasing radio and television channels in Intelsat satellites, were rejected. But a dispute arose over the management of the Canadian system, whether it was to be in the hands of common communications carriers or a public corporation. The solution was a private corporation based on tripartite ownership, distributed in approximately equal portions between the Crown, twelve common carriers, and the public, comprising provincial governments and agencies as well as individual shareholders. Negotiations with foreign authorities over launching services or the allocation of radio frequencies or satellite orbital positions were reserved to the Minister of Communications.

The transnational consortia, which have organised themselves in the aerospace industry, already have their acronyms or code-names, such as MESH (Engins Matra; Entwicklungsring Nord); SAAB; and Hawker-Siddeley. Four consortia, including MESH, submitted designs for the air traffic control system envisaged in the agreement between ESRO and the United States FAA. A special consortium was established [18] for the construction of *Symphonie*, a geostationary satellite, which France and Germany agreed to make a joint project in June 1967 in place of two national satellites, *Saros* (France) and *Olympia* (Germany). *Symphonie* will transmit radio and television programmes and also carry 300 telephone channels; it will cover Europe, North Africa, eastern Canada and the Caribbean. Indeed at some points co-operation has been more successful at industrial than at government level. The air traffic control agreement has not prospered, and ESRO announced in March 1972 that 'in view of the difficulties encountered in seeking co-operation with the United States in an aeronautical

[18] Composed of Nord-Aviation and Sud-Aviation; Bölkow; Junkers; Thomson-CSF and SAT; Siemens and AEG Telefunken.

satellite programme, and to prevent delays as a result of these difficulties, the member-States of ESRO have decided to go ahead with industrial studies for a satellite project (Aerosat) designed for use in air traffic control, weather research and telecommunications.'

But the accommodation of private enterprise in international arrangements has created problems in Intelsat both in the management and the sub-contracting. Under the provisional Intelsat agreements of 1964, management of the programme was vested in Comsat, the Communications Satellite Corporation created by Act of the US Congress in 1962. Shares in this public corporation are divided between corporate [19] and individual subscribers, each group being entitled to appoint six directors, the president appointing the remaining three of a board of fifteen. Three consequences have caused discontent among many of the eighty countries participating in the Intelsat system. First, as an American corporation Comsat is subject, in awarding contracts in the United States, to the jurisdiction of the US Federal Communications Commission; and its approval for the grant of the Intelsat III contract to TRW Inc. had to be obtained even after the affirmative decision of the Intelsat Committee. Secondly, its potential competitors in some fields have substantial influence on its directing board. Thirdly, it has been considered that too much procurement has been concentrated in the United States and that there has been too little sub-contracting in the participating countries. Here a certain advance was made in the production of Intelsat IV satellites: $19·4 million-worth of contracts, out of a total of $73 million, were distributed among ten countries outside the United States, and the British Aircraft Corporation secured a contract for assembling one of the satellites for $7 million. Further, Intelsat control does not extend to the prices which common telecommunications carriers using satellite channels charge to the consumer. High rates may be imposed on international services to subsidise domestic services, and profits may be withheld as savings, which might otherwise go to the reduction of satellite operational costs.

The permanent agreement, concluded in May 1971 after years of arduous negotiation, went some way to meeting these defects. On an earlier joint proposal of Australia and Japan, it was agreed that there would be a transition period of six years, during which Comsat would continue to manage the system but under the supervision of a secretary general, and that at the end of this period the management would be transferred to the director general and technical staff. The institution would then be similar to a UN specialised agency, the assembly of participating countries having powers to recommend policies and to

[19] ATT, 29 per cent.; ITandT, General Telephone, RCA, and Electronics Corporation, 16·4 per cent.; 158 private corporations, 4·6 per cent.

amend the basic agreement by an 85 per cent. majority vote. But a country's membership of the board of governors is still to depend on its volume of international communications traffic, as will its investment share and vote. The countries with leading shares are: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Canada, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan and Spain. The first three between them command 53·5 per cent. of the votes, but a veto requires the participation of four members. Small or developing countries with a low volume of international communications traffic may provide essential ground stations and yet have little effective say in the running of the system; and the continuance of Comsat as manager through what may be decisive years in the development of satellite telecommunications means American domination of the market. It is not surprising that a high authority has called Intelsat a 'lost hope'.

The Intersputnik Agreement was presented in contrast, and a little ostentatiously, as providing 'total participation of all participants'. It is to have a governing Council with each member having one vote and all members represented. But although at least some of the East European countries may make technological contributions,[20] the production of launchers and satellites, and the general direction of the Intersputnik programme, must lie for some time to come in Soviet hands. The Intersputnik Agreement is open to participation by any country, but it must be noted that so far the developing and non-aligned countries have chosen Intelsat, perhaps because for all its disadvantages it has more channels and services to offer.

Partial satellite systems, based on and serving one country or region, are likely to develop rapidly. In addition to Europe and Canada, of which some account has been given in the field of space activities, India is making steady progress. An Experimental Satellite Communication Earth Station was established at Ahmedabad in August 1967 with the assistance of the UN Development Programme. In September 1969 an agreement was concluded with the United States for a Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE). The purpose is to use an American Application Technology Satellite (ATS series) to bring instructional programmes by television to community receivers in about 5,000 Indian villages. The programmes will be designed to popularise methods of increased agricultural productivity, to provide information on family planning, and to promote national integration. It is hoped, if adequate funds can be made available, to cover the whole country, using geostationary satellites, by 1980. India is also increasing its own launching capabilities and expects to be able to put a satellite in orbit in 1974

[20] The Intercosmos satellites have carried equipment and experiments designed in East European countries.

from the new launching station at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh. Indian rockets with small payloads have already been fired from this station. Brazil has begun to study the possibilities of educational television programmes brought by satellite.

An international code of conduct?

The regulation and control of these proliferating uses of Earth satellites, as far as they have international impacts, fall primarily upon the United Nations system. There is therefore a great need for reform of the International Telecommunications Union, and particularly for an enlargement of the authority of its International Frequency Registration Board. The ITU has been well described by Professor Abram Chayes as 'a constellation of plenary bodies' rather than a unitary institution. The two main fields of the Union, telegraph and telephone on the one side and radio on the other, each have a consultative committee (CCITT and CCIR) and a periodic administrative conference devoted to them. The plenipotentiary conference meets only occasionally, for example, in 1965 and 1971, so that the specialised bodies of the Union operate as a kind of autonomous cartel of the larger national communications authorities. What is needed is greater integration of the consultative committees and the specialised secretariats, and more frequent meetings and interventions of the plenipotentiary conference. The International Frequency Registration Board is composed of five experts, each serving in his individual capacity. It has at present an amalgam of functions, which locate it somewhere between a passive record office and an active regulatory body. It recommends, according to technical standards, the allocation of frequency bands to particular uses, military, commercial, scientific and so on, and these may be embodied in ITU radio regulations. It also records the assignments of particular frequencies by national authorities within the bands allocated. The registration of an assigned frequency gives the national authority a prior claim to its use, but, while the IFRB mediates in disputes over harmful interference [21] between frequencies, it has no power to order the discontinuance of the use of a registered frequency or the surrender of a registered frequency that is not in fact being used or has been abandoned.

Earth satellites make two resource demands, which will need closer regulation and control than is at present available in the UN system, for orbital space and radio frequencies. The regulated separation of satellites, particularly in geostationary orbit, is necessary to prevent mutual interference; and their increasing demands on the already over-

[21] Under ITU Radio Regulations Nos. 501, 607, claims from registrations prior in time are not necessarily decisive in regard to harmful interference.

burdened radio spectrum are obvious. Satellite broadcasting presents a number of regulatory problems, for example, of 'overspill', copyright, and commercial use. But satellite broadcasting, direct into home receivers, practicable perhaps within a decade, is a political bogy which has scared governments into urging restraints upon it. It is sufficient here to quote some of the paragraphs from the proposals submitted to a UN Working Group on direct satellite broadcasting by the Soviet Union and France. The Russians proposed that:

> 4. Direct radio and television broadcasts by satellite to the population of a foreign State may be carried out only with the express consent of the Government of that State.
> 5. The aims of radio and television broadcasting by satellite shall be the raising of the general educational level of the population, the development of culture, and the intensification of international exchanges in the fields of science, culture and sport. Radio and television broadcasts by satellite which include propaganda in favour of war, militarism, Nazism, national and racial hatred or hostility among peoples, and broadcasts which are amoral or provocative in nature or which in any other manner tend to interfere with the national life of States shall be deemed to be illegal.
> 6. States shall have international responsibility for all national activities involving the use of satellites for radio and television broadcasting, whether carried out by governmental organs or non-governmental entities, and regardless of whether they are carried out independently by States or within the framework of international organizations. Such radio and television broadcasts to a foreign State may be carried out only by organizations under the control of the Governments of the States concerned.
> 7. In the event of direct broadcasts transmitted by satellite to another country without the consent of its Government, that Government shall be entitled to use any available means to counteract such broadcasts.
> 8. The technical criteria for radio and television broadcasting by satellite shall conform strictly to the above principles. The selection and use of frequencies for such broadcasts shall be regulated by international agreement.

The French proposals were more elaborate, but it is of interest to set their general principles by the side of the Soviet proposals:

> 1. Interference in the internal affairs of foreign States or in the conduct of their foreign policy shall be forbidden. The following shall be forbidden in particular: (a) any direct intervention in internal conflicts and disputes notably in political, social, linguistic or religious conflicts; (b) any remark or image, any argument, any allusion that might undermine the credit of the States; (c) any insult to chiefs of State or Heads of Government or to the official representatives of these States.
> 2. Any form of propaganda liable to be prejudicial to the maintenance of international peace or to the internal peace of States shall be forbidden.
> 3. Any attack on the dignity of the individual or on the rights of individuality shall be forbidden. Any propaganda that might be an

incitement to violation of the rights of man and the fundamental liberties shall be forbidden.
4. Broadcasts must contain no element, no reference, that might offend the audience's moral, religious, philosophical or political convictions.
5. Scenes of violence and frightening scenes must be eschewed.
6. Children's programmes must be conceived in such a way as not to prejudice their physical, intellectual, psychic or moral development. Adult programmes which might be seen or heard by children must be preceded by an announcement or distinguishing sign calling the audience's attention to the nature of the programme.
7. Broadcasts must respect the diverse cultures, religions or philosophical doctrines existing in the areas of reception. In particular, programmes tending to destroy civilizations, cultures, religions or traditions shall be forbidden.

How realistic such proposals for an international code of control are is questionable, and we shall see how the proposed UN convention on direct satellite broadcasting evolves. It may be that common standards might be more easily established by agreement between broadcasting authorities, whether public or private, than between governments.

But perhaps enough has now been said to show that the operation and uses of Earth satellites, if the greatest common benefit is to be obtained from them, make demands on governments for policy choices, institutional reforms, and a measure of enduring co-operation, which so far they have only inadequately met.

INDIA AND AMERICA AT ODDS

William J. Barnds

THE persistent inability of the United States and India to work out a mutually acceptable relationship has been one of the central features of modern Asian politics. Occasional episodes of co-operation between the world's two largest non-communist nations, such as occurred when they were motivated by a similar antipathy to China for some years after 1959, have been overshadowed by the tension and antagonism that accompanied the Korean and Vietnam wars, American emphasis on military alliances in Asia, and India's close relations with the Soviet Union. These erupted into open hostility during the Bangladesh upheaval in 1971 when India, inundated by nearly ten million refugees fleeing the Pakistani army's reign of terror, invoked the principle of Bengali self-determination and dismembered its hostile neighbour. American support for Pakistan's national integrity won widespread support in the United Nations, but the Nixon Administration's attempt to use the nuclear-powered carrier *Enterprise* as an instrument of gunboat diplomacy was a dismal failure. Relations between the United States and India quickly plummeted to an all-time low.

Both countries, however, feel uneasy when they are at loggerheads, and towards the end of 1972 they began a cautious effort to improve relations. American agreement to a rescheduling of India's foreign debt repayments was interpreted by Indian leaders as a step in this direction; New Delhi's restrained comments on United States policy in Vietnam when the ceasefire hung in the balance were viewed in a similar light by Washington.

However, this beginning could suffer the same fate as several false starts which occurred in 1972. (Mrs. Gandhi's biting attack last February on American actions in Vietnam, and the sharp American reaction, illustrate this danger, as does the American decision the following month to sell several million dollars' worth of military equipment to Pakistan.) President Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi periodically asserted their desire for friendly relations, but such pro-forma statements were overshadowed by acts regarded as hostile by the other country. New Delhi maintained that the reference to Kashmir in the joint communiqué signed by President Nixon and Chou En-lai in Shanghai in February 1972 was interference in India's internal affairs. The United States regarded New Delhi's silence over North Vietnam's 1972 invasion of

South Vietnam, coupled with its condemnation of American bombing, as another example of India's one-sided reaction where communism is involved. It also regarded Mrs. Gandhi's allegations in September 1972, that CIA manipulation of opposition parties was behind widespread anti-government disturbances, as an attempt to blame America for conditions arising out of her government's domestic failures. Each government, convinced that the blame for the impasse rested overwhelmingly on the other—in fact, with the other leader personally—has maintained that the initiative for any improvement was not its responsibility.

But the annoyance and anger extend far beyond the political leaders in the two capitals. Most Americans concerned about India feel frustrated and uncertain: uncertain because they are perplexed as to why and how the relationship went sour, and thus what to do next; frustrated because they believe that the United States has done better by India than the latter acknowledges. Indians generally feel abused and neglected by the United States: abused by past American support of Pakistan and present preference for China; and neglected when told that this represents not hostility towards India but broader American concerns in the world. The Indian perception of United States hostility is reinforced by an awareness that, despite changing world conditions, Indo-American relations have been troubled under every president since Truman.

Today each country places the worst possible interpretation on the words and actions of the other, brushing aside congruities of interests and emphasising conflicts of interest. Yet a process of mutual adjustment is essential if the United States is to respond constructively to India's enhanced position in the subcontinent, and if India is to adjust to the major changes occurring in American policy toward Asia. This will require, however, clearing away the debris of mutual misperceptions and unrealistic expectations which have bedevilled the relationship since shortly after the British departure from the subcontinent.

Conflicting ideas on Asian stability

The most notable feature of Indo-American relations during the past twenty-five years has been their sharp fluctuations. This has long puzzled many citizens of both countries, who believed that a common language and shared democratic values provided a basis for understanding and co-operation despite diverse cultural and historical legacies. Both countries had mixed economies despite India's declaratory socialism and America's advocacy of free enterprise. Yet the past twenty-five years illustrate how little influence such matters have when political leaders see the interests of their countries as dissimilar and

thus follow conflicting foreign policies. Failure to appreciate this elementary political fact has confounded communists as well as democrats over the years; it was Bukharin who said that conflict between socialist states was ' by definition an impossibility '.

The fact that Indo-American relations have been characterised by sharp fluctuations rather than consistent hostility or co-operation suggests that the two countries' policies towards each other have been primarily influenced by other concerns which their governments regarded as more important. Each has had different perceptions of the key issues in world affairs. A newly independent India accorded a high priority to anti-colonialism and freedom from Western influence. The United States was ambivalent on colonialism, which it saw as a waning force. American leaders wanted the co-operation of a revived Western Europe, but also saw the need for Asian independence so that its peoples would have a stake in their own future and thus not be vulnerable to extremist forces. Independent Asian countries co-operating with the West, rather than independence as such, was the American goal.

Both countries placed a high priority on peace, but had sharply differing judgments about the best means for achieving a measure of stability in Asia. The Western experience with Hitler and Stalin convinced the United States that only through establishing positions of strength could peace and freedom be safeguarded. Moreover, few Americans believed that the inexperienced Asian leaders could withstand internal and external communist pressures without Western assistance—an attitude of patronising condescension in Indian eyes. Thus in the wake of the Korean stalemate and the French defeat in Indochina the United States began its quest for military allies. But concern over communism was only one reason why Asian governments entered Western alliance systems. Conservative political and military leaders, who enjoyed limited popular support, sought Western aid to bolster their domestic position, and small countries fearful of their larger neighbours sought ties with the West to offset their regional inferiority. Yet since containment required the military co-operation of at least a few nations around the rim of the communist world, the United States was led to accept as an ally nearly any country willing to become one.

Indian leaders regarded such policies as dangerous and destabilising on two grounds. They would provoke increased communist activity to counter the American moves, and thus make conflict more likely. The United States should instead give top priority to the search for areas of agreement with Moscow and Peking. Second, the American approach would deepen the political divisions within the Asian countries. New Delhi was impressed with the strength of Asian nationalism, which had

withstood communist attempts at revolution in several countries in the late 1940s. It argued that whatever the immediate risks involved, long-term stability was possible only by allowing the Asian countries to work out their own problems without great power involvement. Time has demonstrated that Indian criticisms had a certain measure of validity; pro-Western forces have often been weak reeds, and Asian nationalists have proved more durable than most Westerners expected.

An unspoken but important Indian objection to American policy was that it reduced the potential scope for Indian influence. Indians thought that their country deserved major power status in view of its size, population, and ancient cultural tradition.

> In the years following independence there was a pervasive sense among many Indians that their nation, though weak in relation to the Great Powers, could still achieve international stature through mediatory efforts and moral suasion. Gandhi, pursuing such a strategy in national politics, had commanded world attention and respect; could the Indian nation not adapt that role to the sphere of international relations?[1]

This strategy suffered from several inherent limitations. India was too big to be acceptable as a mediator to smaller nations. Its credentials were suspect by both the communists and the West at the height of the cold war, and when tensions eased, the antagonists normally preferred bilateral negotiations to reliance on any intermediary. India also had its own national interests to pursue on such issues as Kashmir, Goa, and China. It built positions of strength and took a firm position in negotiations—the same course which it attacked the United States for following. India's aspirations to be a moral force left it little option but to attempt to cloak its power plays in moral rhetoric, but the gap between its words and deeds could not be bridged by any of the explanations it offered. The United States was at this point painfully divesting itself of its earlier beliefs about the power of moral example in international life, which made it difficult for many Americans to take seriously an approach they had come to regard as misguided. Many Americans came to view Indian foreign policy as pretentious and hypocritical.

The American challenge to India

Conflicting approaches to the Middle East and south-east Asia might have been surmounted if the United States had not extended its alliance policy to the subcontinent. The creation of Pakistan had constricted

[1] Stanley J. Heginbotham, 'In the Wake of Bangladesh: A New Role for India in Asia?', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLV, No. 3 (Fall 1972). Heginbotham shows clearly how India's foreign policy aspirations and style grew out of Indian cultural values, as well as how different value structures in other Asian states limit India's leadership appeal.

India's freedom by forcing it to concentrate energy and resources on countering its hostile neighbour. American military aid to Pakistan intensified India's security problem and challenged its pre-eminence in South Asia. Indians were furious with Eisenhower and Dulles for upsetting what they saw as the natural order of things in the subcontinent.

The maintenance of the alliance over the years despite Pakistan's growing co-operation with Peking, culminating in the American action during the 1971 crisis, have led a growing number of Indians to believe that the primary aim of the United States is to prevent India's emergence as a major power. They look upon this as one element in a general American opposition to the rise of other power centres capable of limiting the hegemony of the United States.[2] Such a conclusion flies in the face of all the evidence of American support for European and Japanese reconstruction, as well as support for European unification. These facts make little impression on many Indians, who can find no other explanation for what they interpret as consistent American opposition to India's efforts to develop its industrial and military strength and to play a prominent role in Asia.

This interpretation has become more sophisticated as its advocates have refined their arguments. They grant that the United States does not want to see India collapse, lest the Soviet Union or China take advantage of the ensuing power vacuum. Nonetheless, they see food-grain assistance as motivated chiefly by a need to dispose of American surpluses. They portray aid in such areas as power and rail development as basically export promotion efforts ('even imperialist countries laid railroads in colonies'), and emphasise American unwillingness to provide direct help for the heavy industrial facilities designed to promote India's economic independence. America's willingness after 1962 to provide air support (in co-operation with the United Kingdom) in the event of a new Chinese attack and its unwillingness to provide large quantities of sophisticated arms or the factories to produce them together provide additional evidence: India must be protected, but not allowed to develop the strength to protect itself. American opposition to nuclear proliferation clinches the argument.

The contention that American policy is directed *primarily* at containing India strikes Americans as based upon an incredibly inflated view of India's importance, as well as involving a highly selective use of evidence. However, it is easier for a large and proud country to see itself as the direct object of animosity than to think that it plays a

[2] See, for example, K. Subrahmanyan, 'U.S. Policy Toward India', *China Report*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1 and 2, January-February and March-April 1972; Baldev Raj Nayar, 'U.S. Policy', *Seminar*, January 1973; and Major General D. K. Palit (Ret'd.), 'Can India be a Major Power?', *The Overseas Hindustan Times*, February 15, 1973.

subordinate role in others' calculations. American opposition to India's efforts to play a major role in Asia ended by the late 1950s, and the Kennedy Administration urged India to take a more active stance. If the United States had wanted to keep India dependent on American foodstuffs it would not have provided aid for the green revolution. America's unwillingness to finance heavy industrial projects was based partly upon ideological opposition to public ownership of industry, as well as on the more valid ground that public sector factories in India were proving grossly inefficient. And America's hesitant and ambivalent military aid policy was largely due to its desire not to undermine its relationship with Pakistan rather than to any grand hegemonic design. But few Indians could see Pakistan as important enough to warrant such consideration.

Indians also complained that the 1954 alliance with Pakistan strengthened the position of military leaders relative to civilian politicians (and bolstered a hostile West Pakistan relative to a less anti-Indian East Pakistan) just when the issue of a democratic versus an authoritarian political system hung in the balance. If the United States had not followed the old British divide and rule strategy, a democratic political system would have emerged in Pakistan and the two countries would have worked out solutions to their political disputes.

However, the prospects for democratic government in Pakistan were always bleak. Its weak democratic traditions, the dismal record of its politicians, and the early collapse of the only party (the Muslim League) with any nation-wide popular support led to periodic interventions by the civil service and military as early as 1951.[3] Similarly, antagonism towards India, especially over Kashmir (even among East Pakistanis until the 1965 war) predated American arms aid, and continued after such aid was stopped. The military leaders did not manufacture this hostility; it reflected the feelings of large parts of the population. American policy contributed to India's problems, but to see it as the cause is to exaggerate American power, as Mrs. Gandhi did when she claimed that the United States could have *forced* the Pakistani government to reach an accommodation with the Bengalis in 1971. The illusion of American omnipotence dies hard, in Asia as well as in the United States.

This is not to suggest that the alliance with Pakistan was wise, based

[3] One can argue that United States policy led to the ultimate division of Pakistan by strengthening the military and bureaucratic forces, who came overwhelmingly from West Pakistan and who alienated East Pakistan by their refusal to share power with that area. This assumes, however, that the military officers and civil servants would have lost out to the politicians without the American involvement, *and* that the politicians would have worked out a satisfactory division of power between the two provinces. This seems unlikely, but American policy can be faulted for making it impossible.

as it was upon an inflated estimate of the communist military threat. Its benefits—electronic intelligence facilities and political support on cold war issues—were modest. When the Kennedy Administration wanted to support India after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian dispute, it felt constrained not to endanger its links with any ally—especially one which had convinced important military leaders and congressmen that it was a staunch ally—lest the American alliance system should unravel.

Only an accord between India and Pakistan would have relieved the United States of its dilemma. (In such an event Washington might have been relieved of its ally as well, in view of Pakistan's reasons for joining the alliance—a point that American leaders apparently overlooked.) The United States at times persuaded Pakistani governments to maintain a low-key position on Kashmir, but it could hardly persuade or induce them to abandon the issue. Periodic American support for United Nations' efforts to deal with the issue angered India while only temporarily assuaging Pakistan. But the United States saw its aims in India—co-operation against China, supporting economic development, and keeping India from relying too closely on Moscow—as too important to risk by making its assistance conditional upon an Indian compromise on Kashmir. Many American leaders struggled with this dilemma, but none was able to resolve it.

Problems of perception

A variety of psychological difficulties compounded these conflicts of perspective and policy. Both countries share a hypersensitivity to each other's criticisms as well as an insensitivity to each other's feelings. Indians take great pride in their nonalignment policy. Despite revisionist criticism, most Americans take similar pride in their country's record in containing communist power—at least until Vietnam. Yet neither country demonstrates much understanding, not to speak of appreciation, for what the other regards as a major achievement.

The American view of Pakistanis as more straightforward and dependable than Indians was galling to the latter, who attributed it to American unhappiness over their determination to be independent and thus retain their dignity and self-respect. Indians contrasted the American desire for allies with the Soviet willingness to co-operate with nonaligned countries, and concluded that Washington was less willing than Moscow to accept independent decision-making. Americans, observing Eastern Europe, saw satellisation as the Soviet goal, and contrasted this with the freedom enjoyed by allies of the United States.

For many years key elements of each elite looked upon their opposite numbers as 'like us'—but really meaning as each saw itself. Their expectations were repeatedly dashed when actions were taken according

to calculations of power politics; each country saw the gap between the moral rhetoric and the *Realpolitik* of the other while remaining blind to its own. Indian indignation over the American preference for an authoritarian Pakistan rather than a democratic India rings hollow in American ears in the light of New Delhi's close relations with Moscow and Cairo; American talk about the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism sounds cynical in view of its links with such authoritarian regimes as Iran, Thailand, and Taiwan. Indians contrast the Americans' talk of their efforts to build a peaceful world order of independent nations with their covert involvement in Iran and Cuba and their military action in Vietnam. Americans weigh the insistence of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi that India does not believe in power politics against the country's three wars with Pakistan, its war with China, and its military action in Goa. India's proclaimed determination to judge issues on their merit convinces few Americans after New Delhi's silence over Soviet military action in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Indians are at present chagrined at seeing former admirers of their country jump on the China bandwagon. American conservatives remain friendly toward Pakistan, while moving closer to China out of considerations of *Realpolitik*. Many American liberals (not to speak of radicals) have lost interest in India and become lyrical in their praise of a purposeful and egalitarian China.

American problems have been compounded by a longstanding inability to form a realistic view of India's prospects. Some have viewed its future as virtually hopeless. After living briefly in India, John Fischer wrote an article on 'India's Insoluble Hunger' in *Harper's* of April 1945:

> Does this mean that there is *no* solution for India's economic problem? So far as I can see, it probably does—at least for the predictable future. I arrived at this hopeless sort of answer reluctantly, over a period of many months, and the process was one of the most painful experiences I have undergone. . . . It was a considerable shock, therefore, to run into a situation to which I could not find even a theoretical answer. . . . And it was especially numbing to realize that this apparently insoluble problem may mean suffering and death on a staggering scale, for many generations to come. . . .

Fifteen years later Selig Harrison, in a thoughtful appraisal of India's deep-seated divisions, concluded that it probably would eventually need an authoritarian government to hold the country together. Others have seen India in danger of falling under decisive Soviet influence, or of acting as a Soviet proxy.

If such pessimistic forecasts have proved wrong so far, so have the optimistic judgments of such Americans as Chester Bowles. He saw India as capable of making rapid economic progress and, especially

after the development of the Sino-Indian dispute, believed India might become a *de facto* ally of the United States. Failure to recognise that India was building a working democracy, that it was able to set its own foreign policy course, and that it would progress in the only way such a society could in overcoming its age-old poverty and social rigidities—slowly and unevenly, with many ups and downs—were behind the cycles of enthusiasm and disappointment about India. The formulation of a consistent policy in such circumstances was extremely difficult.

Indian views of American society have been more consistent and thus caused fewer fluctuations in Indian foreign policy. However, there has been a tendency for much of the Indian elite to assume that a capitalistic America was by definition unconcerned with the welfare of the masses at home or abroad. Underlying this was a deep resentment of a rich, white nation, and one that had become the leader of the Western nations which India blamed for its poverty. Mrs. Gandhi gave voice to this feeling at the environmental conference at Stockholm in 1972:

> Many of the advanced countries of today have reached their present affluence by their domination over other races and countries, the exploitation of their own masses and their own natural resources. They got a head start through sheer ruthlessness, undisturbed by feelings of compassion or by abstract theories of freedom, equality or justice. . . . The riches and the labour of the colonised countries played no small part in the industrialisation and prosperity of the West.

Many Indians, influenced by British socialism or Marxist thought, believed that a capitalist society was inherently imperialistic. They feared that foreign capitalists would swarm over their country if given half an opportunity, and so erected barriers to prevent an invasion that Western businessmen have shown remarkably little interest in mounting. American detachment was selfish, but American involvement was dangerous for India.

Such suspicions were one reason behind Nehru's desire that India should keep its distance from the United States, lest close relations should strengthen his conservative opponents. Mrs. Gandhi inherited many of these feelings, which have been reinforced by her unhappy experiences with the United States ever since she became prime minister. Indo-American clashes during the struggle over Bangladesh are the most obvious, but there are others as well. For example, in the mid-1960s, Mrs. Gandhi accepted the argument of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United States that devaluation of the rupee, in combination with economic liberalisation and increased American aid, would pull India out of its economic difficulties. At some political risks, Mrs. Gandhi devalued, only to be told by an America which was becoming bogged down in Vietnam and less interested in

economic development that it could not provide the aid it had led India to expect.

Such disappointments, together with the American suspension of military aid after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, have led many Indians to conclude that their country should look to a more reliable Soviet Union for support.[4] It may not provide as much economic aid as the United States did in years past, but Moscow's need for a counterweight to China and its relative uninterest in Pakistan make it a dependable source of support as well as an important trade partner. Moreover, India's size and stable institutions render it largely immune to any attempted manipulation by the Soviet Union.

Only in the area of economic development has there been sustained Indo-American co-operation. India's own efforts have been supplemented by some $15 billion in external resources, although such practices as tying aid to purchases in the granting country reduce its values by perhaps one-fifth. Nearly two-thirds of the aid has come directly from the United States, which also provided about one-third of the $3 billion supplied by international organisations. This assistance has been an important element in India's progress. But such an unbalanced relationship is seldom an easy one, and as a proud people Indians dislike acknowledging the dependency involved. It is difficult for Americans to distinguish this from ingratitude. But gratitude seems out of place to Indians since the United States has at times tried to use its aid to influence Indian foreign policy as well as its domestic economic course.

An end to antagonism?

Given this litany of complaints and misunderstanding, is there any prospect of improved relations? Even if an appraisal of the respective interests of the two countries reveals no reason for active hostility, perhaps their aim should be no more than the absence of antagonism. Or are there considerations which suggest that a more fruitful relationship would be appropriate, and if so, what would be its broad outline? Both countries would do well to guard against excessive expectations and to eschew ambitious goals as they grapple with these issues, not only in the near future—when considerable effort will be required to prevent further deterioration—but over the next few years as well.

Indian political leaders see their country's three central interests as national security and integrity, international status and political influence, and economic development. New Delhi wants political and, when

[4] See Bhabani Sen Gupta, 'The New Balance of Power in South Asia', *Pacific Community*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (July 1972); and J. D. Sethi, 'Indo-Soviet Relations and the Limits of Bilateralism', *China Report*, Vol. VIII, No. 6 (November-December 1972).

necessary, military support from major powers in its disputes with China and Pakistan. Neutrality is tolerable, but it regards support of either enemy as an attempt to deny India its rightful position in the world by increasing its security problems. Similarly, New Delhi wants to be consulted on major international issues, especially those involving Asia.

Economic development would require external support even if the government's economic performance improved substantially. During 1972 Indian assertions of self-reliance reflected the euphoria attendant upon a great victory as well as a defiant reaction to the cut-off of American aid; they also involved a dangerous degree of self-delusion. A drop in food production, industrial stagnation, and a large foreign exchange gap for the fifth five-year plan (1974–79) soon brought this reality home. The Soviet Union has shown little eagerness to increase its support. Western Europe and Japan are willing to continue their assistance; the United States attitude is the question mark.

New Delhi is uncertain about how to proceed in these circumstances. It does not want to replace the dependence on Britain and then on the United States that it found so unpalatable with a similar dependence on the Soviet Union.[5] New Delhi views Soviet interests in Asia as at present similar to its own, but world politics is an uncertain affair; even a partial Sino-Soviet reconciliation after Mao's departure could leave India out in the cold. Even without such a dramatic shift, a better relationship with the United States would enhance India's bargaining power with Moscow. The Indians' insistence that the United States must accommodate their aspirations is diminishing as they become more aware that such a non-negotiable position will yield few results. But what does Washington want, apart from a muting of criticism, and how far is it willing to go to accommodate India?

Indian uncertainty is matched by American perplexity. Although past experiences have left many American officials frustrated and bitter, there remains a conviction that there is no essential reason for antagonism, and a vague sense that something better should be possible. The lessened importance of the Afro-Asian world in the Nixon Administration's scheme of things makes it unlikely that the United States will actively help India enhance its national security. But the general approach of the present Administration towards world politics—either the cautious containment policy of the Nixon doctrine or the Administration's more recent balance of power approach—implies a

[5] The desire to reduce its dependency on outsiders also lies behind India's restrictions on the cultural programmes of foreign governments, and the activities of foreign scholars. This affects the Western powers more than the Soviet Union—if only because of their more extensive involvement.

greater reliance on local countries to maintain their own security. The logic of such an approach suggests giving a higher priority to improved relations with the stronger regional powers, for they are best able to enhance stability in their areas. It also involves considerable acceptance of the policies they follow in their own regions and a willingness to let them settle disputes bilaterally with their neighbours.

It is by no means certain that India, if accepted as the pre-eminent power in the subcontinent, would demonstrate the breadth of vision and the skill necessary to make its pre-eminence palatable to its neighbours —especially Pakistan and Bangladesh. New Delhi has been better at dealing with small neighbours than with large ones. However, external attempts to support its neighbours *against* India would probably make New Delhi more rather than less intractable.

An American policy of accepting India's conception of its own role in the subcontinent would dismay Pakistan, which still hopes to utilise external support to counter India. But this is an increasingly dangerous as well as futile policy for a weakened and embittered Pakistan. A policy of confrontation with India would require such a large budget and result in such a central role for the military as to undermine the country's hopes for economic development and civilian government. In these circumstances, any substantial American arms shipments to Pakistan—especially over any sustained period—would not only be a disservice to its basic needs but also reduce the prospects for regional stability.

However, the Nixon Administration clearly believes that a working relationship with Peking is much more important than any American interest in the subcontinent. Some officials think that this requires the United States to keep in step with Chinese hostility toward India by parallel support of Pakistan.[6] Such an argument overlooks the vast difference between an end to Indo-American antagonism and active Indo-American co-operation on Asian security matters. The latter would anger Peking, for Chinese leaders would fear that the Soviet Union would be the real beneficiary in view of India's ties to Moscow. But South Asia is not one of China's top priorities and American hostility towards India is hardly an essential element in the Sino-American relationship.

The limits of co-operation

If there is a fair prospect of ending Indo-American antagonism, there is little possibility of a close relationship during the next few years. India has no constituency among politically powerful groups in

[6] Nothing would stimulate the growing pressures in India for nuclear weapons more than an Indian conviction that Sino-American-Pakistani military co-operation was a permanent feature of Asian politics.

the United States, and pro-American forces are on the defensive in India. Moscow's record in countries once close to it—China, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic—is hardly such as to excite American concern over Soviet influence and lead to competition for India's favour. Neither country is prepared for the problems that would arise from a large American aid programme, which many Indians fear would be a prelude to a new American attempt to manipulate India. Indeed, one section of the Indian elite argues that foreign aid has permitted the country to avoid the hard choices that must now be made if its democratic system is to meet growing popular demands for greater equality, adequate job opportunities, and more rapid economic growth. But if such needs are increasingly obvious, the path to follow is not. Mrs. Gandhi, in contrast to her mastery of domestic politics and foreign policy, is buffeted by conflicting advice about economic policy, and is not providing effective leadership.

The benefits the United States would derive from any major effort to assist Indian development are uncertain and long-range. Indian economic growth is of only marginal importance to the American economy. Aid has little influence on the basic direction of Indian foreign policy. The benefits derived from helping to sustain Indian democracy are imprecise; its fate rests overwhelmingly upon India's efforts. And humanitarian considerations have less appeal to a United States that has lost, at least for a time, its sense of mission.

Nonetheless, there are certain overlapping interests that provide a basis for co-operation at arms-length. India and the United States are the largest contributors to reconstruction and development in Bangladesh, and both have an interest in a moderate and stable situation there. Both import increasing quantities of petroleum at rising prices, and suffer from the reverse preferences accorded to European manufacturers by the African countries associated with the European Economic Community. Hijacking and terrorism threaten all peoples, and there is an acute need to create a new international trade and monetary order to replace the defunct Bretton Woods and the battered Gatt systems. Indian and American interests in these areas are neither identical nor in basic conflict, which leaves scope for constructive diplomacy.

Such an approach would have a foreign aid component because India still needs outside help. If the United States is to assume even a modest role in the international development effort, a continued failure to be involved in India makes little sense. It would create strains with Western Europe and Japan, and could only be the result of American petulance. Nonetheless, unless India experiences drought and famine, the size of any aid programme during the next few years should be modest, and should be related not only to India's performance but also to the degree of understanding that develops between the two countries.

Such an approach should be adopted not as a means of influencing Indian foreign policy, but in recognition that an aid programme is tolerable to recipient and provider alike only to the extent that it reflects a sense of shared purpose. Modest but realistic expectations and consistency of approach are the basic needs in the years just ahead, for only if the two countries are able to overcome their unhappy legacy of antagonism and establish a measure of trust can a closer relationship evolve.

NICHOLAS II TO SALT II: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN EAST-WEST DIPLOMACY *

Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

THE arms race as a problem in East-West relations has been marked by aspects of both continuity and change. If we look back not only to the first disarmament efforts of the Bolsheviks but to Tsarist diplomacy, the elements of continuity appear at least as significant as the changes that have affected Soviet policy over the years. Moscow's negotiating behaviour even in recent times continues to bear striking resemblances to the approach of Tsarist Russia to the Hague Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1899 (and again in 1907).[1] Like Tsar Nicholas II, Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev have been aware of Russia's technological and material disadvantages *vis-à-vis* the West. Nicholas, for example, called the Hague Conference in part because he sought to outlaw the rapid-fire cannon available to Austria but not to Russia, unless at great expense. Soviet leaders, in their time, have also sought to negate the West's lead in various fields of military technology: atomic weaponry (by exploiting the ban-the-bomb campaigns of 1946–52); the West's plans for tactical nuclear weapon deployment in Europe (by the atom-free zone proposals of 1956 and later); outer space surveillance (by denouncing spy satellites as contrary to international law until Russia also obtained such craft in the early 1960s). Indeed, the Kremlin seems to have finally decided to take part in the strategic arms limitation talks (Salt) with Washington only after the Johnson Administration asked Congress for funds in 1968 to deploy antiballistic missile defences (ABM), an expensive and sophisticated system in which the United States might produce another 'gap' to Russia's disadvantage.[2] The American lead in the testing of

* The article draws in part from the author's forthcoming book on the super-powers and arms control to be published later in 1973.

[1] For documentation on Tsarist policy in 1899, see L. Teleshevskoi (Ed.), 'K istorii pervoi Gaagakoi konferentsii 1899 g.', *Krasnyi arkhiv*, LI–LII (Moscow, 1932), pp. 64–96, and 'Novye materialy o Gaagskoi mirnoi konferentsii 1899 g.', *Krasnyi arkhiv*, LIV–LV (Moscow, 1932), pp. 49–70.

[2] For historical analyses of recent Soviet participation in efforts to contain the super-power arms race, see Thomas B. Larson, *Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1964–1968* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1969), pp. 139–183; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution. 1968); Roman Kolkowicz *et al.*, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1970); Thomas W. Wolfe, 'Soviet Approaches to SALT', *Problems of Communism*, XIX, No. 5 (September–October 1970), pp. 1–10; Lawrence T. Caldwell, 'Soviet Attitudes to SALT', Adelphi Paper No. 75 (London: IISS. 1971).

multiple warheads was no doubt another incentive to Moscow to participate in the Salt negotiations.

The diplomacy of Nicholas II appealed to pacifist sentiments at home and abroad, just as Soviet propaganda has courted elements of the liberal bourgeoisie, the working class, the oppressed nations of the Third World, as well as the war-weary people of the Soviet Union.[3] Like Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union has also been constrained by the views of its allies. Thus, despite its original reasons for calling the Hague Conference and wanting it to succeed, St. Petersburg had to promise the French that no agreements would be reached before they had consented to attend. Analogous pressures from Pankow and Peking have no doubt contributed to occasional harsh notes in the Kremlin's negotiations with the West in the 1950s and 1960s.

More ironic even than the cross-pressures from allies were those from within the Tsarist government. Nicholas was eventually compelled to assure some of his own ministers that Russia would not agree to major arms controls at The Hague because force or the threat of force would be needed to obtain Russia's political and territorial objectives in the Far East (where war with Japan was anticipated) and at the Turkish Straits (near which a number of Balkan wars would be fought before Sarajevo).

Soviet arms control policy has also been the result of conflicting pressures, from Lenin's day to the present (though dissent was muffled in the years of high Stalinism). These pressures have reflected the same kinds of bureaucratic interests and institutional orientations that characterise decision-making processes in the United States and other countries.[4] Thus, a relatively conciliatory position towards negotiations with the West was developed in the Soviet Foreign Ministry (or Commissariat) under Chicherin, Litvinov and Gromyko—all of them professional diplomats well versed in foreign cultures and languages, but (partly because of their cosmopolitan ways) relatively low in the Party hierarchy. This professional orientation and its concomitant willingness to explore the possibilities of negotiation were not nearly so pronounced when the Foreign Ministry was headed by Trotsky, Molotov or Shepilov—in part because these men were ranking Party leaders first (at least two of them ideological hardliners) and only secondarily concerned with

[3] See Nikolai Notovitch, *La Pacification de l'Europe et Nicholas II* (Paris: P. Ollendorf. 1899). For a study of Stalin's use of the peace movement as an adjunct to Soviet policy, see Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1963). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1964, p. 328.

[4] Sovietologists have probably exaggerated the degree to which various parts of the Soviet policy apparatus have worked in concert. For a collection of essays that persuasively challenge the old orthodoxy, see H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1971). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1971, p. 832.

diplomacy. Vyshinsky's term as Foreign Minister (1949–53) coincided with the height of the cold war and internal tensions in the Soviet Union, producing a climate unsuitable for exploring detente, even if the Foreign Minister had not been notable for his legalistic defence of, and other involvement in, the purges of the 1930s.[5]

The contrast between the world views associated with the Party hardliner and the professional diplomat was illustrated by the different ways in which Trotsky and Chicherin spoke, in their day, of 'peaceful co-existence'.[6] This concept can be rendered in two ways in Russian: as *mirnoe sozhitel'stvo* or as *mirnoe sosushchestvovanie*. The first of these expressions more nearly approximates to 'peaceful co-habitation', implying a more active but less enduring relationship than the second term, which literally means 'peaceful co-existence', connoting a more stable but also a more formal relationship. Trotsky seems to have been the first Soviet leader to speak of *mirnoe sozhitel'stvo*, a term that he used in a basically revolutionary context from November 1917 until the Brest-Litovsk Treaty concluded in March 1918. He used this term, for example, in the same speech in which he called for 'no war, no peace'. It was left to Trotsky's successor as Foreign Commissar, Chicherin (once employed in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry), to use *mirnoe sozhitel'stvo* in a more conciliatory sense, as he did in September 1918 when attempting privately to convince the Kaiser's government of Moscow's interest in good-neighbourly relations and 'peaceful co-habitation'. Chicherin later described Soviet Russia's peace treaty with Estonia in February 1920 as 'the first experiment in *mirnoe sozhitel'stvo* with bourgeois states' and 'a dress rehearsal for understanding with the Entente'.

Chicherin also seems to have been the first Soviet spokesman to employ the more formal expression for co-existence when, on June 17, 1920, he called for '*mirnoe sosushchestvovanie* with other governments, no matter what they are'. Such niceties, of course, have been blurred

[5] From 1917 until 1971 there have been only seven Soviet Foreign Ministers: Trotsky (November 1917–April 1918); Chicherin (1918–29); Litvinov (1929–39); Molotov (1939–49 and 1953–56); Vyshinsky (1949–53); Shepilov (during 1956); Gromyko (1957–). The first two professionals—Chicherin and Litvinov—became members of the Party Central Committee only late in their careers. Gromyko attained this status in 1956. Trotsky, Molotov and now Gromyko have been the only Foreign Ministers to become full members in the Party Politburo. Vyshinsky and Shepilov were alternate members of the Politburo (or Presidium) during their incumbency. For detailed studies of Chicherin and Litvinov, see the essays by Theodore H. von Laue and Henry L. Roberts in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Eds.), *The Diplomats, 1919–39* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1954, p. 216. See also the analytical survey by Robert M. Slusser, 'The Role of the Foreign Ministry', in Ivo J. Lederer (Ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 197–242. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1963, p. 113). See esp. the discussion of Litvinov's place in the power struggles of the 1930s (pp. 215–230). Many other essays in the Lederer book are relevant to the problems of continuity and change discussed here.

[6] The following analysis is based on Franklyn Griffiths, 'Origins of Peaceful Coexistence: A Historical Note', *Survey*, No. 50 (January 1964), pp. 195–201.

in later Soviet treatments of the problem, but Lenin seems never to have used the term *mirnoe sosushchestvovanie*, though in February 1920 he did speak of Soviet policy in Asia as '*mirnoe sozhitel'stvo* with all peoples, the workers and peasants of all nations awakening to a new life, a life without exploitation, without landowners, without capitalists, without merchants'. Lenin did, however, speak of *mirnoe sozhitel'stvo* with bourgeois governments in October 1922, when he told the London *Observer* that lack of full Soviet participation at the Lausanne Conference would impede trade 'so that there would be either no grounds at all left for peaceful co-existence or it would be unusually hampered', and that the League of Nations was without 'real equality of nations or real prospects of peaceful co-existence between them'.

Stalin, after Lenin's death, used both terms for co-existence, but declared that the period of *mirnoe sozhitel'stvo* was receding into the past, giving way to a period of imperialist attacks. At the same time as Litvinov was presenting Moscow's appeals for total and complete disarmament at the League of Nations, Stalin declared that the task was to delay war by buying off capitalists and applying all measures to maintain peaceful relations. 'The basis of our relations with capitalist countries', he declared, 'consists of admitting the *sosushchestvovanie* of the two opposing systems'. As Franklyn Griffiths has pointed out in his essay on these changes, Stalin's 'acceptance' evolved into Khrushchev's active pursuit of *mirnoe sosuchchestvovanie*.[7] If Stalin accepted peaceful co-existence out of weakness, Khrushchev later made it a foundation of Soviet policy at a time of mutual deterrence.

Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov (first his deputy, later his successor as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs) took the lead in formulating the Soviet position on disarmament at a number of international conferences.[8] It was Chicherin who, in mid-1921, first expressed the Soviet government's interest in 'disarmament of any kind', though he also noted that it doubted whether 'guarantees' would be found to assure the implementation of disarmament measures (about to be discussed at the Washington Naval Conference), a point that Comintern statements made in much stronger language. Before the Genoa Economic Conference in 1922, Litvinov seems to have drawn up theses on a 'pacifist programme' to be presented by the Soviet delegation, a procedure approved by the Party's Central Committee. Chicherin was apparently instructed to elaborate the details of the programme, which he did in consultation with Lenin. Later the Soviet Foreign Commissar presented this programme with a great flourish at Genoa. Litvinov, for his part, led the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Conference on the Limitation

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[8] For documentation, see the author's 'Lenin on Disarmament', *Slavic Review*, XXIII, No. 3 (September 1964), pp. 504–525.

of Armaments later in 1922, demonstrating much of the style and substance he showed when Moscow joined the League of Nations disarmament talks in 1927. As recent documentation has shown, however, in 1922 Chicherin was rebuked for going too far towards concessions to the West (a fate suffered more visibly in 1957 by Harold E. Stassen, who was alleged by John Foster Dulles to have exceeded his instructions in arms control talks with Moscow[9]). After an exchange of telegrams with Chicherin, however, 'the Politburo [to quote a senior Soviet historian] decided that Chicherin was right' and directed him to make 'concessions in strict dependence on the amount and terms of the loan granted to Soviet Russia'.[10]

We can only speculate whether Zinoviev and other Comintern leaders welcomed the disarmament declarations and proposals of the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, or whether they simply made the best of a policy line about which they had grave doubts. (The manner in which they exploited the disarmament campaign raised apprehensions in the West that tended to undermine the kind of trust on which an accord would probably have to rest.) The Cominform, in its day, also worked in orchestration with various communist fronts to exploit the bomb banning proposals of Soviet diplomacy in the years before Stalin's death. Revolutionary concerns and interests seem to have diminished in the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s, though Khrushchev and his successors have often been inhibited by fear of being exposed as traitors to the revolution by reason of their arms control dealings with the West. Assuming that revolutionary concerns have subsided, however, it would seem that their potentially hawkish influence on Soviet arms policy has been more than compensated by the growth of a military-industrial complex within the Soviet Union.

Like military men everywhere, Soviet ministers and commissars of defence and their subordinates have taken a dim view of letting down moral and material defences by negotiating with the adversary. There is no evidence that Trotsky (while in power) or his successor as Commissar for Military Affairs, Mikhail Frunze, were opposed to the disarmament line espoused by Chicherin and Litvinov. That line, after all, could be rationalised as part of a one-two punch, in which Comintern propaganda followed through to underscore the futility and hypocrisy of the bourgeois disarmament position. But it is clear that Trotsky and Frunze—despite their personal and doctrinal feuding—shared a militant, revolutionary outlook concerned with keeping the entire nation and its armed forces in a high degree of readiness.[11] Frunze and other Soviet

[9] Mr. Stassen has claimed that these charges are ill-founded.

[10] M. Trush, 'Lenin's Foreign Policy Activity (April–July 1922)', *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 63–66 at p. 64.

[11] See, *e.g.*, L. Trotskii, *Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia: na voennoi rabote* (3 vols. Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet. 1923–25). On Trotsky's project of

military men tried to obstruct and minimise the transition of the Red Army toward a small cadre force backed by a large territorial militia. A less independent and revolutionary outlook was shown by Voroshilov, but he too talked of the need to strengthen Soviet defences in the period of the Five Year Plans before the Second World War, on premises that stressed the implacable hostility between the Soviet Union and the capitalist system.[12] The zero-sum competition between Moscow and its adversaries has continued to be emphasised in speeches by Soviet defence ministers such as Malinovsky and Grechko. In addition, however, there is much evidence since 1960 of serious dissatisfaction among the military over (a) reductions of troop strength; (b) allocation of funds to the military budget; and (c) the favouring of one branch of the armed forces over another.[13] There have also been indirect assertions by the military that arms control efforts would be in vain, such as Frunze's admonition that chemical weapons would be used in future wars and that no convention or agreement would change the matter.[14] A veritable chorus of Soviet military writers warned in 1968–69 against entering strategic arms negotiations with the United States, but their concern was muted in 1970–71, and by 1972 the military press joined with *Pravda* and *Izvestia* in asserting that 'equal security' had been enshrined in the Moscow summit agreements.

Soviet politicians, especially at moments of crisis when they felt insecure (as in 1954–55 and in 1964–65), have courted the military. It also seems likely that the links between some political leaders and the military have been further reinforced by support from heads of industries engaged in advanced research, and in the development and manufacture of military and military-related products such as space ships.[15] Thus, what Joseph Schumpeter termed the 'warrior class'

'militarisation of labour', see Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879–1921* (New York; London: Oxford University Press. 1954), pp. 487–503. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1954, p. 488. Trotsky did, however, argue for a reduction of Soviet military personnel and their transfer to civilian production in 1920. See the author's 'Soviet Disarmament Proposals and the Cadre-Territorial Army', *Orbis*, VII, No. 4 (Winter 1964), notes 14 and 15. In exile in 1935, on the other hand, Trotsky castigated the Second and Third Internationals for day-dreaming about disarmament and the League of Nations. See *Trotsky's Diary in Exile* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1958), pp. 113–114. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1960, p. 384. For a minor spat between Trotsky and Lenin in 1921 over the liquidation of a coastguard department, see the author's 'Lenin on Disarmament', note 66.

[12] See, *e.g.*, K. E. Voroshilov, *Oborona SSSR*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Voennyi vestnik. 1928), pp. 28–36, 89, 160–170 and *K. E. Voroshilov: stat'i i rechi* (Moscow: Partizdat TsK VKP (b). 1937), pp. 513, 540.

[13] See, *e.g.*, Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1967), pp. 153–165. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1968, p. 562. See also the materials attributed to Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1965), pp. 231–260.

[14] Frunze, *Sobranie sochinenii*, II, p. 134.

[15] For documentation, see *e.g.*, Walter C. Clemens, Jr.,*Outer Space and Arms Control* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Center for Space Research. 1966 [processed]), pp. 44–47. For corroborating documentation, see also William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott

finds itself in common cause with certain political leaders, with the secret police, and with certain industrial interests whose empires may atrophy or be otherwise threatened by a lessening of international tensions, by freer contacts with foreigners, or by decreased investments in certain sectors of the economy.

Party leaders' pragmatic approach

Ranging between the proponents and opponents of arms control and other negotiations with the West, the heads of the Soviet Communist Party and government have generally adopted a more balanced view, taking account of the arguments pro and con and weighing them according to the needs and opportunities of the moment. Lenin, though disposed to rule out disarmament talks on *a priori* ideological grounds, recognised the pragmatic utility of such talks as a means of strengthening peace sentiments as well as revolutionary movements in the West. He also anticipated the day when military technology would make war counterproductive as an instrument of policy.[16] In these waverings he adumbrated considerations and policies that were later present under Stalin and the several regimes that have succeeded him. The pragmatic note was struck most vividly in Khrushchev's time by the Party statement that the 'atomic bomb does not adhere to the class principle'.[17] On the other hand, since technology increasingly acquires a dynamism of its own, it is possible that it will take command over the foresight that Soviet leaders have sometimes demonstrated. (The lack of a more responsive body politic may account for the unhindered development of a supersonic transport in the Soviet Union, in contrast with the refusal by the United States Congress to provide funds for such a plane in 1971.)

Brezhnev, like his predecessors at the head of the Soviet Communist Party, has progressively widened his sphere of interest. In recent years he has educated himself in the intricacies of foreign affairs, including arms control questions. Until a few months ago, the Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, remained a specialist, listened to for advice but left outside the Politburo where decisions are taken. Western diplomats have observed that Gromyko behaves like the foreign minister of a great power, concerned with diplomacy and *Realpolitik*. Whether he is less ideological than Brezhnev and Kosygin is not clear, since they

(Trans. and Eds.), *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1969, p. 151. See also the apparent alarm in the Soviet Defence Ministry about the consequence of any Salt accord, manifested for example in 'A Policy of Active Resistance to Aggression', *Krasnaia Zvezda*, June 1, 1971: 'Our preparedness to support real measures for disarmament must match and does match our preparedness for any turn of events.'

[16] See the author's 'Lenin on Disarmament', notes 48 and 49.

[17] 'Open Letter' of the CPSU Central Committee 'to All Party Organisations and All Communists of the Soviet Union', *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

must take a broader view of Soviet interests and speak out on issues affecting morale and ideological purity.

There is, we should note, a world-wide trend for foreign ministers to meet one another frequently; to initiate and respond to proposals from one another as theoretical equals; to develop their expertise on the basis of higher education and professional diplomatic experience—usually without benefit of military training or service, even in developing countries. Within this elite, Andrei Gromyko was already in 1965 the third best-known foreign minister, ranking only after Couve de Murville and Dean Rusk among those known personally to other foreign ministers.[18] It is not very strange that—more than fifty years after the revolution—the Soviet Union's foreign minister is a part of an international elite of specialists in diplomacy. It is perhaps more surprising that he is part of a tradition that Chicherin and Litvinov established in the interwar years. They, no less than Gromyko, lost no chance to speak in favour of disarmament if permitted to do so by the political directorate. They, in their day, like Gromyko in April 1971, also urged the West to listen carefully to the arms control proposals espoused by the Party leadership.

The trend towards functional representation at the highest level of foreign policy-making reached its apotheosis in April 1973, not long before Brezhnev's meeting with President Nixon in June, when Gromyko, Marshal Grechko and Yuri Andropov were all named as full members of the Politburo (replacing one foreign policy conservative and one liberal in domestic affairs). This was the first time since 1957 that a foreign minister or defence minister held Politburo rank, and the first time since Beria (1953) that it could be claimed by a head of the secret police. Only time will tell whether these three voices echo their General Secretary or whether they will exercise some independent influence on Soviet foreign policy, representative perhaps of their own institutional perspective.

Returning to our main theme, we see that Soviet policy—like Tsarist—has objective reasons for seeking limitations on East-West arms competition, but that these may be submerged by other political interests or forces working for the expansion of Russia's military power. In this regard, unfortunately, we see a partial convergence between the Soviet Union and the other super-power. Indeed, the judgments of the White House, the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as to what risks may be taken for peace are subject to challenge

[18] George Modelski, 'The Foreign Ministers as a World Elite', *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, Vol. XIV, 1970 (The Ann Arbor Conference, 1969), pp. 31–46. See also Barry R. Farrell, 'Foreign Policies of Open and Closed Political Societies', in Farrell (Ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1966), pp. 167–208. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1967, p. 125.

not only from the Defense Department,[19] but also from Congress and from numerous business interests who campaign more openly and vigorously than would be possible in a less pluralistic community. By late 1972 or early 1973, however, it appeared that President Nixon was aiming to reduce the influence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency still further, cutting its grant and putting an ageing State Department officer at the head of the delegation to Salt II. (By the same token, however, public and elite pressures for detente and arms control also receive freer expression in the United States, though the dissent of intellectuals such as Sakharov, the underground chronicles of the opposition, the organised protests and sit-ins of Soviet citizens in recent years showed some increase in the possibility of free expression in the Soviet Union, despite occasional crackdowns by the agencies of control.)

Some continuities in Tsarist and Soviet policy derive from Russia's geopolitical condition (its vast size, location, technological backwardness, and so on) and perhaps from Russian culture. Other continuities are based on the ideological heritage of communism, particularly as inherited by Lenin, and from the early experiences of Bolshevik diplomacy when its initial characteristics were developed under Lenin. But let us also consider the forces that have functioned to bring on certain discontinuities from the momentum of history, certain changes that have tended to make arms control agreements between Moscow and the West not only feasible but perhaps vital to the survival of each side.

The evolution of Soviet arms control policy

In the evolution of Soviet policy we see the interaction of three factors: (1) ideas and sentiments about strategic objectives and how to achieve them; (2) actions taken to pursue these goals; and (3) the conditions, at home and abroad, that affect and are affected by Soviet policy. Does any one of these three factors have 'precedence'? Clearly, the ideas of Lenin and other Soviet leaders on disarmament did not arise in a vacuum, but reflected the culture in which they had grown up; the material problems of the Russian state; their own political experience (heavy in conspiratorial intrigue for Lenin and his contemporaries); their personal dispositions and personal interests. These ideas generated policies: actions by the foreign ministry; the war ministry; the Comintern and other agencies for dealing with revolutionary movements abroad. These actions then mingled with those of other govern-

[19] During most of Robert S. McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, however, his department took a more positive stand on arms control matters than the Department of State and a more influential one than the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

ments, either succeeding or failing in some degree to achieve Soviet objectives, either vindicating or eroding the expectations on which the policies had been constructed—thereby creating a new set of conditions in which the ideas of Soviet leaders could be refined or altered. Once the Bolsheviks were in power, the material problems and opportunities of managing state power came to overshadow those aspects of their ideology based on pure theory. Though ideology continued to reflect itself in Soviet disarmament policy, for example, in expectations of capitalist hostility and in the dependence of capitalist economies upon the arms industry (a point which was not discarded until 1959),[20] 'ideology' was gradually redefined to rationalise the strategic interests of the Soviet state.

The underlying conditions shaping Soviet policy (or that of any country) on arms control can be grouped under four headings: (1) military-strategic; (2) external political; (3) domestic political and sociological; and (4) economic. Ideology, we assume, will also be conditioned by these four factors, no less than by government or Party words and deeds on arms and arms control. The weight of history suggests that the most important conditions shaping Soviet arms control policy have been military-strategic in character, though the other forces have also played a significant role, particularly at moments of instability within the Soviet ruling circles or at times of great economic difficulty.[21]

We should emphasise, however, that the conditions in which Soviet ideas on arms control take shape are not the product only of Soviet policy. This milieu results rather from the interaction of Soviet actions and those of other states, not least the United States and China. Soviet views on arms competition will naturally reflect a learning experience the nature of which can be shaped by Washington no less than by Peking or other centres of power. To the extent that Soviet leaders feel that their experiences in arms control matters have been conducive to the promotion of their interests, they will be inclined to pursue these negotiations more seriously, and vice versa.[22]

There is a tendency in Western writing on the Soviet Union to

[20] See references in the author's *Soviet Disarmament Policy, 1917–1963: An Annotated Bibliography of Soviet and Western Sources* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution. 1965), pp. 78–86, 104, 125.

[21] Domestic factors in Soviet policy are emphasised, probably overemphasised, in Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin* (London: Collins. 1968; New York: Viking. 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 530; and Robert Slusser, 'America, China and the Hydra-Headed Opposition: The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy', in Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton (Eds.), *Soviet Policy-Making* (New York: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1967), pp. 183–269. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1968, p. 118.

[22] For a study of the manner in which the Kennedy and Khrushchev Administrations seemed to pursue a strategy of reciprocal tension reduction in 1963, see Amitai Etzioni, 'The Kennedy Experiment', *Western Political Quarterly*, XX, No. 2. Part 1 (June 1967), pp. 361–380.

understate the degree to which Soviet policy has been reactive rather than initiating. Much Western analysis assumes that Moscow has embarked on some coherent strategy for reasons of ideology or internal compulsions of Soviet power, and that the job of Western governments is to ascertain the true character of this strategy and react accordingly. One of the leading American arms control negotiators once began a lecture by saying: 'My subject is what the Russians have been doing; why they behave that way; and what we ought to do about it'. What this negotiator and many Sovietologists minimise is the impact of the West upon Soviet policy. Thus, one Soviet diplomat told the author of the profound shock and disillusionment experienced by some in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1955 when the three Western heads of government ignored, at Geneva, the Russian disarmament proposals of May 10. These proposals specifically incorporated much of the Western position up to that time, and by September of that year had led Washington to 'place a reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva substantive positions . . . [on] levels of armaments. . . .'[23] This incident may or may not be apocryphal, recounted to impress the sympathetic Westerner, but the principle implicit in the Soviet diplomat's story seems indisputable: Soviet ideas and actions—no less than the West's—will be based upon perceptions and experiences that reflect international as well as domestic and purely ideological inputs.

We should note, in passing, that Western policy toward the East-West arms race has also displayed aspects of continuity, some of them not conducive to restraining this competition. One aspect of Western policy is the mirror image of a vital facet in the Soviet outlook as well: a profound distrust of the other side as a reliable negotiating partner. Western policy-makers have considered the Soviet regime to be unstable, immoral or amoral, unable to maintain itself except by force, and prone to cheating or violence to achieve its foreign objectives. One negative result of this outlook has been a disposition to look with extreme scepticism at any Soviet proposal, expecting that it must be loaded to favour only one side. If the Russians accept some Western proposals, the West may renege on these (as it did for example in 1955 and 1959), in part from a fear that there must be some hidden reason that makes these measures good for Russia but bad for the West. As recently as 1970 Washington undercut its Salt delegation by withdrawing support for an American proposal limiting ABM defence to capital cities after it was accepted by Moscow. Though a time-lag intervened between the American offer and the Soviet response, the Soviet leaders must have questioned American motives.[24] We must note also that the West has

[23] *Documents on Disarmament*, 1945–1959. 2 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1960). Vol. I, p. 513.

[24] For details, see John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1973).

itself looked with a jaundiced eye on East European initiatives such as the Rapacki Plan, which its Polish author hoped would give his country an element of independence, partly because the Western governments assumed some dark Soviet design behind the scenes.[25]

Second, following from this distrust of the Russians, Western policy —particularly American policy—has been marked by a high degree of self-righteousness. In Washington, no less than in Moscow, a semi-official line has stressed the country's steady dedication to the quest for peace and arms limitation: the United States citing the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22 or, later, the magnanimity of the Baruch proposals for the international control of atomic energy in 1946, just as the Soviet Union can refer to its disarmament campaign in 1922; its 'principled stand' at the League of Nations; and its efforts to 'ban the bomb' after the Second World War. What most officials and citizens of each country have often failed to do is to consider their own policies as others perceive them. The self-righteousness of Washington and Moscow has been compounded as the two super-powers retain or increase their own arms while putting pressure on Israel, India, Japan, and other countries to forswear the nuclear option.

Third, Washington has tended to operate on the assumption that American and Western economic and technological prowess will permit the United States and its allies to achieve and maintain military superiority if the communist bloc persists in continuing the arms race. Just as the British navy was once pledged to superiority over any two competing fleets, in the 1960s Washington tried to maintain nuclear and general purpose forces able to fight two and a half major wars. As the British sights were lowered, however, so, under President Nixon, the United States has altered its target to an ability to fight only one and a half major wars, and to maintain a posture of strategic 'sufficiency' rather than superiority.[26]

From Lenin to Brezhnev

Perhaps the most important change in factors affecting Soviet arms control policy has been the achievement in the late 1960s of a rough parity in strategic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. For the first time the strategic balance could facilitate a nego-

[25] Poland's motives in this matter have been discussed with a number of East European scholars and diplomats, who agree with this interpretation. For a historical analysis of disengagement proposals, see Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Franklyn Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954–1964* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press. 1966), pp. 147–151.

[26] These changes may be traced in the annual posture statements of Defense Secretaries McNamara and Laird, and in statements by the White House. For a summary and analysis of those developments, see Morton H. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), esp. pp. 51–53 and pp. 72–86.

tiated freeze. Washington's earlier determination to maintain strategic superiority had served as a red flag goading Soviet decision-makers to pursue the arms race in order to nullify the American lead.[27] Only time will tell whether the super-powers will be content with a position of approximate parity. Parity, of course, does not denote equality, and each super-power has unique advantages, the American lead in numbers of deliverable warheads being especially important. Nevertheless, the strategic background to the Salt negotiations is one in which either super-power can assume an 'assured destruction capability' *vis-à-vis* the other, even if one of them launched a surprise attack.

The attainment of a rough parity in the late 1960s has been only one of several developments that have improved Russia's position militarily and strategically since the end of the Second World War. One consequence of the war, of course, was the establishment of regimes friendly to Moscow, or even subordinate to Kremlin control, throughout Eastern Europe. This gain for Soviet power was undermined, however, by changes in military technology that left the Soviet Union vulnerable to airborne attack with nuclear weapons even though Soviet troops stood athwart the historic invasion routes of the East European plains and mountains. Though Russian scientists tested their first atomic bomb in 1949, it was not until 1954–55 that the Soviet government amassed numbers of long-range bombers capable of striking the territory of the United States. Thus, though the Soviet Union did not possess numerical equality with American strategic forces, by the mid- and later 1950s it had acquired—for the first time in Russian history—a minimum deterrent capable of dissuading any rational opponent from an attack. This important fact enabled the Soviet Union for the first time to negotiate with the West on the basis of relative equality, both sides considering measures that could be to their mutual benefit.

Other changes accumulated in rapid succession. The first summit conference since Potsdam and the opening rounds of the cold war brought the British, French, Soviet and American heads of government together in 1955. Although these meetings had some negative results, Western and Soviet leaders left Geneva persuaded that both sides acknowledged the futility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy. By 1958 the first conference of 'experts' was held, thereby acknowledging the role of technological expertise in resolving problems of arms control, for example, in the matter of nuclear test detection and identification. The years 1958–61 witnessed a three-power moratorium

[27] On Stalin's personal participation and oversight of programmes during the Second World War aimed at improving Soviet technology in ways that would overtake the West, *e.g.*, in range of fighter planes, see the memoirs of a leading Soviet engineer and designer: A. Iakovlev, *Tsel' zhizni (zapiski aviakonstruktora)*. 2nd and enlarged edition. (Moscow: Politizdat. 1969), esp. pp. 336–351.

on nuclear tests, though France entered the atomic club in 1960. The first arms control treaty involving the super-powers (on Antarctica, in 1959) was followed by others in 1963, and then by a succession of accords leading toward the Salt agreements of 1972.

The limited accords of the early 1960s demonstrated that arms control was possible between communist and non-communist powers. They also showed—for all to see—that world communism was not monolithic, nor was the Western alliance. The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 helped to expose and to confirm the rift between Moscow and Peking; it increased tension between Adenauer's Germany and the leaders of Britain and the United States; France, like China, also refused to sign the treaty and separated itself still further from its alliance partners.

These agreements of the 1960s and, still more, those reached in Salt, suggest how far Soviet arms control policy has travelled since Lenin's initial view of disarmament as a pacifist myth. The first positive Soviet policy towards arms control can be observed in 1918–22 in the treaties terminating hostilities along Russia's western front (demilitarised zones and so on); next, in 1921, as a means of obtaining Soviet participation in the Washington Naval Conference, where Moscow wanted particularly to take part in negotiations about the Far East; in 1922 as a means of dividing the bourgeois governments facing Soviet Russia at Genoa and generating support from the working classes and pacifist bourgeoisie of Europe; later in 1922, as a means of putting pressure on Russia's East European neighbours to make the same kinds of manpower reductions as those already planned for the Red Army [28]; beginning with Litvinov's first presentations to the League of Nations in 1927, as a way of enhancing Moscow's international position and mobilising world opinion by exposing the hypocrisy of bourgeois diplomacy; in the years 1946–53, as a tool with which to hamstring America's nuclear weapon monopoly and to undermine the West's moral position in the Korean War (by accusations of bacteriological warfare). Only in the mid-1950s and the 1960s did Kremlin policy-makers begin to approach arms control negotiations in a manner that might promote the strategic interests of the parties concerned—by helping to economise on scarce resources, by reducing the danger of war, and by reducing the destructiveness of war if it should occur.[29] In these years Moscow, like

[28] See the author's, 'Lenin on Disarmament', notes 41–43.

[29] Even in the 1920s and 1930s, however, there were Soviet writers and diplomats who took an 'analytical middle marginalist' or 'marginalist anti-war' approach to disarmament talks. Some of them, such as E. A. Korovin, continued this line despite criticism from powerful foes. Litvinov and his secretary at the League negotiations, Boris Shtein (the present author's mentor at Moscow University in 1958), seemed also to belong to this non-ideological grouping. For references, see Griffiths, 'Inner Tensions in the Soviet Approach to "Disarmament"', *International Journal* XXII, No. 4 (Autumn 1967), pp. 593–617, esp. pp. 600–602.

the Western governments, also came to appreciate the extent to which arms control negotiations can alienate as well as win support from allies and uncommitted nations.

Virtually the entire evolution of communist thinking on arms limitation from before the Bolshevik Revolution to the 1970s was anticipated by shifts in Lenin's views on this subject. His attitude towards disarmament passed through two fairly well-defined stages, but contained the seeds of a third stage that seems to have become increasingly influential in Soviet thinking in recent years.[30] First, from before the 1905 Revolution until after the October 1917 Revolution, Lenin opposed disarmament negotiations because they engendered pacifist illusions harmful to a revolutionary mentality. The task of the proletariat, he urged, was rather to 'disarm' the bourgeoisie and to end war by terminating the class struggle. While maintaining his theoretical opposition to such schemes as the 'plague of nations', however, in 1919–20 Lenin presided over the conclusion of many arms control arrangements embodied in peace treaties with Russia's western neighbours. By 1921–22 a second stage emerged as Lenin endorsed disarmament negotiations as a way to buy time and exploit contradictions in the enemy camp. This second stage in Lenin's thought, however, contained elements of another, less revolutionary, orientation which treated disarmament not only as a tactic but as a possible long-range objective of Soviet policy. Not only did he foresee a period when military technology would make war unthinkable, but he called it one of the main tasks of Soviet diplomacy to support the pacifist wing of the bourgeois camp 'as one of the few chances for the peaceful evolution of capitalism to a new structure. . . .'[31]

These three stages continue to be manifest in the outlook and policies of the Soviet, Chinese and other governments claiming to follow the precepts of Marxism-Leninism. Stage I of Lenin's thinking on disarmament has provided the model for Mao Tse-tung and other revolutionaries sceptical about the prospects of peace so long as capitalism remains a world force; the instrumental view of disarmament implicit in Stage II Leninism provided the basic model for Soviet policy at the League of Nations and the United Nations until Stalin's death in 1953; the inchoate aspects of Stage III were developed under Khrushchev who tried to make disarmament and arms limitation a strategic goal of Soviet policy. Even when model III came to the fore under Khrushchev, however, the influence of model II continued to be marked: profound doubts about the willingness or ability of bourgeois governments to enter into balanced, long-term agreements with com-

[30] See Griffiths, 'Inner Tensions in the Soviet Approach to "Disarmament"'.
[31] See the author's 'Lenin on Disarmament', notes 26 and 28.

munist regimes; a kind of Bolshevik (or Russian) proclivity for all-out solutions such as GCD (general and complete disarmament) instead of 'mere' arms control; and as a corollary to these points, the rejection of the view that 'security' assurances and on-site inspection procedures need to precede disarmament.[32] Nonetheless, Malenkov and then Khrushchev turned Soviet policy away from exposure tactics and towards a line that would strengthen 'sober forces' in the West and make it feasible for both sides to agree to 'partial measures of disarmament' (which the West termed 'arms control').

Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, Soviet Policy has steadily gravitated towards the third stage of Lenin's thought. The first years of their regime, coinciding with tensions over Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, saw a certain reluctance to give the same weight that Khrushchev had assigned to peaceful co-existence and arms limitation as goals of Soviet foreign policy. While Brezhnev has attempted to maintain a certain centrist position, however, he joined Gromyko at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in April 1971 in making sober proposals for arms limitation addressed to attentive Western audiences as well as endorsing statements designed to maintain Moscow's chosen posture in propaganda bouts with Peking. More significantly, the ABM treaty signed in 1972 signifies not only that technology has made nuclear war counterproductive as an instrument of policy but that defence has become impossible. Soviet propaganda has justified the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons on pragmatic as well as ideological grounds. By 1972–73 it appeared that Brezhnev, no less than Khrushchev in earlier years, had staked his reputation on the desirability and feasibility of establishing long-term agreements with the Western governments to contain the arms race and enhance economic and technological co-operation.

The third model of arms limitation has come to exist not only in theory but in practice. This development has been favoured by a series of shifts in the underlying factors shaping Soviet policy. Some of these factors, such as the relative strength of moderates in the Politburo, can be affected only indirectly by the United States. But Western decisions on military deployment, including restraints adopted without formal agreements, can serve to strengthen the hand of those who argue that the time is ripe to damp down international competition so as to focus on the internal needs of Soviet society. A climate conducive to East-West trade (which Lenin in his time hoped would result from the Genoa Conference) would reinforce these tendencies.

To make the most of these possibilities, diplomacy must rise like a

[32] See the author's 'Ideology in Soviet Arms Control Policy', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII, No 1 (March 1964), pp. 74–81.

phoenix from the doldrums of cold war confrontation. The art of compromise, an important ingredient in the 1972 agreements of the Moscow summit, will be put to still sharper tests as both sides move to more complex negotiations to limit the characteristics as well as the numbers of their arsenals, expanding also the scope of their agreements to include other centres of nuclear power. As in 1899, so also in the 1970s, diplomacy can be spiked by powerful factions within the country or by external allies opposed to a broad agreement. Technology proceeds with its own mad momentum. Where there is a will to succeed, however, diplomacy may find a way. This is the lesson—until now at least—of the limited test ban, the non-proliferation treaty and the Moscow agreements of 1972.

THE EEC AND EASTERN EUROPE: PROSPECTS FOR TRADE AND FINANCE *

Michael Kaser

Divided institutions

WHEN Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973 the prospects for East-West economic relations were more problematical than for a quarter of a century. In 1947 every country in Europe—Germany and Austria excepted—participated in the plenary session at Geneva of the newly founded United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), while in Paris, Russian, French and British representatives met to discuss European acceptance of American economic aid. Marshall had made his momentous offer of June that year to Eastern as well as to Western Europe, and it was not obvious from what Molotov said at the tripartite conference that the Russians would turn it down. He argued in favour of a European agency of co-operation, not of co-ordination, on the grounds that European states, having only just regained their national sovereignty, were unwilling to fetter their incipient planning agencies with oversight by a superior organisation. The scope for pan-European collaboration was at the same time being put more explicitly by the Director of the Institute of World Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences: as a consequence of the war, effective national planning had begun in capitalist countries and in England there was even 'something of a Gosplan'; furthermore 'only American and Canadian banks and firms were able to provide credit to European countries [and] the rate of recovery depended in the first place on the export of American capital to Europe '[1] Varga's concept of convergence was supported by such developments as a visit by staff of the French Monnet Plan to the State Planning Office in Prague for advice on indicative planning in a mixed economy, and the launching of a Polish reconstruction plan which was justly termed a 'mixture of Marx and Keynes'. The EEC, Molotov pointed out in Paris, was intended to facilitate whatever co-operation

* This article is based on a paper read at a Chatham House conference on the EEC and Eastern Europe on February 23, 1973, and on the papers and discussions of a Chatham House Study Group on East-West relations which preceded the conference.

[1] E. Varga, at a conference in May 1947 to discuss his book *Izmeniya v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voyny* (Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a result of the Second World War) (Moscow: 1946), reported in *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 6, 1948.

these rehabilitation plans demanded; the danger, in the Soviet view, was rather from 'American monopolies . . . whose interests had nothing in common with those of the peoples of Europe'.

Within eighteen months divergence rather than convergence had become Europe's watchword. Czechoslovakia, the microcosm of that division, had had to withdraw its acceptance of Marshall Aid and—after the coup of February 1948—replaced its mixed economy with a five year plan and the instruments of Soviet-type centralisation. It is a significant commentary on these methods that Comecon has been less effective than its Western counterparts, first the OEEC then the EEC, in co-ordinating members' economic policies and that this inferiority is unlikely to change in the 1970s. This forecast would seem to be borne out by Comecon's decision to postpone until 1980 (under its 1972 'Complex Programme for Further Economic Integration') the multilateralisation of its payments and the unification of its exchange rates. In contrast, the enlarged EEC exercises functions in social, consumer and fiscal harmonisation which have not been entrusted to Comecon.

TABLE [2]

EXPORTS IN 1971

(thousand million dollars f.o.b. and percentages)

	Value	Per cent.
EEC Six	100·5	29·0
Nine	127·7	36·9
Yugoslavia	1·8	0·5
Rest of 'Western' Europe	26·7	7·7
Total 'Western' Europe	156·3	45·1
Comecon	33·5	9·7
(of which to Western Europe	7·5	2·2
Comecon	19·8	5·7
Rest of World	6·2	1·8)
Rest of World	156·4	45·2
World	346·2	100·0

Moreover, the importance of Brussels for market economies in general, as well as for Community members in particular, derives from the EEC's share of world trade, which is quadruple that of Comecon. As the 1971 data in the table show,[3] the enlargement of the EEC left

[2] Sources: European data from ECE, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1971* (Geneva: United Nations 1972), Part II, Tables 2·2 and text table on p. 92; World from *International Trade 1971* (Geneva: GATT. 1972), Table 2.

[3] The east European countries should be publishing 1972 trade statistics by partner in the second half of 1973.

only 7·7 per cent. of world exports to come from the remaining non-socialist countries of Western Europe. Comecon contributes a mere 2·2 per cent. of world exports to Western Europe (excluding Yugoslavia) and still less to the rest of the world—mostly to the developing countries (1·8 per cent., including the socialist states of Asia).

Institutionally, the ECE, which with the adherence of the German Democratic Republic as a full member becomes the sole pan-European economic agency, still remains available, as in 1947, to work towards making the Continent a real economic region. Last year the United Kingdom was the first Western government to declare that it would prefer the Geneva body to take on whatever economic functions might emerge from the Conference on European Security and Co-operation. Significantly, Mr. Heath's speech in Brussels at the signing of the accession treaty emphasised that he saw the EEC as a stage in pan-European relations.

An adaptation of the ECE's approach in recent years was pointed out during the Chatham House Study Group's discussion of Pierre Hassner's paper: having formerly thrown open for discussion virtually every field of economic activity in which East-West negotiation might lead to collaboration, the ECE Secretariat was now trying to identify—from Eastern and Western countries as separate groups—those specific topics in which each desired co-operation. The first technique, in appearing to assume that all economic issues could be reduced to technical terms, ignores political realities as much as the second is generated by them. Michael Palmer, however, in his address to the Study Group considered that Western participants in the forthcoming European Security conference should oppose the channelling of East-West contacts into multilateral patterns: it would be better if the conference could establish some permanent negotiating mechanism for technological, monetary, economic and cultural exchanges.[4]

But it is one thing to recognise the division of Europe into economic blocs in order to achieve rapidly some functional collaboration, and another to promote a confrontation between blocs which could perpetuate that division. The European Security Conference at least is not intended to deprive smaller states of their right to speak independently. When discussing the paper by Pierre Hassner (which examined the individual interests of certain smaller Western countries towards individual East European ones), the Study Group heard the view that bloc negotiation would nevertheless be necessary if a fundamental bargain were to be struck between the desire of the East for advanced technology and that of the West for increased freedom of movement. It was

[4] M. Palmer, 'The European Community and a Security Conference', *The World Today*, July 1972, pp. 296–303.

contended, on the other hand, that the presence of neutral states at the European Security Conference and Romania's demonstration of autonomy at the Helsinki preparatory talks made this inappropriate; it might further be said that the Western powers' insistence on bloc negotiation would strengthen Soviet pressure on Eastern Europe. The strategic arms limitation talks (Salt) and the clearing of the path to mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) implied that both blocs accepted the removal of security from the sphere of discussion, and hence that trade and cultural exchanges were to be the major topics in East-West debate.

Members of the Community are already under an obligation to consult among themselves about the first of these. The requirement of the Common Commercial Policy that they should seek the approval of the Commission—of the Council of Ministers in the event of dispute—was extended to include East European trade partners from January 1, 1973, although this will not have its full effect until 1975, when most existing bilateral agreements are due to expire. It is widely agreed that the implementation of a common policy should liberalise and expand exchanges, although, in terms of institutions, the EEC commitment is binding. It seems unlikely, however, that Comecon will be in a position to respond at the same level. The acute debates among its members which have continued after agreement in 1972 on the 'Complex Programme' may indicate the difficulties which members would find in taking a common position *vis-à-vis* the EEC. Significantly, however, M. Rey was able to negotiate the Kennedy Round far less as chairman of a supranational agency than as the spokesman of a group whose members had hammered out a joint negotiating position by direct bargaining among themselves. Hence Comecon might in practice negotiate effectively as a unity without creating the supranational machinery which Romania (and tacitly other members) have opposed.[5]

Certainly Comecon's refusal to recognise the Community on political grounds cannot be much longer maintained. A paper submitted by the Brussels Commission to the foreign ministers of the Nine on November 20, 1972, has already called for increased Community responsibility in trade negotiations. The Commission accepts the importance of wide-ranging co-operation agreements, such as that between France and Poland, which create as well as regulate trade; but it stressed the importance of developing Community procedures which would make it possible to consult on and co-ordinate agreements at Community level, for example, by establishing common rules and principles, on which the Commission plans to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers next

[5] The author's paper to the preceding Chatham House Study Group on East Europe argued in favour of this possibility in some detail (see 'Comecon and the New Multilateralism', *The World Today*, April 1972, pp. 162–169).

year. Its armoury against the Comecon countries' reluctance to deal directly with the EEC includes common anti-dumping measures and a common policy on quantitative restrictions, as well as in the standard field of most favoured nation treatment and concessions on the Common External Tariff.

Another Study Group paper drew a distinction between the more trade-dependent countries (*e.g.*, Hungary) and the less (notably the Soviet Union) within Comecon. Whereas the former were prepared for direct negotiations with the Community, Russia has not yet clarified how it hopes to combine what Mr. Brezhnev called 'businesslike relations between European inter-state trade and economic organisations' with 'the development of natural bilateral links and general European co-ordination'. Mr. Brezhnev's encouraging statement in his speech of December 21, 1972, must be read in conjunction with the vagueness of the Soviet Central Committee's resolution of April 27, 1973, which was apparently restricted to bilateral economic approaches to the developed capitalist states.[6] In any case, a number of informal deals have enabled some Comecon members to sidestep the issue of recognition and the list to date is impressive: Bulgaria on wine (December 1970), dairy products (January 1971), pork (July 1971), eggs and poultry (October 1972); Hungary on pork (July 1968), wine (November 1970) and dairy products (February 1971); Poland on eggs (April 1965), live pigs, pork and poultry (April 1968) and turkeys (December 1970); and Romania on live and slaughtered pigs, ducks, geese, Tilsit cheese, eggs in shell (all November 1969), sunflower seed oil (July 1970), wine (November 1970), goat cheese (December 1970) and tomato purée (September 1972). It is the unofficial view of the Brussels Commission that signatories to the Kennedy Round have implicitly recognised the Community by countersigning with it, although in a public statement on the subject on April 19, 1972, Dr. Sicco Mansholt merely said that the Commission had noted with interest recent Soviet statements on recognition of the EEC.

Charles Ransom's paper for the Study Group suggested that the enlargement of the Community and the resulting increase in contacts between it and members of Comecon would only gradually influence the latter in their economic relations, price policy, exchange reform, marketing in the West and the elimination of foreign trade monpolies. Changes in trading methods could conceivably be brought about by bargaining over concessions offered by the Community to individual East European countries, but there was little evidence as yet that East

[6] The relevant sentence in the resolution is: 'The activation of the USSR's mutually-beneficial external economic ties with these countries and the utilization of the new opportunities along this road will promote the strengthening of peace and are in the interests of our people'. The simultaneous changes in Politburo membership were interpreted as strengthening general approval for East-West detente, which this resolution supported.

European thinking had been affected by the example of markets within an EEC framework.

Some Comecon members preferred, say, more price flexibility, fewer import restrictions and contacts with Western companies which went beyond mere buying and selling and influenced domestic procedures—costing systems, for example; but there would be political dangers if EEC members appeared to have any influence on economic developments in Eastern Europe. When Mr. Brezhnev stated the Soviet Union's readiness to negotiate with the EEC in a speech on March 20, 1972, he made the proviso that the existing relationships of Comecon must be respected. Apparently, the Soviet Union has not approved Romania's independent request for inclusion in the EEC's preference scheme,[7] but it could hardly fail to have been consulted by Bulgaria (which has made tentative approaches to the Community) and to have been made aware that Hungary and Poland are anxious about their Western trade prospects.

While Ransom's conclusion, in effect, was that the most that the EEC can do is to demonstrate the rationality of its own practice, a paper by Ghiţa Ionescu argued that a demonstrable economic success in Western Europe would strengthen the influence in Eastern Europe of 'pluralists' over 'centralists'. The Soviet government's decision of April 3, 1973, to put industry into the hands of 'production associations', operating—unlike the previous administrations of each ministry—on the basis of autonomous profit-making, would seem to suggest that the 'pluralists' in Russia have some influence, although the retention of the all-embracing power of the industrial ministry to issue them with orders shows scant weakening of the 'centralists'.

East-West trade

Ransom was also cautious about the effect of the enlargement of the EEC on the volume of East-West exchanges. His reasons included the time which would have to elapse for East Europe to lessen its heavy dependence on exports of raw materials and foodstuffs, for which demand by EEC members is unlikely to increase, while that by Comecon members will rise; the five year plans of Comecon members certainly showed little change in foreign trade patterns by 1975. After allowing for the trade-creation effect of the enlargement of the EEC and for some improved competitiveness among Comecon members as a

[7] The Council of Ministers accorded Romania the Community's preferences as for a developing country on June 4, 1973, but it is noteworthy that Sir Christopher Soames's statement of April 5, 1973 (reproduced as 'the EEC's External Relations', *The World Today*, May 1973, pp. 190–195) had contained no reference to Eastern Europe: 'The Commission . . . has no intention of proposing any additional agreements of a preferential kind with countries which lie outside Africa, the Mediterranean basin and the list of other developing countries referred to specifically in the Treaty of Accession'.

result of their own integration, but not discounting closer industrial co-operation between Western and Eastern enterprises, the annual increment in total EEC-Comecon trade would, on Ransom's assessment, be of the order of 10 to 12 per cent., that is, less than in 1958–72.

A similar conclusion with respect to the Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany was reached in Roger Morgan's paper. Even though West Germany was well placed to surpass other Community members in trade with Comecon, the expansion was likely to be relatively modest; Morgan pointed out that Luxembourg was still as important to the Federal Republic as the entire Comecon market. The government of the German Democratic Republic, under the leadership of Honecker, was verbally more flexible than it had been under Ulbricht, but the doctrine of *Abgrenzung* made progress towards a 'regulated neighbourly relation' between the two German states slow and difficult.[8]

A survey by Gatt, released after the Study Group had discussed trade matters, showed that under the last round of five year plans (1965–70), Comecon members (other than Russia, the self-sufficient nature of which justifies its separate treatment) had reduced their ratio of trade to production of manufactured goods. Whereas Comecon's aggregate production of manufactures in those five years (9 per cent. on average annually) had been more rapid than in the EEC (7 per cent.), the growth of trade (in value terms) was faster in the EEC (16 per cent. annually for imports and 14 per cent. for exports) than in Comecon, still excluding Russia (13 per cent. for imports and 10 per cent. for exports). The Gatt secretariat observed that, since price trends of manufactures exported or imported did not significantly differ between the EEC and Comecon (the foreign trade prices of which are based on world-market relationships), the gap between the low trade-intensity of Comecon and the high showing of EEC was wider in 1971[9] than it had been in the early 1960s.

This record clearly underlines the uncertainty about trade prospects to which this article has already referred, the more so as trade in manufactures represents a sensitive indicator of the degree of international specialisation. In the five years reviewed by Gatt, EEC intra-area trade in manufactures rose on average by 17 per cent. each year, that is, at a much more rapid rate than the total trade in manufactures of the member nations; in 1970 it reached 45 per cent. of total exports and 64 per cent. of total imports of manufactures. Within Comecon, however, intra-area trade expanded by 11 per cent. per year, or by less

[8] See Roger Morgan, 'West-East Relations in Europe: Political Perspectives', *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 188.

[9] This trend was shared by Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, though imports into Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Romania and the USSR grew more slowly than did output.

than members' total trade in manufactures (27 per cent. of exports and 47 per cent. of imports from all partners); the comparison suggests that specialisation agreements in Comecon have been less effective than resolutions of that organisation had envisaged.[10] The same reservations might apply to the commitments undertaken for the 1970s in the 'Complex Programme'. A more immediate uncertainty relates, however, to developments other than institutional or structural. The trade agreement of October 18, 1972, between the United States and the Soviet Union [11] may displace a significant share of prevailing trade or at least pre-empt some of the increase that EEC members might have expected. Having noted Ransom's observations that American companies would in future be less inhibited in their relations with Eastern Europe, the Study Group suggested that these companies could provide technology and capacity to exploit Soviet materials which could well be greater (and hence more attractive to the Russians) than Western firms. It was pointed out that the Soviet Union might buy large quantities of the American manufactures in which Western Europe was patently uninterested, and that this could even lead to collusion between Soviet and American interests in exploiting East European resources. If Soviet-American bilateral relations developed strongly, Comecon's European members other than Russia [12] might—Ionescu's paper suggested—seek to treat themselves as a sub-system within Comecon for purposes of foreign trade co-ordination. Christoph Bertram's paper noted that detente between the United States and the Soviet Union might to some degree block development within the Community by offering tempting alternatives to weaker members.[13]

Finance and industrial co-operation

It was the smaller—and hence more trade-dependent—members of Comecon which would find in financial constraints the greatest hindrance to trade expansion. The structures for commercial and financial co-operation in both the Community and Comecon, on which a large increase in trade ultimately depends, are unlikely to change radically before both achieve monetary union. This can hardly be expected to become effective until well into the 1980s, although the year 1980 is the target date for unification under both the Werner Plan and the Summit decision of the enlarged EEC in October 1972, and Comecon's 'Complex Programme'. The Study Group attached special import-

[10] *International Trade 1971* (Geneva: GATT, 1972), pp. 174–175.
[11] US-Soviet Commercial Agreements, 1972 (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce. 1973), pp. 75–101.
[12] The Study Group did not discuss implications for Comecon of its inclusion of Cuba and Mongolia as members or of Yugoslavia as an observer.
[13] C. Bertram, 'The Politics of MBFR', *The World Today*, January 1973, pp. 1–7.

ance to recent legislative changes, notably in Hungary and Romania, which have made possible foreign investment in the equity capital (as a minority holding) of domestic enterprises, and borrowing by Comecon members (either singly or collectively in Eurocurrencies). In its first two years the International Investment Bank (IIB), set up by Comecon members in 1971, financed 26 projects in six countries (including new transport systems in Romania, computer installations in Poland and the Tatra car works in Czechoslovakia). Loans seem to be arranged chiefly by the Soviet Union, which borrows at a higher rate than that at which it lends to other participating countries. Information provided at a meeting of the Study Group suggested that some of the difference is made up by the Soviet Union in its gold sales to the West. The International Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC) raised $140 million in Eurocurrencies in 1972—its first such operation in its nine years—and IIB borrowed $50 million earlier this year. However, a meeting of Comecon central banks, held in Prague in November 1972, discussed the possibility of raising very much larger loans in the international market, including the Eurodollar market, and reports early in May were speaking of a $300 million Eurocurrency loan by a syndicate led by the Banca Commerciale Italiana.[14] Competition from banks in Japan and the United States could force down the rate, especially as the IIB has already achieved an interest rate merely $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. above the London inter-bank loan rate.[15] If the Soviet Union were to begin to exploit differences between Western bankers and governments, the latter might react by pressing for a unified policy on loans to Comecon members within the EEC. In his paper, Michael Palmer had proposed that the EEC should effect a united financial front against the co-ordination of credit policies by Comecon members through the IIB: the national banks of Eastern Europe could obtain better terms by working through the IIB than they would have in separate flotations. By contrast, Gerda Zellentin's paper suggested that the EEC should take the lead in establishing a 'Fund for European Development and Co-operation' to which all participants in the European Security Conference would subscribe a capital of approximately $15,000 million. Its aims would include direct investment in the underdeveloped regions or economic branches of the continent, and finance for projects which would diminish the 'technology gap'. Such an institution, which would be administered by the EEC, could be the main vehicle of growth in the European system and could assist trade, particularly East-West trade,

[14] *The Financial Times*, May 9, 1973. *The Sunday Times*, May 6, 1973, had written of bigger sums.

[15] In the negotiations with the Italian-led syndicate, the Russian Foreign Trade Bank was reported to have pressed for $\frac{3}{8}$ per cent. above the base-line, the same as that which the British Electricity Council obtained for its $1000 million loan, but only for the first three years ($\frac{5}{8}$ per cent. subsequently).

by establishing a clearing scheme to ensure convertibility into every European currency.[16]

Similarly, a permanent commission on economic and technical co-operation might assign the administration and regulation of joint ventures to the ECE. It would be in line with this approach (and hence contrary to Palmer's scheme for the negotiation of technological exchange to be in the hands of a standing commission which the European Security Conference could create) to vest in the European bureaux of the relevant United Nations specialised agency the practical exercise of the functions of a permanent commission for the free exchange of people, goods and ideas. Dr. Zellentin did not envisage any ' negative consequences ' arising from only one of the super-powers—the Soviet Union—belonging to such bureaux because the West European states would control the balance by offering resources and innovations of which the Soviet Union had no surplus available for all-European utilisation. But Christoph Bertram (whose paper had analysed Soviet policies mainly in the light of a bipolar relationship with the United States) pointed out that in Europe the Soviet Union had in effect moved from the idea of a continental condominium to the view that ' the United States was no longer vitally concerned in hindering Soviet activities among West European nations '. Roger Morgan's paper concluded that in any case joint East-West ventures would bring only limited benefits and, though various specific schemes for consortia had been prepared, the effects of the two-way dependence thereby created were unclear. A contributor to the discussion of Ransom's paper was almost as pessimistic: only one scheme (on wood-pulp) had been implemented under the Franco-Soviet Agreement of October 1971. Others pointed to the lack of Community policy on industrial co-operation, which was only in its initial stages largely because this type of business relationship had been of much smaller significance when the Treaty of Rome was drafted.[17]

It was, however, emphasised that the EEC would not be able to force firms in member countries to conform to its directives in technological or industrial dealings in anything like the way it imposed customs duties on current trade. The Community would have to take ' a tough line ' in such a field only if it saw some solid economic advantage emerging—and none was in prospect; it was more likely that the Community would interpret the Common Commercial Policy narrowly—as applicable only to standard trade agreements. The view of some

[16] G. Zellentin, ' Institutions for Détente and Cooperation ', *The World Today*, January 1973, pp. 8–15.

[17] The scope for bilateral industrial co-operation was of course much enlarged by the Soviet agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany of May 19, 1973, during the discussions on which Brezhnev spoke of thirty to fifty major co-operative projects. The Soviet Union had proposed a similar ten-year co-operation treaty with the UK at talks in Moscow in April.

Western businessmen on trade prospects with the East were described as euphoric during the Study Group discussions; and indeed recent events have emphasised the newer cautiousness. The Soviet government's current five year plan seems to have veered somewhat away from its original consumer orientation. That policy implied a major effort to reduce the rate of saving and to halt, if not to reverse, the trend to increased capital investment. An obvious solution—the import of Western capital and technology against medium to long-term credit—was made all the more appropriate by the relative lack of technology for consumer-directed manufacturing and services, such as cheap but highly fabricated consumer durables and motoring facilities. A shift of priorities back to growth-inducing industries could be based on existing Soviet techniques and expertise and on something like the autarky of the earlier Soviet tradition. A potential increase in defence spending has already been checked by the agreement on strategic arms limitation, and mutual and balanced force reductions would also allow a significant decrease, and hence tolerance of higher rates of capital to output and of investment to consumption. The future progress of industrial and technological co-operation with the West [18] is thus something of a pointer to the allocation of resources within the Soviet economy. The other members of Comecon are encountering the same uncertainty over trade and capital flows in both the medium and the long term. With five year plans in their third year, the trade quotas for the raw materials deliveries that underlie them are already obsolete; perspective planning for 1980–85—on which the coming plan's capital projects stand—is held back because the Soviet Union is not committing itself, even in broad orders of magnitude, to material delivery targets. The way ahead in trade with the East is none too clear for the West, but the uncertainty brings greater problems for the East.

[18] The meeting of heads of government of Comecon members (Prague, June 5–8, 1973) emphasised 'their willingness to develop economic relations with other countries regardless of their social and state systems'. It ratified the agreement of May 16 with Finland (the first by Comecon itself with a non-member state), which was informally seen by both sides as a model for treaties between EEC and Comecon members, *viz.*, a Joint Commission, the meetings of which would be open to each group's fellow-members.

FOREIGN POLICY AND STABILITY IN WEST GERMANY *

W. E. Paterson

'As somebody once said, the Federal Republic ought to recognise itself—and that is precisely a part of the foreign policy which we are striving to develop at present.'

Willy Brandt, *Die Zeit*, October 29, 1971

IN the last decade a flood of articles and monographs has analysed the motivations and implications of the *Ost* and *Deutschlandpolitik* of successive West German governments. These analyses have generally been pitched at the level of the impact of these policies on international politics. Where the impact of the *Ostpolitik* on the domestic arena has been analysed it has generally been in relation to the ostensible objects of the policy, *i.e.*, the states of Eastern Europe.[1] This article is basically concerned with the impact of these policies on the stability of the Federal Republic. It will be argued that foreign policy decisions taken in Bonn and relating to both Eastern and Western Europe have implied—as Brandt's quotation indicates—a self-acceptance by the Federal Republic and have contributed decisively to the stability of West Germany. In particular, the main body of this article will argue that the commitment of the Federal Republic to recreate an all-German state has been abandoned as a matter of practical policy and that the attempt to graft loyalties normally associated with the nation on to a West European construction has similarly been halted. In this situation, it will be further argued that West Germany is beginning to display characteristics normally associated with the nation-state.

The concept of ' nation ', although difficult to define, is still essential for any discussion of political stability and the viability of regimes,

* A preliminary draft of this article was read to the conference of the Political Studies Association in Edinburgh in March 1972 and I would like to thank Nevil Johnson for useful comments on that first draft. My main debt of gratitude is owed to two German colleagues, the late Waldemar Besson and Kurt Schmitz. Waldemar Besson proved a valuable source of encouragement when I first started thinking along the lines outlined in this article and Kurt Schmitz has tolerated endless discussions of this topic with patient fortitude.

[1] Karl Kaiser, *German Foreign Policy in Transition* (London: Oxford University Press. 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1969, p. 730), is the most notable exception to this rule.

whether we are considering Ulster, Belgium or indeed the United Kingdom. Of nowhere is this more true than of Germany, where it has formed the central point of political controversy for nearly two centuries. Until the close of the 18th century Germany was split into many small states, and progress towards a centrally governed state looked very improbable because the constituent states were able to meet any challenge by relying on a moderate form of enlightened absolutism. Even at that time there was a German nation, but it was a *Kulturnation*. Evolution along these lines was interrupted by the external force of the French revolution. While there was considerable initial enthusiasm for the revolution, this gave way under the aggressive expansion of the French to a much stronger sense of German national consciousness, which was reflected in a desire to give it political expression—for Germany to become a *Staatsnation*. Nationalism in Germany thus preceded the achievement of political unity.

The realisation of the national ideal in Germany demanded the physical defeat of Austria—which explains why the German *Nationalstaat* was created in 1871 under the auspices of Prussia. The failure of the liberals in 1848, the tradition of German thought about the state, and the success of Prussia meant that the idea of 'the nation' was identified with the values of an *Obrigkeitstaat* (authoritarian state), that it was, in Alfred Grosser's words, not based on 'le peuple volonté de Michelet: bien plutôt le peuple-ethnie, le peuple troupeau docile à ses chefs temporels ou spirituels'.[2] As a nation-state it was an unsatisfactory solution, since it excluded the Germans of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as the Swiss Germans. It represented too an uneasy fusion between the imperial idea and the national ideal, emphasising as it did pre-national values. The considerable autonomy enjoyed by the states meant that Germany did not conform to the model of the unified nation-state, typical by this time of Western Europe. The sense of national identity which this frail creation enjoyed was created mainly by action in the field of external policy, where fervent efforts were made to compensate for Germany's position as a 'belated nation' (Plessner).

The Weimar Republic, the successor state to the Empire, was seriously weakened by the inability of large sections of the population to identify it with the nation. This was less a question of territory, since relatively little had been lost, but rather that the Republic failed to incorporate those predominantly conservative and autocratic values that had been identified with the Empire.[3]

The ability of Adolf Hitler to identify himself with these values

[2] See A. Grosser, 'Specificités du Nationalisme Allemand', *La Revue d'Allemagne*, 1969, pp. 421–435, p. 423.

[3] K. Sontheimer, 'Der antiliberale Staatsgedanke in der Weimarer Republik', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 1962, pp. 25–42.

played, as is well known, an important role in his rise to power. With the *Anschluss* of 1938 he achieved for the first time an almost complete coincidence of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*, of the nation conceived of as a political entity and as a cultural, ethnic and linguistic concept. While it became increasingly apparent after the outbreak of the war that Hitler's goals were much more dynamic and dangerous than asserting the power of the German nation, the coincidence was still strong enough to ensure that the defeat of Germany would mean the defeat of the German nation. Not the least important aspect of this defeat was moral. The attempt by the conservative resisters of the July 20, 1944, to escape this dilemma, by attempting to assassinate Hitler in the name of the values associated by them with the nation, was doomed to fail since it meant associating the nation with defeat.

Thus the end of the Nazi period meant the breakdown of an already fragile historical continuity. In this atmosphere the idea of a German *Staatsnation* was attacked both by supporters of European unity and by particularists, especially in the historic states like Bavaria. This feeling that Germany had gambled away the right to be unified lessened as wartime memories receded, although nationalism of an aggressive exclusive kind continued to be regarded with revulsion.

The Federal Republic's search for stability

When the Federal Republic was set up in 1949 great care was taken to stress its provisional character. It was given a 'Basic Law', not a constitution. The Basic Law was adopted by a Parliamentary Council rather than by a referendum, which would have lent it too much legitimacy. It possessed no national anthem although it was given a flag. An attempt by the first President, Theodor Heuss, to introduce a new national anthem was a total failure. The German composer, Karlheinz Stockhausen, in an ironic echo of this episode, created a composition *Hymnen*, which was an amalgam of forty national anthems. The Federal Republic was not fully a state but rather a transitory mechanism for holding in trust the legal rights of all Germany within its 1937 boundaries. Its citizens were expected to owe only instrumental loyalty to the West German state, deeper loyalties were to be reserved for a future reunified Germany. These loyalties were legitimised in three ways: by the fact that the anti-communist nature of the state genuinely reflected the views of the majority of its citizens; by free elections, which provided the basis of the Federal Republic's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the German people (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*); and through the implicit understanding that acceptance of the Federal Republic would result in a relaxation of Allied controls and increasing German prosperity.

In the first years of the Federal Republic politics revolved around what was to replace it, the main lines of internal policy having been decided before the Republic's establishment.[4] This might have been anticipated from the provisions of the Basic Law, especially Article 24.1, which provides for the transfer of sovereign rights to international authorities; from the ambiguity in Articles 23 and 146 as to whether the territory referred to is the Federal Republic of Germany within the borders of 1937; and perhaps most obviously from the commitment to reunification expressed in the preamble to the Basic Law. Dr. Adenauer, the first Federal Chancellor, would have liked to see West Germany absorbed into a greater West European grouping, the forces of German nationalism merged in a macro-European nationalism centred on a commitment to Catholicism and anti-communism.[5] The existence of a large number of refugees in the Federal Republic made an unequivocal espousal of this standpoint impossible, and Adenauer preserved a verbal commitment to German unity. However, the circumstances of postwar Europe forced him to reject the Central European orientation which alone would have made a policy of reunification possible. West Germany was an occupied country and any policy, if it was to succeed, had to acknowledge this fact. As the Western powers were opposed to reunification except on terms known to be unacceptable to the Russians, Adenauer had little choice but to follow his natural inclinations and opt for integration with the West. Adenauer's genius was to identify the recovery of West German sovereignty with the integration of Western Europe. Under Adenauer Germany re-emerged as a major power at the same time as it became a partner in the EEC and Nato. The two processes were simultaneous and almost indistinguishable. In that way Adenauer identified the emergence of West Germany as a political force with the pattern of co-operation that was established in the Western world. Thus West Germany was awarded the formal attributes of statehood, internal and external sovereignty, as a result of joining Nato in 1955. By following this policy Adenauer was able to bring about a profound reconciliation with France and yet avoid the stark alternatives of the past when Germany either dominated the European system or was discriminated against by other powers.

Adenauer's policy was opposed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the main opposition party, which continued to give first priority

[4] See especially F. R. Allemann, 'Bonns verschränkte Fronten: Parteiensystem und internationale Politik', *Der Monat* 35/209 (February 1966).

[5] See Adenauer's *Erinnerungen*, Vols. I-IV (Frankfurt, Hamburg: Fischer Bücherei. 1965–68); K. D. Erdmann, *Adenauer in der Rheinlandpolitik nach dem ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Klett Verlag. 1966); A. Baring, *Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 816.

to the task of reuniting the German nation within its 1937 borders.[6] It was felt that this nationalist strain in SPD policy offered a chance of appealing to the huge number of refugees in West Germany who might otherwise be attracted to a new totalitarian movement and thus prevent the SPD from being identified with a policy of fulfilment. At a higher level it offered a chance of shifting the identification with the nation from its historic position on the right and thus of overcoming some of what the SPD could only regard as its pathological qualities. A nationalist policy would, it was hoped, give the party some hope of breaking out of the traditional minority *Turm*. The danger that the party might be confined to a permanent minority position had been increased by the loss of former SPD strongholds in the East. This nationalism was in no danger of being outbid from the right, since extreme nationalist groups were likely to be outlawed either by the Federal Constitutional Court or directly by the Allies. This assumption was proved correct when the SRP, a neo-Nazi party, was outlawed by the Federal Constitutional Court in October 1952, and when in 1953 British security authorities broke up an attempted takeover of sections of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) by neo-Nazi elements under the leadership of Werner Naumann, Goebbels's ex-state secretary. The nationalist opposition to Adenauer established by Kurt Schumacher was continued by his successor as party chairman, Erich Ollenhauer. But the party was wrong in its calculation that a stress on nationalism would bring in sufficient refugee votes to sway the balance of power in the Federal Republic. Enough refugees were attracted to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) by the strength of its anti-communism and by their share in the growing prosperity of the Federal Republic—which was made possible by the Equalisation of the Burden Laws of 1952—to prevent any change in the balance of power.

The years after 1955 were thus a period of stability in the Federal Republic. The SPD nationalist opposition to European integration, which had been at its most intense when the question of European integration became identified with that of defence, softened after the two were separated by Geman entry into Nato in 1955 and the prospects of German unity began to appear more remote. Other contributory factors were the return of the Saar to Germany, the interest in Euratom, and the positive experience of prominent Social Democrat leaders, like Herbert Wehner, in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

In October 1955 the SPD was able to join the Monnet committee as a founding member and thereafter its leaders became enthusiastic

[6] For a detailed study of the development of SPD attitudes, see W. E. Paterson, 'The S.P.D. and European Integration in Emigration and Occupation', *European Studies Review* (to be published).

'Europeans', their views coinciding with government policy over the whole field of European integration. In retrospect these years can be characterised as the 'Monnet years', when the West German citizen, happy in his role as *homo economicus,* gave less and less thought to the problems of his identity, and elections, in Erich Kuby's words, became 'plebiscites for refrigerators'.[7]

The Adenauer solution to what was coming to be called the German question rather than the German problem was thus almost universally accepted by the late 1950s. Early in 1960, the SPD abandoned its last independent initiative, the *Deutschlandplan* of 1959. Yet as so often happens once a solution is universally accepted, the first cracks in the foundation supporting it begin to appear, and the 1960s were dominated by the collapse of the Adenauer solution.

Adenauer's conception of West Germany involved, as we have seen, its participation in a supranational political grouping of Western Europe and eventually the creation of a United States of Europe. This view came under extreme pressure from the policies of Gaullist France, policies which Adenauer felt impelled to support because of his belief in the overriding necessity for a Franco-German entente. Ironically, General de Gaulle's assertion of the French 'nation' can be considered as an important contributory factor in the formation of an embryonic West German nation. But the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963 soon proved to be a dead letter, and Gaullist policy, culminating in the precipitation of the Community crisis of 1965 and the subsequent Luxembourg Agreements of January 1966, made any development towards a truly supranational West European Union extraordinarily improbable. The prospects for a West European Union were further weakened by the accession of Willy Brandt to the Chancellorship in September 1969. Although Brandt played a major role in the Hague summit conference of that year and in the subsequent extension of the Community, most of his energies have been taken up with the preparation of all-European solutions and he has declared himself to be against a West European federal state.[8] The accession of the three new members to the Community in January 1973, while heightening the chances of economic and monetary co-operation, has almost certainly weakened the already slim prospects for some form of genuine political union.

Progress at a societal level has been equally slow. We now have enough evidence to conclude that it has not been possible to create a viable European macro-nationalism. There has been no large-scale transference of political loyalties on the part of the individual citizen

[7] For Monnet's views on Germany see J. B. Duroselle, 'General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe', *The World Today*, January 1966.

[8] For the clearest statement of Brandt's views on this topic see G. Ziebura, *Die deutsch-französichen Beziehungen seit 1945: Mythen und Realitäten* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1970), pp. 188–189.

and it is difficult to avoid endorsing Karl Deutsch's conclusion that 'European integration has slowed down since the mid-Fifties and has reached a plateau since 1958'.[9] This point has been made very succinctly by Donald Puchala.[10] After a detailed examination of public opinion surveys he concludes that: 'Whatever integration in Western Europe meant institutionally and otherwise between 1954 and 1962, it apparently did not mean the submergence of nationalities in a transnational population.'

Reunification becomes increasingly unreal

More threatening to the previously held conception of the Federal Republic has been the consolidation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). West German legitimacy has always to some extent depended on the visible weakness of the GDR. The events of 1953 in Berlin helped to legitimise the Federal Republic in the eyes of its citizens. This can be seen very clearly by the fact that June 17, unlike July 20, became a major national holiday in the Federal Republic. This view of the GDR, based on the fundamentally anti-communist nature of the origin of the Federal Republic, meant that German unity was looked upon as a result of the collapse of the GDR, not as a result of the growing together of the two Germanies. For this reason, West German policy, enshrined in the Hallstein doctrine of 1955, which labelled recognition of the GDR by a foreign power as an unfriendly act, was designed to weaken the East German regime. Paradoxically, however, the regime's confession of weakness in 1961 by the building of the Berlin wall has resulted in a consolidation of the GDR. Having deprived its population of the right to flee, the East German government embarked on a process of liberalisation in the economic field. With one-third of the Federal Republic's population, the GDR became Europe's fifth industrial power and the second trading nation in the East, contributing one-fifth of the Soviet Union's total import requirements. As far as one can judge, the GDR *Staatsbürger* has proved to be as much a *homo economicus* as his West German neighbour; and the progress of the economy and the manner in which the rewards of this progress have been distributed has strengthened his loyalty to the regime—a GDR consciousness has been created.[11]

[9] K. Deutsch, 'Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment', *American Political Science Review*, 1966, p. 355.

[10] D. Puchala, 'National Distinctiveness and Transnationality in West European Public Opinion 1954–62', *Integration*, No. 3 (1970), pp. 278–279. See also the table in M. Koch, *Die Deutschen und ihr Staat* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1972), p. 76, showing that almost two-thirds of the West German respondents (58 per cent. as against 43 per cent. for France) did not expect their government to be superseded at some point in the future by a united Europe.

[11] See especially, E. Schulz, 'Die D.D.R. als Gegenspieler der Bonner Ostpolitik', *Europa-Archiv*, No. 8, 1971, pp. 283–292.

In one sense this was easier to accomplish in East Germany than in the Federal Republic. Although the East German leadership has co-operated even more closely with its allies than has the Federal Republic and although the political system of the GDR was, in Rosenau's sense, more penetrated, integration at a societal level was never possible in the historical context of Eastern Europe. This allowed a great stress on national, particularly Prussian, values. This process has been accompanied by an abandonment of East Germany's earlier endorsement of the goal of German unity.

In April 1968 the GDR adopted a new constitution which emphasised its distinctiveness from West Germany and which proclaimed it to be a 'socialist state of the German people'. At the same time the Secretariat for All German Affairs was renamed the Secretariat for East German Affairs. This trend has become more dominant in recent months and the GDR has now been categorised as a 'nation' by leading East German functionaries as part of the official policy of *Abgrenzung*. This policy of 'separation' is likely to become more marked as contacts between the peoples of the two states increase. In one of his last speeches, on January 14, 1971, Walter Ulbricht referred to the development of a socialist national culture in the GDR. Simultaneously there has been a great increase in the international recognition accorded to East Germany. At the time of writing it has been recognised by eighty-two states.[12] This consolidation was a serious challenge to Adenauer's policy, which had held out the hope that a strong and united West Europe would eventually persuade the Soviet Union to hand over East Germany. In this connection Melvin Croan advanced what he claimed was an empirically derived theorem of intra-German politics: 'the impossibility of stabilising one part of the divided nation without seriously threatening to destabilise the other part.'[13]

Adenauer's policy was further weakened by the changed attitude of the United States. The new Kennedy Administration made it clear that it intended to press for a detente with the Soviet Union despite the continued division of Germany. It had been one of Adenauer's major diplomatic successes to get a commitment from the Western Allies that any detente would be predicated on a solution of the German question. It was now no longer possible to identify complete loyalty to the West with support of German unity. This fact became even clearer during the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. President Johnson, for instance, failed to mention the problem of Germany in his important 'building bridges' speech of October 1966.

These developments had a significant effect on the population of

[12] Information from the Embassy of the GDR.

[13] M. Croan, 'Bonn and Pankow—Intra-German Politics' *Survey*, April 1968, p. 78. I shall argue that the reverse has been true in the long run.

West Germany. Public belief in, and concern with, reunification and the related question of the Oder-Neisse border dropped sharply throughout the 1960s. Uwe Kitzinger has claimed from his reading of survey data that in 1969 reunification was considered the most important task of a West German government by only 6 per cent. of the electorate.[14] Even more revealing are the figures cited by Josef Korbel. In 1956 the partition of Germany was considered 'intolerable' by 52 per cent.; in 1962 by 61 per cent. and in 1963 by 53 per cent. The proportion dropped to 38 per cent. in 1965 and 22 per cent. in 1966.[15] The 58 per cent. of West Germans polled in 1955 who believed that the United States was in favour of reunification had fallen to 37 per cent. in 1969.[16]

The waning of public commitment to the primacy of German reunification as a goal of state policy has been complemented by a similar decline at the elite level. West German business interests, anxious to expand their markets in Eastern Europe and fearful of the social and political effects of incorporating the population of the GDR, have been the most ready of the elites to contemplate an end to the primacy of German reunification. The trade unions, which earlier had been enthusiastic about the prospect of transforming the Federal Republic through the incorporation of the more socialist elements of the GDR, became less enthusiastic as their commitment to socialism waned and they have followed the Social Democrat line on foreign policy very closely.[17] One of the lasting weaknesses of a policy based on reunification was that no group in West Germany had an obvious economic interest in it; even in 1959 the majority of West Germans was not prepared to make an economic sacrifice for German unity.[18]

In postwar Germany, especially in the Federal Republic, the churches have played an important role in politics. While the Roman Catholic Church has been an important source of support for policies of West European integration, the Protestant Church was strongly identified with the cause of German unity. The importance of their 'Memorandum on the situation of the refugees and the relationship of the German people to their Eastern neighbours', of October 1965, where they accepted that the Poles also had a *Recht auf Heimat,* was thus in Karl Kaiser's words impossible to over-emphasise.[19] This report marked a real change in the direction of the German Evangelical Church, and reunification would not now be counted as one of its primary political

[14] *The Times*, September 30, 1969.

[15] Cited J. Korbel, *Detente in Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1972), p. 184. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 247.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[17] W. Hanrieder, *The Stable Crisis, Two Decades of German Foreign Policy* (New York, London: Harper & Row. 1970), p. 139.

[18] E. P. Neumann, 'Wiedervereinigung und öffentliche Meinung', *Die Politische Meinung*, 9 (1964), pp. 9–31.

[19] Karl Kaiser, *German Foreign Policy in Transition*, p. 38.

demands. This change culminated in the election of Ludwig Raiser, the prime author of the *Denkschrift*, to the Presidency of the Evangelical Church's synod in May 1970.

The strongest support for a policy based on German reunification came from sections of the army and the diplomatic service. But the views of the army have been fairly unimportant because of its low status and low access to the decision-making process. The views of the majority of the diplomatic service have changed in response to the international situation, and those who cling to the paramountcy of German reunification, muzzled by their official position, have been forced to resort to leaks to the Springer Press. This general lessening of interest has been mirrored in the spectacular decline in the prestige and intellectual coherence of *kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland*, the most important pressure group concerned with the propagation of German reunification.

This process has been accompanied by a drastic decline in the bargaining position of the refugees. A refugee party, the *Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten*, founded in January 1950, won twenty-seven seats in the 1953 election. The desertion of their two most prominent representatives, Kraft and Oberländer, to the CDU proved fatal and the GB/BHE, as it was later called, was not represented in the Third Bundestag. A second vehicle for refugee views, the GDP, polled only about 2·8 per cent. of the votes in 1961. The refugees' hopes of influencing the two major parties have also dwindled with the death of their major spokesmen, H. C. Seebohm in the CDU, and Wenzel Jaksch in the SPD. Seebohm was excluded from office on the formation of the new government in 1965, despite his undoubted expertise as transport minister (he had been a minister for sixteen years), because his views had become an embarrassment to any policy of detente. Wenzel Jaksch, president of the refugees association, was killed in a traffic accident in November 1966. More important, there was a growing discrepancy between the views of the ageing functionaries of the refugee movements, together with their sons and daughters, and the West German population at large.[20] Although they fought a vigorous rearguard action, they suffered continual reversals in the 1960s, culminating in the debacle of the 1969 election. In October 1969 the ministry for refugees was abolished. A great deal of attention was focused on Herbert Hupka, the Silesian refugee leader and last prominent spokesman of the refugees' cause in the SPD, when he deserted to the Christian Democrats in the spring of 1972, and there was some speculation about the revival of refugee influence. In fact the refugee organisations played no discernible role in the elections of November 1972.

[20] *e.g.*, 62 per cent. of the refugees under fifty supported the Warsaw Treaties, *W.D.R. Survey*, March 1971. For more data supporting this hypothesis, see Korbel, p. 158.

The last pressure on the Adenauer solution has been the changing attitude of the political parties, particularly the FDP and the SPD. Despite its small size, the Free Democratic Party has played a crucial role because of the balance of forces in the Federal Republic. Initially it acted as a valuable safety valve in the Adenauer consensus by laying more stress on *Ostpolitik* while generally, though not universally, accepting the steps taken by the Chancellor in West European integration. Throughout the 1960s, the FDP, influenced by the reformers Schollwer, Rubin and Scheel, and by the desertion of many of its conservative voters, first to the CDU and then also to the National Democratic Party (NPD), softened its anti-communism more quickly than the two major parties. What ex-Chancellor Kiesinger has called the *Anerkennungspartei* has been more strongly represented in the FDP than in the two major parties.[21] Even more important, there was a change in the position of the Social Democrats. Under the pressure of world events, particularly in Berlin, their position gradually changed from one which gave primacy to the goal of reunification to one which gave greater emphasis to a West German contribution to detente and to the improvement of living conditions in the GDR. These inter-related developments have found expression in the *Ostpolitik* of successive West German governments.

The development of an Ostpolitik

The beginnings of an *Ostpolitik* were made under the foreign minister, Gerhard Schroeder. Schroeder took up contacts, particularly at a trade level, with East European states. This policy had two main aims: first, to prevent the Federal Republic from being diplomatically isolated from the West, particularly from the United States; and secondly, to isolate the GDR from its neighbours. No great progress was made, however, since the continued operation of the Hallstein doctrine prevented the establishment of diplomatic relations with states which also recognised East Germany. The establishment of the Grand Coalition and Brandt's succession to the post of foreign minister in 1966 led to a slightly faster rate of change. The Hallstein doctrine was ignored in practice and relations were re-established with Yugoslavia and Romania. Any great change, however, was prevented by the need for the coalition partners to agree, which became more difficult as the CDU recovered confidence.

The first days of the Brandt government in 1969 were marked by

[21] There is no acceptable account of the transformation of the FDP from a 'national party' to its present position available in English. There are now several accounts in German, *viz.*: H. J. Thiele, *Die Deutschlandpolitik der F.D.P.* (MA thesis, Bonn. 1968); Kurt Körper, *F.D.P.—Bilanz der Jahre 1960–66* (Cologne. 1968); Rolf Zundel, *Die Erben des Liberalismus* (Freudenstadt: Eurobuch-Verlag Lutzeyer. 1971).

some fairly dramatic pronouncements, particularly in relation to East Germany. In this connection perhaps the most famous was Brandt's reference to 'two states of one German nation'. While stopping short of full international recognition of the GDR, it also by implication ruled out the reunification option in the foreseeable future. Brandt's governmental declaration was the first not to use the term reunification. This does not mean that he had become uninterested in German unity. It was more that he recognised that the pursuit of a policy based on the primacy of reunification had resulted in the atrophying of contacts between East and West Germany by encouraging the government of the GDR to maintain its defensive posture. Explicit acceptance of the fact that reunification was not practical policy would, it was hoped, enable the East German government to feel free enough to liberalise contacts between the two states and thus strengthen the sense of *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* (feeling of belonging together). Historically, this feeling has not, as Brandt has constantly emphasised, depended on living within the same frontiers. In other words, the new government, in the hope of preserving the German nation in its *Kulturnation* sense, refrained from stressing the pursuit of a German *Staatsnation*. Meetings were held between Brandt and Stoph, the prime minister of the GDR, at Erfurt and Kassel, but the East German leadership proved very unresponsive. Closer contacts between the two German states and their populations were still regarded as a real danger in East Berlin, a view reinforced by the pro-Brandt demonstrations at Erfurt and by riots in

The Brandt government concluded treaties with the Soviet Union

the Polish Baltic towns.

and with Poland in August and December 1970 respectively. These agreements offer considerable economic benefits to the Soviet Union and Poland, but their main importance lies in the recognition of the territorial *status quo* in Europe (Article 1 of the Warsaw Agreement, Article 3 of the Moscow Agreement). The force of this recognition of the *status quo* is scarcely affected by the letter sent by the West German foreign minister, Walter Scheel, to the Soviet foreign minister on August 12, 1970. This letter, which was sent on the same day as the Moscow Treaty was signed, was written at a time when the government had been under heavy pressure as a result of 'leaks' to the Springer press. The smallness of the government's majority meant that this gesture had to be made if the treaties were to have any hope of being ratified. It was also necessary to square the treaties with the Basic Law. At Scheel's instigation the Federal government insisted that a precondition for the ratification of these agreements must be a satisfactory settlement on Berlin. The Allied Agreement on Berlin of September 1971 fulfilled the major demands of the Federal government.

But for the purposes of this article the most important agreement is

the 'Basic Treaty' regulating relations with East Germany. The contents of this treaty became known a fortnight before the federal elections on November 19, 1972, and the treaty itself was signed on December 22. In effect, it amounts to recognition of the GDR. Article Three talks of the inviolability of the existing border and commits both states to unqualified respect for each other's territorial integrity. Article Six recognises unconditionally the internal and external sovereignty of both states. It was agreed that after the treaty had been ratified, both German states would participate in various international organisations, including the United Nations.

These developments have been opposed by the Christian Democrats fairly consistently since the formation of the first Brandt/Scheel government in 1969. Ironically the arguments they have used have been full of echoes of the Social Democrats' opposition to West European integration in the early 1950s. In the first debate on the Basic Treaty Dr. Barzel talked of opposing a process which was 'narrowing the consciousness of fatherland to the Federal Republic'. There was, however, one important difference in that while the Christian Democrats laid the same emphasis as the Social Democrats formerly had done on the need to keep the all-German option open, they rather contradictorily preserved their commitment to European integration. The CDU opposition to the policy of the government is however likely to be affected by factors similar to those which persuaded the SPD to abandon its opposition to Adenauer's European policy. First and most obviously, the evident popularity of the government's policy, confirmed in the decisive electoral defeat of the CDU a fortnight after the conclusion of the negotiations on the Basic Treaty. Second, the obvious international support for this policy, particularly from the United States. Third, just as the Social Democrats' position was affected by trade union opposition to its *Europapolitik*, so business support for the foreign policy of the present government has had some impact on the Christian Democrats' policy.[22]

The importance of these developments has often been misconstrued by undue attention being paid to their effects on East Germany. More important, though less dramatic in the short run, will be the effects on the Federal Republic. The recognition of the GDR has meant that it is possible for the first time fully to recognise the Federal Republic. It has begun to make possible the development of a specifically West German nationhood and thus greatly to increase the chances of political stability in West Germany.

[22] While press attention has concentrated on the resignation of Rainer Barzel just before the debate on West German membership of the UN, less attention has been given to the equally significant action of Walter Leisler Kiep, the treasurer of the CDU, in voting for the Basic Treaty.

The nation in a *Staatsnation* sense can be described as the largest group of people who feel that they share a common identity and whose attachment to a defined spatial area they express (or wish to) through political institutions. A member of a nation in this sense feels a sense of 'otherness' towards citizens of all other states. This would, for instance, cover the Swiss case. In the following section, I wish to discuss four main aspects of the emergence of a West German 'nation'. These are the internal integration of the Federal Republic, the modalities of stability in West Germany, the growing sense of identity of citizens of the Federal Republic and their estrangement from East Germany, and the impact of international politics.

There has been a marked tendency towards integration within West Germany. The integration of the refugees has already been noted. A growing attack has also been mounted on the notion of federalism. Influential publicists like Theo Sommer have repeatedly pointed out the difficulties posed by the dual control of finances involved in the West German version of federalism for the preservation of an active defence and thus foreign policy.[23] In the steadily more mobile West German society federalism is increasingly perceived to be a major hindrance to the solution of very important problems like education, law and order and the environment.

This attack on federalism is implicitly an attack on the particularist loyalties that were such a prominent feature at the time of the creation of the Federal Republic. There is no longer, as there was in 1949, a Bavarian question. Indeed the confessional balance inside the Federal Republic means that Bavaria can be a part of the West German political community in a way that it could never be part of the Wilhelmine Empire.

In the first part of this article I have attempted to demonstrate that a denial of the Federal Republic's permanence in the 1950s was a condition of its stability. In the 1960s the ground rules changed, and stability seems to have lain in asserting the permanence of the Federal Republic. The episode of the NPD helped to create an awareness of the fragility of a state based solely on a consensus grouped around economic prosperity and anti-communism; and there have been signs of a broader appreciation within the West German elite of the need to develop a feeling of identification with the West German state to overcome this deficiency in West German political culture. This view, first articulated by the late Professor Besson, has been echoed by politicians like Helmut Schmidt, who has written of the need to identify 'with the *Gemeinschaft* which exists within the state and nation'.[24] The first SPD/FDP govern-

[23] Theo Sommer, 'Selbstmord des Föderalismus', *Die Zeit*, February 1969.

[24] W. Besson, 'The Federal Republic's National Interest', Aussenpolitik, English Edition, 1970/2, pp. 123–135. Ralf Dahrendorf in his seminal *Society and Democracy*

ment was committed to a policy of internal reform as well as external detente. This policy, which was stymied by the operation of the federal system, was intended to help deepen loyalties to the West German state. The German federal system tends to block any far-reaching internal changes because of the large role it accords to representatives of the states in the law-making process. Since no one party has dominated government at the Federal level or in the overwhelming majority of *Länder*, there is great pressure for the preservation of the *status quo.* Even prominent Christian Democrat politicians like Olaf von Wrangel are calling for a consolidation of the Federal Republic. This contrasts strongly with the mid-1960s, when conservatives like Eugen Gerstenmaier and Gerhard Schroeder tried to revive traditional pan-German national feelings.[25] On a societal level an important piece of evidence is provided by Lutz Niethammer. More West Germans (41 per cent. as against 38 per cent.) now understand by the expression 'out national interests' those of the Federal Republic rather than of the two German states.[26] At the level of personal observation, the undertone of irony and lack of pride which many observers found in the West Germans' description of themselves as *Bundesrepublikaner* has largely disappeared.

The greatest contribution to the development of deeper feelings of identification with the Federal Republic has been made, as the quotation by Brandt at the beginning of this article suggests, in the field of *Ost* and *Deutschlandpolitik.* In recognising the sovereignty, permanence and separateness of the GDR, the West German government has at last accepted the permanent legitimacy of its own regime. The extent to which this self-acceptance has increased the stability and viability of the West German regime is shown by some features of the elections of November 1972.[27]

These elections are generally agreed to have been the most polarised in the history of the Federal Republic. Not only was party competition exceptionally fierce but the principal interest groups in West German society aligned themselves clearly with one or other of the main parties.

in Germany (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968) implicitly endorsed this position in his plea for the Federal Republic to turn inward and abandon the primacy of foreign policy. F. R. Allemann, in the article cited in footnote 4, explains why this *Wendung nach innen* did not come in the early 1960s, when the replacement of Adenauer by Erhard and the SPD's talk of *Gemeinschaftsaufgaben* made it look a likely prospect. Helmut Schmidt, 'Bisher nur eine Schönwetterdemokratie', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 5, 1969, p. 10.

[25] Eugen Gerstenmaier, *Neuer Nationalismus? von der Wandlung der Deutschen* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1964); Gerhard Schroeder, *Wir brauchen eine heile Welt* (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag. 1963).

[26] L. Niethammer, 'Traditionen und Perspektiven der Nationalstaatlichkeit für die B.R.D.', *Aussenpolitische Perspektiven des Westdeutschen Staates*, Vol. 2 (Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg. 1972), p. 54.

[27] For more detail see R. E. M. Irving and W. E. Paterson, 'The West German Parliamentary Election of November 1972', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Spring 1973, pp. 218–239.

Even more exceptionally, the degree of public involvement and debate was unprecedently high. Membership of the main political parties increased steadily throughout 1972; so did the liveliness of their debates. For the first time many West German citizens were prepared to talk publicly about their political views, to advertise them in newspapers and even to join 'voters' initiatives'. These 'voters' initiatives', although they supported one particular party, were not tied organisationally to the main parties and adopted an attitude of what can best be described as 'critical support' towards them. Finally, it was significant that the election was won by a coalition which was perceived by the voters (all opinion polls agree on this) to be likely to be less efficient at managing the economy than the opposition.

Taken together, these features indicate that the system is now considered permanent enough to mobilise large numbers of people into politics and that there is a sufficient underlying consensus for the system to tolerate a high level of polarisation. That this consensus was provided by *Ostpolitik* can readily be demonstrated. *Ostpolitik* was the only issue on which the government enjoyed a clear advantage (73 per cent. to 9 per cent.) over the opposition, and a survey undertaken by Marplan on November 20, 1972, indicated that 79 per cent. of those polled thought that the Basic Treaty had been the most important single event to benefit the coalition. Secondly, the fact that the coalition could win despite being perceived by the voters to be less efficient at managing the economy is another indication that a regime whose stability has been held to be over-dependent on economic success is broadening the basis of its support and that the public is developing affective ties to the political system.

Although the Federal government is reluctant to accord full international recognition to the GDR because this would imply that East Germany was 'abroad', there is little doubt that it is coming to seem more and more foreign to the citizens of the Federal Republic. This trend was apparent as early as 1963 when a group of journalists from *Die Zeit* entitled their report on a visit to the GDR 'Journey in a foreign land'. Lutz Niethammer cites the 1967 opinion survey which claimed that 79 per cent. of the respondents felt that the two states were becoming more dissimilar. He also claims, from a reading of several empirical surveys, that the tendency to regard the GDR as 'foreign' is much more pronounced among younger age groups.[28] While this trend is obviously a product of the lack of contact between the two societies in past years, it is very doubtful if the new opportunities for travel to East Germany resulting from the conclusion of the Basic Treaty will reverse it, since young people in the two states have

[28] Niethammer, *passim*.

had completely different social patterns. If the increased contact did lead to a real *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* (feeling of belonging together) on the part of East German citizens (especially younger citizens), it is likely that contact would again be made much more difficult. Even the present level of contact has led the East German leadership to pursue a policy of *Abgrenzung* (separation).

The strongest reason however for positing the existence of a West German nation lies in the field of foreign policy. First and most obviously is the acceptance of the permanence of present boundaries. Secondly, there is the new mood of self-assertion in foreign policy in a country where identity has often been created by international action. 'To rejuvenate the country by way of foreign policy is an idea ever alive in the German tradition' (Besson). This mood of self-assertion, exemplified by Brandt's visit to Yalta in September 1971 and the conclusion of the Basic Treaty, and even more clearly by the monetary and agricultural policies of West Germany in relation to the EEC has been made possible by the beginning of the disappearance of the one-sided dependence on the Western allies created by the desire for their support over Berlin and German reunification. In other words, a downgrading of the Federal government's role as spokesman for all German interests permits an upgrading of the specific interests of the Federal Republic. The future presence of two Germanies in the United Nations can be expected to encourage the feeling of separate identity. Even the measure of international recognition enjoyed by the GDR before the conclusion of the Basic Treaty has influenced the Federal government to delimit and thus emphasise the separate identity of the Federal Republic.[29]

Conclusion

It has been the argument of this article that the maintenance of the present regime in West Germany, on which so many hopes for stability in Western Europe rest, has involved the creation of loyalties to the West German state which go beyond mere pragmatism, the sort of loyalties we normally associate with the concept of 'nation'.

I am very conscious of how fragile is this process of creating a West German nation, subject as it is to changes in the international constellation. It is also of course implicitly against the Basic Law, a factor of considerable importance in a *Rechtsstaat* like the Federal Republic. This is one of the factors which have led to the characteristic

[29] *e.g.*, *Die Welt*, January 17, 1972, refers to a request from the Ministry of Inner German Affairs to the Ministry of Economics and Finance requesting that the word 'Germany' be deleted and replaced by 'Federal Republic' in a trade agreement with Luxembourg to avoid confusion. This policy emanated apparently from the Chancellor's office.

ambiguity in the policy of the Federal government in this matter.[30] I am aware, too, of the elusiveness of the identity I have tried to describe and that the evidence to support my thesis rests on a very short time-span. To treat West Germany as a new state and then look at it purely under the aspect of 'nation' building would be, despite the obvious parallels between the situation of West Germany in 1949 and a colonial state, to oversimplify, given the diverse impact of German history. Yet it would be difficult to deny that some aspects of this West German nationhood do now exist. Nationhood like any form of loyalty is, as Dankwart Rustow reminds us, a matter of degree—'a given people at a given time may be more or less a nation while none approximates the ideal type'.[31] In the opening section we have seen how much the content of the nation has altered historically. The further deepening of this attachment to the Federal Republic will be much more difficult to accomplish than in postwar Austria. Austria had the advantages of its core area being a recognisable historical entity, of having tried before and, perhaps most important of all, of Vienna.[32] Yet, given the lack of convincing alternative sources of allegiance, the prospects for West German nationhood seem fairly bright. The events of the last twenty-five years have shown to the West Germans, as the Second World War demonstrated to the Austrians, that other states will do nothing to bring about an all-German state. Squaring the circle by means of European unity now looks equally unpromising. In the circumstances outlined above, it seems possible to talk in terms of a West German nation in the way in which we talk of an Austrian nation, that is, in the sense of a *Staatsnation* but not of a *Kulturnation.*

[30] Egon Bahr, for instance, has consistently maintained that he continues to see *Ostpolitik* in terms of eventual German reunification. The ambiguity in the policy of successive West German governments prompted Peter Bender to remark that 'the only way to introduce a new policy in the Federal Republic is to guarantee that it is merely a continuation of an old one'.

[31] Dankwart Rustow on 'Nation', *The International Encyclopaedia of Social Science* (New York: Macmillan. 1968).

[32] On Austria, see W. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1973).

BOOKS

THEORISING ABOUT THE BEHAVIOUR OF STATES

J. Frankel

Principles of World Politics. By George Modelski. *New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1972. 370 pp. Index. £4·95.*

World Society. By John Burton. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1972. 180 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·60; paperback £1·00.*

International Politics: A framework for Analysis. 2nd ed. By K. J. Holsti. *Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 1972. 532 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·20.*

The United States in World Affairs. By Paul Seabury. *New York, London: McGraw-Hill. 1973. 124 pp. Index. (Foundations of American Government and Political Science.)*

Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships. By Marshall R. Singer. *New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1972. 431 pp. Index. £5·50.*

World Politics: Verbal Strategy among the Superpowers. By Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. *New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1971. 176 pp. Index. £2·70; paperback £0·90.*

Crazy States: A Counterconventional Strategic Problem. By Yehezkel Dror. *Lexington, Toronto, London: Heath Lexington Books. 1971. 118 pp. Bibliog.*

Political Science Annual: An International Review. Volume 3. 1972. Ed. by James A. Robinson. *Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1972. 515 pp. Bibliog. Index. $10.00.*

Theory and Policy in International Relations. Ed. by Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 262 pp. Index. £4·25; paperback £1·50.*

Political Analysis: An Unorthodox Approach. By Charles A. McCoy and Alan Wolfe. *New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1972. 308 pp. Bibliog. Index.*

THE ten books discussed here are a fairly random selection from those sent to *International Affairs* for review during the winter of 1972–73, chosen because all of them possess some theoretical slant of a general nature. They cannot be regarded as representative of the state of the discipline of international relations, but they reflect enough of its continuing major concerns and the main aspects of its present orientation to warrant a joint appraisal.

I shall start with two books which undertake a comprehensive treatment of the discipline, continue with five concerned with various aspects of the analysis of foreign policy and of interaction among states, and conclude with three books devoted to more general theorising. The individual books vary greatly in their subject-matter, size and style. They will be examined here mainly in order to compare their theoretical contents.

George Modelski's *Principles of World Politics* has the broadest sweep and bears the imprint of the author's lifetime of sustained research into and reflection on international relations. The broad generalisations are based upon a real understanding of historical detail and are supported by voluminous statistical evidence. The book thus comes closer than any other of those discussed here to a synthesis between the statistically based 'scientific', and the history- and philosophy-based 'traditional', approaches; it also provides a reasonable synthesis of 'realism' and of 'utopianism', the shortcomings of each of which have been so graphically analysed by E. H. Carr in *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939*.[1] The author is successful in bridging the gap between an ethnocentric and a geocentric point of view—a task for which he is exceptionally well equipped by his background. Polish-born, he spent much of his life in England, Australia and the United States—the most truly global state—where he is now living.

Professor Modelski's main insights are drawn from the theory of organisation. His major themes lie in the dichotomy between the autonomy of the individual states and the dominance of imperial powers, and in the vicious circle between the institution of the nation-state, an organisation geared primarily to waging wars, and the incidence of warfare. The author discusses in turn the past, the present and the future. He finds only negative lessons in the histories of the successive empires based upon military power and in the disjointed process of 'globalisation' of world politics through European expansion. In his analysis of the balance-of-power system in Europe he finds more promise in the variety of the cross-national 'networks', *i.e.*, international relationships based upon equality of status (*e.g.*, diplomacy or the financial community); but he regards the emergence of nationalism as essentially disfunctional and disruptive for the international system, owing to the resulting tendency to strive for homogeneity within states and to curb and suppress local and partial networks.

The middle part of the book is devoted to the examination of the contemporary nation-state system, which is excessively fragmented and, as argued by philosophers and supported by statistical trends, has a tendency to progressive militarisation. The latter phenomenon is particularly characteristic of the 'Great Powers', a peculiar institution of major states which occupy a privileged position within the system and carry the burdens of its maintenance. Traditional diplomacy as a network of political representation has proved inadequate and has been supplemented by various forms of multilateral diplomacy concerned with world problems. After a detailed examination of the role of states within the international system where they can be regarded as pressure groups, the author concludes in favour of a tenable concept of 'world interest' concerned not only with survival but also with autonomy, equality and justice. The road towards the realisation of this interest lies in the reconciliation of disruptive ethnocentric models of world politics with utopian ones, which unrealistically postulate a 'family of man', by adopting a 'layer cake' model based upon geocentric layered

[1] 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. 1946.

models and recognising interdependences and common values. This amounts to a statement of faith based upon scientific analysis.

The concluding part turns to the future. Mankind is enmeshed in a vicious circle of militarisation and ultimate war and its survival lies in the recognition of the complexity of the world system. Instead of the simplicity of the state system operating through the mechanism of war, we can adopt an untidy system with high adaptive qualities in which various conflict-absorbing and resolving capabilities could be evolved. The 'layer cake' model of society, which has served well the United States, could be extended to the whole globe, probably with regional layers interposed. The only realistic basis of order lies in the recognition of the patterns of social communication and of interdependence. Some progress towards the limitation of armaments and the non-escalation of local wars can be already discerned. Functional pluralism would enable us to improve and reform the contemporary system of states and to clarify our vision both of the situation and of the objectives common to mankind. This may prove a substitute for the great wars of the past, which were the only occasions leading to major attempts to establish a world order.

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Dr. Burton's *World Society* is an introductory text for first year undergraduates and is much less comprehensive; it includes little reference to empirical material and few statistics. Its general tenor is similar—that we are living in a transitional stage from a system of nation-states to one of world society. After explaining what 'world society' means and the methods available for its analysis, Dr. Burton proposes a 'cobweb model' of transnational links based upon systems analysis as a supplement to, and ultimately a substitute for, the commonly used 'billiard ball' model of states in interaction—a parallel to Professor Modelski's 'layer cake' model. After examining such selected topics as perceptions, the self-defeating divisive state strategies and the opposed integrative tendencies, Dr. Burton devotes the major part of his book to prescription. His basic message, like that of Modelski, is to clarify our understanding by working on the traditional simple models of states engaged in conflicts over their respective national interests. His prescription is, however, much less sophisticated and realistic as it is based upon the rather simplistic traditional radical notion that all conflicts are due to misperceptions and can be transformed into co-operative enterprises; his belief in the promise of mediation is greatly exaggerated.

States, however, undoubtedly remain the major actors within the international system. The second, 1972, edition of Professor K. L. Holsti's well-balanced textbook *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis* offers a good indication that in the last five years, since the publication of the first edition,[2] the analysis of foreign policy has not progressed in a dramatic way. Although the author updates the text, there is little re-arrangement, and the only substantial addition is found in the analysis of the concept of 'roles' which he himself has meanwhile developed. The author, and probably most of his readers, find it reasonable to focus what, in effect, is a comprehensive discussion of international relations around the analysis of the behaviour of states. The arrangement of the argument is sensible; after an explanation of the historical origins of the present state system

[2] 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1968, p. 749.

(about one-fifth of the text), Holsti devotes the bulk of his book to a thorough analysis of foreign policy 'outputs'. Two subsequent, briefer, sections consider the major explanations advanced and the nature of the conflict and co-operation.

Professor Paul Seabury's pamphlet on *The United States in World Affairs* provides confirmation that the analysis of foreign policy can still serve as a useful focus for analysis of international relations in general. While Holsti incorporates many up-to-date analytical findings, Seabury's analysis is mainly historical. The fact that he discusses one state enables him to start with an illuminating analysis of the relationship between foreign and domestic policies; he continues with the meaning of foreign policy, and the constitutional, power and racial issues, subtly analysing the cold war and detente and the altering nature of American commitments and alliances. The author repeatedly and rightly stresses the fact that major decisions were taken on the basis of fluctuating short-term considerations and that their general pattern emerges only in historical perspective.

Professor Marshall R. Singer's *Weak States in a World of Power* is about the relations of these weak units with major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Britain and France. His book centres on the theme that this type of asymmetrical relationship is becoming increasingly important and that it is frequently determined by misperceptions of reality. The author starts with a few basic concepts of the psychology of the individual in application to state behaviour; in the second part, he discusses the various ties that bind the partners in the unequal relationships. He successfully arranges his argument around broad essential themes and his judgments, generally conforming with conventional wisdom, are sensible and plausible, frequently tabulating a great amount of comparative statistical information. Most readers, however, are likely to be struck by the excessive length of the book, especially in the discussion of the psychology of the individual.

The two following contributions are of a more limited scope. In *World Politics*, Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband discuss, as the subtitle indicates, 'Verbal Strategy among the Superpowers'. This is a convincing analysis in considerable depth of the frequently mentioned but rarely analysed relationship between declaratory and operational policies and of the transition from hostility to co-operation. The authors successfully establish the linkages between the American actions in the Western hemisphere—Guatemala, Cuba, and especially the Dominican Republic—and the Russians' explanation of their intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, an achievement which contrasts with the dearth of a similar analysis of the frequently mentioned connection between the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the Suez action in 1956. The argument is convincing because it employs a plausible model of international behaviour based upon reciprocity and an 'echo phenomenon' in the inter-relationship between the two super-powers. It is well documented by detailed references to official statements and the core of the book, a thorough analysis of the Johnson and the Brezhnev 'doctrines', demonstrates that all the elements of the latter had been clearly adumbrated by the Americans. The concluding argument that, apart from moral objections, the subsequent 'two-ghetto system' is against the interest of the United States, is convincing; and the authors' surmise that President Nixon has adopted a more relaxed attitude to Latin America, especially in dealing with Allende, is hopefully plausible.

Y. Dror's *Crazy States: a Counterconventional Strategic Problem* is a

brief monograph closely related to the central Israeli problem of how to deal with the Arab states, but is based upon and directed towards the analysis of American strategic thinking. Dror draws attention to an important limitation of all strategic thinking—the unrealistic assumption of 'rationality' within the terms of the assumed rules of the game on the part of the adversary. The author analyses the dimensions of 'crazy', *i.e.*, 'irrational', behaviour on the basis of numerous historical cases and outlines interesting and by no means improbable scenarios of a number of states turning 'crazy', including the super-powers but, flatteringly, not Britain. Despite the frequently off-putting terminology, this clearly argued and tabulated book constitutes a contribution, although a limited one, to more orderly thinking on a subject of general importance: Dror's categories could for example be usefully employed in the analysis of Britain's strategies in its relations with President Amin of Uganda. Not unexpectedly, however, no convincing strategies emerge.

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To turn to more pronouncedly theoretical treatments, the *Political Science Annual*, Volume III, edited by J. A. Robinson, includes three substantial articles on international relations, all of them with useful up-to-date bibliographies. E. H. Fedder and F. S. Pearson, on 'The Four Ambiguities of International Integration', in a concise way help to disaggregate a concept which means so many things to different people. The other two articles consist of comprehensive inventories of propositions: P. M. Burgess and D. W. Moore appraise and classify an inventory of propositions in the literature on 'Inter-Nation Alliances', based upon twenty-five major textbooks of international relations, several other related books and all the articles in journals listed in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. H. R. Alker Jr. and P. G. Bock are even more ambitious in their compilation of the inevitably much more diffuse 'Propositions about International Relations' from more than seventy-five relevant articles in the *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*.

While the propositional inventories are merely the raw material for theory, the volume on *Theory and Policy in International Relations*, edited by R. Tanter and R. H. Ullman, can be justifiably regarded as one of the most advanced attempts to apply theory to empirical material. When compared with its predecessor—another special supplement to *World Politics* entitled *The International System*,[3] edited by K. Knorr and S. Verba—this volume demonstrates the basic shift of interest of American academics to actual policy. The main cause of this shift seems to lie in experiences during this period arising out of the Vietnam war; the Pentagon Papers are the final testimony to the acute problems of consciousness and of political responsibility encountered when academic writings were used for the formulation and rationalisation of governmental strategies. The major methodological shift is from the widespread attractions of the theory of games to the so far somewhat rudimentary but intellectually exciting application of concepts and models borrowed from economics, econometrics and the theory of organisation. The handling of the variables chosen is now much more sophisticated although, inevitably, it does not come anywhere near the precision of econometrics. The contributors generally manage to make clear the important distinction between models explaining

[3] Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1961.

foreign policy through domestic processes and those attributing it predominantly to reactions to the capabilities and behaviour of other nations; another important distinction drawn is that between variables which can and those which cannot be manipulated.

The most fundamental issues of theorising are discussed by Oran Young, who sums up the general opinion that no general theory is in sight and the advantages of the limited theoretical approaches—sensitisation, conceptualisation, factual assessment, simple generalisation and extrapolation. He identifies the theoreticians' dilemma as having to choose between tight logical models and the enrichment of the descriptive frameworks through searching for empirical regularities on an inductive basis. Five papers are contributed by scholars who are actively developing some of the new approaches; all are of substantial interest. The first three concentrate upon organisational issues in an attempt to systematise our thinking on the interrelationship between domestic and foreign factors. In the first paper, Professor Tanter somewhat confusingly takes alliances as his units; dealing with the interaction between Nato and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, he seeks an answer to the question whether an alliance, when involved in a conflict, tends to follow its established patterns of behaviour or respond to the moves of its opponent. The paper by Professors G. T. Allison and M. H. Halperin systematise the former's model of bureaucratic politics and concludes with a list of suggestions for policy-makers. The interesting feature of this model is that, although it has been developed within the context of the American system, as Professor Whiting points out in his comment, it can be fruitfully applied to the Chinese system. The third paper, by Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, analyses such clearly crucial variables as the size of the population, the relative availability of resources and the levels of technology and the resulting ' lateral pressures ', as causes of national expansion, competition and crises.

Two subsequent papers deal with the concept of economic rationality: E. L. Morse develops one of economic interdependence and of a rational political calculation and tries to explain why economic diplomacy has been marked by deliberate attempts both to provoke and to manipulate crises. M. Froehlich and J. A. Oppenheimer develop an entrepreneurial model of an exchange relationship in an analysis of three areas of foreign policy—the establishment and the maintenance of an alliance interpreted as ' public-collective goods ', foreign aid given to a country to increase its capacity to mobilise its resources, and military intervention to remove political opposition. The volume ends with two papers by scholars with extensive governmental experience, D. B. Bobrow and R. S. Whiting, on the general relationship between theory and practice in the previous essays.

There seems to be much promise in evolving a political theory consistent with verified economic theory and some felicitous concepts emerge, such as that of a ' free rider ' within an alliance. No precise predictions are possible, but one has to bear in mind that lately the assumption of rationality has also come under attack in micro-economics and that it is particularly hard to sustain it in the relatively underdeveloped theory of oligopoly, which bears the closest resemblance to the international political system. *Political Analysis: an Unorthodox Approach*, edited by C. A. McCoy and A. Wolfe, an original, well-integrated and well-formulated introductory text for students of politics, indicates that at the moment no insights from that discipline are likely to match those from economics and from the theory of organisation. In contrast to the widespread interest in

domestic politics of the scholars working in the field of international relations, the foreign policy aspects of domestic politics play only a marginal role in the analysis of the latter and no methodological advances are in sight. There is one signal exception. As is well brought out by the two most general books under review, those by Modelski and Burton, the analysis of the international system requires the application of some of the fundamental notions of traditional political philosophy, such as justice, legitimacy, etc., especially when analysis turns normative, as it so readily does. The greatest promise of progress in this direction clearly lies in the study of the political philosophers and the transposition of their reasoning from the domestic to the international context. This task may be of equal importance for scholars as the application of more precise methods to the study of actual state behaviour, especially if, as appears to be likely, the international system continues to become more closely integrated.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. (1957–1972.) By W. W. Rostow. *New York, London: Macmillan. 1972. 739 pp. Index. £6·25.*

PROFESSOR ROSTOW has written, as is his habit, several books within the compass of one volume. *The Diffusion of Power* is a record, and a justification, of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, preceded by an account of Eisenhower's last years of office, and followed by a 'preliminary sketch' of President Nixon's first term. It is also a report, and a modest one, of Rostow's own part in recent events, during the time he served, from 1961 to 1966, as Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, and, from 1966 to 1969, as Special Assistant in the White House. *The Diffusion of Power* is not simply a collection of essays on American economic, social, racial, military and diplomatic problems: it is most notably, for Rostow is a *systematic* thinker, an attempt to set events since 1957 in a context of world development characterised by a shift of power (and prospects of power) from Moscow and Washington to other nations and continents. This enormous enterprise is sustained, not merely by Rostow's own recollections of government service, but also by a splendid array of academic sources. Faced with mountains of evidence, the author remains commendably calm; granted a fondness for flashy adjectives—'ardent', 'turbulent', 'visceral'—he deals unemotionally with contentious policies with whose inception and execution he was himself closely involved. His concern for clarity does much to mitigate the results of his industry.

In some areas, Rostow advances what is essentially an orthodox liberal view of events. His analysis of the domestic programmes of Kennedy and Johnson places emphasis on the shift of resources to social welfare projects. It may be that he goes too far in describing this legislative activity as a social revolution, but he is clearly right to claim for Johnson a high place among Presidents for his domestic successes alone. With the same realism, although greater caution, Rostow approves the developing Soviet-American detente of the 1960s, and the attempt, through the non-proliferation treaty and the Salt talks, to make safer a dangerous world. Here, at least, he is in agreement with the 'Eastern establishment' in the United States, of whose vacillations over Vietnam he so disapproves.

Vietnam, of course, is the great stumbling-block. Rostow, like Kennedy

and Johnson, subscribed to the domino theory. And to save south-east Asia he was prepared to go further than the Presidents who employed him, arguing for the military occupation of parts of North Vietnam in order to inhibit Hanoi's capacity for intrusion into the South. For Rostow, American interests dictated intervention. But there was a more idealistic aim as well: to secure for the South Vietnamese (in danger, by 1965, of being overborne) the opportunity to preserve themselves from rule by Hanoi. Militarily, he argues, the intervention was a success, but that success was threatened by the collapse of American support, as more and more Americans decided that a ghastly blunder had been made. Few observers now believe that President Nixon's aims have been achieved: that the South Vietnamese can bear the burden alone, that Indochina has been preserved for the free world, or that Thailand and the Philippines have been saved from the dreadful fate which would otherwise have befallen them. Rostow mentions, but does not refute, the major criticism of American action: that a war, arguably defensible in its initial stages, grew steadily less so as the scale of devastation became ever less commensurate with the limited objectives that might possibly be attained. It is good to have so articulate a defender of America's policy in Vietnam, but Rostow leaves many questions unresolved.

In a world where, as this book so plausibly argues, there is a diffusion of power to regional groupings in Europe, Asia and Latin America, where does America's national interest lie? For Rostow, two factors predominate: the protection of American security, and an interest in democratic societies elsewhere. Such societies need not be democratic in absolute terms; their democracy may be only a 'trend' (which enables him to grant a degree of legitimacy and, admittedly 'imperfect', democracy to the Thieu regime that will surprise many). But what should America do when the trend goes the other way, as in Greece or Brazil? As yet there is no answer. The makers of American foreign policy in the 1960s tried hard to reconcile pragmatism and idealism. Rostow's vast book, for all its range and depth, is an illustration of their failure to find a satisfactory solution.

GERARD EVANS

The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers. By Trygve Mathisen. *Oslo, Bergen, Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget. 1971. 288 pp. Index. (Scandinavian University Books.) Nkr. 69,00.*

The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States. Ed. by R. P. Barston. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1973. 341 pp. Index. £7·35.*

IT is difficult to find any justification for Dr. Mathisen's book. The current modest fashion for studies in the foreign policies of small states has already yielded a number of general studies, like David Vital's *The Inequality of States.*[1] As critics of the fashion have pointed out, the category 'small state' is too heterogeneous to permit of useful generalisation. In his book, Dr. Mathisen is content to wander across the world, picking up small countries here and there as samples only to discard them a paragraph later without apparent reference to any overall conceptual scheme or purpose. Given the heterogeneity of his examples, the banality of his conclusions is

[1] Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1969, p. 112.

inevitable. Equally, Mathisen's intellectual fidgeting deprives the reader of case studies thorough enough to provide insight into what one might call the 'perceptual field' of the decision-maker in the small state. After Mathisen's book, small-state addicts among academics should observe a self-denying ordinance on general small-state studies. In their place, case studies of particular small states, or comparative studies of small states in regions where a background of uniform conditions permits some chance of isolating the relevant variables, should be given priority.

The only chapters which contain even the promise of useful analysis are those which form the sequence discussing small states in the different roles of bases of expansion for the great powers, suppliers of essential raw materials, 'rimstates', buffer states, and barrier states. But without any regional focus, these categories prove incapable of containing the author's restlessness. And so the conclusion to Mathisen's discussion of the relationship between international companies and small states under the second heading is unfortunately typical. 'Obviously there is no simple clear-cut answer to this question. There are many shades and variations of the relationship. It is not merely a question of . . . but also of . . .', and so on (p. 200). In a more sustained examination of the 'rimstate' category, the brief juxtaposition of Canada and Finland, for example, might have been developed into a comparison between the North American state, diplomatically sovereign but economically and culturally dependent on its great-power neighbour, and the Nordic state, which in spite of its diplomatic handicap successfully resists economic and cultural dependence.

Again, Mathisen neglects the opportunity to explore the implications for the study of small-state behaviour of the process of integration. As that process increases the areas of inter-state contact through economic and social penetration, the question arises whether the focus of attention should not be less on the formal, diplomatic behaviour of the state and more on the reactions of the society supporting the state to the social, economic and cultural pressures resulting from participation in a process of integration with more powerful societies.

Mr. Barston's collection of essays is altogether more workmanlike. It consists of nine brief case studies of small-state foreign policies, ranging from the Netherlands and Norway through Cyprus and Singapore to New Zealand. The emphasis throughout is on description and practical analysis. Perhaps there could have been a larger theoretical content. Professor Ørvik's discussion of Norwegian foreign policy might have included some reference to the different models of integration represented by Nordic co-operation, EFTA and the EEC. Professor Baehr might have included in his discussion of Dutch foreign policy an examination of the paradox of a small state supporting a degree of institutional integration which promises to reduce its own influence.

The price of the book—£7·35—is exorbitant.

STEPHEN MAXWELL

Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age. By Jonathan Trumbull Howe. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The M.I.T. Press. 1971. 412 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·85. $12.50.*

Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force. By James Cable. *London: Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies. 1971. 251 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in International Security: 16.) £2·80.*

BOTH Commander Howe's *Multicrisis* and James Cable's *Gunboat Diplomacy* follow in the wake of renewed academic and professional interest in maritime power. Both authors—one a diplomat and the other a naval officer—took time off from their professional duties to conduct and write up their studies in this field.

While both authors might be conceived as having a similar professional interest in naval power and its initial uses in the future, the similarity between the two books virtually ends there. Indeed, what is assumed to be a different approach to international affairs, both professional and institutional, between the Foreign Service and the armed forces is manifest in the content and basic assumptions of these two books.

The most immediate distinction that can be drawn between them is their wholly different styles. Commander Howe's work has the disadvantage of having been initially produced as an academic thesis. Theses do not make good books without substantial revision, and regrettably little or no attempt has been made to make the book digestible for a wider, and less specialist, audience. It is so earnest and unrelenting in its presentation that it frequently verges on being a bore and the message fails to make its rightful impact.

Again attributable to its thesis style is the more indictable fault of contrivance for contrivance's sake. The title of the book, *Multicrisis*, refers to the proposition that in the future a state—in this case, the United States—may well be involved in one military engagement and suddenly find that another is on the brink of erupting. Commander Howe's contrivance does not lie in his extrapolation from his case studies of the essential characteristics of the multicrisis situation; by and large these are well and systematically done. It lies rather in the assumption that the two instances he has selected to analyse and compare (he hardly attempts any synthesis)—Quemoy and Lebanon, 1958; Vietnam and Israel, 1967—provide a basis for synthesis with his hypothetical future crises in the 1970s, themselves based on some questionable assumptions about Soviet naval capabilities and foreign policy objectives.

For those who are less interested in the intellectual contrivance of taking two case studies to further a wider discussion of the use of naval force in the future, and more interested in the discussion of the case studies investigated, *Multicrisis* may well prove a stimulating book. Given that the handling of each case study is restricted by the purposes for which it was intended, Commander Howe has developed them with methodological rigour and presented them with detail and comprehensive supporting evidence. The straight comparison of the two cases is respectably done, though there is little or no attempt at synthesis.

James Cable discusses the application of limited naval force for a political purpose without recourse to war by a medium power—in this case, Britain. Unlike Commander Howe, he writes in an attractive, colourful and flowing style. Structurally he has opted for a standard formula: get your definitions worked out first and follow with discussion in the light of these propositions. The difficulty with definitions is that the reader has to take them as given, otherwise the ensuing discussion is meaningless. Mr. Cable

has judiciously decided to devote a large proportion of his book to a discussion of the concepts so as to avoid the risk of misunderstanding later on because of a lack of early precision.

On the question of definitions, encapsulated as they are within a wider discussion of the principles of naval force, *Gunboat Diplomacy* offers some valuable and well-categorised new concepts. They are valuable in as much as they are general enough to afford wide application by other scholars, yet specific enough to enable tight synthesis. With each definition of the purpose of limited naval force (for it is in relation to purpose that each is synthesised), Mr. Cable has provided colourful and unusual illustrative examples. By and large, the examples are fairly cursorily treated with only a minimum of detail.

In comparing the two books, the respective interpretations both authors offer of the Formosa/Lebanon crises of 1958 provide the key to the essential differences between them. To Mr. Cable, the diplomat, military force, naval or otherwise, is tied in with, and related to, political purpose; to Commander Howe, the professional naval officer, naval vessels are ' instruments of political and psychological leverage ' but not *sui generis* related to the political ends themselves. This difference is likewise reflected in their respective discussion of contemporary Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. To the former, the circumstantial evidence of Soviet naval activities ' does not prove that the Soviet Government have decided to emulate the United States and to use the Navy to support Soviet policy and diplomacy in the Mediterranean '. For Commander Howe, the Soviet fleet is not only proof of intent, but also further evidence in support of the argument that prima facie United States freedom and command of the seas are constrained and that options in the event of ' multicrisis ' are severely limited.

These are both useful books, but I suspect that of the two, only *Gunboat Diplomacy* will have any lasting value among the more cerebral books of maritime strategy and sea power in general.

MARTIN EDMONDS

The United Nations and the Population Question, 1945–1970. By Richard Symonds and Michael Carder. *London: Chatto & Windus for the Sussex University Press. 1973. 236 pp. Index. £3·00.*

THE concluding sentence of this book aptly summarises its *raison d'être*, by claiming that ' the proceedings of the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies concerning the major economic and social issues with which the world is confronted deserve considerably wider attention in relation to the future of mankind than they at present receive from the relatively few diplomatic and academic specialists and international officials who find them intelligible '. Out of this wider concern arose this volume about the role of the United Nations and its specialised agencies in relation to the population question. It highlights chronologically the great debate concerning the involvement of these international organisations over the period 1945–70, when the world population increased by 40 per cent. The authors describe the slow emergence of population as a crucial international issue, the changes in the attitudes and policies of the various agencies and the effect of these changes upon the policies of national governments.

Many reading about the ping-pong motion of the population question from the legislative and executive bodies of one agency after another—WHO, UNICEF, FAO, Unesco, the World Bank as well as the Population Commission, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly—will share the frustrations felt by some of those employed in UN technical assistance. These frustrations were expressed forcibly by Lord Caradon in an address to the International Planned Parenthood Federation in 1967 when he criticised the UN and its specialised agencies because until 1965 they had taken almost no practical action to reduce the birth rate. Faced with the inability of the UN system to assist governments, many Asian governments had already adopted population control policies, and it was their action, along with a change in American policy giving top priority to family planning in foreign aid, which instigated greater UN involvement. The strength of American support for family planning was of course enough to provoke a powerful reaction among the Third World countries, many of whom sensed economic and political motives rather than philanthropic ones.

The two authors, both UN men who wrote this book while at the University of Sussex Institute of Development Studies and the Institute for the Study of International Organisation, weave a detailed explanation for the seeming inaction of the UN. They point to the various attitudes of executive heads like Julian Huxley and his successors at Unesco and Dr. Sen and his predecessors at FAO, and to the diverse views of governments and religious groups concerning the involvement of the agencies. They are also at pains to explain the slow increase in the awareness of 'the population explosion' and the fact that population growth could be influenced. Stress is also given to the way in which the agencies contributed to this increased awareness through the provision of statistical data and a forum for debate and resolutions which gave an international legitimacy to population control measures enabling national leaders to accept them in the face of local opposition.

This is a scholarly but readable survey of a complex issue, which perhaps inevitably reflects a fairly marked support for the Western, Protestant, family-planning approach to the population question. Two Soviet or Third World authors might write a different volume on this topic. They would certainly qualify the statement that 'the countries of North Africa and the Middle East moved very rapidly towards population policies in the mid-sixties' (p. 204), which is a very broad generalisation about more than twenty countries from the cases of a few.

JOHN I. CLARKE

Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs. Ed. by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, with James Chace, Carol Kahn and Jennifer Whittaker. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger for The Council on Foreign Relations. 1973. 498 pp. £5·25.*

Thirty-one articles are republished here, taken from between two and three thousand which have appeared during the first fifty years of the quarterly journal *Foreign Affairs*. The selection includes the well-known 'A requisite for the success of popular diplomacy' by Elihu Root, written for the first issue in 1922, as well as articles by Thomas Masaryk, Bendetto Croce, Henry Kissinger, Tom Mboya and on to Richard Nixon in 1971.

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. Ed. by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe
London: Longman. 1972. 390 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·25.

BASED upon a seminar in which Marxists and non-Marxists read and discussed papers upon the subject of imperialism, this book reproduces thirteen of the papers together with summaries of the discussions which followed them. Papers I to V treat of various theories of imperialism, including the Marxist theories; VI and VII apply Marxist theory to the situation in the contemporary, post-colonial world; and in VIII to XIII we are given various historical case studies of European imperialism, mostly from the period 1870–1914.

The discussions, we are told, were often vehement, with the participants tending to argue at cross-purposes: not surprisingly, for there was little consensus as to what imperialism was. The usual understanding of it is the policies of the metropolitan powers in acquiring and administering territory, or, in a wider sense, the political and economic relations between advanced and backward countries. To Lenin, however, imperialism was the highest, 'the monopoly stage' of capitalism, and it is this famous, yet specialised, definition of it which tends to dominate the Marxist contributions to the book.

But it was not only the subject which seems to have given rise to misunderstanding, but also the methodology. One has the impression that whereas the Marxists were mainly concerned to interpret history and the contemporary world in the light of theory, the non-Marxists were content to examine the evidence and to let theory make of it what it could. The gap is most apparent in the treatment of some of the case studies. Leopold II's acquisition of the Congo, the French drive to the upper Nile, and British business activity in Latin America before 1914, are all shown, either implicitly or explicitly, as fitting awkwardly or not at all into the Marxist theoretical framework. To judge by their questions, some of the more theoretically minded were clearly perturbed by these findings, and B. Sutcliffe, the co-editor, comments in the Conclusion that Lenin was not primarily interested in how or why individual colonies were acquired, but only in the general economic and political effects of the export of monopolistic capital. Which makes one wonder what purpose these particular case studies were intended to serve.

Despite the confusion in the approach to the subject, many of the papers throw a good deal of light on the nature of imperialism, whether in the Marxist or non-Marxist senses of the term. A most revealing study is that by R. E. Robinson, who shifts the emphasis from Europe to the non-European world by claiming that colonialism was largely a feature of indigenous politics, and that in view of the often minute bodies of administrators and military deployed, it could hardly have existed without the extensive collaboration of native elites.

The book is admirable in the modesty of its claims: in the sense it gives of questions to be answered, of theories to be refined, of work still to be done. There is a useful annotated bibliography designed to encourage more research, and one may hope that there will be further, similar exercises, although conducted on more precisely defined grounds.

BRIAN PORTER

Further Essays in Monetary Economics. By Harry G. Johnson. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1973. 366 pp. Index. £5·00; paperback: £2·95.*

PROFESSOR JOHNSON'S writings for the years 1967–72 are collected together and arranged in three groups—on domestic (*i.e.*, national) monetary economics, on questions of international monetary theory and, lastly, four pieces on problems of the international monetary system and one on European monetary union. Elegant and erudite as are the pieces in the first two parts, it is the last section which will be of widest interest. On EMU, Johnson, assisted perhaps by an unconcealed antipathy for the cultural pretensions of Europeans in general, is cool, critical and acute. He demonstrates clearly that all the proposals so far (and in fact including the 1973 joint float) presuppose the existence of a 'central decision-making process'. Instead:

> the danger is that the European countries will procrastinate indefinitely, in order to avoid actually reaching the chasm that has to be crossed at the end, and that in so doing they will deprive themselves of the possibility of individual exchange rate action that they enjoy under the present system, without arriving at any effective possibility of collective exchange rate action, as envisaged in the plan for a common currency. The result would be that control of the international monetary system would pass to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, whose domestically oriented policy decisions would determine the world rate of inflation (p. 324).

As for the international monetary system, Johnson argues that the instability of the system first indicated by Triffin in 1958 was bound to lead to trouble and that the only surprises were first that it was so long deferred by various devices of international co-operation, and second that it should have been precipitated in August 1971 by the exasperation of the United States with the behaviour of other countries, and not the other way round. On the whole, although deploring Connally's brinkmanship with trade liberalisation, he defends the American action as positively leading both to the 'dedollarisation' of gold and to a new rule book allowing greater flexibility in exchange rates. He does half admit that flexible rates will make it more difficult for the rest of the system to resist the pervading influence of inflation emanating from the United States. But he still thinks—and indeed has consistently argued—that flexible rates are greatly to be preferred to the difficulties with the adjustment problem caused by fixed rates. His comments on inflation, however, are mainly directed at the British, whose incomes policy he judges 'not an answer but an irrelevance'. Indeed, it seems odd that a professor, who regularly commutes like a kind of academic David Frost between London and Chicago, should show such apparent disinterest in the problems of American monetary policy and such apparent diffidence in analysing and prescribing the policies that should be followed by the centre country in the system. After all, what the Americans do is much more important to all of us—British, Canadian, French, Swiss, Asian and African—than what either the Europeans do or fail to do or what any other national government does. Perhaps in the next five years, as American dominance of the international monetary system becomes still more pronounced and as the problems of managing the system become more acute, Professor Johnson will direct the power of his logical analysis and his expert advice to the other side of the Atlantic.

SUSAN STRANGE

Modern Capitalism and Other Essays. By Paul M. Sweezy. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1972. 184 pp. $5.95. £2·50.*

Paternalistic Capitalism. By Andreas G. Papandreou. *Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 190 pp. Index. £2·75.*

PROFESSOR SWEEZY is a believer, belonging to the 'radical underworld' (p. 93). His method is assertion. He is not against wealth, but he is against the rich because, he asserts, they 'maintain a system which needlessly denies the same advantages to others' (p. 97). If only the rich put the Marxists (which one of the present selection of groups?) in power and let them nationalise everything, everybody would be a millionaire. How naive can one get after the experience of the last fifty years?

A summary of Paul Sweezy's position is given on page 54:

> I have already indicated my own view that orthodox economics does not reflect that reality but rather serves as an apologetic rationalization for it. Similarly it seems to me that Marxism *does* reflect capitalist reality. Or, to put the matter in other terms, the world we live in is not one of harmonies of interest, tendencies to equilibrium, and gradual change. Rather it is dominated by conflict of interest, tendencies to disequilibrium, and recurring breaks in the continuity of development.

Of course, the world is not a paradise on earth, but how is it possible to maintain that there is no community of interest in countries where the standard of living has substantially increased for all?

Professor Sweezy's answer would be that such general progress in some countries was possible because they exploited the rest of the world. Such arguments only hold water if one believes with Paul Sweezy that development entirely depends on the primitive accumulation of capital. But there is substantial evidence that capital alone is by no means sufficient to enable a country to develop economically. It may be less important than technical innovation, organisational talent and economic motivation. Paul Sweezy never notices this possibility and claims that trade, investment and aid are the modern ways of exploitation (p. 21).

Professor Papandreou takes Sweezy to task because he believes that capitalism is a market economy. In his own view, it is not, because its market is so plagued with distortions that it no longer fulfils its functions. And the former professor of economics at Berkeley ably—as would be expected—passes in review all the well-known inadequacies of the static model of the market. However, the real market is dynamic and 'this evolutionary process is enormously difficult to comprehend, let alone formalise' (p. 36). So, at worst, we do not know whether static inadequacies matter all that much—they do not seem to, as the market does deliver the goods.

But, writes Andreas Papandreou, the system works only because of private planning by giant corporations and this planning is 'not carried out in the interest of the consumer, but in the interest of the system' (p. 6) with the connivance of the labour establishment. One wonders why the consumers are so eagerly pursuing higher wages if they obtain for them only what suits the corporations.

The Soviet system is as paternalistic as American capitalism and they have divided the world amongst themselves. Grecce is a typical example. What is the solution? Ownership does not matter all that much (p. 166),

but planning is essential, decentralised planning that is, with bargaining processes between decision-making units to establish 'society-wide preference systems'. Planning units should be 'regional' (p. 177). This reviewer finds this solution rather an anticlimax.

LJUBO SIRC

Agricultural Policy in Wealthy Countries. By Gwyn James. *Sydney, London: Angus & Robertson. 1971. 368 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·75.*

THE coming round of trade negotiations in Gatt is likely to involve much discussion of the problems of agricultural trade and many plans for its improvement. Previous attempts to reduce barriers to trade in agricultural products have proved so unsuccessful largely because of the existence of agricultural policies in wealthy countries. Mr. James's book gives an introduction to the factors which underlie these policies, and the form which they take, in Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Community and the United States. As such, it is a timely volume which should find a welcome among all who wish to understand the issues at stake.

The author devotes three chapters to setting the scene in which policy decisions are made, the changes occurring in the agricultural sector and the nature of our farm problems. He then reviews agricultural policy in each of the four examples considered, varying his treatment to emphasise, for example, the problems of supply control in the United States and the role of statutory marketing boards in the United Kingdom. In two additional chapters, Mr. James considers the problems of structural reform in agriculture and offers his reflections on agricultural policy. The book includes a worthwhile bibliography and a usable index.

The book bears the stamp of its origin as a series of lectures to senior undergraduate students. Although it is written in a style which is refreshingly free from the most arcane forms of economic jargon, it will in practice be most readily comprehended by those who already recognise that the diagram on page 165, which purports to show the determination of price, output and profit under imperfectly competitive conditions, is inadequate. Similar reservations will accompany their reading of the text of page 232, which accompanies a diagram intended to show the effect of supply control on the cost of price support.

Such detailed criticisms must not be allowed to obscure the fact that Mr. James has attempted a very demanding task and, on the whole, has done so with success. For the British reader the chapters on policy in Australia and the United States will be especially valuable, if only because of the relative scarcity of such succinct accounts. The material on the United Kingdom and the European Community is less adequate both because it has dated and because we have already a variety of useful texts on the Common Agricultural Policy. However, what is said is well worth reading, in its own right as well as a background to more recent developments.

It is stimulating to read a book in which the strong free enterprise tradition which pervades much Australian thinking encounters some of the most *dirigiste* aspects of economic policy in each of the countries considered. In such terms we all sin, but Mr. James in his final chapter points to ways in which some of the more extravagant folly of agricultural policy in

wealthy countries may be removed without total insensitivity to the needs of the farmer.

JOHN MARSH

Measuring Development: The Role and Adequacy of Development Indicators. Ed. by Nancy Baster. *London: Frank Cass. 1972. 182 pp. £2·50.*

FORECASTERS of change in academic fashion will probably agree that development studies are likely to become increasingly concerned in the near future with the issue of what really constitutes human progress. It is now often argued that the substantial upward trends which have been observed in the major economic indicators for at least some less developed countries—GNPs, national incomes etc.—have not been accompanied by corresponding increases in the welfare of the mass of their populations. A prominent ringer of this particular alarm-bell, Dudley Seers, is the author of the first paper in this collection. From a humanitarian and egalitarian stance he argues four main points: that the conventional economic indicators do not take account of income distribution; that grossly unequal income distribution and primary poverty often show no sign of disappearing as a consequence of the type of economic growth experienced by less developed countries; that the statistics on income distribution underestimate actual inequalities of welfare because access to education, health and social services is restricted largely to the economically privileged; and that the character of social relationships should be included as one aspect of welfare. While in part rhetorical, Seers's paper does pose a practical challenge: the need to develop a system of 'welfare accounts' as useful to the planners in their own way as the familiar national (economic) accounts. The challenge is accepted in this volume only by R. B. Tabbarah and J. Drewnowski. The latter's paper on 'social indicators' is most useful, although it does make clear the amount of work which remains to be done before practical 'social accounting' becomes possible. He makes a useful distinction between welfare indicators which measure 'the actual satisfaction of needs' and the conventional economic measures which measure only 'the market values of the means that could be (but not necessarily are) used for satisfaction of these needs' (p. 80).

The impetus to bring together this collection derives from the sort of concern with present growth patterns of the type outlined above. The disappointment is that the remaining six authors in this collection have very little to say that is relevant to this theme in anything more than a marginal sense. Two of these papers relate to a type of academic exercise foreign in spirit to the alarums of Seers; they concern the statistical procedures involved in the validation of cross-country models of the development process as it is empirically observed. It is difficult to see why I. Adelman and C. T. Morris's measures of how political participation changes with economic development, or D. McGranahan's attempts to identify statistically the best proxy variables for the whole development process, should be included with articles advocating new planning goals and new welfare measurements.

For the other papers, C. L. Taylor gives some sensible reasons why one could not produce a usable set of indicators of political development, and

C. Elliott's paper on why income distribution may not improve with economic growth is at least relevant to the main theme. This reviewer fails to see the justification for including a paper by J. Galtung challenging 'simplistic one-way models of the relation between education (human resources) and economic development' (p. 137), or M. Hechter's historical analysis of regional inequalities in the British Isles.

The publication of an edited set of papers should be justified by coherence at some level even if, as is not the case here, the contributions are individually of considerable academic merit. One might argue that all the papers in this collection are related in some sense to the exercise of 'measuring development', but that is such a blanket term that real coherence emerges neither from the editor's Introduction nor from the papers themselves. Some of the contributors ignore entirely the term 'development indicators', others make it more or less central to their papers, but understand it in very different ways.

M. P. Moore

De l'Aide à la Recolonisation: Les leçons d'un échec. By Tibor Mende. *Paris: Seuil. 1972. 317 pp. (Collection 'L'histoire immédiate'. Gen. ed.: Jean Lacouture.)*

If 'aid' is more willingly given than received, this is because it is ill-conceived and never quite what it seems to be. This is the message of the first half of this book. For instance, it is shown that about one-third of the developing countries' imports have been financed out of foreign aid. But only a fraction of this took the form of outright gifts. Moreover, much of the help received was used or misused to satisfy the requirements of urban elites and had little effect on the problem of relieving the poverty of the masses. The elites live in Western-style in Western-style towns. They are already relatively well off. Yet an examination of the relevant import statistics shows that there were more imports of motor cars and refrigerators for use by the urban well-to-do than of the simple tools and implements which might have helped rural populations to relieve their lot. If this is not enough to disillusion well-meaning aid-givers, the author also shows how closely correlated defence budgets were with aid receipts. If it is countered that not all aid could be so used or misused, since much of it took the form of educational aid, here too there is a story of disillusionment. There is a brain drain: those educated by the West often end up working in the West; and those who stay behind may have acquired all sorts of knowledge but not the sort of knowledge required for the mobilisation of their countries' manpower and real resources.

The second part of the book is concerned with how those resources could actually be mobilised. Inevitably it is more difficult to map out where we should go from here than to show how we have arrived at the present impasse. By no means all who follow the author's reasoning in Part I will necessarily wish to follow him all the way in Part II. Briefly, he wants to end the 'vertical integration' of elitist sectors in developing countries with the West, and replace this by a 'horizontal' expansion of activity within each country or region within a country. The selective assimilation of the towns into Western patterns has led to a gulf between those towns and their alienated countrysides. Much evidence is given in support of this view, and

this should command attention. Perhaps the author carries his enthusiasm for autonomous growth a bit far when he cites as examples Japan, China, Russia and Latin American countries. Was there no social conflict between town and country in any of these cases? Did Latin America develop quite so unaided? But these are minor blemishes and the author is on stronger ground when he argues for the mobilisation of developing countries' resources through green revolutions and the translation of development theories into action which involves the peasantry. The author may not have written the last word on how to get development with less social conflict, but he has made a positive attempt to sketch out where we could go from here, and even those who cannot follow him all the way there will find the first part of the book a masterly exposition of the current disillusionment with aid.

F. V. MEYER

Managing the Multinational Enterprise: Organisation of the Firm and Ownership of the Subsidiaries. By John M. Stopford and Louis T. Wells. *London: Longman. 1972. 223 pp. Index. £4·50.*

THIS is another sound report springing from the Harvard Business School's Multinational Enterprise Project. Bursting with charts and tables, it will be a goldmine for organisational theorists but, as with some other studies in this series, only of incidental interest to those concerned with international relations.

The first half of the book looks at the relationship between companies' strategies and their organisational structures. The meat comes in the second half, where the authors examine ownership policies concerning foreign subsidiaries. There are, for instance, some interesting pages (pp. 117–119, 133–137, 179) dealing with extractive industries. They look at the logic behind the oil and copper oligopolies, whose control of sources of raw materials is so important. The companies involved in these industries have tried hard to keep total control over their extractive operations, while being relatively willing to enter at the marketing stage into partnerships with companies with local marketing expertise.

Since the empirical data was collected, the producing governments have been muscling into the extraction operations, but the logic of this study would suggest that they, too, will feel the need to guarantee outlets for their output. This could be via long-term government-to-government contracts, but may, more likely, be in the form of joint marketing ventures with existing multinationals, whose continued survival will depend on their marketing expertise. (Those interested in Guyana and other bauxite producers should note that this industry's logic is different, with the power going to those controlling the smelting, rather than extractive, process.)

The book also looks at the relative success of six countries which tend to insist officially on heavy local participation in subsidiaries—Japan, Spain, Ceylon, India, Mexico and Pakistan. It proves in practice that India has been giving the multinationals the hardest time, with countries like Japan being more lenient than one might expect. Chapter 11 looks at this question in more depth, and the authors put forward a tentative model linking a country's ability to keep multinationals at arms length with the level of its development. Too few countries are looked at to support a definitive

theory, but it is clear that the material gathered by Harvard would support a wider study of the factors contributing to the success or failure of policies aimed against the freedom of American multinationals.

LOUIS TURNER

LAW

The Vietnam War and International Law. Vol. 3: The Widening Context. Ed. by Richard A. Falk. Sponsored by the American Society of International Law. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 951 pp. Index. $12·50; paperback: £4·75.*

THIS third volume in the series sponsored by the American Society of International Law and edited by Professor Falk [1] contains 862 pages of articles gathered from various law reviews, *Foreign Affairs* and other periodicals, and 55 pages of documents, including three official American statements on the 1970 Cambodian operation, and texts relevant to the articles on war crimes. The articles and essays are grouped into six parts, the first being the Cambodian incursion. In a preceptive study, Jean Lacouture of *Le Monde* argues that the 1970 operation may well in the long run contribute ' to the revolutionary unification of the old colonial Indochina ' and that ' while a united Indochina, more or less inspired by Hanoi, cannot oppose China, it can limit Chinese expansion '. There follow seven essays on international law aspects of the incursion, ranging from the official view of John R. Stevenson, State Department Legal Adviser, to critical pieces by Falk, John H. Fried and others. Falk's article, and that of John Norton Moore, with comments by other international lawyers, appeared in the Symposium on US Action in Cambodia, *American Journal of International Law*, January 1971. Part I concludes with three articles on issues of American constitutional law raised by the Administration's action.

Parts II and III will interest lawyers in general as well as international law specialists. In particular, legal and moral philosophers as well as military lawyers will find the articles in the war crimes section valuable. Three deal with the My Lai incident. Four review the judicial decisions on conscientious objection to the Vietnam war. Constitutional lawyers, political scientists and scholars in American history and politics give varying views on the President's powers to make war and to commit American forces abroad, and on the justiciability of challenges to his decisions. The single contribution in Part IV is a controversial essay by Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley on the legitimacy and legal rights of revolutionary movements. The authors are not, as they acknowledge, the first to emphasise the pathetic inadequacy of traditional international law ' rules ' concerning foreign intervention in civil wars, and recognition of various ' grades ' of revolutionary entities. One writes ' rules ' between inverted commas since it is apparent that propositions stated in law books but no longer consonant to any degree with state practice, nor indeed (although this is debatable) with the perceived mutual self-interest of states, have lost their status as

[1] Volumes I and II (Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1968 and 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 400.

legal norms. Clearly, these are not subjects on which we are likely to have a 'law-making' treaty after deliberations by the International Law Commission and by governments. The scholar and the advocate have perforce to exercise judgment and enquire whether there are any legal rules restricting states' discretion in these matters, and if so, what is their content. Franck and Rodley make a stimulating contribution to this process.

Part V has a dated air since the ceasefire agreements, but John Hannon's thorough study of the experience of the International Control Commission, set up under the 1954 Geneva Agreements, and the role of an improved international supervisory body in any Vietnam settlement, should not be missed. First published in the *Virginia Journal of International Law*, December 1968, this is a lasting contribution to peacekeeping literature. Hannon concludes that United Nations peace observation techniques, while far from perfect, are much more effective than the ICC and pleads that any supervisory body for Vietnam should operate under UN auspices.

Part VI has two essays on lessons to be learnt, principally by American decision-makers, from the Vietnam war, and one by William Fox, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, which looks generally at the problems of terminating wars and makes interesting comparisons between the Boer War and the problems in Korea and Vietnam. Altogether, Volume 3 is a worthy companion to the first two volumes. They maintain high standards of production and have been carefully indexed.

GILLIAN WHITE

Theorie und Realität der Bündnisse. By Stephan Verosta. *Stuttgart: Europa. 1972. 660 pp.*

THE author, who was Austrian ambassador in Warsaw and is now Professor of International Law at the University of Vienna, writes in the Introduction to his book that he started research on the subject of the theory and reality of alliances when he was Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna. As an international lawyer he asks the question whether European state practice justifies the view that in the 19th century states assumed the right in international law to resort to war against other states irrespective of any restraining factors which were characteristic of the classic law of nations and are essential in present day international law. In order to answer this question he investigates the procedure by which rules of international customary law are generated. He emphasises the process of converting usages emerging out of state practice into legal rules, and dwells particularly on the meaning of *opinio juris* (Rechtsüberzeugung) which is instrumental in effecting the conversion.

Professor Verosta maintains that declarations or decisions of governments, parliamentary debates or similar sources are often unsatisfactory evidence of the existence of an *opinio juris*, because the facts as well as the legal position are at the time only known to a restricted number of persons in high authority. A final conviction as to the outcome of an international legal development may only be reached later when the acts and files containing the details of instructions, negotiations and official reports become available to international lawyers. But the result of investigating such material can be surprising to jurists as Professor Verosta successfully demonstrates in relation to the law of war (*jus ad bellum*). For, many

9th and 20th-century international lawyers were of the opinion that war, n the light of alleged state practice, was a contention between states .dmitted by international law for the purpose of settling their disputes. :onsequently, they argued, states had a right to reap the fruits of victory n the battlefield and to acquire enemy territory by title of conquest and nnexation—a significant deviation from the classic law of nations which iad condemned agressive war as *bellum injustum*. Professor Verosta refutes his opinion in discussing several 19th-century issues, particularly the nnexation by Prussia of Schleswig Holstein, Hanover, Hesse, Nassau and he Free City of Frankfurt (1866). Bismarck, who was instrumental in the olicy of annexation, is shown to have been well aware that his action was violation of international law. Public opinion, even in Prussia, never cquiesced in it. Professor Verosta quotes a number of similar examples, uch as the annexation of Turkish territory by Austria in 1908 (Bosnia-Ierzegovina) and the Austrian attack on Serbia in 1914 and comes to the onclusion, which would be supported from British official records, that there as no *opinio juris* among European states, in the form of a customary rule, ustifying war and conquest as a title to acquisition of enemy territory.

Professor Verosta's work is of a pioneering nature and his conclusions re of vital significance, for they allow us to look at the present day law as determined by the United Nations Charter) against a background which different from that painted by some of the positivists of the 19th century.

CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWICZ

'**he Status of Refugees in International Law.** Volume II. Asylum, Entry and Sojourn. By Atle Grahl-Madsen. *Leyden: Sijthoff. 1972. 482 pp. Bibliog. Index. Fl. 79·00.*

N the volume under review, Mr. Grahl-Madsen successfully continues a ask well begun in 1966 with the first volume of a trilogy on *The Status of* '*efugees in International Law*. In the first volume, the author laid the oundations (historical background, applicable rules of international law nd categories of refugees) of an impressive endeavour. In the second olume, three crucial issues are covered; the rights of asylum, entry and ojourn.

It is a positive feature of this study that Mr. Grahl-Madsen firmly ontrols his compassion for the objects of his research. While the work is ermeated with the writer's humanity it does not suffer from the faults of ommitted 'scholarship'. It is to be welcomed that the author should emind us of the high and practicable standards set by British Foreign ecretaries in the 19th century. Unavoidably, they compare favourably vith the collective efforts of a world that, on a global level, contains an ncreasing number of totalitarian and authoritarian states, is more deeply ivided by ideologies and increasingly in danger of degenerating into a state f neo-barbarism. Even so, Mr. Grahl-Madsen treats generously the self-enying, if limited, efforts of the League of Nations and United Nations o build consensual superstructures on an international customary law that eaves the questions of asylum, entry and sojourn essentially in the domain f national sovereignty.

At a time when, regrettably, the United Kingdom *Treaty Series* has een limited to publication of texts in English only, it is salutary to recall

the mishap that occurred in the Geneva-made official English translation of the authoritative French text of the 1933 League of Nations Convention on the International Status of Refugees. The rule of *non-refoulement* (non-return of a refugee to his country of origin against his will) was erroneously translated as meaning non-refusal of entry. The careful treatment of this and other technical questions of the international law relating to refugees strengthens confidence in the author's more general conclusions.

It may be hoped that Mr. Grahl-Madsen will be able to complete with the contemplated third volume his admirable study of a topic that deserves so dedicated, humane and competent an author.

GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER

International Law in Historical Perspective. By J. H. W. Verzijl. Vols. I.-V. *Leyden: Sijthoff. Vol. I. General Subjects. 1968. 575 pp. Index. Fl. 62.50. Vol. II. International Persons. 1969. 606 pp. Bibliog. Index. Fl. 65.00. Vol. III. State Territory. 1970. 636 pp. Maps. Index. Vol. IV. Stateless Domain. 1971. 305 pp. Bibliog. Index. Fl. 45.00. Vol. V. Nationality and Other Matters Relating to Individuals. 1972. 518 pp. Index. Fl. 67.00.*

THESE volumes are a kind of testament of one of the most distinguished legal scholars of his time. They are marked by great legal acumen, a deep sense and knowledge of history, and an intellectual humility, which together lead the reader to an unusual understanding of how law is interwoven with international relations. The first volume is devoted to a case-by-case analysis of the work of the Permanent Court of International Justice from 1922 to 1940. The succeeding volumes are devoted to certain large fields of international law: international persons; state territory; the regions of outer space as non-national domains; and the nationality of individuals and enterprises. Though some parts of the work have been published before, these volumes are not a fragmented collection of papers, but highly organised and rethought: for example, an analysis of the British Commonwealth as an international structure from the Statute of Westminster to the Second World War is completed by a trenchant epilogue written in 1969. The combination of historical and legal learning with political sense makes these volumes a very considerable interdisciplinary achievement.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

Basic Documents on Human Rights. Ed. by Ian Brownlie. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. 531 pp. Index. £3·50; paperback: £1·75.*

This volume, like Dr. Brownlie's *Basic Documents in International Law*, now in its second edition,[1] presents the documents with an introductory note including excellent short bibliographies. It contains all the principal international instruments, including nine ILO conventions, and a valuable section on national con-

[1] Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1972, p. 304.

stitutional provisions ranging from the Bill of Rights 1688, to the Dahomey Constitution 1964.

This 'Brownlie' series, which also includes *Basic Documents on African Affairs*,[2] is a major contribution to the study of international law and relations.

Principles of Public International Law. 2nd ed. By Ian Brownlie. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1973. 735 pp. Bibliog. Index. £8·50; paperback: £4·00.*

The second edition of a book first published in 1966 and and reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1968 (p. 311). The book has been revised to reflect recent developments in such topics as the law of the sea, the admissibility of claims, and the law of treaties. New chapters have been added on diplomatic relations, techniques of supervision and protection, and state succession. The book includes two bibliographies on common amenities and co-operation in the use of resources and on international organisations and a short glossary of technical terms.

WESTERN EUROPE

Europe in the Making. By Walter Hallstein. Trans. by Charles Roetter. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 343 pp. Index. £5·50.*

The Power of the Purse in the European Communities. By David Coombes assisted by Ilka Wiebecke. *London: Chatham House/PEP 1972. 103 pp. Index. (European Series, No. 20.) £1.25.*

European Integration. Selected Readings. Ed. by Michael Hodges. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1972. 461 pp. Index. (Penguin Interdisciplinary Readings. Gen. ed.: Michael Vile.) £1·25.*

THE book by Walter Hallstein is the third version of a work first completed in German in the autumn of 1969.[1] This English edition, completed in March 1972, is an important contribution to the current debate about the future of the enlarged Community. Its essential message is that the reality of Europe is the Community structure, and the paramount need is to develop political unity.

Professor Hallstein maintains that the logic of integration demands much more than simply the free flow of industrial and agricultural products, and that there is a need for common Community bodies with wide powers over such areas as taxation, budget, economic and monetary policies. In his view, even foreign and defence policy, which are not covered by the Community treaties, require a common European discipline.

In the long central chapter on European economic policy, Professor Hallstein deals in turn with all the different facets of internal Community policy. In his section dealing with monetary policy, he points out that while adopting some of M. Werner's recommendations for the first stage of economic and monetary union, the Council of Ministers nevertheless left the future political structures of the Community to a system of incentives or even force of circumstances, thus funking the political and institutional implications. However, he himself does not flinch from pointing out in a later section that 'the main problem is that of differing rates of inflation

[2] Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1972, p. 523.

[1] *Der unvollendete Bundesstaat, europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse* (Düsseldorf: Econ. 1969).

and hence of arriving at stability within the Community' (p. 168). For him this is the strongest argument of all for developing the necessary institutions for political union.

When he turns to the question of European defence policy, he is right to stress that Europe now finds itself in a new situation, with the United States less anxious to bear a disproportionate share of the burden and the Soviet Union feeling the need to consolidate its Western frontier. In his view, Western Europe has three alternatives: it can go neutralist, it can strengthen its national efforts, or it can organise collective defence on a permanent basis within the Atlantic framework. Needless to say, he favours the third alternative as the best way of contributing to European security and facilitating the emergence of a true Atlantic partnership. In this he leaves his reader with a strong sense of *déjà vu*, but he is sufficiently realistic to admit that 'one can probably envisage a Defence Community only at a later stage when the fusion of all the Communities has brought us close to the establishment of a full federation' (p. 324).

Looking back over his own distinguished involvement with the European Community, Professor Hallstein concludes that the obstacles to European unity have always been principally psychological and political. As he puts it, 'it was difficult for public opinion, and partly also for those who held positions of responsibility in the states, to grasp the full extent of the consequences involved in seeking unity' (p. 327). On the contrary, it is surely because rational politicians and bureaucrats have grasped the full consequences of European unity that the Community has not been developed as far or as fast as the dedicated 'Europeans' would have liked. The last redoubts of nationalism in Western Europe are to be found in the Treasury and the Quai d'Orsay.

The slim volume by David Coombes is one of the best in the excellent Chatham House/PEP European Series. The author deals with one of the fundamental issues involved in the future of the Community: namely, the extent to which the European Parliament's newly won power of the purse, however embryonic at this stage, raises important constitutional principles and questions of sovereignty.

In drawing our attention to the political significance of the Community budget, Mr. Coombes points out that it was assumed in 1970–1971 that the introduction of 'own resources' would mean the transfer of authority over the budget to the European Parliament. The fact that this authority is still contested by some national governments, and that it only covers some 5 per cent. or so of the total budget, does not diminish the potential significance of this political development. He is right to point out that the Luxembourg Treaty of April 1970 postponed rather than defined agreement on this issue, but it is well for us in Britain to realise that the issue has only been postponed to 1978 and that it may well provide a lever for more substantial changes in the powers of the various Community institutions and in their relationship to national institutions.

Mr. Coombes's main conclusion is that the procedures provided by the Luxembourg Treaty are inadequate and that the European Parliament cannot reasonably be given power to approve expenditure when it does not have the power to approve the decisions from which the expenditure arises. Looking to the future, he suggests that it is vital for the European Parliament to develop the power to approve the level of Community taxation, that its power to reject the budget as a whole would be an indirect but

necessary means of getting the Commission to treat Community expenditure as a whole, and that the Commission should be looking for ways of diversifying the Community's sources of revenue.

Writing early in 1972, Mr. Coombes was perceptive in his forecasts about the likely impact of British membership upon the European Parliament. We can now see that the British presence has had a dramatic revitalising effect upon that institution and that the Community is only at the beginning of a long overdue period of democratic development.

The book of interdisciplinary readings, edited by Michael Hodges, is a useful addition to the literature in this field. It contains a wide range of material which will be valuable for teachers and student alike. It is also good value for money.

NIGEL FORMAN

L'Europe de Strasbourg. By Charles Melchior de Molènes. *Paris: Roudil. 1971. 774 pp.*

THIS work won the Drouyn de Lhuys annual prize in Belgium. It is in essence an ideological study of the Council of Europe. A long historical introduction describes the idea of Europe in the minds of thinkers and practitioners from Leibniz and William Penn, Saint Simon and Proud'hon to Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand, Herriot and the founders of the Council. The genesis of the Council and the evolution of its Statute are described in some detail. There follows a survey of the Strasbourg institutions from such angles as confederalism, supranationality, political authority and integration. But the description of the practical work and achievements of the Council is slight, so slight indeed that the reader may be left with an abstract and rather idealised picture of the Council which in the result does it less than justice.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

Diplomacy and Persuasion. How Britain Joined the Common Market. By Uwe Kitzinger. *London: Thames & Hudson. 1973. 432 pp. Index. £2·75.*

MR. KITZINGER describes himself as a contemporary chronicler and says that the bulk of his book (about 400 pages) was written early in 1972. He also says that it does not ' set out to be a cathedral. It constitutes at most a quarry ' (p. 12). He is too modest. However great his speed, he writes with skill and even elegance. The book is good and easy reading; it has a clear structure and is entirely comprehensible.

One reservation must be made. The second and longer part—dealing with policies, attitudes and feelings about the EEC in Britain between 1967 and 1972—is more valuable and interesting than the first and shorter part, which sketches Anglo-French relations over the EEC problem from the Soames affair early in 1969 until the signature of the Treaty of Accession in January 1972.

In this first part, Mr. Kitzinger recapitulates the story of the Soames affair without adding much that is new—perhaps because of a reluctance to betray confidences—and then dramatically poses the question: exactly

when did President Pompidou decide to admit Britain? Was it as late as his summit meeting with Mr. Heath in May 1971? He can thus focus the spotlight on the private Soames-Jobert talks in Paris early in 1971, as paving the way for the breakthrough in the negotiations and the summit itself; and of these talks he writes with obvious inside knowledge. Yet it still seems doubtful how important they really were. In the light of M. Pompidou's on-off tactics over the Summit of the Nine during the summer of 1972, it seems fairly clear that both then and also over British entry, his manner of keeping everyone in suspense for as long as possible revealed the skills of the expert political stage-manager and actor, rather than genuine indecision or serious misgivings about the enlargement of the EEC.

The second part of the book is fascinating reading. Although some of the ground covered is inevitably familiar, Mr. Kitzinger provides fresh insights and also—through his wide personal contacts and his own personal 'European' involvement—plenty of fresh material. He tells the inside story of the multifarious activities and financial resources of the European Movement and of the various anti-Market groups. The relative failure of the richer, more prestigious and outwardly more active European Movement to sway British opinion shows how much harder it is to fight a positive campaign for something new than a campaign appealing to defensive and conservative feelings.

There is also a lucid account—remarkably fair-minded, given the author's personal commitment—of the activities and internal quarrels of the British political parties and of a good many individual members. (Mr. Wilson is judged with perhaps surprising toleration and understanding.) Mr. Kitzinger also reports in detail the attitudes of the churches, the trade unions, television and the press (including the 'media breakfasts') and the general public, as shown in the opinion polls. The polls are analysed and the swings of feeling are made as intelligible as possible—which is not saying a great deal. Finally, there is a lively record of the parliamentary battles of October 1971 and the first part of 1972.

As for the future, Mr. Kitzinger gives a warning against any euphoria. 'Both in Britain and in Brussels', he writes, 'there are sterner tests ahead, and battles to be fought compared to which British entry was simple' (p. 399). It is to be hoped he will one day chronicle these too.

ELISABETH BARKER.

British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–68. By Phillip Darby. *London: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1973. 366 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £6·50.*

FOR anyone who believes that the function of government is to plan in the long and short term, and then to formulate policies to implement these plans, this book offers an insight into their particular version of hell. In nine, lucid, well-documented, chapters it chronicles an unwillingness to rethink the British role in the Middle and Far East after the loss of India, and even after the loss of the Suez base; an almost total lack of anything other than very short-term forward planning; a lack of any accepted relationship between commitment and capability; an almost total lack of communication between the Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry, and the Colonial Office; and a lack of co-ordination between the three Services.

The picture presented by Phillip Darby is not, however, totally black. A coherent pattern emerges as the emphasis of British thinking slowly evolved from the residue of imperial policing, via a British version of the domino theory, to a special relationship with the newly emergent states of Afro-Asia, and finally to a general peace-keeping role in the area—a role that for a brief period took priority over the Nato commitment in Europe. The general success of the military operations in the area, and the requests for British action that had, apparently, to be rejected, may be taken as indicators of the political acceptability of this changing role.

The East of Suez policy was, however, operated on inadequate resources. But neither the, at times fierce, inter-service rivalry, nor the wildly divergent views of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office about the possible continuing tenability of base areas, made for the efficient allocation of the resources available. Especially within the army, a body of thinking had existed since at least 1954 on the limited war role East of Suez. As the author carefully plots, the impact of events in late 1956 and early 1957 was to act as a catalyst, first on the Admiralty, and later the Air Staff, in a process of adjustment towards an intellectually and militarily coherent limited war doctrine. But until this adjustment was made, naval and air support for the army lagged far behind the desirable level.

The problem East of Suez was, obviously, commitment, and the unquestioned acceptance of the legacies stemming from the Indian Empire. It is, retrospectively, amazing that there was no questioning of the purpose of the commitment, or of the relationship between military power and the economic interests and diplomatic influence that it was designed to protect. Perhaps because of this lack of questioning in 1962 the Chiefs of Staff were forced to conclude that Britain could only engage in one major operation at a time, and not more than one major operation or a number of limited operations each year. Such a situation indicates why the whole postwar East of Suez exercise may be characterised as operating 'by sleight of hand and military inadequacy' (p. 252).

In examining this central problem of resources, and other problems, the author sets the East of Suez policy firmly—and rightly—into the broader context of overall defence and foreign policy thinking, and into the international environment against which this thinking was taking place. On some issues he appears to place undue reliance upon a single source—for example De Witt Armstrong on the strategy over bases—but the written material has been reinforced by very extensive interviews. The result is a volume that makes a substantial contribution to the literature on British defence policy.

ROGER CAREY

French Foreign Policy since the Second World War. By Herbert Tint. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1972. 273 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

ONE of a series of foreign policy studies dealing with each of the major world powers, this book sets out to provide an analysis of French policy since 1945 in two parts. Part One describes the search for economic aid after 1945, the developments of Franco-German relations within the context of European unity, Franco-Soviet relations, and French relations with the francophone countries and the Third World. Part Two describes the

organisation of the French diplomatic service, and provides an Appendix on the institutional aspects of the decision-making process in French foreign policy.

The scope of the book is clearly ambitious but disappointingly it fails to live up to expectations. Broad policy principles and detailed analyses of specific policy decisions are introduced without adequate development; so that, for instance, the Jeanneney Report of 1963 on French foreign policy is mentioned (p. 176) with misleading brevity to underline the political motivation behind French policy without any attempt to do justice to the admirable moral, economic and political recommendations of that report. The injustice is compounded in that the report is not even included in the bibliography. Excluded too are many important articles in the *Revue Française de Science Politique*.

There is no attempt to integrate the two parts of the book by showing how the theoretical decision-making structure at the Quai d'Orsay operates in practice. In fact the attempt to define the difference between the Minister's Chef de Cabinet and the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay is ruined by wrongly labelling Berthelot as Briand's Chef de Cabinet instead of Léger (p. 237). It is hard to see why a prewar example was chosen in any case. Other personalities are introduced throughout the book without any explanation of their diplomatic or political experience.

There is a need for a detailed study of French foreign policy since 1945, but until a more suitable book is published, both general and specialist readers will be well-advised to use the works of Alfred Grosser and Guy de Carmoy, the latter being also available in translation.

NEVILLE WAITES

Gustav Heinemann: The Committed President. By Joachim Braun. Foreword by Siegfried Lenz. Trans. by R. W. Last. *London: Oswald Wolff. 1972. 277 pp. Illus. £4·00.*

THERE is an odd discrepancy between the subtitles of the German original and the English translation of this book. The German edition [1] has 'The Awkward President' (*Der unbequeme Präsident*), the English, 'The Committed President'. Yet a perusal of this informative and well-balanced account of Dr. Heinemann's career, views and present office shows that both epithets are justified. On the one hand, he has sometimes proved 'awkward' to some of his fellow-countrymen because of his courage in being outspoken and in swimming against the tide. He gave up his ties with a political party when he could no longer share its major policies and he has questioned deep-rooted authoritarian traditions and prejudices. On the other hand, Dr. Heinemann has been 'committed' to the principles in which he believes: the idea of human rights and Protestant liberalism, which to him means an acceptance of the binding force of the Gospels on the lines of Karl Barth as well as an emphasis on rationality in political, economic and social life, the need to understand the younger generation and to protect minorities.

By training, a student of economics and law, Gustav Heinemann was for many years legal adviser to a big industrial firm in the Ruhr. After

[1] Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller. 1972.

the collapse in 1945 he helped his fellow citizens as Lord Mayor of Essen, then a badly battered city. He joined the CDU and in 1949 became Minister of the Interior in Dr. Adenauer's first cabinet. When he disagreed with the Chancellor's rearmament policy he resigned from the post in 1950. Seven years later he joined the Social Democrats and re-entered the Bonn Diet in the following year. In the cabinet of the 'Great Coalition', Dr. Heinemann distinguished himself as a far-sighted and progressive Minister of Justice. Elected to his present presidential office in 1969, he has since profited from his versatility in a long and varied life. As he put it in an interview with the author:

> I have had an independent career as a lawyer, and I have been engaged in the management of a large industrial company. I have been involved in all forms of political office from the humblest to the highest. In the church, I have held every office open to someone who is not ordained. I have been an academic teacher—and much more besides. At no time in my life have I worked within one single area, but have always been engaged in a variety of activities (p. 232).

Dr. Heinemann has never favoured the German idolatry of the state. 'I do not love the state, I love my wife', he once told an enquirer. Though this attitude has met with both approval and disapproval in his country, he remains convinced that 'our links with the state should be based, not on emotion, but on reason' (p. 158). This outspoken critic of the mere outward glory of the Bismarckian Empire and of the cruelties of the Third Reich has made a point of welcoming ordinary men and women from all walks of life at his state functions. Dr. Heinemann may not be a brilliant orator but according to a recent opinion poll, he enjoys the respect of the overwhelming majority of his fellow-countrymen. He has also gained friends for the Federal Republic during his frequent state visits abroad.

The book includes a number of attractive photographs and translations of some of the major speeches delivered by the President during the last few years. The translation as a whole is not always felicitous.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Aussenpolitische Perspektiven des Westdeutschen Staates. Vol. 2: Das Vordringen Neuer Kräfte. Ed. by Ulrich Scheuner. *Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg. 1972. 235 pp. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik E.V., vol. 30/2.) DM 32.00.*

Aussenpolitische Perspektiven des Westdeutschen Staates. Vol. 3: Der Zwang zur Partnerschaft. Ed. by Richard Löwenthal. *Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg. 1972. 312 pp. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik E.V., vol. 30/3.) DM 38.00.*

THE volumes under review were produced by a study group at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik under the chairmanship of Professor Ulrich Scheuner. The first volume in the series met with a less than enthusiastic response from the reviewers and this has resulted in some changes in presentation, such as notably longer contributions, in these two volumes.

Volume Two is basically concerned with the interaction of internal and external factors in the making of West German foreign policy. This

volume contains an extremely important essay by Lutz Niethammer, a very distinguished young West German political scientist, exploring the modalities of the concept of nation-state in relation to the Federal Republic. In doing this Niethammer is tackling the major question in the study of postwar Germany, since it is precisely the nature of relationship between state and nation that distinguishes West and East German politics from those of other European states. Niethammer demonstrates both his deep insight into the nature of West German politics and a rare ability to apply in a meaningful way the concepts and tools of Anglo-American social science in his treatment of this topic.

Given the consistently high standard of the piece and my own intellectual indebtedness to it, it seems churlish to offer any criticism. However, the topic is so central to any serious study of West Germany that no one author can deal with the topic definitively. Niethammer's essay, while a most important contribution to our understanding, is weakened by three elements in his approach (two of these are singled out for criticism by Professor Carstens in his magisterial summing up in Volume III). First, and this is obviously a matter of interpretation, Niethammer sometimes puts more weight on an argument than the evidence will bear. Thus on page 56 he talks about 'the genuine national motives behind the new Ostpolitik' without producing any real evidence for this assertion. There is, too, a necessary distortion involved in publishing Niethammer's essay in the context of this general work since it does not allow him to bring out with sufficient clarity the role of foreign policy decisions on the process he is analysing. Last, and most important, his analysis is weakened by his inherently negative view of nationalism as something inextricably associated with conservative values. This means that Niethammer regards the abolition of the nation-state as a matter of first priority, although his suggestion that the nation-state basis of West Europe can best be overcome by an alliance of social democrats and communists is, to say the least, problematical. If we take the West German example, I have argued that the increased stability of the Federal Republic is linked with the development of loyalties towards it more normally associated with the nation-state. An attempt to get beyond the Federal Republic on the basis of an alliance between communists and social democrats would be most unlikely to contribute to political stability in that country.

Hans Heinrich Mahnke's contribution provides a well-written and lucid account of the constitutional constraints on West German foreign policy. This topic assumes great importance given the combination of the constraints imposed by the Basic Law and the legal background of many West German decision-makers. Erich Kitzmüller and Heinz Kuby give a good though very general account of the impact of technological and economic factors on West German foreign policy.

The other essays in Volume II are very disappointing. Klaus Erdemenger's look at the goals of West German foreign policy is too cursory and superficial to be of great interest to anyone but a novice in the subject. Most disappointing of all is Ernst Richert's essay. In dealing with attitudes, a notoriously difficult area, Richert shows none of the easy familiarity with the Anglo-American literature of Lutz Niethammer. One of the least researched areas in the study of West German foreign policy is that of the impact of interest groups on foreign policy-making. Ernst Richert's essay leaves us little the wiser on this topic.

Volume III, in marked contrast to Volume II, eschews the methodological sophistication and conceptual contortion so dear to the heart of the traditional German academic and is basically made up of descriptive studies of aspects of West German policy. Of these essays, those by Manfred Rexin on East Germany and by Hans Siegfreid Lamm on Poland are outstanding. Dieter Dettke's article is very competent but it is difficult to say something new about West German foreign policy towards most of the Western world in sixty-eight pages.

These two volumes then, taken as a whole, are something of a curate's egg—excellent in patches. While they are essential and rewarding reading for the specialist in West German foreign policy, they offer relatively little to the scholar interested in comparative foreign policy. What such a scholar needs *inter alia* are detailed and systematic studies of the impact of the parties, bureaucracy and interest groups on the making of West German foreign policy. This is by no means an easy task but scholars like Baring, Hanrieder and Kaiser have demonstrated that it can be done.

W. PATERSON

The Rebirth of Italy 1943–50. Ed. by S. J. Woolf. *London: Longman. 1972. 264 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

THIS symposium by nine authors, both English and Italian, originated in a series of seminars held at the Centre for the Advanced Study of Italian Society at Reading University where the editor, Dr. S. J. Woolf, is Reader in Italian History. The papers discuss the various aspects, political and economic, of the transformation of Italy from a fascist to a democratic state.

The Resistance which developed after the fall of fascism in 1943 was a composite movement of six anti-fascist parties of widely differing backgrounds and views, united by the primary object of defeating the Germans and neo-fascists. During the war political differences were subordinated in the interests of that essential unity; but once the war was over, and the future shape of the Italian state came into question, they became sharply apparent. By no means all the Resistance leaders had clear ideas about that future; but while the more right-wing parties may have visualised a return to something not unlike the pre-fascist liberal state, those of the Left, who certainly preponderated in the military Resistance in the North, envisaged, if not revolution, at least a revolutionary transformation of Italian society as a whole. Even within the Left, there were gradations of view among the Communists and Socialists, while Togliatti's readiness to collaborate in the royal government in the South came as an incomprehensible shock to many left-wingers. Yet within his own terms that decision was both realistic and far-sighted. He realised that a war-weary Italy was not ripe for revolution; and his '*svolta*' then was only a step in the long-range policy of broadening the basis and appeal of the Communist party which he was to pursue after the war.

The progressives' hopes of a radical transformation were doomed to disappointment—here the turning-point, as F. Catalano shows in his piece on 'The Rebirth of the Party System', was the fall of the Parri government. With the advent of more conservative elements from the South the balance altered and the 'wind from the North' lost some of its force.

But the old liberal state was dead beyond revival. Those who still hankered after it hastened to join the new Christian Democrat party, heir of the Partito Popolare, which now came to fill the vacuum as a third mass party, with a strong peasant following, beside the Communists and Socialists. Its outstanding leader, Alcide De Gasperi, was to find this accretion of Southern reactionaries a serious embarrassment, notably in his plans for introducing land reform in 1950 (described in P. A. Allum's piece on 'The South and National Politics'). The Republican constitution of 1948, as P. Vercellone relates, combined in watered-down form the aspirations of the progressives with the checks and balances introduced by the more cautious traditionalists.

Geoffrey Warner's perceptive article on 'Italy and the Powers' describes the international background against which these transformations took place, and traces the stages—of which Resistance leaders in the early days were largely unaware—whereby Italy eventually came to be included in the American rather than the Soviet sphere of influence. Gianfranco Poggi describes the role of another vital factor, that of the Church. M. de Cecco is sharply critical of the liberal economists' methods of dealing with the postwar situation.

This book taken as a whole provides a very useful and thoughtful account of the difficult years in which the new Italy was born. Twenty years after, despite great progress in several respects, it is not yet out of the wood. Dr. Woolf concludes his summing-up by quoting Salvemini: 'The Italian situation is always desperate but normal.'

MURIEL GRINDROD

Portugal. By Sarah Bradford. *London: Thames & Hudson. 1973. 176 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £2·50.*

PORTUGAL remains an anomaly, politically, socially and economically. The progenitor of the modern world—comparison of the early navigators with the astronauts of our day is not entirely fanciful—retains its distinctive individuality: an island, as it were, in relation to the continental land-mass, preserving a time-dimension quite different from that of 'the others', not excluding Franco's Spain. And, despite the chronic guerrilla troubles, this imperial pioneer manages to maintain its unique position in Africa; to cleave to its multiracial tradition and ultramarine destiny.

Mrs. Bradford's new book (she has previously produced three travel books and a study of the port wine trade) comes pat to the occasion of the 600th anniversity of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance—though is it not clear whether this was intended. It can be recommended unreservedly as, in the author's own words, 'a short cut to a country where history still impinges on everyday life'. There are thirty lively illustrations, an uncomplicated map, a good index, and—a welcome innovation—a Who's Who of Portuguese personalities.

The historical sections are adequate, within the narrow compass prescribed, and the three chapters devoted to pre-Salazarian Portugal tell us all we need to know. It is, however, in her intelligent and informed account of the sequel to Salazar's autocratic rule that Mrs. Bradford breaks fresh ground and acquires particular merit. We know far too little of the

cautious elaboration by the new Prime Minister, Marcelo Caetano, of the *Estado Social* with its device of 'evolution within continuity'. There has been the unobtrusive shift in the centre of gravity to a 'more important' presidency; the encouragement of a new generation of bright young technocrats, admitted into the government but without cabinet rank; the sanction of SEDES, the opinion pressure-group manned largely by progressive Catholics; and, last but not least, the quiet abolition of discriminatory regulations affecting women—incidentally, there has also been the appointment of Maria Teresa Lobo (married, with children) as Under-Secretary of State for Health and Welfare.

This 'reform from above', and indeed the whole Corporative State system, may not be palatable to the pundits of Western democracy as we understand it; but it is certainly the most that can be expected in a country where the political sap has been destroyed for more than two generations. If, politically, as Mrs. Bradford says, the *abertura* has been more psychological than real, at any rate the opportunities for economic progress are being deftly exploited. Industrial development is really happening, with the aid of foreign investment; France has acquired in the past decade a substantial stake in the Portuguese economy, and West Germany is now taking the lead. Britain's centuries-old monopoly of influence has gone by the board—except in the wine trade. Finally, with the stepping-up of wage rates and the introduction, in 1969, of family allowances and other welfare benefits for rural workers plus sundry measures of modernisation, agricultural reform is at last being seriously tackled.

W. Horsfall Carter

Sweden. By Irene Scobbie. *London: Benn. 1972. 254 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. ('Nations of the Modern World.') £3·00.*

This is another book in Benn's 'Nations of the Modern World' series and it comes well up to standard. Nearly two-thirds of it deals with the period from 1866 down to the present day; and the rest with the emergence of Sweden in about 8,000 B.C. Until the beginnings of industry in Sweden, the country was of little importance on the international stage except during the years when Gustavus Adolphus was king. His death at the battle of Lutzen in 1632 effectively put an end to Sweden's great-power pretentions. They suffered their final death blow in 1809 with the cession of Finland to Russia.

The main interest of this book lies in its description of Swedish life—social, economic, political and cultural—from 1866 to the present day when Sweden is considered a model welfare state. The author is critical of certain aspects of Swedish life, and not without justification—excessive spirits-drinking, for instance, which is higher in Sweden than in almost any other country in the world. She also comments on the high suicide rate, although making the point that the United States has five times more crimes of violence than Sweden.

The author's remarks about the Swedish hospital service are particularly instructive. There are splendid hospitals, the author comments, but adds:

> There is such a shortage of staff in some parts of the country that they cannot be used to full capacity. This is particularly true in the summer months, when all the personnel have a minimum of four weeks holiday and senior

physicians thirty-nine days, excluding public holidays and week-ends, which amounts in practice to about eight weeks. This has led to sections of hospitals having to close down for the holiday and to about one-third of all hospital beds being unused for the summer (p. 184).

Another interesting point made in this book is the growing feeling in Sweden that too much is being sacrificed in the name of that 'great national divinity', the GNP (p. 178). As a result, people have been drawn from the already sparsely populated North to the South. 'A strange desolation has descended over large parts of Northern Sweden. Small plots of agricultural land wrested and kept from the forest by generations of hard-working peasants are now being overgrown again, while byres and barns stand empty and abandoned' (p. 179).

The book is well illustrated.

THOMAS BARMAN

Science in the Federal Republic of Germany: Organization and Promotion. 2nd ed. By Reinhold Geimer and Hildegard Geimer. *Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst. 1972. 76 pp. Bibliog.*

A booklet (in English) published by the German Academic Exchange Service on the organisation and promotion of science—that is, the humanities, the social and pure sciences and medicine—in the Federal Republic of Germany. It sets out for the benefit of the foreign reader the various research and teaching centres in the Federal Republic, as well as the principal institutions and associations concerned with promoting the arts and sciences. The text is illustrated with tables, graphs and charts.

Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa: Dokumentation 1954–1972. Die Bemühungen um Entspannung und Annäherung im politischen, militärischen, wirtschaftlichen, wissenschaftlich-technologischen und kulturellen Bereich. Ed. by Friedrich-Karl Schramm, Wolfram-Georg Riggert and Alois Friedel. *Frankfurt am Main: Metzner. 1972. 975 pp. Index. DM 88.*

There are nearly 700 documents in this collection, all either originally in or translated into German. They comprise governmental statements and notes, speeches and interviews on the Europe Security Conference and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy 1945–1970. By William C. Fletcher. *London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1973. 179 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

DR. FLETCHER's study of religion and Soviet policy fills a long-felt gap and he gives a useful survey; but it lacks depth. One can see the difficulty of writing this book. As Dr. Fletcher knows well, the religious element in the internal evolution of the Soviet Union is important in the long run but not in the very short run. By contrast, religion is a significant but minor element in Soviet foreign policy. One can describe the political successes and failures easily enough, but it is impossible to convey the

atmosphere or the motives of the participants without going fairly deeply into the development of the internal climate of opinion and feeling in the Soviet Union, but that is not Dr. Fletcher's subject.

He gives a clear account of the part played by the Church and the Mosque in Soviet foreign policy in the cold war through the Prague Christian Peace Conference, in the Third World, and in the 'East-West Confrontation'. There are chapters on Rome and the Orthodox world, on the World Council of Churches and on Islam, which is a significant factor, and Buddhism, which is not. There is no chapter on Judaism, because 'unlike certain of the other religious denominations, Jews in the USSR have not been allowed to conduct international activities, and they possess no central administration, which might enable them to render service to Soviet interests abroad'. But in the index there are a number of references to Israel and the Jews.

The general impression given is that religious bodies have rendered significant but minor services to Soviet foreign policy since Stalin's persecution eased up in the Second World War. One does not get much light on whether they did so willingly, unwillingly or with their tongues in their cheeks. That would need a different kind of book.

The least satisfactory chapter is that on the Prague Christian peace movement. Dr. Fletcher's narrative is accurate so far as it goes, but one would not guess why most of the Western churches eventually decided, after careful thought and with their eyes open, on a policy of cautious co-operation with the Prague movement, or that a number of the anglophone African countries consulted the British Council of Churches and the Conference of British Missionary Societies before taking part in the Prague Assemblies and that they were advised by their British colleagues to take part but to send strong and experienced delegations. In fact the Prague meetings did much good in ways that were not greatly connected with the events recorded by Dr. Fletcher; and the virtual collapse of the Prague peace movement after 1968 was keenly felt by many of those who participated in it on both sides of the iron curtain. No doubt the Soviet foreign office was using the Prague Christian peace movement as Dr. Fletcher shows, but so were Christians from the West and the Third World. It is another question, who had the best of the bargain.

JOHN LAWRENCE

The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970. By Werner G. Hahn. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. 311 pp. Maps. Index. £5·65.*

Soviet Agricultural Trade Unions, 1917–70. By Peter J. Potichnyj. *Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1972. 258 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·25.*

DR. HAHN's political study of agricultural development in the Soviet Union covers four years of Khrushchev's eleven-year reign, and six years of that of his successors. Personality contrasts could hardly be more marked than between the impulsive, impatient, outspoken Khrushchev, and the cautious, reticent men who took over from him. But their basic problem was the same. Decades of Stalinist concentration on heavy industry and defence had encouraged the growth in these sectors of powerful entrenched

interests, and had wrecked the physical basis of agriculture, as well as destroying incentive among farm workers. Both the old and the new leadership saw the pressing need to restore balance in the economy.

It was Khrushchev's double misfortune that the defenders of the favoured sectors were too strong to be overcome by direct assault; and that his own nature made it impossible for him to accept alternative methods that were soundly based, but would have been slow in showing results. Thwarted in his persistent efforts to secure higher allocations for agriculture, he resorted to panaceas, administrative reorganisations, any kind of short cut promising quick results with the minimum expenditure. Hence his prolonged, and what the author calls 'irrational' (p. 8) support of Lysenko, whose methods 'showed' how to raise livestock numbers, expand grain-growing on the virgin lands, increase supplies of fertiliser, all at minimum cost (p. 43). Those who opposed Khrushchev's views were 'promoted' to less influential posts, exiled, demoted in favour of more pliable, if less well qualified, men. Dr. Hahn's study reveals in startling detail the adverse effects of the resulting confusion, frustration, resentment and uncertainty among agricultural officials and workers at all levels. He ascribes Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 largely to these feelings, along with the effects of the Cuban fiasco and the disastrous crop failure of 1963.

The political scene is shown as calming down considerably under the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny regime. There was a shift in emphasis from direct interference in agricultural techniques to the vital question of securing more investments for the neglected sector. But despite striking victories in 1965 and 1970, and the 'historic shift to consumer goods priority' at the 24th Congress in 1971 (p. 247), the writer's analysis does not hold out hopes of rapid change.

Since the book was completed Russia has suffered two bad harvests, necessitating huge imports of grain, as in 1963. Normally a good harvest induces complacency and encourages the adherents of heavy industry and defence. Conversely, the present situation should favour the agricultural and light industry lobbies. But deep-rooted historical traditions—the exercise of power on a personal basis, centralised government control, the supremacy of political factors—all impede the transition to a system in which objective economic laws are free to operate, and flexibility and drive are recognised as the mainsprings of progress. The dangers of haste in such a situation are all too clearly illustrated in this study.

In view of the total subjection of agricultural to industrial interests so revealingly described in Dr. Hahn's volume, the very existence of trade unions in agriculture may come as a surprise to some readers. They were from the beginning subject to strict party control, and manipulated to serve political ends. Their task was simply to act as a 'conveyor belt' for government decisions, a theory decisively rejected by Mr. Brezhnev in his speech to the 15th Congress of Trade Unions held in March 1972. This lends support to Mr. Potichnyj tentative optimism about slowly changing trends in the direction of greater trade union influence on working conditions in the countryside, still far behind those prevailing in the hitherto favoured urban centres.

MARGARET MILLER

The Writing of History in the Soviet Union. By Anatole G. Mazour. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1971. 383 pp. Index. (Hoover Institution Publications, 87.) $17.50.*

UNDER an ambiguous title Professor Mazour here presents a valuable bibliographical survey of the writing on Russian history that has appeared in the Soviet Union since 1917. The first point to note is that a terminal date for inclusion of work is nowhere explicitly stated. Compilation appears to have ended in 1968, and works published after 1966 are not systematically covered. In effect this is an annotated card file to Soviet historical writing on Russian and Soviet history from 1917 to the mid-1960s. As such it deserves a place in any serious reference library. What it is *not*—and for that much relief—is an attempt to tease Soviet historians with the contortions imposed on them by ideological croquet.

The terminal date has necessarily excluded the anniversary year publications of 1967. The coverage, therefore, of Soviet writing on collectivisation and industrialisation makes the amount of available material seem anachronistically thin. Otherwise the selection of material within the competence of this reviewer leaves little to cavil at. More emphasis might be put by some on the contribution made by Professor P. A. Zaionchkovskii to the study of policy-making in 19th-century tsarist government. But a good example of judicious summary are the pages devoted to Soviet writing on the so-called 'revolutionary situation' of 1859–61. As Professor Mazour comments, 'such work demands improved archival methodology, an overall plan or purpose as well as standardisation of nomenclature used frequently and carelessly such as "peasant struggle", "revolutionary situation" or "mass resistance"'. Just so; the followers of M. V. Nechkina to note. Such tart commentary on the professional, as opposed to the political, problems of Soviet historians adds greatly to the bibliographical value of this work.

DAVID SHAPIRO

Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe: Political Background and Economic Significance. By Radoslav Selucky. Trans. by Zdenek Elias. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1972. 179 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £6·25.*

IN 1968 Radoslav Selucky was an adviser to the Economic Council of the Czechoslovak government, and he contributed to the economic and political reform programme of that year. His knowledge of the Czechoslovak economy and of plans for its reform is therefore detailed. His understanding of the economic affairs of the other Comecon countries is also considerable, and during the 1960s he travelled extensively in Eastern Europe, talking to leading economists and politicians. It is this background that enabled him to produce this current collection of essays. His aim, he says, is 'to present a discussion of the Soviet bloc's economic reforms from the position of those who have devised and promoted these reforms and who continue to do so'. It is 'the view of a Marxist reformer based on personal experiences' (p. v).

This is an interesting book, simply and clearly written. Though few of the ideas advanced by Dr. Selucky are startlingly new, his careful explanations of the histories of the countries under review, of the need for reform, and the nature of the reforms attempted in each country, make a

keen impact. He says that there are two possible ways of reforming a command economy. Market reform aims at changing the economic system itself by replacing command planning by indicative planning and decentralising the decision-making process. But because these changes are so far-reaching they must be preceded or accompanied by a fundamental political reform. Technocratisation, on the other hand, is a mere economic reform. The intention is solely to modify the internal structure of the command system so as to encourage the more effective utilisation of capital and labour.

Dr. Selucky strongly favours reform leading to the establishment of the market mechanism and its attendant democratisation, and he tends to judge the Comecon economic reforms according to how nearly they approach his ideal. This is natural enough in view of his role in the Czechoslovak reform movement. But he is no mere idealist. He is fully aware, for example, of what has been achieved in Kadar's Hungary, though mainly limited to the economic sphere. 'While their Czechoslovak colleagues believed that the choice was between a consistent reform and an inconsistent one, the Hungarians knew that the choice was between an inconsistent reform or no reform at all' (p. 138).

But what lies ahead? Dr. Selucky believes that economic and technical advance depend on the introduction of the market system, and this leads him to conclude that if the Marxist concept of historical development is correct, ultimately the East European countries must adopt the political and economic model he admires. The only question that remains unanswered is whether this will be achieved by reform or by revolution.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Ekonomika Handlu Zagranicznego. By J. Krynicki, T. Kronsjo and Z. Zawada. *Warsaw: State Economic Publishers. 1972. 595 pp. Bibliog.*

THE theory of socialist countries' international trade is a very young discipline. Interest in its problems does not go back much further than the early 1950s when the strategy of autarky, hitherto identified with these countries, was being gradually abandoned; understandably, this interest developed first among those socialist countries whose economy is in a 'natural' way foreign-trade oriented, for example, in Poland. (The Soviet Union is now a very eager late-comer to this field.)

The book under review is a major contribution to the theory of socialist international trade—with a strong eye to matters of practice. The parts in 'prose' (as against that in mathematical language) are largely by the co-authors Krynicki and Zawada (one chapter is supplemented by E. Warzyszynski). One part is concerned, very usefully in the circumstances, with the general aspects of the international division of labour and its 'benefits'; another deals with the specific forms international trade takes in socialist countries as we know them: its operational principles, its institutional scaffolding and its mechanism. Most of the socialist countries, we are told, are entering a new phase in their historical development which is bound to oblige them to readjust the principles of their foreign trading and the authors take this into account in their analysis.

The part of the book concerned with the modern methodology—the application of mathematics and the computerisation of foreign trade—is by

T. Kronsjo. It is fair to say that this is a field in which Professor Kronsjo, head of Birmingham University's National Economic Planning unit, was a pioneer; and his ideas have had a decisive impact on the attempts made in socialist countries to work out rational methodologies. (The impact of Kronsjo's ideas has been very justly acknowledged, in particular in Poland.) It would not be appropriate in these pages to discuss the technical side of Kronsjo's contribution. I will confine myself to suggesting that he applies to international trade the formalism of mathematical programming, that is, of seeking the best ('optional') solution, given that the planner's goal is subject to constraints imposed by environmental conditions and/or policies pursued. Important variations that help to work out such a solution are of Kronsjo's own original design.

A most useful component of Kronsjo's part of the book, of obvious value from the practical angle, is devoted to electronic plan computation. (In co-operation with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade, Kronsjo has formulated a tentative foreign trade plan-programme using the computers at the University of Warsaw.) Patently Kronsjo's rigorous elaboration of procedures for the adjustment of distorted rates of exchange to approximately realistic parities, and generally for appraising the influence of domestic and foreign prices on cost-benefit computation, is of first-class importance for decision-making in international trading.

One may express the hope that this outstandingly valuable book will not have to wait long for its English translation.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

The Communist States in Disarray 1965–1971. Ed. by Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. *Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 363 pp. Index. £6·75. Paperback: £2·30.*

THIS is a most useful survey of the developments in and between the communist-dominated states from Khrushchev's demotion until about the middle of 1971. For some strange reason there is no separate contribution on events inside the Soviet Union, but all the other relevant countries in Europe, Asia and America (Cuba) are fully covered by first-class (mostly Canadian) experts, and the volume is ably introduced and summed up by the editors. There is no overlapping and repetitive statements are reduced to the inevitable minimum. Naturally the dominant themes are the schism between Moscow and Peking and 'Czechoslovakia 1968' with all the ramifications of this sordid story, but hardly any other aspect of communist policy is overlooked; in particular, the degree of subservience to Moscow, if it exists at all, is carefully analysed in every case. The generally known facts are completed by some less known but still remarkable details. Perhaps the volume's most important addition to our knowledge is Paul F. Langer's description of the skilful way in which both North Korea and North Vietnam avoided getting entangled in the Soviet-Chinese conflict and nevertheless still managed to receive support from both sides.

Some readers might not share Adam Bromke's belief that 'there are important forces in the communist orbit which eventually may bring the Soviet Union to the conference table on *Western terms*' (reviewer's italics) or agree with Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's claim that Khrushchev and

Brezhnev ever, even if reluctantly, conceded their satellites' right to '*their own road to socialism*'; *it is evident from another of her quotations that this* '*own road*' *is permitted only if it is identical with the Moscow road.* Furthermore, Melvin Croan's expectation that after Ulbricht's retirement, East Germany might enjoy its first experience of collective leadership does not seem to be borne out by later events. In his contribution on Poland, V. C. Chrypinski makes the somewhat surprising statement that the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which Poland participated, temporarily reinforced Gomulka's position. According to Ferenc A. Vali, Hungary's participation in the invasion was considered shameful even by the average Hungarian party member, and it could hardly have been different in Poland. But these are minor blemishes which do not detract from the value of a book packed with facts, well documented and easily readable.

But is the title, *The Communist States in Disarray*, appropriate for a publication which reflects rather the internal consolidation of the various regimes? To a considerable extent they overcame their difficulties and in particular the shock created by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the international sphere communism has been in disarray since 1948 and the rift between Moscow and Peking, which could no longer be hidden by about 1960, was dealt with in the volume's predecessor, *The Communist States at the Crossroads between Moscow and Peking* *. The authors of the present volume do not believe in the possibility of a genuine reconciliation between the hostile brethren, and in this assumption they are certainly right.

J. W. BRUEGEL

Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era 1968–1969. By Galia Golan. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 327 pp. Bibliog. Index. $18.50. £5·80.*

IN *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement* [1] Galia Golan gave a comprehensive, well-documented account of the ideals and activities that gave birth to what we know as the Prague Spring. Her latest book, *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia*, traces what happened to those ideas and the people behind them during that brief period when men of reformist sympathies occupied the highest positions in the Communist party and other organisations. Miss Golan once again succeeds in weaving together events and ideas. Her detailed narrative of the major occurrences between January 1968 and April 1969 is accompanied by accounts of the discussions taking place on vital policy issues, and of the thoughts which were being aired in the major social organisations. She draws widely on Czechoslovak sources, like newspapers, radio and television, to show the sort of debate that was taking place. For her final section on the invasion crisis she relies mainly on interviews with the reformers themselves.

The story told by Miss Golan reveals all the doubts and fears that constantly beset the reformers; their awareness of the penalties for stepping too far out of line; the spectre of the conservatives hovering in the wings; the division within their own ranks between the cautious pragmatists and

* New York: Praeger. 1965.

[1] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1971. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1972.

the uncompromising liberals. Looking back, it seems that the glory of the Prague Spring was not what was achieved in the way of new laws or revised institutional structures, but the way in which the reformers stood together as Soviet threats grew; the personal courage of the leaders; and the mass support that gradually emerged for them.

The tragedy of the reform movement, as Miss Golan relates, is that it was not until well into 1968 that the mass of Czechoslovaks woke up to what the Prague Spring was about. Twenty years of Communist party rule had made the people indifferent to politics. Reformist ideas had been generated by a comparatively narrow group of intellectuals and party activists. But during the summer of 1968, as Soviet pressure increased, the potential of the reform movement became clear to the Czechoslovak people. They began to anticipate what might be achieved and to be apprehensive lest what had already been accomplished might be lost. From January onwards the reformers won the people's interest and support; after August they had their total commitment.

Miss Golan's book is a valuable addition to the literature on the Prague Spring. She lucidly recalls that attempt to fit socialism to the conditions prevailing in Czechoslovakia—to give socialism a human face.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Social Groups in Polish Society. Ed. by David Lane and George Kolankiewicz. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 380 pp. Bibliog. Index. £7·50.*

In the period of the cold war, discussions of Eastern Europe were essentially political. They were concerned with the totalitarian nature of its government or with speculation about possible international change. Now that communism has persisted for a quarter of a century and a loose division of Europe into somewhat distinct halves is accepted, the continuing debate can shift to other questions. In any case East European society has so altered that it is the other questions that have become important. If communism has made its mark on the East European peoples, the converse is also true.

It is this that explains and justifies the series of books on Eastern Europe to which the present volume is an excellent addition. West European observers can be interested in the diversified society that Poland has become and the Poles themselves are perforce much taken up with its study. The explicable but still remarkable fact is that such an array of authors can be found in Britain to pursue the theme and that they have available in Poland such an abundance of statistical materials and commentaries to assist them.

David Lane provides the introduction and conclusion in two very clear chapters. Economically and socially, 1945 shook Poland out of its prewar static state and made the country more homogeneous both ethnically and religiously. The balance of occupation and domicile moved from agriculture and the countryside to industry and the towns. Through the crises of 1956, 1968 and 1970 social groups emerged, never wholly distinct and occasionally subdividing, which made Poland, despite much contrary propaganda, a jostling multi-group society not unlike many of its West European contemporaries. There is no industrial entrepreneur class; the skilled worker enjoys higher status than his white-collar counterpart. But there are observable

similarities in the cultural and the technical intelligentsia; and the peasantry has not been collectivised. The main difference is that the social system is held together not by private property, but by party authority.

Between Lane's chapters there are historical-analytical discussions covering each of the main social groups and a survey of the interplay between them in the local community. Despite an overlong theoretical introduction, Paul Lewis's analysis of the proprietary peasantry is particularly rewarding. Their very existence is one of the main points differentiating Polish and Soviet societies. They provide a basic social stability, but they are also a major economic handicap. They neither make as much profit as they wish, nor produce as much as Poland needs. They feel distant from the centre of power; but the government feels powerless to control them. George Gömöri's etching of the cultural intelligentsia is also rewarding. Etching is a better word than analysis because the evidence about them is hard to come by and their role is that of interpreting the past and providing continuity and, at times, leadership. Significantly, too, they are a little less working class than the technical intelligentsia.

Lane's conclusion is modest and entirely frank: 'We have been more successful in describing the changing structure of groups than we have been in depicting their involvement in politics' (p. 303). There are wholly acceptable reasons for this, as he points out, particularly the sheer lack of hard information. What he and his colleagues have done, however, is of value in the sense 'that political leadership is a form of steering and that social groups are structures which both limit and influence the direction that steering may take'. Readers will look forward to the volume on steering. They will also hope that in due course an author will be found to discuss steering in wider waters, taking account of Eastern Europe as a whole, of the Soviet Union, and of the Common Market.

W. V. WALLACE

Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia. By Rudolf Bicanic. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 254 pp. Bibliog. of author's works. Index. £4·80.*

THE untimely death in 1968 of Rudolf Bicanic deprived Yugoslavia of its most distinguished and internationally famous economist. Since his youth he had been committed to a multitude of activities, practical as well as academic, directed to trying to find solutions to the economic problems of Yugoslavia, and especially of his native Croatia to which he felt a deep commitment. His interests were so wide (as is shown by the bibliography compiled by Dr. Pintaric at the end of this book), his commitment to the political life of his country so intense (as is described in Mr. Michael Kaser's foreword), and his teaching activities in Yugoslavia and throughout the world so heavy that he never had time to complete the definitive works that his friends hoped he would publish. This book is the distillation of the knowledge and experience which, had he lived, would have been the subject of his *magnum opus*. Even as a posthumous publication, compiled from his notes and papers, it is most impressive; it radiates the erudition and humanity which made such an impact on all who met him. This book, like some of his earlier writings, will surely become a classic among works on this subject.

The book covers many aspects of Yugoslavia's economic development,

starting with a tantalisingly short account of the economic problems of the newly created state of Yugoslavia in 1918. This subject is not developed through the interwar years but subsequent chapters deal with policies and planning in the socialist republic of Tito's Yugoslavia after 1945. They cover the organisation of 'the socialist sector'; the three different models of planning that were used between 1945 and 1965 and the policy towards industrialisation, foreign trade and workers' income (including some interesting material about workers' self-management). Other chapters deal with economic growth and investment policy, problems of the underdeveloped areas and general concepts of economic development. The author's own work does not go beyond 1965 and his colleague and collaborator Professor Marijan Hanzekovic has added a chapter to bring the work more up to date; even so, there are a number of statements that have been overtaken by events—for example, the remark (p. 101) that there are no strikes in Yugoslavia. Readers who have followed events there, especially in Croatia, over the past two years, will certainly feel acutely the lack of Professor Bicanic's comments on the interaction of economic policies and political nationalism as demonstrated by recent events in Croatia.

Inevitably with such a wide range of subject-matter, there is some overlapping, but this appears as emphasis rather than repetition. What is most striking is the brilliant lucidity with which the most complex subjects are explained. Free from all communist or economic jargon, the book is easy to read and will interest both the expert and the ordinary reader. Friends of Rudolf Bicanic know that he held strong views about what he considered to be some of the errors of socialist planning—the sacrifice of investment in agriculture to the goal of accelerated industrialisation, the self-defeating policy of centralist planning, the inadequate investment in certain backward areas of the more developed republics of Croatia and Slovenia, to take only a few examples. Yet his writing in this book is factual and objective, with a remarkable lack of the carping criticism based on local national prejudices that has sometimes marred economic argument in recent times in Yugoslavia. The quality of deep human commitment, the consciousness that economic planning is primarily concerned with the lives of individual human beings, which Rudolf Bicanic always conveyed in conversation, is clearly present in this well-presented and beautifully translated book. It is a fittting memorial to a great Yugoslav scholar.

PHYLLIS AUTY

Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People. By Andrew Oxley, Alex Pravda and Andrew Ritchie. *London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press. 1973. 303 pp. £4·50.*

This volume brings together some of the foremost statements of reformist ideas that were published in Czechoslovakia during 1967 and 1968. It includes Ludvik Vaculik's 'Two Thousand Words', extracts from the Communist Party's Action Programme, and several other articles discussing such sensitive topics as the political trials of the 1950s, workers' councils and political opposition. The editors provide introductory notes to explain the context in which many of the articles were written. It is a useful and moving collection.

MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. Fourth Edition. Ed. by Peter Mansfield. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1973. 591 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

The first two editions of this work were evolved in the Information Department of Chatham House in 1950 and 1954 under unnamed editorship; the third was edited by Sir Reader Bullard for Chatham House. All three were published for the RIIA by the Oxford University Press. The present volume is edited by Peter Mansfield for OUP without specific connection with Chatham House, and without following, otherwise than as the compilation's intention and contents dictate, the arrangement of material adopted by its three predecessors. About 70 per cent of the Mansfield edition consists of new writing by himself and his distinguished and named collaborators.

Some 45 pages of Introduction (the region in general, history and politics, religions, minorities, economics, society) is followed by 90 pages containing seven essays on subjects of special current interest—the Palestine problem, Arab politics, the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East, oil, literature and art and cultural matters (so little known to most of us) in the Fertile Crescent, and separately in Egypt. The rest of the book, except its final assembly (45 pages) of varied and admirably presented statistics—most but not all including the year 1970—is given to close consideration of each country in the region, in alphabetical order. Within each country-chapter (in which Arabia is treated as one) an immense amount of material is readably, indeed enjoyably, compressed. Recent history and present politics are given the greater part of the space allotted, but finance and economics, society and the social services, administration, land and natural resources, agriculture and industry, commerce, public works, transport and communications are all covered. These chapters vary in length from 77 pages (for all Arabia) and 53 (Iran) to around 35 for most of the other countries, with rather less for Jordan and Lebanon. The sequence of subjects within each is similar. The accuracy of facts and figures provided is assured, the objectivity in controversial matters is above reproach, the too-probable dullness of a compendium covering a region so endlessly described and debated is avoided. The work, in which only the few poorish maps seem inadequate, does great credit to the editor and his helpers, and to his own practical as well as academic background. It will be of great value to students, both new and old, of the region covered, as well as to visitors, journalists or politicians—indeed to any reasonably world-conscious element in society. One only regrets that, life and time being what they are, this value must, month by month, inevitably diminish—until, three or four years hence, the fifth edition may see the light.

Stephen H. Longrigg

The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf. The Report of an International Seminar at the Center for Mediterranean Studies, Rome: June 26th–July 1st, 1972. Ed. by Elizabeth Monroe. Foreword by E. A. Bayne. Introduction by Sir Denis Wright. *New York: American Universities Field Staff. 1972. 79 pp. Bibliog.*

Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects. **By Muhammad T. Sadik and William P. Snavely.** *Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1972. 255 pp. Bibliog. Index. $12.50.*

THESE two books throw into sharp focus several significant facts. These are that, if we leave the Soviet bloc out of account, the Persian Gulf area already provides a third of world oil production, that much of this production comes from mini-states with tiny populations and only embryonic administrations, and that the dependence of the developed industrial countries on oil supplies from this area is increasing at an alarming rate.

The first is a report of an international seminar under the auspices of American Universities Field Staff Inc., which was held in Rome in June 1972 to explore the implications of these facts for what used to be called the 'Free World'. The meeting was chaired by Sir Denis Wright, who was British Ambassador to Iran from 1963 to 1971. The other participants were senior officials, academics, bankers and oilmen from the United States, Great Britain, Federal Germany, Iran, Turkey and Kuwait. The report was written by the distinguished modern historian of the Middle East, Miss Elizabeth Monroe. She has produced a succinct and connected account of the points made in four days of discussion, which started from the assumption that world oil consumption (outside the Soviet bloc) will increase during the 1970s from forty million to between eighty and one hundred million barrels per day and that much of this increase will have to be procured from the Persian Gulf area, most of it from the Gulf's Arab shores. The participants discussed the problems which these assumptions would entail for the Gulf states themselves and for the consumer states of the West. Having ruled out the theoretical option of a forceful takeover, they concluded that the consumer states would have their best chance of satisfying their insatiable appetite for oil if they sought to harmonise their interests with those of the producer states by inviting participation at all stages in the management of the oil industry, not only from citizens of the Gulf states, but also from the Russians and the Iraqis; by studying in advance the large-scale monetary problems which would arise in paying for the oil; and by making serious efforts to achieve an acceptable solution of the Israeli problem.

No one could quarrel seriously with these conclusions. But the great difficulty of following this sage advice emerges from a study of the second of these books, in which macro-politico-economic problems give way to micro-socio-political ones. *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates* provides a detailed study of social and economic change in an area which in 1970 was already producing more than a million and a quarter barrels of oil daily, and containing, in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, two of the fastest growing oil producers. The authors have assembled a mass of statistical material, all of it recent and much of it unpublished, bearing on population, urbanisation, foreign trade, government revenues, education, health and administration, and have presented it in something like eighty tables. They have also provided governmental organisation charts for Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah at various stages of their development. Although the discussion of this material is somewhat pedestrian, the material itself will be of great value to students of the area.

For the historian the introductory account of the area is not very satisfying—it contains a number of minor errors and some misleading generalis-

ations—but he will be compensated by the useful account of the negotiations aiming at federation in the Lower Gulf which were set in motion by the British government's announcement in 1968 of its intention to withdraw from the area by the end of 1971. These negotiations are adequately covered, though it is difficult to recognise Sir William Luce, the personal representative of the Foreign Secretary, who figures as Mr. William Loss.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

Syria. By Tabitha Petran. *London: Ernest Benn. 1972. 284 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. ('Nations of the Modern World'.) £3·25.*

LIKE most of the other volumes in this series Miss Petran's book concentrates, for much the greater part, on recent political history, while aiming to make the narrative intelligible by providing surveys of the remoter past, as well as of the geographical setting, economic conditions and traditional social structure of the country.

There are considerable difficulties besetting a treatment of the Syrian Republic along these lines, which the author acknowledges and, to some extent, succeeds in overcoming. That Syria by itself is in any real sense a 'nation' would be widely denied among the Syrians themselves. Certainly they live in what the book calls a truncated state, whose mainly artificial boundaries were determined by French and British imperial power for its own administrative convenience. Thus modern Syrian developments constantly have to be referred to a broader Arab context, while not being too readily submerged in it. The need, felt by many Syrians, for their country to be closely associated in a greater Arab entity has, since the experiment of union with Egypt in 1958–61, been considerably offset by a clearer realisation of the discomforts, difficulties and dangers this may involve.

Thus the writer's task was a delicately balanced one, and on the whole Miss Petran has discharged it ably. She keeps in sight—while perhaps treating too cursorily—both important developments in the rest of the Arab world and the local structures underlying her political survey: the old-established religious, agricultural and mercantile interests, technological developments, the tension between the various minority groups, and the memories and myths that have gathered around Faysal's short-lived Arab kingdom of 1919–20. The kaleidoscopic movement of Syrian politics is seen as being articulated by a few constant forces. There is the Palestine issue, sharpened into an urgent menace by the disaster of 1967; hence the primary role of the army in politics since Colonel Za'im's coup in 1949. Secondly, the 'extraordinary diffusion of Socialist ideas throughout the Arab East' (p. 80) from the mid-1940s on, in which Syrians have played a leading part, seemed at times to provide an ideology and a political base of which the military leaders felt a need. Miss Petran, whose survey reaches forward to the end of 1971, has much of interest to say about the schisms within the Ba'th party, and, later, within the 'neo-Ba'th' after the coup of March 1963. Thirdly, there has been the manoeuvring and interference of the great powers—much, perhaps rather too much, is made of the activities of the CIA at certain crucial moments.

The author's overall picture is one of political sterility and persistent gaps between aspiration and achievement in such areas of social reform as

the fight against illiteracy and the movement for women's rights. Disillusion and detachment have spread among 'the people' (a category used fearlessly and with insufficient definition) leading to the emigration of much valuable talent. The conclusion is pessimistic: 'Democratisation is, in fact, a pre-condition for the solution of the problems Syria faces . . . the peasant must acquire a self-interest in his own future, become literate, and learn new techniques. Fulfilment of these tasks requires democratic conditions, as the failure of authoritarian regimes to achieve them has shown' (p. 256). It is not quite clear whether this is intended as a maxim of general validity—in which case the experience of the Soviet Union and perhaps China suggests doubts—or one that applies specifically to Syria.

Written in a clear if occasionally inelegant style, this book is, within its rather cramping limits, informative and useful.

J. S. F. PARKER

AFRICA

Africa and the World. Ed. by Robert K. A. Gardiner, M. J. Anstee and C. L. Patterson. *Addis Ababa, London: Oxford University Press. 1970–72. 255 pp. (A Haile Selassie I Prize Trust Symposium.) £1·70.*

Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa: The Focus on National Integration. By Helen Desfosses Cohn. Foreword by John N. Hazard. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 316 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs.) £7·25.*

BOTH these volumes can be recommended—with some reservations—to students of African affairs. The first is a collection of papers presented at a conference at Addis Ababa sponsored by the Haile Selassie I Prize Trust in October 1966. Despite the fact that six years have elapsed between their original submission and appearance in Britain, many of the papers written retain a high degree of freshness and originality. That they remain pertinent to an understanding of Africa in 1973 is both a tribute to the authors' skills in discussing the importance of certain perennial themes in Africa's political and economic development and at the same time a sad commentary on the intractability of the problems that confront its leadership.

The material is organised under three headings designed to cover the political, economic and educational aspects of Africa's relationship with the outside world and a brief summary of the Conference's findings is appended at the end of each section. The quality of the individual contributions varies from the rather generalised confines dealing with political and historical aspects to the more detailed and, in some cases immensely researched, papers discussing Africa's economic links with the rich nations of the West. In the former category Colin Legum's paper on 'The Growth of Africa's Foreign Policy: From Illusion to Reality' is a useful summary of Africa's role in international affairs in the postwar period and he deals incisively with the implications of the 1964 Congo crisis and the 1965 Rhodesian rebellion. By contrast, the remaining chapters in this section, especially those dealing with Africa's role in the United Nations (Gwendolen Carter) and 'Africa and the History of Tomorrow' (Basil Davidson), are too broad in scope, giving little opportunity for the authors in question to

display their undoubted expertise in more specific and concrete terms. Perhaps this is to expect too much from a symposium purporting to cover so wide a range of issues relating to Africa as a whole, although Richard Pankhurst's 'Ethiopia: A Case Study in Independent Development' is a fine example of what can be done by a scholar concentrating on a more limited area of academic inquiry.

The essays on economic development are all written by experts with a long acquaintance with Africa's problems. These can be unreservedly recommended—in particular, 'The Transmission in Equality' by Dudley Seers, which discusses the question of income distribution and its implications for the political economy of new states. This is the outstanding contribution in the volume, for the author, apart from demonstrating familiarity with a wide range of primary and secondary materials, makes effective use of historical comparisons and contrasts with Western Europe, the United States and Latin America. The dilemma facing the African states is squarely put: 'if [the governments] do not raise local professional salaries, they lose badly needed personnel, in whom they have invested a great deal of resources. . . . On the other hand if governments do raise professional salaries inequalities are accentuated' (p. 170). Mr. Seers concludes by offering a number of alternative solutions, all of which—as he readily admits—contain difficulties: the reader, however, cannot help but be impressed by the quality of the arguments contained in this essay and the masterly way in which the facts and figures have been assembled to provide a coherent and scholarly account of a fundamental problem in developing countries.

Mrs. Cohn's volume, *Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa*, is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the topic which has increasingly engaged the attention of Western scholars in recent years. Her analysis is primarily concerned with Soviet attitudes to the nation-building process in black Africa: a sharp distinction is drawn between the attitude of Soviet scholars during the Khrushchev era and their counterparts in the years after October 1964. During the earlier period, the author argues that Soviet theorists tended to view the question in orthodox Marxist-Leninist terms: thereafter, their approach has become more flexible and pragmatic. This change in attitude was forced upon the Soviet authorities as it became clear that the pattern of national integration characteristic of Soviet experience which emphasised '. . . the potential role long ascribed to the single-party system, ideology, the dominance of the party over the state, totalitarian control, and economic aid to backward regions . . .' was inappropriate in the very different conditions of Africa.

This summary of Mrs. Cohn's thesis does scant justice to the sophistication of her analysis: especially interesting are the chapters on the Soviet interpretations of the nature of African statehood, the role of industrial development and attitudes to the peasantry, urban workers and the intelligentsia. The author has immersed herself in the relevant literature (and this is considerable) on the subject and has familiarised herself with an impressive range of Russian source materials. In addition she has had the advantage of interviews with leading Soviet experts on African history and politics. Altogether, this is a stimulating and useful work—although written in a style which at times is clumsy and heavy-handed.

J. E. SPENCE

Aid to Africa: A Policy Outline for the 1970's. By Paul Streeten. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 169 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £5·25.*

AID shares many features of national systems of discretionary or means-tested welfare payments, with all the problems that these imply. The general effect of both is the same—that the less poor get more out of the system than the poorest. Within Britain, there is pressure for this kind of system to be scrapped in favour of universal, unconditional payments in the form of, for example, tax credits or larger family allowances. This is so despite fears that if unconditional payments are made to the 'wrong' member of a family, they may be misused. Internationally, a system of universal payments is far away, and the problem of selecting the 'right' recipient of an unconditional payment on behalf of a whole nation is much greater than at family level.

Professor Streeten assumes no substantial change in the system, and concentrates on ways of making the present system of aid more useful to African countries. His report was originally written in 1971 for the tenth session of the Council of Ministers of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and uses statistical and a minimum of theoretical analysis to back up his recommendations.

Some of his suggestions for improving donors' policies are familiar and straightforward enough: increasing technical assistance and subsequently increasing financial assistance; softening the terms of aid; untying aid to a very modest extent. Donors will probably make heavy weather even of these changes, but they present no real difficulty.

Other suggestions to donors are more controversial: that they should use aid to encourage regional and sub-regional co-operation (especially through the African Development Bank's proposed African Development Fund); that they should be more particular about the kinds of development they finance, avoiding for example academic education and mechanised agriculture in favour of introducing more gradual but far-reaching changes in the agriculture, literacy, communications and so on of whole areas; that they should not judge the effectiveness of their aid in terms of 'measurable' growth in gross domestic product, but in terms of 'institution-building' and social change. He recognises that such policies would often be unpopular, and regarded as 'neo-colonial', but thinks the risk worth taking. He might have added that the existence of white minority governments in southern Africa who discourage academic education for Africans, and deny them job opportunities, makes educational change in the rest of the continent very much more difficult. These suggestions are not new either, but until changes are made, they need to be repeated and supported by up-to-date statistics.

The book is short, and mostly confined to generalisations about the whole of Africa. Nevertheless, since most African countries have a great deal in common, readers interested in a single African country would still find it useful. On the other hand, the general chapters, particularly the one about the impact of the advanced countries on Africa, are applicable throughout the world, and give an excellent summary of the present situation of poor countries.

JULIET CLIFFORD

South of the Sahara: Development in African Economies. Ed. by Sayre P. Schatz. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 363 pp. Index. £6·95.*

PROFESSOR SCHATZ, in his preface, writes that 'interest in Africa on the part of American economists is recent'. In a sense, he is right, but anyone concerned with Africa has, in the course of the last decade or so, been in danger of almost total submersion by learned treatises on African development problems and many of them have come from Americans.

Some are very good and some are very bad, and it is therefore particularly encouraging to acknowledge that the present volume—a collection of papers written for a conference—is of a high standard, and of far greater coherence and depth than some other collections of conference papers have been. The editor himself makes reference to the vigour and competence of the studies, and although editors are sometimes biased in these matters, on this occasion the compliment is justified.

Of particular interest is the section on indigenous entrepreneurship, which covers nearly a third of the book. It is not without significance that the field work here was undertaken in West African countries. The chapter on development in an advanced economic environment, by the editor, contains some sound observations on the problems African businessmen have to face as a result of their activities taking place in an 'alien economic milieu'. The difficulties here are certainly real enough, and it is important to remember that it is the structures and organisations that are alien, rather than the persons. When expatriate enterprise is taken over by indigenous people, it comes as a shock to many to find how little is the change in methods and attitudes. Mr. Wayne Nafziger refers in his chapter to the importance of training entrepreneurs. But how is this done? Indeed, is an entrepreneur an innovator who has an eye for markets and a gift for judging right and speedily, or is he a competent business administrator who can run organisations of increasing complexity? Perhaps there is a movement from one into the other. The latter can certainly be trained, the former probably not.

The remaining parts of the book deal with agriculture and industry (here it is East, Central and Southern Africa that are examined through field studies), economic policy and finance, and international economic relations. Virginia Galbraith's chapter on the Ivory Coast makes particularly interesting reading. Here is an African country which is encouraging foreign private investment and an influx of foreign African labour (as well as an influx of French expertise and officials). The result has been a first decade of independence that is undoubtedly impressive. But there are problems, and one of these is the concentration of growth in Abidjan, a problem of which the Ivory Coast leaders are well aware. In this connection, Dr. Galbraith refers to the plan to open up the South West which can 'take the stress off the cities', especially Abidjan, and ameliorate the high cost of immigrants.

The book is expensive, but this collection of carefully documented case studies is worth the price.

TOM SOPER

Kenyatta. By Jeremy Murray-Brown. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1972. 381 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £5·50.*

WHEN Jomo Kenyatta visited London in 1961, after his release from restriction and when he had already established himself as the most important political leader in Kenya, the question that was widely asked was: 'What will happen to Kenya if Kenyatta becomes prime minister?' The question frequently posed today is: 'What will happen to Kenya when Kenyatta is gone?'

In the decade since independence, President Kenyatta has established himself as a national leader of undisputed stature, a transformation which would have seemed impossible to most people, when their judgment was coloured by the memories of Mau Mau. In this detailed and painstakingly researched biography, Mr. Murray-Brown has traced the development of Jomo Kenyatta from his birth towards the end of the last century, through early political activity in the 1920s, his years of absence in Europe, the storms of the 1950s, to *uhuru* and beyond. In this context, the statesmanship of the President is seen to be far more consistent than it appeared from the jaundiced vantage point of the immediate pre-independence era.

By the time Kenya became independent, Jomo Kenyatta had far wider experience than most political leaders of any race possess on coming to power. Mr. Murray-Brown examines the major influences which had shaped his attitude, influences which included liberal-minded 'old colonials', such as W. McGregor Ross, academics, politicians, but also members of international left-wing organisations, the West Indian George Padmore and 'person or persons unknown' in Russia. The nature of some of these influences remains a matter for conjecture, but it is quite clear, as the author shows, that Kenyatta harnessed them to his own desire for self-determination. As he points out, Kenyatta's future career was to be the answer to the challenge laid down in 1928 by the Hilton Young Commission which reported: 'Not only are natives of sufficient education lacking but it would be impossible to find any single man who could represent, or command the confidence of, more than a section of the people' (p. 107).

Clearly, there must be limitations on the work of a biographer whose subject is still an executive head of state. Within these limitations, however, Mr. Murray-Brown has produced a remarkably objective study. In his treatment of the Kapenguria trial, for instance, he illustrates not merely the unsatisfactory conditions in which the colonial government caused it to take place, but also the evasiveness of Kenyatta in response to questioning. In short, he has produced an excellent book.

W. P. KIRKMAN

African Elite: The Big Men of a Small Town. By Joan Vincent. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1971. 309 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £4·95.*

DR. VINCENT'S study of Gondo, a small settlement of mixed population on the shores of Lake Kioga in south-western Teso District, Uganda, is a welcome addition to our knowledge of East African society. Such small townships are to be found in many areas of East Africa, but their investigation has been very much neglected by comparison with that of major towns or rural 'tribal' areas. This is regrettable since, as the author herself

notes, such communities provide major points of contact between surrounding rural areas and the wider society of which they are a part, and they may usefully be viewed as microcosmic models of the sort of supra-tribal social structures which are so significant for the development of national integration in the states concerned.

Dr. Vincent's main concern is micro-politics, and she is especially interested in the patterns of choice, competition, and manoeuvre which characterise the quest of local 'big men' for prestige and influence in the community. In the course of her account, she outlines the history of Gondo, the patterns of land holding, and the structure of kinship and marriage, and she goes on to analyse the division of the population into core families, immigrants and outsiders. She then moves on to an investigation of the relation between agriculture and local political influence, the patterns of dispute settlement, and the structure and background history of the small group of men who form Gondo's 'elite'. Her treatment of the role of these men in the internal and external affairs of the community is particularly interesting. A major theme running through Dr. Vincent's discussion is the relative unimportance of tribal affiliation as a structural principle in the community, even though it contains members of many tribal groups. My own experience of comparable mixed communities would support this contention, though the author does not altogether succeed in demonstrating its validity as forcibly as she might. A fuller body of illustrative and extended case material would have been extremely useful here, and indeed the reader is more generally left feeling that theoretical assertions, descriptive generalisations and detailed ethnography could be more closely interwoven in the book than they are.

The book is clearly an important one for all who are actively engaged in the study of contemporary East African society. The style tends to be a little heavily professional in places, and this may make it rather hard going for some 'lay' readers.

R. G. ABRAHAMS

The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War. By Ntieyong U. Akpan. *London: Frank Cass. 1971. 225 pp. Maps. Index. £3·50.*

The Nigerian Civil War. By John de St. Jorre. *London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton. 1972. 437 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

It is no reflection on the large, painstaking and very readable account produced by John de St. Jorre to say that Mr. Akpan's personal account of the Nigerian war is in a special category. It is unique as an 'inside story' by a leading figure—on the defeated side, which he served as Chief Secretary to the Government of Eastern Nigeria and then of Biafra. Other such accounts will emerge, one hopes, but Mr. Akpan has got in first and written most important 'source material'.

Thematic rather than chronological, dealing with such themes as the Eastern Nigeria minorities, relief for civilians in the war, and the role of the British government, Mr. Akpan returns to one particular theme throughout: that of the character, actions and responsibility of Colonel Ojukwu, whom he served until both left on the eve of Biafra's surrender

(Akpan returning to Nigeria three weeks later). He bitterly criticises his former leader, and describes how he continually disagreed with him, opposing the 1967 secession which—and his book offers valuable, and surely irrefutable, proof of this—was planned as early as Nigeria's second 1966 coup. He depicts Ojukwu as dictatorial, theatrical, and both suspicious and easily swayed.

Non-Nigerian readers may find Mr. Akpan's early chapters difficult despite his excellent lucid style, for they assume a basic knowledge of Nigeria's geography, tribal composition, politics, and civil service organisation. Those without this basic knowledge should first read an introductory book, perhaps Mr. de St. Jorre's. But readers who already know the main story will find valuable new insights on, for example, the September 1966 Constitutional Conference. Personal reminiscences and anecdotes lend colour to Mr. Akpan's assessment of some general issues. On many of these he provides food for thought. His assessment of the causes of Biafra's collapse is convincing, except that he says too little about one often mentioned factor, the influence of an independent Christian sect or sects. He says that their following was huge and that their suppression by Ojukwu therefore had a demoralising effect, but he gives few details and he does not name the sects, calling them simply 'spiritualists' (an ambiguous term), although others have specifically mentioned the Cherubim and Seraphim Church.

As for the immediate cause of the war, Mr Akpan suggests that both the massacres of Eastern Nigerians in the North in September and October 1966, and the plans of politicians and intellectuals which began earlier, were vitally important. He repeatedly emphasises that the Easterners, very understandably, burned for revenge for the cold-blooded, well-planned northern pogroms. But he also says that ' . . . an eventual secession of the East from the rest of the Federation was likely, even if there had been no provocation in 1966' (p. xiv).

On the reasons for Biafra's dogged resistance, Mr. Akpan's strongly stated view that Nigerian air raids were largely responsible seems fairly plausible. I disagree with Mr. de St. Jorre's suggestion that civilian deaths were no more than those inevitable in bombing raids; contemporary reports support Mr. Akpan's allegation of deliberate, indiscriminate bombing. His condemnation of this strengthens his arguments in Nigeria's defence on other issues. But those who expected Mr. Akpan to write a sycophantic pro-Nigerian work will find they were mistaken. While he may not have felt free to write all he knew—throughout one feels he could tell much more—what he has written is full of criticisms of *both* sides.

Mr. de St. Jorre, of the *Observer*, has written a part-historical, part-journalistic account of the conflict which he witnessed as a reporter. He begins with good summaries of the 1966 coups (January 15 and July 28) and other events of the prewar crisis. On the question of the causes of the war, however, he does not appreciate as well as Mr. Akpan the consequences of the September massacres, even though he brings out their full horror. Throughout he avoids both 'white-washing' and exaggerations. His account of the war includes chapters on the civilian starvation and the relief operations, on foreign involvement of all sorts and on propaganda and public relations. There are also brief descriptions of military operations; their brevity is the main disappointment of this book, especially as the actual fighting in the Nigerian war has so far been much less well described than other aspects of the struggle.

This book, however, contributes well to the task of separating fact from myth. Mercenaries and public relations firms are relegated to their historical roles, which were much humbler than the mythical ones. But Mr. de St. Jorre repeats one myth that is still widely believed, that of a fiendishly efficient Biafran propaganda machine. Mr. Akpan confirms what was clear at the time, that official Biafran propaganda, when not actually pornographic, was often crude, tasteless, hysterical and generally unpleasant (p. 143f.). It was not that propaganda, nor Markpress handouts, which won world sympathy for the Biafrans, but the reports of visiting journalists.

I must also take issue with Mr. de St. Jorre's statement (p. 377) that there was 'conscription' in Nigeria. There were reports at the time of illegal press-ganging, but not, I think, organised conscription; Nigeria had enough volunteers and to spare, for, as this author rightly emphasises, there was a surge of nationalist feeling on its side as well as on the other. Unfortunately, this feeling was expressed in disagreeable attacks on relief agencies, but as Mr. de St. Jorre says, the 'hawks'' attitude to the agencies never prevailed in Lagos. Indeed, the book makes the important point, confirmed by Mr. Akpan, that while defeating the Biafrans, General Gowon also defeated the hawks on his own side. We need a leading Federalist's personal story to tell us more about this.

JONATHAN DERRICK

The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria. By Kenneth W. J. Post and George D. Jenkins. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 494 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £8·00.*

WE know very little, beyond the superficial, about most African political figures. To be sure there are biographies and autobiographies but these are few in number and very mixed in quality. All too often we feel the breath of the eminent man upon the collar of his biographer, or his 'ghost', leading to works which, like the bikini, reveal the obvious and are merely suggestive of what they conceal. Post and Jenkins's biography of Adegoke Adelabu marks a dramatic break from this dull, panegyric and largely thinly researched tradition. For one thing Adelabu is dead, dead since 1958. For another he was never great enough to have attracted much hagiography apart from that which he penned himself: 'humbler than Shaw, physically stronger than Gandhi, more cultured than Stalin, older than Jesus, more educated than Shakespeare, more worldly-wise than Socrates and better tailored than Lincoln' (p. 123). More important than these points was the free access to the obviously quite remarkable 'Adelabu papers' that the authors enjoyed. It seems to be sadly the case that few African politicians have preserved so much of their correspondence and ephemera.

Adelabu's early career irresistibly conjures up Joyce Carey's irrepressible Mister Johnson. While Adelabu's learning was greater and his pathetic absurdity much less, he too was unboundingly optimistic in near destitution, often unlucky and tactically deceitful, but disarmingly charming. Indeed the picaresque early career is far funnier than his rather solemn biographers allow; it is amusement that Adelabu would have shared. A noisy rather than initially effective politician in his home town, Ibadan, Nigeria's largest city, Adelabu slipped by persistence into leadership of the National Council

of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the Western Region, a region whose Assembly was dominated by Awolowo's Action Group by the time of Adelabu's untimely death in a motor accident. He was not, then, in the absolute front-rank and what he might have been must remain guesswork.

Post and Jenkins weld the sources together with an impressive deployment of knowledge of Ibadan and its politics in particular and those of Nigeria in general. It is no criticism of them to say that the biography only really comes to life when Adelabu's career touches events and personalities that were bigger than him. But there are weaknesses. The authors are too unsmiling about their man whose good sense was often interlaced with mystical clap-trap or pompous tommy-rot. Added to this is a shyness about explaining the politics of Ibadan, Western Region or even Nigeria except in terms of party labels and the activities of prominent figures. The blurb claims that Adelabu was Ibadan's 'boss', but adherence to the description of formal political methods and a lack of description of followers and their motives never really suggests why he was, or how he was, or really if he was. The well-handled description of Ibadan's political geography in the first chapter is not followed through with more than a superficial political sociology of the town, and this is a pity. Adelabu clearly saw himself as a man of the people but we never really find out which people. Nor regrettably is Adelabu set in any broader analytical framework. He himself suggested his own typicality in 1949: 'I am at once the cocoa-farmer, the mercantile clerk, the civil servant, the petty trader, the transporter, the capitalist and the intellectual. . . .' If he was, as he himself suggested, not swimming against, but rather part of, a stream, then that stream deserved closer attention.

The book is rather longer than its subject merits. Style does not help the story along; at times it is turgid and at others it is pure BBC schools broadcasting: 'Nineteen fifty-two was a disappointing year for the weaver's son from Oke Oluokon' (p. 159). The book is also extremely expensive, an expense hardly justified by three pages of maps and a further three of plates. Post and Jenkins have achieved an important scholarly break with the worst kind of 'journalistic' tradition of African biography, but at a high price.

RICHARD RATHBONE

Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo. By Jean-Claude Willame. *Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 223 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

WHEN the author went out as a Research Assistant to the University of Lovanium in 1962 to study provincial politics, he decided to gather as much material as possible before attempting any generalisations. He was fortunate in being allowed to search through public and private documents which elsewhere might have been kept secret for many years and even to read unopened correspondence and the files and waste paper baskets of abandoned offices. Tactfully he does not quote such sources, but they must have given him a rare insight into what was happening.

However, he starts with a quotation from Crawford Young to the effect that 'the primary challenge to the student of Congolese politics is to provide a conceptual frame-work to order the mass of disparate data available'

(p. 1). This he has bravely endeavoured to do and 'patrimonialism' is the conceptual framework into which the situation after the collapse of the central government, the mutiny of the Force Publique and the division of the country into 21 provinces is fitted.

As a way of life patrimonialism might possibly have succeeded in a country sheltered from the rest of the world. Unfortunately the Congo was in the middle of a volatile continent and the patrimonialists did not make things easier for themselves by calling in outside assistance, including eventually the United Nations. Although for three years the UN saved the country from extreme forms of civil war, its presence prevented the Zairois from hammering out a solution to their problems for themselves.

The renewed fighting which followed the departure of the UN and the period between November 1965 and November 1970, Mr. Willame describes as 'Towards a Caesarist Bureaucracy' (pp. 129–158). Here, and in his last chapter when he tries to see the shape of things to come, he is on surer ground.

Mr. Willame confesses that political events in Africa do not conform to any preconceived pattern and that concepts such as nationalism, African socialism, the one-party state—he might later have added *authenticité* to his list—are mere rationalisations for the artificial façades African leaders have erected round themselves. The politicians might retort that they are not the only people to erect façades. However, Mr. Willame's theories are certainly stimulating and help to explain Zairian politics between 1960–65, even though he gives them a title and a dignity which such disorderly events hardly merit.

JAMES MURRAY

ASIA

Reform and Revolution in Asia. Ed. by G. F. Hudson. *London: Allen & Unwin for St. Antony's College, Oxford. 1973. 318 pp. Index. (St. Antony's Publications, No. 7.) £5·50.*

Southeast Asia. Ed. by Alice Taylor. *Newton Abbot: David & Charles in co-operation with The American Geographical Society. 1972. 229 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. (Focus Series. Gen ed.: Alice Taylor.) £3·25.*

GEOFFREY HUDSON, who recently retired as Director of St. Antony's College Far Eastern Centre, has brought together under his editorship a number of special studies of political life in the five largest states of Asia in terms of population. The result is an interesting mixture of general evaluation and specific themes which does more than provide the conventional survey so common to broad studies of Asia. Hudson provides both an introduction and a conclusion to the work. He sets the Asian political scene in a succinct and admirable manner and closes the collection with a cogent *tour d'horizon* in which he looks at governmental experience in democratic, communist and military political systems. A further chapter of a more general nature is written by Dr. Klatt, who sets out to identify the prerequisites of modernisation in Asia and in the process highlights vividly impediments to the attainment of that desired state. He also has some useful comments on the causes of insurgency. Modernisation is a notion which recurs in the special studies, particularly in an engaging

essay on 'Education and Politics in China' by W. A. C. Adie, who underlines Mao's attempt to 'prevent China from suffering the fate of other countries that had lost their souls under the impact of the Industrial Revolution' (p. 60). Richard Storry's interpretation of the Mishima Affair in Japan relates also to the impact of modernisation. Three other special studies look at the process of political change in India, Pakistan (up to the advent of Bangladesh) and Indonesia. This volume may be read as an introductory study of the relationship between politics and modernity in Asia since independence. It is not, however, a mere elementary text but a work which combines perspective with depth.

Southeast Asia edited by Alice Taylor is much more of an elementary introduction to a region that has only recently become something other than a category of convenience. This book, designed specifically for geographers, combines four chapters on the nature of the region, the workings of the Mekong Project and problems of urban development, with individual studies of the states of south-east Asia from Burma to the Philippines.

MICHAEL LEIFER

Indo-Pakistan Relations (1960–1965). By Dinesh Chandra Jha. *Patna: Bharati Bhawan. 1972. 418 pp. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 30.00.*

DR. JHA's book is concerned with six crowded years, and their many broils between two countries very much alike in poverty and in many other ways, with the brief war of 1965 as the upshot. Recriminations arose over all kinds of issues, prominent among them being the treatment of communal minorities, Muslims in India and Hindus in East Pakistan. There were territorial disputes as well, and it was in the wasteland of the Rann of Kutch that fighting first broke out. Kashmir was the grand question, the insoluble Ireland or Alsace-Lorraine of middle Asia.

This study, based on a Ph.D. thesis, is solid and conscientious. Its materials are drawn from printed sources, official documents and Assembly debates and numerous press files. No strikingly novel information or interpretation emerges and detail is perhaps sometimes multiplied to excess, but it is painstakingly sifted and lucidly presented. Although of course the author writes as an Indian, his tone is reasonably free from partisanship. He tries to see both sides of the question, for instance on page 240, where he is sceptical of his own government's figures of Muslim casualties in the West Bengal disturbances of 1962, though still more sceptical of Pakistani allegations. As he remarks elsewhere, Pakistan was claiming not only the Muslim part of Kashmir, but Buddhist Ladakh and Hindu Jammu as well (p. 116), much as before 1947 the Muslim League was demanding the whole of the Punjab and Bengal for its separate state. The inflammatory role of Bhutto in pushing Ayub's government towards invasion of Kashmir stands out clearly. Dr. Jha points out that the Pakistanis were in a hurry to strike before the rebuilding of the Indian army, after its defeat by China, could make it too strong (pp. 375–376); and he discusses the theory that Pakistan was aiming at something much bigger than the acquisition of Kashmir, namely the balkanisation of all India which might have followed (p. 324). Today we see the boot on the other foot, with Bhutto struggling to keep the remaining western half of his country from breaking up; it is Pakistan that appears, as he formerly referred to India, as a 'land of

mysterious and frightening contradictions' (p. 330). For readers outside the subcontinent the record of UN attempts, with little success, to calm disputes between the two nations will be of special interest. An Indian representative described one of them as 'an exercise in futility' (p. 135). The same description might be applied to most of the halting efforts of the Commonwealth to patch things up between two members of the 'club'.

V. G. KIERNAN

Development Policy II: The Pakistan Experience. Ed. by Walter P. Falcon and Gustav F. Papanek. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1971. 267 pp. Index. (Studies based on the work of the Development Advisory Service, and written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.) £4·25.*

Growth and Inequality in Pakistan. Ed. by Keith Griffin and Azizur Rahman Khan. *London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1972. 282 pp. Index. £5·25.*

Foreign Aid and Industrial Development in Pakistan. By Irving Brecher and S. A. Abbas. *Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Press. 1972. 271 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Perspectives on Development, 1.) £6·60.*

ASIDE from any general historical interest, recent books on undivided Pakistan ought to be judged not only on their contribution to methodology and analysis worthy of wider application, but also on the insights they provide into the causes of the break-up. This may seem a harsh imposition on manuscripts which went to press before the events of March 1971, but the growing tensions between the East and West Wings were manifest some years before and were certainly serious enough to warrant careful attention, if only in an implicit way. Comparing the first two books, which address themselves to the same sort of issues, it is plain that Griffin and Khan perceived the significance of East-West discord and its sources (to the point of making them a major theme) and that Falcon and Papanek did not (or thought it better to treat the matter elsewhere). Whereas the former included only two chapters dealing with topics specific to one Wing alone—agricultural mechanisation in the West and rural poverty in the East—the latter decided on no fewer than five (about two-thirds of the book). Of course, this assessment does not reflect on the individual contributors to Falcon and Papanek, but it does point to something of an editorial infelicity, which is aggravated by the rather facile and very brief 'Introductory Perspective' by Falcon and Stern.

At a more detailed level, there is much to admire in both books. Griffin and Khan has four sections—on development strategy, agriculture, industry and trade, and poverty and inequality—each preceded by a pithy commentary, and the whole prefaced by a sharp 'Introduction', which spans structural change, government policy and the relationship between inequality and growth. With a couple of exceptions, all of the chapters were first published in the *Pakistan Development Review* in the latter half of the 1960s. The revisions made subsequently appear to be minor, which is a pity as the data rarely goes beyond 1967. Yet this is a small quibble, for the quality is uniformly and strikingly high, and it says much for the editors' abilities that the final result is both coherent and balanced.

Falcon and Papanek is much less structured, and rather surprisingly so, as the contributors were all members of the Harvard Development Advisory Service and their advisory work was (presumably) co-ordinated and subject to much discussion. The editors intended that the book should have a marked methodological flavour, and in this they have surely succeeded, the contributions being, for the most part, highly specific and problem-oriented. The chapters are a bit uneven, those on West Pakistan's exports (by Hufbauer), irrigation design in the East (by Repetto), and the character of the domestic entrepreneurial class (by Papanek) standing out. There is also an interesting programming exercise by Stern to examine the nature of an optimal transition of the economy to the goal of complete regional equity by a set terminal date (1985) and variations thereon. The disconcertingly extreme conclusions which tend to emerge from such linear models (in this case, a need to put a very strong brake on growth in the West Wing so that the East can catch up in time) should not be allowed to obscure their usefulness for certain areas of policy analysis. The absence of a like chapter in Griffin and Khan is a damaging, though not critical, omission. Specialists in the field will obviously require both books, but if forced to choose, my preference would be for Griffin and Khan.

The work of Professor Brecher and Dr. Abbas is not to be lumped in with the above, either in subject-matter or (I fear) in quality. Like all things 'virtuous' in the matter of painstaking detail, it is achingly dull. After an opening chapter which presents a rather garbled account of aid theories, marred further by a spate of (what seem to be) uncorrected proof-reading errors in the algebra on page 13, there follows a turgid discussion of Pakistan's growth, aid and balance of payments since Independence. A useful (and relieving) feature is the calculation of the real cost of aid to the various donors (consortium and otherwise), but the absence of any matching estimates of the grant equivalents to the recipient is thus all the more evident. And nowhere can the reader obtain a clear idea of the regional breakdown of aid flows. The case studies of selected donor programmes and of aid to the private and public sectors are often enlightening in their finer details, but somewhat insubstantial taken as a whole. The last third of the book is given over to various appendices, the second of which (on output trends in manufacturing), with its painfully naive statistical methodology, is best ignored, though the last three, which contain highly detailed statistics on Pakistan's aid programme, are undeniably valuable. All in all, it is difficult to envisage a credible audience beyond the tight circle of those still interested in aid to Pakistan.

CLIVE BELL

Indochina in Conflict. A Political Assessment. Ed. by Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan E. Goodman. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1972. 227 pp. Index. £5·00.*

Ho Chi Minh. A Biographical Introduction. By Charles Fenn. *London: Studio Vista. 1973. 144 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Leaders of Modern Thought. Gen. ed.: Christine Bernard.) £2·25. Paperback: £0·95.*

NOT so much *a* political assessment as twelve assessments by contributors well known for more substantial works—four about Cambodia, two about

Laos, three about North Vietnam, one about South Vietnam, and two (inevitably) about America. All were completed by April 1971, and the editors' introduction concludes somewhat obviously that the North Vietnamese were going 'to try to continue the struggle for their objectives,' while the non-communist regimes were likely to go on being weakened, in addition, by internal dissension. Devotees of Chatham House may turn first to the long-awaited contribution of Donald Lancaster, after his eight years spent at the court of Prince Sihanouk. His delightful sardonic eloquence is unimpaired, but, disappointingly, he gives nothing away—still saving up his disclosures, he hints. This group of authors are unfortunate in that their predictions, hedged by reservations that make them pointless, have been overtaken by events.

Captain Charles Fenn, citizen of Ireland but sometime officer in the OSS (forerunner of the CIA), has often been quoted by other writers exploring Ho Chi Minh's contacts with the United States forces in South China in 1945. At last, he offers his own account of the matter, based on the diary he kept at the time—a surprising habit in an intelligence officer. He too, however, is able to give away little not known before, unless it be the use Ho made, when trying to ensure his personal leadership in the post-surrender seizure of power, of a signed photograph complaisantly furnished him by Claire Chennault. Round this core of information Mr. Fenn has given vent to his anti-colonial prejudices in an uncritical biography of Ho. Starting with a quotation on the cover from a *Time* obituary that 'no national leader has stood so stubbornly or so long before the enemy's guns'—whereas, as far as is known, in the whole of his eighty years, Ho Chi Minh was never under fire of any kind—Mr. Fenn, by profession novelist and playwright, goes on to fulfil a wish he quotes from the late Bernard Fall, to see Ho 'catch the attention of a writer of thrillers or a producer of adventure films'. This quotation comes in a paragraph describing Ho's detention at Hong Kong in 1931–32; not a single sentence of the paragraph is accurate, for all its attribution to some unnamed 'Hong Kong government official in 1946'. Indeed, anybody who had the faintest inkling of judicial procedure would know it was piffle. The whole, closely-packed, paperback is of the same quality. The publishers offer it, specifically for the edification of schoolchildren, in a series which sets Chairman Ho beside Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Freud. The editor might care to know that there is evidence of only two pieces of vaguely philosophical writing from the prolific pen of the founder of the Indochina Communist party: first, a reflection on the Christian bias of his personal philosophy, designed to persuade Hong Kong government officials he was not a communist; and second, a Vietnamese translation of Sun Yat-sen's *Three People's Principles*, designed to persuade Chiang Kai-shek's officials that he was not a communist. Neither manuscript is extant.

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

Turning Point in China. An Essay on the Cultural Revolution. By William Hinton. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1972. 112 pp. $5.95. £2·50.*

Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University. By William Hinton. *New York, London: The Monthly Review Press. 1972. 288 pp. $7.95. £3·15.*

HINTON'S two latest books contrast sharply both in style and content. *Turning Point in China* is a wide-ranging and polemical account of the Cultural Revolution as a whole. It fully reflects the author's support for the ideology and policies of Mao Tse-tung and it contains many attacks on American establishment and academic interpretations of the events of the Cultural Revolution, as well as comments on what the American left might learn from them. Originally delivered as a lecture, it retains much of an aggressive, rhetorical style. *Hundred Day War* is a precise and detailed account of the Cultural Revolution at one institution. Hinton's ideological commitment is not put aside but his main aim is to report as fully as possible the related experiences of the people he met at Tsinghua during a visit in 1971. It is a gripping and thoughtful narrative of events. Of the two, *Hundred Day War* is immeasurably the better and ranks alongside the author's *Fanshen* [1] as one of the classics of reportage on modern China. It provides a great deal of information and insight into what the Cultural Revolution has meant, in retrospect, to some of the leading student participants.

The central thesis of *Turning Point in China* is that the Cultural Revolution was a major confrontation in the process of class struggle after a revolution. Hinton criticises interpretations which argue that it was Mao's attempt to temper a new generation of revolutionaries, or a voluntaristic effort to change human nature. Nor does he believe that Liu Shao-ch'i and the bureaucracy were innocent pragmatists overcome by irrational ideologues. Instead, he states that the institutional change of the 1950s had failed to affect the superstructure and the outlook of many of the people involved. Bourgeois elements combined with a new elite were actively working against the growth of socialism. By the mid-1960s differences over a wide range of internal and external policies brought the struggle to a culmination. Fortunately for Mao, Lin Piao had revolutionised the army as a backbone of support and this enabled him to mobilise his overwhelming forces among the masses. Hinton attributes the factionalism of 1967 and 1968 to left-wing extremism and he quotes it as an object lesson for the American left, whom he encourages to unite with the workers, as the Chinese students had to after July 1968. Finally Hinton looks at the impact of the Cultural Revolution on such things as economic and educational organisation, arguing that there has been a successful shift away from elitism and capitalist tendencies. As a whole, the essay suffers from many of the defects of simplistic, black-and-white history. Important events like the Wuhan Incident are glossed over in a way that makes little concession to the complexities of the actual situation. Mao's opponents are all lumped together so that Liu Shao-ch'i and the May 16 group are both seen as representatives of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Moreover the May 16 group is described as a 'neo-Trotskyite' organisation, which does little to clarify the role of an already obscure faction. However, the greatest challenge to Hinton's analysis comes from the Lin Piao affair and the subsequent development in China's internal and external policies. They leave many question marks over Hinton's outline of events and aims.

[1] New York: Monthly Review Press. 1967.

Lin Piao's fall and its implications are considered more carefully in the introduction to *Hundred Day War*. Hinton points out that although it does not change the facts of what happened at Tsinghua, it might lead to a modification of the verdict and 'there is room for doubt as to what it all [*i.e.*, student actions] means politically'. Such problems, however, do not detract from the quality of Hinton's narrative. He weaves together the information he obtained from many sources in Tsinghua with considerable skill. The result is that the overall course of events is clearly described and backed up with a great amount of detailed information. He traces the rise of the hard-core rebels led by Kuai Ta-fu in the face of suppression from Wang Kuang-mei's work team. The manoeuvring by the various 'loyalist' and 'rebel' groups comes to form the basis of the subsequent factionalist split at the university, and also provides the background for the subsequent shift by Kuai to the extreme left. Much insight is given into the role of the Tsinghua students in spreading rebellion across the country, and also into the way the students related to more senior Party figures. The degeneration into violent fighting and the resistance to the workers' propaganda team of July 1968 are fully described as well as the eventual reform of the students and the university organisation. In addition, Hinton is careful to look at the effects of all this on the people involved, the students, Party members, and academic staff.

It is a fascinating account and it is made all the more readable by Hinton's ability to foresee the reader's questions. The first problem to consider about the book as a whole is whether it is accurate. It certainly contains sufficient detail to be compared with the Red Guard papers' reports of events and a brief survey suggests that it is. In fact, Hinton's account does much to clarify some of the more confusing comments to be found in such sources. Additional support is provided by the close parallels with the events in Shanghai described by Neale Hunter in *Shanghai Journal*, as well as with my own experience in Sian in 1966–67. Hinton's description accurately evokes the atmosphere of the movement. At a more detailed level, the book offers many important themes for scrutiny. The political role of various party leaders in their relations with the students is particularly fascinating. Some of the account may well be *post facto* rationalisation but, for example, the inferences of Red Guard reports on the role of Wang Li and Ch'i Pen-yu in the mysterious case of the 'madman of the modern age' support Hinton's description of their actively promoting factionalism and extreme left stands (see pp. 134–137). The obsession of the students with symbols and labels also has significance for understanding the expression of political thought in China. Why was it that the confusion over the categorisation of student groups, cadres and so forth made during the work team period of July 1966 was able to dominate thinking and issues for such a long period when immediate, practical problems could be dealt with by more careful research? Many such problems are thrown up and Hinton's work can be rewardingly read with such points in mind. *Hundred Day War* may lack the depth of experience of *Fanshen* but it will surely become a classic description of the Cultural Revolution and should be required reading for those interested in modern China.

ANDREW J. WATSON

Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China. Ed. by Chun-tu Hsueh. Introduction by Howard L. Boorman. *New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1971. 580 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·25.*

Communist China, 1949–1969: A Twenty Year Appraisal. Ed. by Frank N. Trager and William Henderson. *New York: New York University Press for The American-Asian Educational Exchange. 1970. 356 pp. Bibliog. Index. $7.95.*

THE collection of nineteen biographical essays assembled by Professor Hsueh is a welcome compilation. The first group of contributions deals with three Taiping leaders: Hung Hsiu-ch'uan (Michael, Yap), Hung Jen-kan (So, Boardman and Ch'iu) and Li Hsiu = ch'eng (Uhalley). The longest section, which is where the editor's main interest seems to lie, deals with early republican revolutionaries. Hsueh writes well on Sun Yat-sen and his relations with the now forgotten Yang Ch'u-yun, on the fiery Tsou Jung, and on the murdered democrat Sung Chiao-jen. He also translates an article from *Li-Shih yen-chiu* by two communist historians on the class nature of Huang Hsing, the military leader of the 1911 revolution, thus providing the English reader with an alternative approach to the one he developed in his own book on Huang. The revolutionary passion and pessimism of Ch'en T'ien-hua, which ended in his suicide in Japan in 1905, is explored by Ernest P. Young in a thoughtful article that is one of the best in the book. Kennedy's study of Hu Han-min does not penetrate the obscurities of that central but uninspiring Kuomintang figure. The paradoxes of Wang Ching-wei, revolutionary bomber in his youth, leader of the Kuomintang's left in his middle life, and wretched figurehead of a Japanese-sponsored regime in his declining years, are given a sympathetic treatment by Howard L. Boorman.

The essays on the communist movement focus on the first ten or twelve years of its history and its early leaders: Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chih), Li Ta-chao (Meisner), Ch'u Ch'iu-pai (Hsia), Ch'en Kung-po (Wilbur) and Chang Kuo-t'ao (Hsueh). Only Mao's early life is covered (Snow). Communist politics after 1934 are dealt with only in Boorman's articles on Liu Shao-ch'i and Hsu Kai-yu's on Chou En-lai.

Of the contributions that have appeared elsewhere, some have been revised for this collection, and nearly all are worth having conveniently assembled here. Even though the selection is not well balanced, it will be found useful by the student of early 20th-century China.

Communist China, 1949–1969, assembles fifteen contributors who are generally disinclined to see the country through lenses tinted with rose or any other shade of pink. Each attempts in some twenty or thirty pages to summarise a large subject, and their essays vary greatly in value. The most impressive papers are those of Whitson 'The Military: Their Role in the Policy Process' and Domes 'Party Politics in the Cultural Revolution'.

W. J. F. JENNER

Mao Tse Tung: The Search for Plenty. By Leo Goodstadt. *Hong Kong, London: Longman. 1972. 266 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

A former teacher of economics, with a Chinese wife, and for some time Deputy Editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in Hong Kong, Mr.

Goodstadt has privileged access to all that has to be known or can be known about present-day China by an outsider. This, then, is Pekinology on a high level though with a pronounced, but admitted, bias on the side of Mao's near-infallibility.

His claim to greatness

> must rest not on the structural changes he introduced . . . nor on his success in laying the foundations for communism through methods which were moderate and bloodless compared with East European socialist countries . . . [but] by his view of human nature. His onslaught against destitution, illiteracy and the cruel dictates of nature was founded on an overwhelming conviction of man's ability to conquer a harsh economic environment. Mao's brand of social engineering to tap the energy and ability of the ordinary people should win him the respect which Marx has earned for refusing to accept the proletariat as the inevitable victim of immutable economic laws . . . (p. 95).

To support this thesis the author marshals an impressive amount of evidence. He believes that ever since Mao was in a position to put into practice his own economic philosophy, that is, 1955–58 onwards, his dialogue with his people has been following a consistent line. The aim has been all along a 'decentralised economy, built on agriculture and light industry, supported by a network of rural industries, . . . to act as the springboard for the leap towards a modern, advanced and balanced manufacturing economy' (pp. 202–203). With his emphasis on village prosperity as a precondition of healthy industrialisation, not only has Mao rejected the Soviet model but has opted for a Chinese variant of the Japanese experiment. Goodstadt notes in the course of a detailed analysis of Japan's likely impact on the thinking of Mao and Chou that, although never mentioned in official publications, the coincidences 'are too numerous to be ignored . . . [indeed] Mao's distaste for the profit motive also finds a striking parallel in the initial stage of Japan's take-off' (pp. 123–124).

In the author's perspective Mao is hardly ever in doubt about his ultimate purpose and he tends to absolve him of blame even for the failure of the Great Leap though he is on record as encouraging and praising it. Liu Shao-chi's downfall becomes comprehensible through 'the poor state of the party and the cadres whose political health was his responsibility' (p. 162), and 'Mao must have calculated Liu was not able to cope with the Cultural Revolution' (p. 153), which the helmsman had been consciously preparing ever since 1962. As for Lin Piao, he 'was ousted for much the same mistakes as Liu . . . [because he too] failed to produce for Mao a body of communists whom he could trust to implement his ideas for the transformation of China . . .' (p. 242). In other words, neither of them could create the indispensable prerequisites of 'pure Maoist economics' built on the belief 'that man could strive after development even if his body were not comforted with material rewards' (p. 176). And Mao's mixture of caution, shrewdness and utopianism has been vindicated, in the author's view, by China's economic progress after the Cultural Revolution.

Whether Mao's development policy has been frustrated all along by lesser men, or whether he developed that policy through learning from his own mistakes and making scapegoats pay for them, remains an open question. That 'Maoism represents the outlook which the future China will adopt as the basis of its culture' (p. 238) is considered a possibility. Not only was Marxism garbed by Mao 'in a dress which China would not find alien', and not only did his reign bring order, unity and relative

prosperity, but he is also the 'only Chinese political philosopher of major importance to become his country's ruler' (pp. 46–47).

Plodding through plots and anti-plots, dissecting the origins and components of new and discarded tactics and policies, Mr. Goodstadt's painstaking analyses are built on solid material, are often original and always profound. He offers no joyride to his readers and his style bears the impact of the dreary prose of New China News Agency bulletins and other official texts. Nevertheless, this is a remarkable book and, though published in Hong Kong, one hopes that it will get the world-wide attention it merits.

TIBOR MENDE

The Foreign Trade of Mainland China. By Feng-Hwa Mah. *Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 1972. 270 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·00.*

FENG-HWA MAH'S book is a comprehensive and coherent study of China's foreign trade from 1950 to 1969. Chapter 1 deals with the organisation and planning of foreign trade in China. Chapter 2 presents the conventional dimensions of China's commodity trade: its volume, geographical direction and commodity structure. Chapter 3 tackles the complex and much-neglected problem of China's exchange rates. Mah argues that the official Chinese exchange rates are unrealistic and present a distorted account of China's foreign trade returns. On the one hand, the official yuan-dollar exchange rate has been pegged since 1955, and the resulting over-valuation of the yuan *vis-à-vis* Western currencies has led to an understatement of the yuan value of Sino-Western trade. Conversely, in the 1950s, the rouble-yuan rate undervalued the yuan, with the effect of overstating the yuan value of Sino-Soviet trade. Mah attempts a reconstruction of China's foreign trade returns by the use of his estimates of a more realistic exchange rate.

Chapter 4 is a 'detailed study of the terms of Sino-Soviet trade. This chapter attempts to find explanations for, and to explain the economic significance of, the commodity unit-value differentials which are found to exist between Sino-Soviet trade, Soviet trade with Eastern Europe, and both Chinese and Soviet trade with the Western countries' (p. viii). In Chapter 5, Mah draws up a conjectural balance of payments. Data for this is scarce, and he justifies the attempt principally in terms of its objective of 'appraising Peking's ability to finance a substantial inflow of Western producer goods and perhaps also food-grains' (p. 147) in the near future. The present 'modest level' of China foreign exchange reserves, and the 'absence of substantial credit accommodation from these (Western) trading partners (p. 180), lead him to the conclusion that China's ability to buy from the West 'will depend primarily on the improvement of its domestic production' (p. 180).

The final chapter contains a fascinating but tantalisingly short account of the contribution of foreign trade to China's economic growth. Mah here emphasises the central role played by trade with the Soviet Union, considering that 'China's imports of complete factory equipment from the USSR . . . together with Soviet technical assistance, were largely responsible for the rapid growth of China's industries in the 1950's' (p. 181). Without these imports and technical assistance, he considers that China's investment rate would have fallen drastically, 'and the growth of national production during 1953–1957 would have dropped from an annual rate of about 6·5%

to about 3·5% ' (p. 185). Thus, in spite of the relatively high prices paid for imports from the Soviet Union, and the relatively low prices received by China for its exports (the 'China differential' in Mah's terminology), the kind of resource reallocation gained through its trade with the Soviet Union in the 1950s was greatly to China's advantage, as far as its industrialisation programme was concerned. It is in this light that Mah considers one should view the Sino-Soviet terms of trade in the 1950s, involving such exchanges as: '1 ton of frozen pork for 5 tons of steel products; 107 tons of shelled peanuts for a set of combine coal-mining machinery; and 10,000 tons of cured tobacco for a seamless steel-pipe factory' (p. 182).

The book concludes with a valuable sixty-five page statistical appendix.

PETER NOLAN

Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's. Ed. by James William Morley. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 249 pp. Index. £4·75.*

Japan and Australia in the Seventies. Ed. by J. A. A. Stockwin. *Sydney, London: Angus & Robertson in association with The Australian Institute of International Affairs. 1972. 223 pp. £1·85.*

The Control of Imports and Foreign Capital in Japan. By Robert S. Ozaki. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 309 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £7·75.*

Forecast for Japan, as its subtitle implies, is concerned primarily with the country's 'security in the 1970's'. Given the quality of the book one almost regrets this limitation of the scope of analysis, and misses the broader appraisal of Japan's evolution in the Asian context. Although it is a collective volume, its editor, Professor Morley, managed to avoid the usual shortcomings of such works and obtain from his co-authors a united wavelength in approach, pragmatism and even in style. The result is an exceptionally valuable book, de-mythifying and dispassionately objective.

Strategic thought, the attitudes of the business community and the future of conservative leadership, as well as relations with the United States and south-east Asia are the main subjects examined. Most of the contributions are models of concise, balanced and clear presentations of complex subjects. Because of the exceptional quality of the contributors, it would have been interesting to have more on the influence of Japan's unpopularity in most of Asia and on its apparent difficulty seriously to alter this export-image. Similarly, it would have been useful to have a more detailed examination of Japan's dilemma: to opt in its Asian policy for conservatism and the *status quo* or for alliance with the structural and socio-political change which, in most cases, is a precondition of the economic progress Japan must desire. These, however, are minor, and probably unavoidable, gaps in a commendably short over-view. Professor Morley sums it up in 'A Forecast with Recommendations', masterly in its objectivity and commended by the fact that none of the important changes which have occurred since it was written has in any way invalidated its conclusions.

A subject Kenneth T. Young could only treat briefly in his contribution on south-east Asia to Professor Morley's book is dealt with in detail in *Japan and Australia in the Seventies*. This volume consists of papers read

at a conference (of the same title) sponsored by the Australian Institute of International Affairs and held in Sydney in June 1971, together with edited versions of the discussions following each paper. As Australian trade is shifting from old markets in the West to newer ones in the Pacific, Australia has become involved with Japan to an extent no one could foresee even a few years ago. The hesitation between inevitable reorientation and fear of excessive economic dependence on Japan is tellingly illustrated both by the papers and by the discussions. Outsiders will be specially interested in those papers which deal with little-known local issues. A good example is Professor Sissons's paper on 'Immigration in Australian Japanese Relations, 1871–1971', especially in view of the important role Australian racial animosities still play in the two countries' relations. The survey on 'Japan and Australia: Trade and Investment' (offered by the Department of Trade and Industry) is another brief and useful guide for the observer who is not too familiar with the region. Professor Momoi's paper on 'Japan's Defence Policies', or Professor Passin's probing of the probable evolution of the Japanese party system and its impact on foreign policies, are also very helpful.

According to the editor: '. . . Japan has become a major Australian interest while Australia has become not unimportant to Japan . . .' (p. vii). In Professor Miller's words: '. . . We [Australians] need them more than they need us' (p. 181). But the discussion brings out the understandable Australian desire that Japan should consider their country '. . . not just as a source of minerals and a place to export to . . .' (p. 183). Such and similar statements instructively convey the Australians' difficulties in their mutation from a sense of racial superiority to economic pragmatism—a quality that renders this book most useful to foreign observers.

Robert S. Ozaki's study in the Praeger Special Studies series is a technical volume likely to be useful to those interested in Japanese policies towards import controls and foreign capital. As the text was completed in the spring of 1971, recent developments have transformed it into a most valuable research document. As such it is completed by a bibliography which is probably the most extensive on the subject available for Western readers.

TIBOR MENDE

India. A Modern History. 2nd ed. By Percival Spear. *Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1972. 530 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $10.00.*

A revised and expanded edition of a book first published in 1961 and reviewed in *International Affairs* in July 1962 (p. 429). To bring the record up to date, the author has revised the chapter on Nehru and added a new chapter on the Shastri and Indira Gandhi ministries up to the end of 1971. The annotated bibliography has also been revised and updated.

NORTH AMERICA

No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States Entry into World War II. By Bruce M. Russett. *New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row. 1972. 111 pp. Index. $6.00. Paperback: $1.95.*

The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947. By John Lewis Gaddis. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1972. 396 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·85.*

FOREIGNERS will at first be surprised that heart-searching on the Vietnam intervention can lead Americans by a natural progression to questioning their country's part in the Second World War. The explanation is that Americans still think of this as an intervention. Indeed, in their current debate, one half of each of them thinks of the whole of their foreign policy for the past thirty years as an intervention in the outside world, with the Second World War as the opening and the Vietnam war as perhaps the closing episode.

This is one of many trains of thought touched off by reading Professor Russett's short, well-written, troubled essay. Another concerns might-have-beens in history. Professor Russett argues, in brief, that the United States should have tried to stay on the sidelines of the Second World War, merely supplying the anti-Axis powers until eventual stalemate. Might the American people, as they were in the 1940s, have taken this attitude?

Then again, whatever the answer to this, would it have been reasonable for them to do so? Professor Russett's criteria are the usual ones of America's interests, broad and narrow, and its moral sympathies. As always in the political science of these days, honour is forgotten, the feeling that great power demands action, that shame is incurred by letting others dare re-make the world as they will. The hostile critic dismisses this feeling as 'the arrogance of power'; but that is too easy.

More still, the essay raises the issue of conservatism or meliorism as philosophies of the world's affairs. Professor Russett's most emphatic argument is that, after all, the world that emerged with America's participation in the war was no better than the world which would have emerged from stalemate. Even conceding this, even conceding that Americans could have foreseen this, is it reasonable to evade action against one trouble just because another will surely follow?

As to the new trouble which emerged from the old a generation ago, it is a relief after the heady exaggerations of atomic and economic revisionism, to find younger scholars still looking seriously at all the available evidence on America's share in the origins of the cold war. Professor Gaddis's book is apparently his first major work, and this, together with the scale and sensitiveness of the subject, perhaps accounts for a certain flatness of treatment. The opening chapters on America's approach to the postwar world and Russia and the problems of Germany and Japan strike the present reviewer as solid without being inspired; the middle chapters, on Eastern Europe and on the Russian Loan, as well done: the final chapters, ending with the Truman Doctrine and a retrospect, as competent. The footnoting of sources is very full and useful. The book as a whole is an achievement for the author, and a sensible, basic study of the period.

MICHAEL DONELAN

Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era. By Peter C. Dobell. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1972. 161 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £1·50.*

Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making. By Bruce Thordarson. *Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1972. 231 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £1·40.*

THESE companion volumes are the work of the Director and a special assistant in the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade in Ottawa. The Centre itself merits notice in as much as it is a novel attempt to provide members of the Canadian parliament with information and expertise concerning the larger world beyond the boundaries of Canada about which necessarily they are less knowledgeable and less interested than about mining leases in Temiskaming, the effect of turkey subsidies in Boisevain and the shortcomings of social insurance in Oshawa. The Centre is in a sense Parliament's answer to the Department of External Affairs, which by the late 1960s was beginning to take on the attributes of a sacred institution answerable only to a power beyond Parliament. To perform their function the publications of the Centre have to be clear, brief, precise and analytical. The works of Messrs. Dobell and Thordarson are so, and well worth the attention of anyone seeking to understand Canada and Canadian behaviour in the international community.

The name of Trudeau in the titles of both books is indicative of the effect which the advent of Pierre-Elliott Trudeau has had upon the making and the direction of Canadian foreign policy. Being a university-trained intellectual of first-class ability like the members of the Department of External Affairs, but unlike them in having been for years footloose in the world on a private income, Trudeau was both able to understand and to stand up to External Affairs. Unlike Diefenbaker, who only knew how to quarrel with his foreign office, and Pearson, who represented the takeover of the nation by the Department, Trudeau was determined to master the bureaucracy in the East Block. Mr. Thordarson's book is an account of how Trudeau performed this feat of domination and why. Mr. Dobell's is a description of the end product of Trudeau's ' cultural revolution '. Hence the need to read the two books together.

Like Mao's, Trudeau's strategy for breaking the grip of the bureaucracy on policy concentrated on involving forces outside the bureaucracy. He drew into the review of Canadian foreign policy university intellectuals (but not, as Mao did, students), members of parliament and an assortment of extra-parliamentary interests. After everything was well stirred up, he put in his own team of experts to lay down a new line. In a desperate effort to save the remnants of their authority and even their dignity, the Department of External Affairs finally picked one of their number to study the thoughts of Pierre-Elliot Trudeau with the object of devising a line with which he might conceivably agree.

Mr. Dobell's account of Trudeau's policies, once he was in a position to make them himself, suggests that they do not differ from traditional Canadian policy as much as one might expect. In spite of the sound and fury, traditional Canadian caution has asserted itself in the mind of Trudeau. The Canadian contribution to Nato has been reduced, but Canada remains ready to answer the bugle call in 36 hours. The Canadian posture *vis-à-vis* the United States in respect of the exploitation of Canadian resources and business opportunities has been stiffened, but not nearly enough to satisfy the nationalists and socialists. Aid to the Third World has been increased, but is still far short of one per cent of the GNP. Gaullist interference in Canadian politics has been reduced by demonstrat-

ing that Trudeau is unmistakably in charge in Canada and not the people who cheered the general's graceless and ungrateful demagoguery. Canadian policy in Latin America and the Caribbean remains a combination of caution and clichés. Only with respect to the Soviet Union and China does Canada's attitude have a new look. But even here Trudeau has not yielded to Soviet flattery and has pointed out to the Russians that Canada is a *small* power incapable of altering the facts of life among the dinosaurs. Altogether two excellent books.

H. S. FERNS

In Defence of Canada. Vol. III. Peacemaking and Deterrence. By James Eayrs. *Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1972. London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 448 pp. Illus. Index. (Studies in the Structure of Power: Decision-Making in Canada, 6. Ed.: John Meisel.) £8·75.*

THIS is the third volume[1] (a fourth is expected) of Professor Eayrs's detailed analytical study of Canadian defence policies during the years since 1930. 'Peacemaking and Deterrence' takes the reader from an indefinite point in 1944 through to 1957 when, on August 26 of that year, the Soviet government disclosed the successful launching of an intercontinental ballistic rocket. Professor Eayrs concludes with a variant on a world-famous sentence by another Canadian professor: 'Henceforth the missile was the message.'

The book opens with a familiar scenario still unfolding. The Canadians are fully engaged in saving democracy from German tyranny and aggression while at the same time keeping a sharp eye open for threats to Canadian democracy and sovereignty from the British imperialists. By the close of 1946 the familiar scenario had come to an end. Mackenzie King's paranoic explosion about Lord Halifax's speech in Toronto on the need for the British Commonwealth to hang together and to unite its forces in the presence of the United States, the Soviet Union and China now seemed silly; and his refusal to commit Canada to join in policing Germany because this would release British troops for nefarious purposes elsewhere in the world looked like what it was: a reflex action of a dead and irrelevant idealism. The Canadian leaders were growing up into a world in which Daddy and Mummy were dead.

Contributing to this growing-up process as much as anything was the spy scandal in Ottawa with which Mackenzie King had to live in secret from September 1945 until February 1946. He and his civil service colleagues in External Affairs seem to have been, only in a lesser degree, as naive about the Soviet Union, as the Canadian intellectuals whom Zabotin and Pavlov recruited to do their dirty work. The spy scandal revealed to them the facts of life as far the Soviet Union was concerned. Almost simultaneously Mackenzie King, Brooke Claxton and Louis St. Laurent began to discern an aspect of the United States new at least to them. Full of alarms and endowed with great material power, the American military were preparing to swarm into the Canadian Arctic bringing with them teams of 'experts' on how to use the Canadian wilderness. As if this were not enough, the Canadian leaders were faced with the fact of Anglo-American

[1] Vol. I. 1964. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1965, p. 768; Vol. II. 1965. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1967, p. 199.

rivalry over the development of atomic power, a situation in which the Canadians themselves had some leverage on account of their control of uranium supplies and the fact of the Chalk River atomic development plant.

Given the novelty, complexity and awesomeness of their situation, the Canadian leaders appear to have behaved very well indeed. They never capitulated to American hysteria or to Soviet intrigues and threats. They remained calm, cool and practical, and this seems to have stood them in good stead in dealing with the Americans. Fortunately President Truman was above the average in common sense, humanity and firmness of purpose, and Eisenhower was a better man than the team he captained. Canadian policy was intelligently based on the belief that the United States government has a right and a duty to protect its own people, and that Canada, on account of its location, must co-operate in essentials. On the other hand, the Canadians were not prepared to let the Americans do as they pleased, and they were determined to defend Canada themselves. In practical terms they yielded to the American demand for the use of Goose Bay airfield as a bomber base and accepted American men and money in developing early warning systems in the Arctic, but they were unwilling to abandon European commitments and allow the Americans to convert Canada into an armed outpost of fortress America. Towards the Soviet Union, the Canadians were determined to be firm and as friendly as the Russians would allow. They let the Soviet military attachés look round in the Arctic, and they even tried for a brief moment to dissociate themselves from the United States on nuclear policy in the hope that the Russians and the Americans might accept a ' least worst ' solution of nuclear problems.

Professor Eayrs's account of Anglo-American nuclear rivalry suggests that the British, so keen about integrated Commonwealth military planning, displayed a dog-in-the-manger attitude towards Canada in the matter of nuclear research and development. Their withdrawal from the Chalk River project now appears as a fundamental nonsense that has had very serious long-term effects on their nuclear programme and has increased their dependence on the United States for nuclear weapons of exclusively American design and manufacture.

H. S. FERNS

American Foreign Policy since World War II. 4th rev. ed. By John W. Spanier. *London: Nelson. 1972. 318 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Nelson's University Paperbacks.) £1·75.*

This fourth revised and updated edition of Professor Spanier's standard work on American foreign policy will be widely welcomed by students of the subject. The story is brought up to the spring of 1971 with the same combination of clear narrative and analysis of underlying factors which have established the high reputation of the book's earlier editions.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Foreign Powers in Latin America. By Herbert Goldhamer. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 321 pp. Index. (A Rand Corporation Research Study.) £5·00.*

Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History, 1960-1968, Compiled and trans. by J. Gregory Oswald. Introduction by Herbert S. Dinerstein. Ed. by Robert G. Carlton. *Austin, London: University of Texas Press for the Conference on Latin American History. 1971. 365 pp. Index. £7·25.*

THE assumption that Latin America is essentially a United States sphere of influence has been in large part responsible for the dearth of studies relating to the role played by non-American powers in the region. Although *The Foreign Powers in Latin America* deals with the role of the United States as well as that of non-hemispheric powers, its author hopes that it will help to redress the balance. Mr. Goldhamer's aim 'has been to provide a compact account of the political, economic, and cultural activities of the foreign powers in Latin America in the postwar period, but more especially during the last decade' (p. vii). His book is divided into three parts. The first 'deals with the interests and objectives of the foreign nations in Latin America'; the second 'discusses the instrumentalities and resources that have been employed or that have unintentionally contributed, both positively and negatively, to the pursuit of these ends'; and the third 'evaluates the extent to which the foreign powers achieved their goals' (p. viii).

Mr. Goldhamer discusses such matters as trade and investments; the importance of 'the migrant presence'; and types and uses of aid. But his main theme is the relative decline of United States influence in Latin America—especially its economic dominance—since the immediate postwar years. Of particular significance in this process have been the substantial recovery by Germany of its prewar position in the region, and the emergence of Japan as a new competitor. Japan has been greatly helped by not having 'to pursue political objectives in Latin America other than to maintain the conditions favorable to trade, investment, and migration, and this has required primarily a policy of discretion, of "sticking-to-business", and of avoiding alienation of any significant sector of Latin American opinion or political power' (p. 225). The German Federal Republic, on the other hand, was for a long time anxious to forestall recognition of East Germany by Latin American governments. Its political and security interests have caused the United States difficulties not experienced by Germany and Japan. But Britain, with only minor political problems in the region, has lost ground to both the latter countries. The Soviet Union has, of course, markedly increased its influence in Latin America, though its share of the region's trade remains very small. The interests of France, Italy and Spain—as well as those of other, smaller, countries—are also examined.

After his well-researched analysis briefly outlined above, Mr. Goldhamer has 'imposed on the reader some reflections in which I give special attention to the experience of the United States in Latin America during the decade of the Alliance for Progress. As often happens with reflections, they have sometimes taken me well beyond my data' (p. viii). These reflections amount to little more than a superficial overview of United States policy towards Latin America during the 1960s. Yet they reinforce an impression that perhaps the book was addressed as much to policy-makers in Washington as to students of Latin American affairs wanting to know more about the influence of non-hemispheric powers in the region. Such students will nevertheless find this a very useful book.

Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America 'presents samples of Soviet writing on Latin America in order to furnish to students of the

Soviet Union and of Latin America, in convenient form, source materials for the study of Soviet policy in Latin America' (p. xiii). The samples include the work of both party writers and scholars. Professor Gregory Oswald's interesting selection is grouped into sections on the Objectives and Achievements of Soviet Research on Latin America; the National Liberation Movement; the Forces of Reform; the Catholic Church and Christian Democracy; Conservatism; Labour and Trade Unionism; the Rural and Urban Milieu; Economic Problems; Economic and Ideological Rivalry; and the Cuban Revolution. Inevitably, there are omissions, but what one misses most is comment upon President Allende's success, which would seem to vindicate current Soviet policy towards Latin America. Allende's electoral victory came too late for assessments of it to be included. This is the case also with the present military government in Peru. Incidentally, Professor Oswald does not include any extracts showing Soviet views on the Latin American military. However, this book should certainly fulfil its stated purpose of stimulating further study of its subject.

GORDON CONNELL-SMITH

Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change. Ed. by Stefan A. Halper and John R. Sterling. *London: Allison & Busby. 1972. 219 pp. £3·50.*

THIS anthology, with its familiar names, is also one of familiar themes. Many of its items are available elsewhere, some of its few empirical discussions (such as Jaguaribe's 'The Brazilian Structural Crisis') are considerably out of date, and the complex issues posed by Peru and Chile are ignored. The resulting impression is of an unoriginal and entrepreneurial, rather than scholastic, venture.

The editors fail to allay such doubts in their introduction. Their attitude is so non-committal that apparently they see Germani's blend of Durkheim and Rostow as perfectly compatible with the quasi-Marxism of Gunder Frank. To this they add only the standard clichés about the alleged 'development process'; Latin America's 'potential for social and political upheaval'; 'the lower stratas' exclusion from the political process', and so on. The wholesale reversal of these assumptions might have made a more fruitful beginning.

However, the contributions afford an opportunity to assess the book's ingenuous subtitle. Is change in Latin America dynamic, in that term's apparent sense of some coherent tendency toward a positive new outcome? In so far as any coherence emerges, its quality is in fact static, as Gerassi's paper, 'Violence, Revolution and Change in Latin America', unintentionally indicates: his account of the historical depth of imperialism is reasonably valid, yet he offers no evidence for the 'revolution and structural change' which garnish his title so fashionably.

Three more of the eight titles predict an equally obscure 'revolution'. A. F. C. Wallace's paper, 'Identity and the Nature of Revolution', has almost nothing to do with Latin America: admonishing United States policymakers to adopt a liberal position is an old and futile game, while his comparisons of Cuba with Melanesian millennianism, not unnaturally, lack specificity. Ivan Illich's plea in 'Gradual Change or Violent Revolution in Latin America?' for enlightened empathy as a source of peaceful change neglects precisely the Hobbesian aspect of social relations, ideology and

the realities of power which Latin America illustrates. Advocating the new man is all very well in Guevara's Cuba; but unfortunately the Brazilian generals are not exactly the flower people whom Illich's theories presuppose. In 'Latin America, Capitalist Underdevelopment or Socialist Revolution?' Frank's long-promised sociology of dependence and revolution is limited to vague enquiries as to the radical potential of particular social classes. But where precisely are the specific contradictions? What are the structures of social control which political activists must confront? How do concepts like alienation apply to Latin America? The 'revolutionary' school consistently eschews such questions.

Only Germani really attempts to construct a comparative model of change. Yet even his functionalism makes a concessionary bow to dependence, with its static implications. Why in fact should 'mass mobilisation' be transitional, and to what? His eclectic 'stages of modernisation' approach is like tidying up the playroom of history: once events are under way, very little remains in place, over and above a virtually meaningless level of generality. One is left with the items by Jaguaribe and Horowitz; and these clearly imply that flux, not change, is the essence of Latin America, except in the Cuba which Fagen describes. Yet the question of Cuba's relevance for Latin America is not examined.

Only a neo-colonial setting, with its Janus-like demand for apology and superficial radicalism, could produce a sociology so devoid of genuine enquiry. Perhaps its student victims will some day redress the balance with the radical approaches in depth which are the only honest answer to Latin America's *status quo.*

COLIN HENFREY

Mexico. By Peter Calvert. *London: Ernest Benn. 1973. 361 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. ('Nations of the Modern World' series.). £3·75.*

Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City. By Richard R. Fagen and William S. Tuohy. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 209 pp. Index. £4·25.*

THESE two books offer a sharp contrast. One is a broad and well balanced history of Mexico from its independence almost to the present day, and the other a close examination of the contemporary political, administrative and social structure of a relatively small city, Jalapa, the capital and administrative centre of the state of Veracruz, with a population of just under 100,000. Dr. Calvert's book makes use of the normal sources of the historian and the notes at the end of each chapter together with the bibliographical study, incorporated as an extended topical section at the end of the book, show that he has thrown his net widely. Professor Fagen and Mr. Tuohy have used modern methods of field research *in situ*, including extensive interviews and a questionnaire compiled from the interviews and put to a random sample of the population in 1966. Dr. Calvert, well known to students of Latin America, not least for his admirable *The Mexican Revolution 1910–1914*,[1] has attempted a new approach to the exposition of history. He has divided his chapters, all of which, curiously, are entitled

[1] Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 899.

'The Revolution', into subsections, some of which are straight historical narrative, some examinations of themes arising from the narrative, some potted biographies of prominent Mexicans and, occasionally, a collection of relevant quotations which he calls 'Voices'. His aim has been to produce a book 'to be read from beginning to end' (p. 9), and to that extent he has succeeded. But the student may find this approach inconvenient if the book is to be used as a work of reference; fortunately the index is complete and competent. In view of his earlier book on the Revolution, more about the involvement of the diplomatic corps might have been expected, for it was not President Woodrow Wilson's special agent alone who was convinced of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson's complicity in the events of the *Decena Trágica* (p. 130). But this is a good history although Dr. Calvert has at times been stylistically self-indulgent. The bibliographical study is, perhaps, over-academic for the general reader and it is a pity that there is no bibliography as such.

The study of the city of Jalapa reveals the tensions inescapable in a country trying to move from underdeveloped status into that of a modern industrialised society. As the authors rightly say, the achievements of the Mexican regime cannot lightly be brushed aside:

> Not only is the aggregate economic growth that has been achieved over the past three decades impressive, but contemporary political arrangements are a real improvement over much that existed before the Revolution. . . . The average Mexican, whether urban or rural, lives in a more secure political and economic environment that did his father or grandfather, and in relation to many other Latin Americans he is demonstrably better off (p. 160).

But this relative tranquillity and progress have had to be paid for at the expense of social justice: 'The arrangements that enable a nation to become rich and powerful are not necessarily those most conducive to improving the quality of life of its citizens' (p. 171).

The fact remains that although the middle and wealthy classes have benefited most from the growth of the economy since 1940, the proportion of the population than can properly be described as underprivileged has been halved. It is interesting to note that over half the sample in Jalapa thought that Mexico was making 'a great deal' of economic and social progress, and though only a few (11–17 per cent.) thought themselves to be benefiting 'a great deal', about a third said they were benefiting 'a little' (p. 176). Even from so narrowly focused a study, much can be learned which is applicable to the country as a whole. But the authors are careful not to claim too much and point out that though the interrelation between the economies of Mexico and the United States is of great importance, the relative factors are of limited importance in Jalapa, and they are, therefore, not discussed (p. 18). This is a valuable study; the appendices are useful and the index competent.

J. A. CAMACHO

Brazil Struggles for Development. By Gordon Campbell. *London: Charles Knight. 1973. 206 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·00.*

A Question of Survival for the Indians of Brazil. By Robin Hanbury-Tenison. Foreword by the Duke of Edinburgh. *London: Angus & Robertson. 1973. 272 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £3·50.*

THESE two books are, in a way, complementary; the one about development

and the other about the effect of that development on the aboriginal tribes in the interior of Brazil.

A London publisher used to warn against 'putting journalism between pasteboard'. In a sense Mr. Gordon Campbell's book is precisely that; but he is a good and perceptive journalist who is also an economist and has been correspondent for the *Financial Times* in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. He writes in an easy, unpretentious style and his sympathy for his subject does not blind him to the problems that must be faced or to the faults of the Brazilians and their leaders. He deals objectively with the forecasts of Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, of the Hudson Institute, that, on the basis of probable rates of population and economic growth, the average Brazilian would be earning 'only a meagre 500 dollars a year' by the year 2000 (p. 180). Mr. Campbell also quotes with approval the analysis, by the Brazilian economist Henrique Simonsen, of the needs of the country and the way in which the gloomy forecasts of Kahn and Wiener could be proved wrong. The fact is that the population growth, though still alarming, has slightly declined, and the economic growth has been greater and more sustained than could have been predicted.

Mr. Campbell does not write exclusively about economic matters and his book does not quote masses of figures; in fact there is a surprising absence of tables, of which some would have been useful. The introductory chapter on the people and the land is perhaps over-brief, but the treatment of the Vargas era and the experiment in democracy which followed is well judged and illuminating, as are the next five chapters, tracing the country's political, social and economic development from the government of Castello Branco, which began with the military revolt of 1964, to the present government of General Emilio Garrastazú Médici. The drought-ridden Northeast, and Amazônia and the Centre-West, are sensibly dealt with in two separate chapters. It is in the last chapter, 'Brazil and the year 2000', that Mr. Campbell reveals the underlying optimism which characterises the work of so many students of Latin America, when he writes of 'the patriotism and quickness of mind of the average citizen, the factory worker's capacity for work and ability to learn, [and] the powers of endurance of the peasant' (p. 186). This is a very useful introduction to modern Brazil. The bibliography is barely adequate but the book is well indexed.

One of the sad consequences of the growth and development of Brazil is the gradual elimination of the aboriginal tribes and cultures. Mr. Hanbury-Tenison's highly personal book is the result of a visit of inspection made to see whether the recommendations made by the International Red Cross for the improvement of the lot of the Amazonian Indians had been implemented by the Brazilian government. The answer, briefly, is that they had not, and the author is justifiably indignant about much of what he found. The sad decline and ultimate corruption and dissolution of the Indian Protection Service (SPI) from the days when it achieved so much under Cândido Mariano Rondon had deplorable consequences. 'One hundred and thirty-four of its functionaries were being prosecuted for crimes ranging from murder to theft' (p. 21). The work of its successor, the *Fundacão Nacional do Indio*, has been patchy, its director only doubtfully aware of the task to be done and many of its officers wholly out of sympathy with the Indians it is their duty to care for. But there is unstinted praise for the work of the Villas Boas brothers in the Xingú National Park, in spite of the effect of the road being driven through what was its northern sector, and

for that of Helio Bucker in Mato Grosso. One example of the latter's imaginative approach is the Bororo tribe which he revitalised from a state of lethargic depression caused by the repressive measures of an SPI official and some missionaries (p. 140). Mr. Hanbury-Tenison ends by asking: 'Are we so uncivilized that we must destroy even this last remnant of the Eden from which we were banished aeons ago? Can we not let it survive a little longer and perhaps learn from the remaining residents a thing or two about our own chances of survival? ' (p. 253).

The answers are not so simple as they may appear to the anthropological idealist. It must be doubted whether the need for growth and development, so admirably described by Mr. Campbell, is reconcilable with the preservation and isolation of these Indian cultures. But certainly no effort should be spared to ensure that their integration into modern Brazil is not accompanied by misery and degradation.

J. A. CAMACHO

Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile. By Alan Angell. *London: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1972. 289 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

IT is today no longer necessary to justify a book about Chile by referring to its unique, almost unbroken democratic tradition, its election of the first Marxist president, and so on. These facts are so well known that their recital kills rather than stimulates interest. But Angell's is one of the very few books written in the last decade about Chile's political life which manages to be genuinely objective and balanced without being insipid. Even as it whimsically pricks one, two and more of each and every party's rhetorical balloons and self-righteous arguments, it does so without sacrificing genuine sympathy for each and everyone of those same parties, as well as for all the different sections of the working class.

The first and shorter of the two parts into which the book is divided is a history of the Chilean labour movement and its political involvements essentially up to the late 1950s. (I would have included Chapter 5, 'Socialism and Communism: I', in Part I rather than Part II, because it does not substantially go beyond that period.) This is perhaps the least satisfying section of the book, but it is doubtful whether the author is to be blamed. It is difficult to get excited today over the battles of the 1920s and 1930s between Communists, Anarcho-Syndicalists, Trotskyists, early Social Christians, potential and, later, actual Socialists (the party was not founded until 1932) and the kaleidoscopic, evanescent and invariably weak confederations and counter-confederations to which these battles and rivalries gave rise. The confusion of the events themselves and the quickly shifting allegiances and policies of individuals and groups naturally make for somewhat sluggish writing and reading. Nevertheless, this book could not have dispensed with a historical section, because some of the early strains continue today in much the same manner, and partly for basically the same reasons as those which originally gave rise to them forty or fifty years ago. Some parts of the story are told with greater clarity and against a broader canvas in other books dealing in part with Chilean labour, for example in Robert

Alexander's *Communism in Latin America.*[1] But on balance, this is as good a condensed history of Chilean labour and the parties of the left as any other available in English.

The book really begins to shine, however, in the longer, second part. This is essentially a description and analysis of the very elusive and subtle relationships during the last decade between labour and the four major political parties which have a positive interest in the labour movement, *i.e.*, Radicals, Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists. The careful description of the union departments of each of these parties—their position within the party on the one hand, and their relationship to party members and cadres in the unions on the other—is unique, and indicates that the author must have been thoroughly trusted by key members of all four of these warring entities: a confidence which neither in fact nor in tone he has anywhere betrayed.

In the title of the book's final chapter Angell does himself an injustice by rather repetitiously once again referring to 'Unions and Parties'. In fact, the chapter adds much new material on the structure and function of the Central Labour Confederation, and might well have been entitled 'The CUT'. This chapter is followed by two appendices, one dealing very concisely with agrarian unionism and the other with international entanglements; chiefly the almost farcical efforts of the American Federation of Labor to control Chilean labour development, to which it never got close despite spending literally millions of dollars.

Those looking for a clear-cut analysis of labour's political relations, or even for a clear description, will not find it, mainly because the facts do not permit it. The parties do not control the unions: they do not even necessarily control those members and officials who belong to them. Even less, of course, do the unions control the parties. It is all a matter of mutual influence and dependence; of tensions and balances; of shifts over time and differences between one party and another. Officials will often give primary allegiance to the union and what is good for it (since they would not otherwise survive union elections); and yet this has to be placed side by side with the equally unquestionable fact that practically all divisions within the union movement are along party-political lines. The apparent contradiction can be resolved when one realises that the position of each of the four parties *vis-à-vis* any controversial issue is usually one which any four reasonable unionists could have taken *qua* unionists. Even the position of defending government restraints on wages and strikes (a burden which, ironically, has been carried in turn by Radicals, Christian Democrats, and now Socialists and Communists) will touch a responsive chord in that patriotic feeling which is one of the distinguishing and unifying characteristics of the Chilean working class—which is not to say that parochialism is absent: far from it—and which binds it to other classes. Angell's book captures these subtleties very well. He might have pointed the analysis a little more and shortened the description to balance it; and there are the usual minor errors, for example, Bishop Manuel Larrain was not a Jesuit, and on page 190 the reference is probably to Arica rather than to Africa! Hopefully, Angell will be able to maintain his objective, yet sympathetic, stance towards everyone in the much more close-to-the-brink period through which Chile is now

[1] New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1958, p. 267.

passing, so that he can continue a story he has begun in a highly workmanlike manner.

HENRY LANDSBERGER

Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics. By Miles D. Wolpin. *Lexington, Toronto, London: Heath. 1972. 414 pp. Bibliog. Index. £7·50.*

Small Earthquake in Chile. A Visit to Allende's South America. By Alistair Horne. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 335 pp. Illus. Bibliog. £3·95.*

IT is a common assumption among students of Latin American politics that the Cuban revolution has had a profound influence in that continent. Moreover it is generally agreed that the impact of Cuba is far from falling exclusively on the Latin American left; indeed, there is a good case for arguing that the right, and the United States, have learnt more from Cuba than the would-be imitators.

Yet there have been few attempts to explore the implications of the Cuban revolution for the politics of other Latin American countries. Miles Wolpin's book is a welcome attempt to examine just what Cuba meant for Chilean politics. The exercise is not easy. Different groups had distinct, often opposed, perceptions of the Cuban revolution. And those perceptions were interacting with many other, and stronger, influences on politics and the economy. It is clearly difficult to isolate the effect of one factor in a complex political system.

Wolpin is well aware of this and is usually cautious and balanced in his assessments (though he makes some bizarre predictions about the future of Chilean politics, foreseeing the possible development of an Indonesian-style situation). But the book is not so convincing in its analysis of the Chilean political system. There are far too many references, and equal weight seems to be given to the opinions and 'facts' of committed, biased partisans as to those of more detached observers. There is too much reliance on rather poor public opinion surveys. Wolpin is very severe in his judgments on Frei's Christian Democratic government. Compared with the economic performance of previous administrations, and compared with the progress so far of Allende's government, the Christian Democratic performance does not look *so* complete a failure as Wolpin claims.

If the arguments of the book are rather inconclusive, this is probably inherent in the nature of the subject, and does not mean that the effort was not worth undertaking. All parties and all politicians reacted strongly and in different ways to the Cuban revolution. Especially in the 1964 presidential campaign, propaganda of the right and of the Christian Democrats played very heavily on fears of communism and Castroism. Castro's hostility to the United States, aggressive foreign policy and unorthodox economic policy deeply affected the thinking of the Socialist party. And Guevara served and serves as a model for groups further to the left. Wolpin's book usefully concentrates our attention on this international aspect of Chilean politics.

When reading Alistair Horne's book, it is necessary to bear in mind his initial caution: 'this book is, consciously, an incomplete and impressionistic account' (p. 14). At this level it succeeds—above all, it does convey an *impression*. Alistair Horne's sympathies lie to the right of Allende. The

book contains an accurate account of middle-class reaction to the Allende regime: cynical, frightened, uncertain but not yet despairing.

The most interesting and original parts lie in his account of the rural rebels of southern Chile, and the tragic story of the Teoponte guerrillas in Bolivia. These sections do much more than compensate for superficial judgments on Colombia, or indeed on Chile. Perhaps Alistair Horne exaggerates the importance of people like Commandante Pepe, but it is valuable to have an account of their ideas, their actions and beliefs. It is good to get away from Santiago politics to glimpse the rather different world of the rural South; too few writers or journalists escape from the confines of the metropolitan area.

ALAN ANGELL

Fidel Castro Speaks. Ed. by Martin Kenner and James Petras. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972. 426 pp. Bibliog. (The Pelican Latin American Library. Gen. Ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·75.*

Revolutionary Struggle 1947–1958: Volume 1 of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro. Ed. with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdés. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The M.I.T. Press. 1972. 471 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. $12.50. £5·65.*

Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution. By Lowry Nelson. Foreword by Mose L. Harvey. *Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1972. (U.K. Distributors: Oxford University Press.) 242 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

It is perhaps amazing, as the editors of *Fidel Castro Speaks* suggest, that no collection of Castro's speeches had appeared in the United States before this one was first published in 1969.[1] The omission is being made good in a substantial way. It looks, for example, as if Volume 1 of the *Selected Works of Fidel Castro* is the first of what will be a long series; for Castro makes many speeches and they are very long. This volume covers his output until the eve of the success of the revolution and includes even the meagre material from his university days, as well as the famous 'History Will Absolve Me' speech at his trial, after the failure of the attack on the Moncada barracks on July 26th 1953, and letters, declarations, interviews and speeches during his imprisonment and exile, and throughout the guerrilla war. The introduction takes up a quarter of the book and tells the story of Castro's life up to and including 1958, with clarity and objectivity. This will be an invaluable book for future historians. The two bibliographies, one supplementary and the other of Castro's works, are admirable, and the book is well indexed.

The Penguin collection is less ambitious and covers only speeches from 1959 to 1968. The grouping into main subjects and the disregard of chronological order even within each group, coupled with the fact that the 'contents' gives no dates, which are to be found only in a footnote on the first page of each speech, and the absence of an index, make the book difficult to use. A curious omission is the speech of December 1961 in which Castro declared, 'I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last days of my life'.

[1] New York: Grove Press. 1969; London: Allen Lane. 1970.

Students of Cuba had long been familiar with Dr. Lowry Nelson's *Rural Cuba*,[2] published in 1950. That he should now attempt to assess the Castro revolution promised an interesting analysis; but it has not quite worked out as might have been hoped. The book is presented in a reasonably objective style but it soon becomes clear that Dr. Nelson is not just a non-Marxist, which applies to most English-speaking writers on Castro's Cuba, but is determined to see little good in the Castro regime. He may of course turn out to be right; few who are not committed Marxists have had the opportunity of going to see for themselves. Dr. Nelson himself has had to compile his book on the basis of available statistics and the evidence of others, including some of the 600,000 Cuban refugees who have mainly gone to the United States. Dr. Nelson draws attention to the fact that at the time of the revolution the Cuban economy was expanding and that in most sectors production has since declined. This perhaps is not surprising after a total break with the dominant trading partner and foreign investor. In regard to the sugar industry he points out that American-owned sugar mills produced nearly 37 per cent. of the sugar, whereas Cuban-owned mills produced 62 per cent., and adds that many Cubans held stock in American-owned sugar companies (p. 62). He makes no mention of any American participation in the ostensibly Cuban-owned companies. He agrees that the Cuban programme of education must be considered a major achievement. 'But', he finds it necessary to add, 'one may question the advantage of reading skills to Cubans whose reading matter is completely censored' (p. 187).

Dr. Nelson generously says that the regime must be given credit for its effort to improve the standard of morals, but notes reports of continued sexual relations outside marriage (as if the permissive society were exclusive to Cuba) and of the persistence of prostitution (not exactly eradicated elsewhere). He does pay a less qualified tribute to the effort to eradicate corruption and achieve political integrity. Very little attention is paid to Castro's struggle with the old guard communists, and even Aníbal Escalante gets no more than a brief reference to his trial and imprisonment (pp. 181–182). Curiously, the Bay of Pigs invasion receives no more than four passing references and the missile crisis only two. At best Dr. Nelson has produced a useful corrective to others who have shown greater sympathy for the revolution, such as Hugh Thomas, James O'Connor and Richard R. Fagen. He ends gloomily: '. . . Cubans must face the prospect in the immediate years ahead of continued hardships without hope of improvement. Unrest and discontent cannot fail to continue and increase (p. 206). This is difficult to square with Professor Fagen's statement that 'the revolutionary élite has demonstrated an impressive capacity for mobilizing the Cuban citizenry.'[3] Perhaps the explanation of Dr. Nelson's attitude is to be found in his review of relations between Cuba and the United States where he writes: 'But Castro's rebellion against the United States was possible only because of the cold war . . .' (p. 34). True, of course; but it may be that the use of the word 'rebellion' is more revealing than Dr. Nelson intended. The selected bibliography is useful and the index good.

J. A. CAMACHO

[2] Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1950. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1952, p. 134.

[3] Richard R. Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1969), p. 151.

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History. By Maurice Halperin. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1973. 380 pp. Illus. Index. £5·85.*

WHAT a pleasure it is to read this lucid account of the early years of Castro's Cuba—an account which is at the same time scholarly and readable, sympathetic and critical. The author, who spent three years in the Soviet Union and six in Cuba, has, among other academic qualifications, a doctorate in literature. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that he should express himself with clarity; but it is more particularly the unusual manner in which he has marshalled and presented his facts which enables him to put into such sharp relief significant trends in the country's economic and political development. To quote his preface:

> The main narrative of the present volume is concerned with the first five years of Fidel Castro's regime and its external relations. This is primarily the period of the rise of Fidel Castro, although it was also the time when the seeds of decline were sown. The symbiotic relationship between rise and decline is illustrated by means of digressions into the following years, when the seeds have sprouted and reveal the shape and measure of the decline.

Subject-matter, then, rather than chronology, has determined the lay-out of this book.

Quite rightly, in my view, the author has devoted two complete chapters to the Bay of Pigs invasion, since this was a watershed in Cuban-American relations which gave the Cubans not only an enormous boost to their morale, but also an excuse to clamp down ruthlessly on counter-revolutionary activities. The whole American adventure turned out, of course, to be the sort of disaster which made our own Suez affair look like a successful Sunday afternoon picnic, but the author writes with understanding of President Kennedy's personal dilemma and the decisions he took.

His commentary on the Russian rockets crisis I find less convincing. He claims, among other things, that the 'five points' demanded by Castro immediately after Khrushchev's capitulation were an example of his political acumen, and describes his action as 'a brilliant tour de force'. Few diplomats—Western or communist—who were there at the time would agree. As I remember it, we all interpreted these demands as the near hysterical outburst of a prestigious leader beside himself with rage at the cavalier fashion in which he had been treated. (Not one of those points, incidentally, has been met; today the Americans still occupy Guantanamo, Cuban air space continues to be 'violated' by reconnaissance planes and the economic blockade persists.)

The pomp and circumstance of Castro's subsequent red carpet visit to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1963 is treated in fascinating detail. Few people in the Western world can have realised the impact this forty-day public relations exercise had on Castro—and indeed the impact Castro had on the Russian people. Some of it was hokum, no doubt; much of it, however, was genuine, and I know from Castro's own lips that for this highly emotional leader who loves to be loved it was all undiluted euphoria.

How far the ups and downs of Cuban-Soviet relations have been determined by the state of the Cuban economy is another subject which receives the author's particular attention. Remarkably, the daily \$1–\$1½ million injection of Soviet aid has continued to be piped in without interruption

for ten whole years—although the piper has not always been able to call the tune. For several good reasons—most of them economic—in certain respects Castro has had to become a Soviet puppet; but, as the author shows, thanks to his political acumen, his slippery daring, his ability to somersault his way out of difficulties, he has remained a puppet with an astonishing degree of independence.

'There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.' So wrote Machiavelli in 1513, and the author quotes him by way of preface to this book. The picture of Castro which emerges from this study is that of an initiator of a new order of things, still insufficiently conscious of the awful truth of this dictum. Professor Halperin's incisive probing shows all too clearly how certain weaknesses in Castro's temperament and character have developed in ten years of absolute power. It shows how his early liberal idealism was distorted under various pressures, how in spite of his truly remarkable dynamism, humanity and depth of feeling for his country, his lack of expertise and judgment in economic affairs has time and again put the survival of his 'socialist monarchy' at risk.

Professor Halperin promises another volume to bring his account up to date. Most readers of this present work will, I believe, look forward to its sequel.

HERBERT MARCHANT

The Structure, Performance and Prospects of Central Banking in the Caribbean. By Clive Y. Thomas. *Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 1972. 77 pp. Index. J$2·00.*

The Significance of non-Bank Financial Intermediaries in the Caribbean: An Analysis of Patterns of Financial Structure and Development. By Maurice A. Odle. *Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 1972. 212 pp. Index. J$2·50.*

Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaica. By Norman Girvan. *Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 1972. 282 pp. Bibliog. Index. J$3·50.*

The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica. By Owen Jefferson. *Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 1972. 302 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. J$3·50.*

The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization: Jamaica 1944–62. By Trevor Munroe. *Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 1972. 239 pp. Bibliog. Index. J$3·50.*

WITH the major universities of the tropical Commonwealth now a generation old, there are emerging changes in economic diagnosis and analysis which reflect priorities from the viewpoint of the economists belonging to the less developed countries. In the West Indies these changes have taken the form of a school of thought which sets out to describe backwardness

in terms of features inherited from colonial history and which highlights the continued absence of local control in major economic fields. A previous volume in this series, Beckford's *Persistent Poverty*,[1] contains the kernel of this philosophy. This book and those reviewed should be much more widely used in courses in 'development economics' in Europe and North America. In fact they appear to be difficult to come by in most of the relevant libraries; this is a pity since they contain many new ideas, or at the least new priorities, which should command attention.

Professor Clive Thomas's book on the central banks emphasises the continued traditionalism of these new institutions and picks particularly on the Bank of Jamaica. The first concern of this bank has been with the stabilisation of the internal price level and maintaining the close relationship between the Jamaica dollar and sterling (one can hardly say 'maintaining a stable currency' because sterling was not very stable in the period reviewed). The author feels that far too little attention was given to developing a positive monetary and fiscal policy that would foster growth, and far too much freedom was allowed to the large multinational and other enterprises to move cash and capital around without reference to the effect on cash ratios and reserves. Maurice Odle brings together a wealth of statistical data on insurance companies, government savings banks and other non-bank financial institutions. Here again the emphasis is on the irrelevance of many of the imported institutions to local conditions and the tendency for indigenous institutions to mirror closely the customs evolved elsewhere. A tremendous amount of hard work has gone into the tabulation of this data from sources which usually suffer, not so much from lack of accuracy as from lack of availability, and Mr. Odle is to be congratulated on overcoming this barrier. It is not entirely clear, however, what is a bank and what is a non-bank, and it is difficult to see why some development banking institutions have been included and others left out.

Norman Girvan's book is convincing enough in supporting the thesis that multinational companies and other large foreign investors continue to tie West Indian economies to foreign interests and these are generally in conflict with local interests in the fields of economics, social advance and political independence. However, the argument that Jamaica would have been better off without bauxite, although implied, is never really proven. For the argument to have been valid it would have been necessary to demonstrate that the capital invested in bauxite would have been available for alternatives giving a higher ratio of employment to capital and more linkages with other sectors. While it is realistic in the West Indies context to use economic analysis to support a basically political standpoint, the case is not strengthened by weak methodology. Much greater use could have been made of existing data in the macro-statistical field. Mr. Jefferson's book is more factual and more conventional, but it is a valuable source of information on a country whose importance in development studies far exceeds its importance purely in size. Certain important problems, and in particular that of income distribution, are given far less space than they deserve.

Dr. Munroe's book is a competent and original contribution to the political history of Jamaica in the period 1944–62, but the style suffers

[1] London: Oxford University Press. 1972.

somewhat from the fact that it was originally written as a thesis. The main point of interest is the part played by elite groups in the evolution of Jamaican politics and the relatively small part played by mass movements. The discussion is not, however, carried to the point of considering whether mass movements in themselves run the risk of becoming in the end the new elite groups—as with many trade union movements in more developed countries. The practical problems of putting more opportunity in the way of the small man are neglected in all these studies and one feels that in the end it is in the back rooms of many of the much maligned money institutions that more is being done, mainly because it is on a person to person basis. This is not to deny that there is a great deal of room for improvement in the structure of these and the other institutions discussed.

CARLEEN O'LOUGHLIN

The Caribbean Community: Changing Societies and U.S. Policy. Robert D. Crassweller. *London: Pall Mall for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1972. 468 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean. Ed. by Emanuel de Kadt. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1972. 188 pp. Map. Index. £3·50.*

ALL studies containing 'the Caribbean' in their titles must perforce deal with the political, historical, economic and cultural fragmentation which this amorphous geopolitical region has always exhibited. In recent years a number of foreign social scientists (one thinks particularly of Richard Morse and Sidney Mintz) have attempted to provide historical and structural justification for the idea of a Caribbean experience *sui generis.* And local social scientists, notably in Puerto Rico and the West Indies, are usually as persuaded of the validity of the immanent regional idea as they are uneasily aware of the multiplicity of local variations on the Caribbean theme.

Blame for this fragmented and frustrating state of affairs is placed on European colonialism and North American imperialism. And of course they, along with geography, are to blame. Radical criticism of foreign influences is joined to the appealing notion that there exists a Caribbean people waiting to be united after having been artificially kept apart throughout their history by the selfish, singular interests of the imperial powers. Among the West Indians, the Trinidad Marxist sage, C. L. R. James, has been one of the chief apostles of this historical mission. On a more scholarly level, the Trinidad Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, in 1970 published a major work on the region which integrates historical with contemporary political analysis—with the aim of promoting regional co-operation. Thus, despite the romantic and utopian strain which often permeates discussions of a new emerging Caribbean, it is undeniable that there is today an unprecedented amount of movement within and between the Caribbean territories. Moreover, to judge by the general thrust of Robert D. Crassweller's study, this tendency towards Caribbean convergence can expect the qualified approval of the United States.

The author of *The Caribbean Community* knows the region well. He has previously written a study of Trujillo and has worked for Pan

American Airways. While he was writing this study he was a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and was employed as Staff Counsel for Latin America by International Telephone and Telegraph. These mundane, and to some even sinister, qualifications may detract from the scholarship of the volume, but Mr. Crassweller is not so much interested in scholarship as he is in advocating the concept of Caribbean convergence, the furtherance of which American policy in the region should, in his view, support. Hence this study is basically an attempt to provide a synthesis of a range of policy ideas towards pending changes in the Caribbean in the late 1960s. It is interesting both for the ideas it proposes and those to which it fails to give serious attention. There is no adequate discussion, for example, of how socialist Cuba would function in relation to its capitalist neighbours. Here the author's purpose has been overtaken by the surprising speed of the Kissinger-Nixon detente, which came after this book went to press. It is now possible to think previously unthinkable thoughts in the Caribbean since the relaxation in the East-West confrontation has mitigated the pressures preventing more natural regional associations. Nor does the book reflect the recent flowering of economic nationalism in the West Indies after Guyana's nationalisation of Alcan's bauxite operations in 1971. It is doubtful whether such measures, although anathema only a few years ago, are today viewed with the same degree of disfavour in Washington. On the whole, current American policy towards greater Caribbean unity does seem to be in accord with the non-obtrusive, supportive posture which Crassweller recommends as the replacement for the gunboat-and-marine overkill of American involvement in the past.

The march of recent events has less seriously affected the timeliness of the papers edited by Emanuel de Kadt. The editor has provided an introduction which gives the reader a concise background to the contemporary situation in the region, including the problems of the Caribbean Free Trade Area, CARIFTA. Here are illustrated for the first time in the Caribbean the issues arising from the attempt to create a larger overall economic grouping without the lion's share of development and trade being monopolised by the larger units such as Jamaica and Trinidad. And, as several of the individual papers in this book show, the question of regional integration is obviously closely bound up with the very differing political and economic relations that Caribbean states have with the outside world. All are subjected to the fact of economic dependency and dominant foreign influences but these greatly differ between the case of revolutionary Cuba, ably discussed by Robin Blackburn, and such officially dependent states as the French Antilles, or the Dutch Caribbean. Somewhere in between, in terms of foreign control, lie the British territories with post-1953 Guyana being—as Colin Henfrey shows—the prize exhibit of the incalculable damage done to a society by ill-considered metropolitan intervention. This is a very useful and scholarly collection which gains in coherence from its focus on a specific single feature of Caribbean life, which is the major constraint on reducing the historic division of the region: the fact of foreign dominance.

I. P. OXAAL

The Mechanics of Independence: Patterns of Political and Economic Transformation in Trinidad and Tobago. By A. N. R. Robinson. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The M.I.T. Press. 1971. 200 pp. Bibliog. Index. $8.95. £4·20.*

A. N. R. ROBINSON, as a leading statesman in Trinidad and Tobago during a critical period in the economic and political development of his country, brings to this study of an emerging nation not only technical knowledge based on first-hand experience but also, what is much more important, an acute perception of political realities and a clear vision of the lines of advance open to the various political communities in the Caribbean. Particularly impressive is the last of the three sections into which the book is divided, entitled 'Dynamics of Transformation', in which is discussed, in political and social terms, the shift from dependence to independence, and which concludes with a perceptive analysis of the choices facing not only Trinidad and Tobago, but most of the islands of the Caribbean. Those choices are, bluntly, Caribbean unity on a pattern based on factors peculiar to the region, association with Cuba and the communist world, or a reversion to a form of colonial dependence with the United States replacing previous metropolitan powers. Mr. Robinson is a powerful advocate of the first of these alternatives. He is fully aware of the immense, at times seemingly insuperable, difficulties in the way of achieving an effective and harmonious relationship among the Caribbean communities, but at the same time, given the good will and good sense of major powers, sees some hope of its accomplishment.

While the treatment of political issues is the most interesting and valuable part of the book, other sections have their own merits. In the first section the discussion of the colonial era is useful as a source of background information if not particularly enlightening. The second section, on economic problems, contains a great deal of detailed technical information combined with a measure of perceptive analysis.

Altogether, Mr. Robinson has produced a work well worthy of the attention not only of all who are interested in the Caribbean area but of all whose interest is the problems of developing countries anywhere in the world.

GEOFFREY SEED

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

The Continental Commitment: The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars. By Michael Howard. *London: Temple Smith. 1972. 176 pp. Index. (The Ford Lectures in the University of Oxford 1971.) £2·40.*

The Collapse of British Power. By Correlli Barnett. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1972. 643 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

ALTHOUGH these two books are both concerned with British power and strategy, they are very disparate. Michael Howard takes a relatively limited subject and explores it with scholarship and judgment. Since his subject is central to an understanding of Britain's position in the world in the 20th century it is of cardinal importance; and it is elucidated with perceptive insight into the larger issues.

The problem for British strategy was that Britain was an imperial power geographically close to the continent. Geography could not be changed; nor, at the drop of a hat, could imperial commitments or the attitudes of mind and the 'institutional habits and practical interests' (p. 9) that went with them. The empire was strong and weak—strong to the extent that rulers and ruled believed in it; weak when the confidence trick failed and it had to be defended. Britain could not defend the empire if it was seriously challenged; but the attempt to defend it, as a result of imperial habit, was at the cost of European defence or the maintenance of the European balance of power. 'But if that balance were to be overthrown, for how long would Home Defence be possible? And if Home Defence was not possible, what would happen to the Empire?' (p. 120).

Michael Howard also gives proper weight to the fresh note in strategic discussions after the First World War—the question of what the people could be told, what the taxpayer would bear, and how he would shape up in a crisis. The people gave no help to the dilemma of British defence: they looked to the outer world before Europe—to Abyssinia rather than the Rhineland. Their wish for collective security made a poor blend with the vacillation of their government, with even worse consequences for strategy.

There were dilemmas from which there was no easy escape. But it would have been possible to operate better within the constraints. Michael Howard's study shows the shortcomings in professional competence and determination. The development of bomber power for use in Europe had some sense, although also some dangers. Neither the danger nor even the detailed use of air power was studied, with the result that 'So far from providing any kind of deterrent, the Royal Air Force found itself most effectively deterred' (p. 112). Towns in Germany were different targets from villages in Iraq.

Correlli Barnett has written a much larger book and asked much larger questions. Historians' explanations, he says, have been partial explanations. They have not explained '*why* such a particular stamp of men as Baldwin and MacDonald . . . held sway in British politics . . . *why* British governments handled international crises in the feeble and nerveless way they did . . . *why* the Empire was allowed to remain a source of strategic weakness and danger' (p. 19). There are philosophical problems in this kind of total explanation—there has to be some constant against which to make comparisons. That aside, I do not find that Correlli Barnett's rather noisy and declamatory work provides satisfactory answers. He is very much an 'either-or' man who draws sharp contrasts. Colonial policy, in his view, is *either* directed towards the interests of the imperial power *or* designed to further the interests of native peoples; and 'British colonial policy between the wars was . . . an essay in altruism' (p. 125), a statement which I find only less plausible than the comparison that the French empire was a 'great State enterprise, organised and directed from head office in pursuit of clear and logical policies' (p. 126).

The argument is coarse-grained as well as combative. For example, the author concerns himself with the problem of the Anglo-American relationship, which is central to his study, and offers the view that:

> There was therefore every strategic, economic and psychological justification for England to see in the United States the successor to Imperial Germany, Napoleonic and Bourbon France and Philip II's Spain as an overwhelming super-power dangerous to English prosperity and independence, even if armed aggression was hardly to be expected (p. 257).

Would that politics were so simple. In fact the United States surely is both an ally with which Britain has much in common and an expansive rival—there is the problem.

The root of the trouble, according to Correlli Barnett, lay in the insidious growth through the 19th century of romanticism, evangelical religion, liberalism, internationalism and similar outlooks which sapped the will of the nation, including its governing classes. There is not much in the way of explanation here, beyond a rather familiar argument about the shortcomings of the public schools and the dearth of technological education. Having taken his stand on the virtues of the 18th century 'men hard of mind and hard of will. Aggressive and acquisitive, they saw foreign policy in terms of concrete interests.' (p. 20), the author is often more concerned with asserting his point than with intellectual enquiry.

Unfortunately the structure of the book does not help. It is not all grand or grandiloquent argument: there are also detailed passages closely related to the Cabinet papers and similar sources (indeed sometimes written too close to the source). But the book is divided into six parts of widely unequal length—the longest 344 pages. 'There are no chapters', we are told, 'so that within each part the argument is pursued without interruption'. But surely the rest of the world's authors, who have divided their books into chapters, were well advised to do so. Correlli Barnett shifts too easily from one strand of argument to another. Explanations of detailed events often fall back on general statements, as that 'Businessmen . . . continued to lack the inner restlessness of American and German businessmen and the pleasure of these nations in efficiency and growth *per se*' p. 486) or 'This Lear-like self-delusion not only marked the tragic decline of Chamberlain's own character, but also the climax of the whole tragedy of the England whose virtue Chamberlain so well represented'. In answer to the big questions there are too many half truths which do not even have the virtue of novelty and Correlli Barnett's method certainly runs the risk that anyone wanting to study the events of the interwar years in detail will look in one of the several excellent if more limited studies within this period.

WILFRID KNAPP

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. Second Series. Vol. XII: European Affairs, August 5, 1934–April 18, 1935. Ed. by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert. *London: H.M.S.O. 1972. 929 pp. £9·50.*

THE second series of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939* covers the years 1929 to 1938, the years of the Great Depression, the accession to office of Hitler in Germany and the turning of the balance of power in Europe against the Western democracies. When the series begins, with the 1930 London naval conference, Britain was still the greatest world-wide maritime power, France the greatest land power. When eventually the series is finished with the year 1938 these states will be seen in full flight from Germany's sweep to conquer Europe. The present volume deals with European affairs during the decisive period from August 1934, when Hitler had already taken Germany out of the World Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, to April 1935, when Italy was still working

with Britain and France to curb Germany's resurgence but when this co-operation was about to be swept away by Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia.

The volume consists, as usual, of selected correspondence between the Foreign Office and British diplomats abroad, with occasional papers by Foreign Office chiefs, like Orme Sargent and Vansittart, and reports by Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, and Anthony Eden, then Lord Privy Seal, on their discussions at Geneva and visits to Berlin and Moscow (where Eden went alone) in 1935. Of outstanding interest are the accounts, percipient and unbamboozled, by Sir Eric Phipps, on the first years of the Nazi dictatorship (especially Nos. 120 and 208). Phipps concluded a hilarious report on Göring's wedding in April 1935 with the words: 'General Göring would thus seem to have reached the apogee of his vainglorious career. I see for him and his megalomania no higher goal, apart from the throne, unless indeed it be . . . the scaffold' (No. 733). The more one sees of these documents the more obvious it is that British ministers certainly had the facts before them had they chosen to use them.

But what could they do? The centrepiece of the present volume is the rearmament of Germany officially announced by Hitler along with the introduction of conscription on March 16, 1935 (No. 570). In the previous November Phipps had been instructed to protest to the Chancellor about illicit German rearmament (No. 215) but unless Britain and France were to march into Germany and stop it—and it was doubtful whether even that was legal under the Locarno agreements of 1925—there was little they could do. At the Stresa conference in April 1935, the full minutes of which are published here for the first time, Britain, France and Italy pledged themselves to 'oppose any unilateral repudiation of Treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe' (No. 722). But none knew how.

F. S. Northedge

La destra tedesca e il fascimo. By Klaus-Peter Hoepke. *Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino. 1971. 419 pp. Bibliog. Index. Lire 5,000.*

The above is a much improved Italian version of Dr. Hoepke's *Die deutsche Rechte und der italienische Faschismus*, reviewed in *International Affairs* in October 1970 (p. 748). While some of the defects of the German original remain (the German 'rightist' interpretations of Fascism which are analysed are mostly those of obscure and unrepresentative figures, and insufficient use has been made of the unpublished German records), the author has placed us in his debt by incorporating highly important new material, such as General Capello's memorandum on the German Right (1924) and the secret reports of Giuseppe Renzetti, who was the principal intermediary between Hitler and Mussolini from 1931 to 1933. He has also drawn on important published sources previously overlooked, including the memoirs of Bastianini and Göring's articles in the *Völkischer Beobachter*. The value of the Italian translation is further enhanced by a revised bibliography, brought up to 1971.

Meir Michaelis

Portrait of a Decision: The Council of Four and the Treaty of Versailles. By Howard Elcock. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1972. 386 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

THE publishers of this latest work on the Paris peace conference claim that it is 'the first comprehensive reassessment of the negotiations in Paris since those who were present wrote their memoirs'. The author more modestly says that his aim has been 'to make some sense of the peace negotiations, and to reveal something of the motives, personalities and actions of the chief participants'. Thirty-four pages of bibliographical references bear witness to the fact that Mr. Elcock has worked his way conscientiously through the vast bulk of available primary and secondary source material, but the resulting text, far from shedding extra light on the proceedings of the peace conference, jumbles motives, personalities and policies together in a chronological progression which will confuse the general reader and tell the specialist little that he has not gleaned already from previously published works.

The two main defects of the book are its inadequate analytical framework and its abundance of errors. Mr. Elcock has deliberately eschewed a 'sophisticated methodological framework' in favour of a 'simple analytical account', but this does not deal adequately or in any depth with the numerous interconnected issues of procedure and policy which had to be faced and dealt with by the decision-makers at Paris. More seriously, the inaccuracies and misleading generalisations which litter the text will make it hazardous reading for students.

To give but a few examples: Sir John Philimore (p. 14) is presumably Sir Walter Phillimore, and the Washington Conference of 1920 (p. 142) is undoubtedly that of 1921–22. The League Commission at Paris did not base its work on an 'American draft, prepared by members of the Commission to Negotiate Peace' (p. 84) but on a compromise Anglo-American draft prepared by Hurst and Miller, the legal advisers to the British and American peace delegations. It is inaccurate to refer to the League Council as being 'the supreme body under the authority of the Assembly' (p. 85) and equally inaccurate to assert that with regard to reparations 'the gap between American and European assessments of Germany's obligations and capacity to pay was huge'. Where did this leave Keynes?

Perhaps the most typical example of the author's rather sloppy approach relates to the organisation of the peace conference. On page 62 he says that the Supreme War Council became 'by a simple metamorphosis, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, which came to be called the Council of Ten', and on page 67 we learn that Clemenceau was elected to 'the Chair of the Conference'. On the same page there is a reference to 'the Conference, or rather the Supreme Council'. Are we to assume that the two terms were used synonymously, or was there a distinction between the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and the Plenary Conference? Wilson certainly thought there was.

Since this book is prohibitively priced at £6, it seems unlikely that the author will get the opportunity of a second edition to correct his errors and tighten his arguments. In the meantime, the text should be treated with caution.

RUTH HENIG

Hammarskjöld. By Brian Urquhart. *London, Sydney, Toronto: Bodley Head. 1973. 630 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £6·00.*

Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Vol. II. Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956. Selected and ed. with a commentary by Andrew W. Cordier and Walter Foote. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1972. 716 pp. Index. £10·70.*

'The intensity of a man's faith in life may be gauged by his readiness to say yes to the past *and* yes to the future' (Hammarskjöld, *Public Papers*, p. 98). What Hammarskjöld rightly asserts about individuals might also be affirmed about institutions. You never step twice into the same UN, yet if the organisation is to be more than a fortuitous concourse of political atoms it must develop and preserve a sense of its own past as well as its perpetual anxiety about its own future. And this presents peculiar difficulties. So much of the real life of an international organisation—and especially of *the* international organisation—lies hidden from view, concealed as much as revealed by its own and its members' public pronouncements. In such a twilight myths and fancies abound; the oral tradition is an unreliable memory; today's newspaper kite or canard becomes tomorrow's gospel; there seems no middle ground between the legal record and tribal lays. The first thing that needs to be said about Brian Urquhart's *Hammarskjöld* is that it constitutes the first serious attempt to provide the UN with what is needed to fill this gap—a history. Written with the benefit both of access to Hammarskjöld's private papers, and also of a close and continuous acquaintance not only with the subject but also with the whole period of his Secretary-Generalship, it is uniquely able to present from the inside the story of the UN during the years from 1953 to 1961. It has, of necessity, to respect certain confidences and exercise appropriate restraint, but what is surprising is the degree of frankness and plain speaking that the author has found possible and UN officialdom has approved. This is not an official history, still less would it claim to be definitive history. But it is, as nearly as we are likely to get it, the history of those years as they appeared to the very remarkable figure who carried the burden and powers of the Secretary-General's office.

To pluck the plums out of such a large pie would itself be a lengthy task. But amongst the topics first fully exposed to public view one would certainly have to list Hammarskjöld's stand over the Guatemalan issue in 1954, the remarkable record of his personal embassage to Chou En-lai the following year, the negotiations (especially with Egypt) over UNEF, together with the insights there provided of the workings of the Advisory Committee, some of the intricate complications of the Lebanon story and, above all the Congo *passim*, where Brian Urquhart's own intimate knowledge enables him to cast light on many of the dark places of that confused and tragic story.

The value of these and other 'now it can be told' revelations lies not only in the establishment of the historical record but also in the insight they provide into the way the organisation and its chief officers function. They reveal the actual processes of the UN in crisis when it is in the hands of a master—its potentialities, its complexities, its hazards and its limitations. Of course today's UN is not Hammarskjöld's. But it resembles what is described in these pages more than it resembles any other political organisation to whose secrets we are privy. As such these revelations ought to do more than illuminate the past. They ought to be read and absorbed

by everyone who wants to understand the UN and utilise it, both now and in the future.

Hammarskjöld is, of course, a biography as well as a history, although its focus is so closely on the public figure of the UN years. Here too the author has scored a triumphant success, matching Hammarskjöld's humility with his own humour, his universality with his own sympathy for Hammarskjöld's many-sided interests. The author of *Markings*,[1] the lay saint, the aesthete—these are all realistically, but at the same time, proportionately depicted. But perhaps Urquhart's particular triumph is to show how in the handling of the delicate and awful burdens of the Secretary-General's office the quality of sheer intellectual endeavour can and does make a difference. This is not to depreciate Hammarskjöld's courage and devotion. But it is as well to remember that without his extraordinary fertility of invention, his lightning appreciation of complex situations, his capacity as it were to wrestle his way out of what looked like political and legal deadlocks, these qualities of heart and zeal would have availed little. In a world of *quantula sapientia* it is good to be reminded that intellect can count.

The admirably edited *Public Papers* series devotes its Volume II to most of Hammarskjöld's first term, the years 1953–56. More than most such collections of official utterances, those with a UN provenance are likely to have value mainly for those who need an accessible official record. It is a remarkable indication of Hammarskjöld's distinction of mind and interests that most of what is printed here is actually pleasurable to read, as well as highly informative about UN policies and problems. The celebrated sybillic style is a good deal less in evidence than might be expected (though there are some collector's items in the press conferences) and the range is extraordinary. For an exposé of Anglo-American relations, turn to his 1954 address to the Pilgrims, for a fresh assessment of modern art, see his remarks at the 25th anniversary of the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Something very like the Renaissance man of popular legend emerges from these pages. The book, like Urquhart's, gains immeasurably from being edited by men who knew Hammarskjöld intimately. They have done an excellent job.

H. C. NICHOLAS

Memoirs 1950–1963. By George F. Kennan. *London: Hutchinson. 1973. 368 pp. Index. £4·50.*

'A memorandum typical of its gifted author, beautifully expressed, sometimes contradictory, in which were mingled flashes of prophetic insight and suggestions, as the document itself conceded, of total impracticality.' Thus Mr. Acheson in his *Present at the Creation* [1] on Mr. Kennan's proposals for a Far Eastern settlement with Russia. The reader of *Memoirs 1950–1963* will frequently find himself echoing Mr. Acheson's assessment. Here he will find the author of 'X' up to his old nuances again and suffering once more the slings and arrows of miscomprehension. He will find the critic of Nato becoming a midwife of the CIA, and then complaining that the

[1] London: Faber. 1964.
[1] New York: Norton. 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 887.

military perverted its functions. He will find an experienced diplomat and super-Kremlinologist talking himself out of a job by a gaffe to reporters at Berlin airport. He will find a highly skilful advocate allowing himself so little time to prepare half a dozen Reith Lectures that he does not make comprehensible the central, innovatory idea that he is trying to advance. Above all he will find a passionately patriotic American public servant totally unable to comprehend the outlook and circumstances of his democratically elected representatives in Congress.

To the reader of *Memoirs 1925–1950* [2] this will come as no surprise. This is the same George Kennan as the one who fascinated, teased and exasperated his readers before. But the ground to be covered this time is necessarily less novel and enlivening. There are only two short periods of active diplomacy—at Moscow and Belgrade. There is a valuable view of McCarthyism from the standpoint of an unrepentant State Department liberal. There is a good deal of re-hash of previously published material, for example, the Reith Lectures. There is much hand-wringing over the decline of republican virtues in democratic (and Republican) America, of the kind with which British readers are only too dangerously ready to sympathise. There is also, it has to be said, a certain recurrent petulance and discreet immodesty, which, while leaving the essential virtues of both book and author unimpaired, diminish in a slight degree the enjoyment to be derived from these pages.

H. C. NICHOLAS

The Last of the Giants. By C. L. Sulzberger. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1972. 1056 pp. Index. £6·00.*

THE skill of the journalist consists in distilling significant accounts and comments from the endless, undifferentiated mass of material he collects. The collections of Mr. Sulzberger's diaries and reflections on tour as a foreign correspondent are the endless mass, the raw material, from which he fashioned his significant pieces for his paper. Only a reviewer will, or could, read this book right through. It is far too long. Indeed, the title of the book, *The Last of the Giants*, could well describe Mr. Sulzberger's memoirs themselves: nearly 900 pages in the first volume, over 1000 pages in this second one, with a third still to come. Mr. Sulzberger takes himself, his work, the contacts he makes, and the thoughts that arise in him while he is working, very seriously indeed.

In fact, the giants of the title refer to the top echelon of his regular contacts between 1954 and 1963—after he stopped being just a reporter and became, pridefully, what he calls a journalist: in other words, a columnist. Three of the giants are sketched on the dust jacket: Churchill, Eisenhower and, especially, de Gaulle (drawn here to look astonishingly like Mr. Peregrine Worsthorne). Mr. Sulzberger could have added Adenauer to his dying race: these are the big men to whom (apart, really, from Churchill) he had access in his journalistic right—and in the name, of course, of the *New York Times*. He will not see their like again, he thinks, although already ten years ago Nixon had become 'Dick (we have now gotten to a first-name basis)' (p. 1001).

[2] London: Hutchinson. 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1969, p. 777.

In this volume the raw material is differentiated to a degree according to time, place and theme. De Gaulle is brooded upon, admiringly, many times. America's relations with, and policy towards, China are thought about and rethought about, percipiently (p. 207 et al). Nasser is nearly a giant, though a flawed one (pp. 187, 456 and 1014). Khrushchev is 'on the skids' (p. 668). Vice-President Nixon in 1958, while putting first the security of the United States and the independence of its allies, believes in 'peace at almost any price' (p. 495). Dinner with President and Mrs. Kennedy at the White House, just a year before the assassination, is 'fairly good, if pretentious'; the President wanted to talk and was not angry about Mr. Sulzberger's column (pp. 923–924).

The vein of shrewdness and percipience, as well as sheer banality, runs right through. Of David Bruce eighteen years ago, Mr. Sulzberger says he would like to be 'the first US Ambassador to Communist China', and hints that it might happen (p. 207); in effect, it has now happened, though not yet formally. Of possible military operations against North Vietnam, he says sagely, in 1962, 'a dangerous operation which could escalate into trouble' (p. 847). Of himself, he solemnly says in 1961 that if he were offered the job of ambassador to France, he 'wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole' (p. 804).

The first volume of Mr. Sulzberger's journalistic memoirs, recording the time he was merely a reporter and entitled *A Long Row of Candles*,[1] was dominated by simple excitement at the bliss of making his way into the know and into high society at one and the same time all over Europe. Now he takes these perquisites of being a top rank (and very good) American correspondent much more for granted. True, 'It has enabled me to dine with hobos and kings, to know a press of generals, a gaggle of politicians, and a wallet of Rothschilds' (p. 1); but, as no doubt befits a columnist, he becomes more interested, as he grows older, in what it all adds up to.

DONALD TYERMAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Yearbook of World Affairs 1972. *London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs. 1972. 380 pp. Index. £5·25.*

The twenty-sixth issue of this annual contains about twenty articles on a wide range of current topics, mainly written by academics. Of particular interest are two articles by lawyers Gordon G. Kaplan and B. G. Ramcharan on equality and discrimination in international economic law in continuation of the paper by Professor Schwarzenberger in the 1971 volume. This is the first year that there is no survey of recent literature on world affairs.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. 1972. Ed. by Richard F. Staar. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1972. 708 pp. Bibliog. Index. $25.00.*

A great deal of useful information is made easily available in the sixth issue of this yearbook, which deals with 1971. The major part of the book contains surveys of communist parties in some 95 countries. This is followed by a section on international communist front organisations, a chronology, a bibliography and a very valuable index of persons.

[1] London: Macdonald. 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 757.

The European Parliament: Structure, Procedure and Practice. By Sir Barnett Cocks. *London: H.M.S.O. 1973. 336 pp. Index. £6·75.*

This is an indispensable guide to the origins, structure, external relations and procedure of the European Parliament. It was produced by the Clerk of the House of Commons primarily to assist the members going from the United Kingdom. The appendices include the rules of procedure of the parliament and a list of the principal debates, reports and resolutions 1958–72 with references to the official reports of the debates. A cheaper edition, perhaps omitting the Treaty of Rome which takes up 80 pages, would be welcomed by teachers and students.

Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1970. By The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights. *The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1972. 1173 pp. Bibliog. Index. Fl. 225.*

Despite the fact that a supplementary volume on Greece was published in 1972 the latest issue of this yearbook is nearly twice the size of its predecessor and must soon price itself out of reach of most libraries. It follows the usual plan of having Part I containing basic texts and general information and Part II decisions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers. Part III contains extracts from debates and judgments in national parliaments and courts.

European Yearbook: Vol. XVIII, 1970. *The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff for the Council of Europe. 1970. 995 pp. Bibliog. Index.*

A complete file of this yearbook should be readily available in all libraries concerned with contemporary European studies. It contains chronologies, bibliographies and the essential documentation, including texts of resolutions, for the fifteen major European organisations. Two important articles in this edition are on the Commission of the European Community 1969–70 by Jean Rey and on relations between the Council of Europe and the United Nations by A. H. Robertson.

European Institutions: Co-operation: Integration: Unification. 3rd ed. By A. H. Robertson. *London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs. New York: Matthew Bender. 1973. 478 pp. Index. (The Library of World Affairs. Gen. eds: George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. No. 44.) Paperback: £3·75.*

This is an updated third edition of what has become a standard work. It contains descriptions of the structure and functions of the more important European organisations with information about their principal activities. There are short but pertinent bibliographies at the end of each chapter and 160 pages of relevant treaties, conventions and resolutions as appendices.

Guide to Research and Reference Works on Sub-Saharan Africa. Ed. by Peter Duignan. Compiled by Helen F. Conover and Peter Duignan with the assistance of Evelyn Boyce, Liselotte Hofmann and Karen Fung. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1972. 1102 pp. Index. (Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series XLVI.) $19.50. Paperback: $8·95.*

There are over three thousand entries in this annotated bibliography. Parts I and II, which contain guides to organisations, libraries and the book trade and general African bibliographies respectively, contain little information after 1968 while the sections dealing with subject and area guides were revised to 1970. This means that the coverage is somewhat uneven. Nevertheless the names of the editor and of his co-compiler, Miss Helen F. Conover, are alone sufficient assurance that this is a first-class piece of work which should be in all research libraries with African interests. It is commendable that a paperback edition brings the guide within reach of small libraries.

Africa South of the Sahara 1973: Third edition of a survey and reference book of the countries south of the Sahara presented in a continental perspective. *London: Europa Publications. 1973. 1163 pp. Maps. Bibliog. £10·00*

Part I of the revised edition of this survey is entitled 'Background to the continent' and contains eight articles, one of which is new: 'Africa and the European Economic Community' by Timothy Curtin. Part II deals with the structure and activities of the major African regional organisations and Part III consists of separate chapters on each country. Part IV includes a Who's Who and lists of research institutes and of periodicals dealing with Africa.

Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook. By Donald George Morrison et al. *New York: The Free Press. London: Collier-Macmillan. 1973. 483 pp. Maps. Bibliog. £13·50.*

Black Africa brings together comparable data on political, economic and social matters for the thirty-two countries south of the Sahara which achieved independence between 1956 and 1966, plus Ethiopia and Liberia. Sources are given and for each territory there is a select bibliography.

The International Who's Who: Thirty-sixth Edition. 1972–73. *London: Europa. 1972. 1856 pp. £10·00.*

This excellent reference book maintains its usual high standard by the inclusion of nearly a thousand new names and by the updating of previous entries. Published early in September 1972 some information has been included up to the preceding July.

The Academic Who's Who. 1973–1974: University Teachers in the British Isles in Arts, Education and Social Sciences. *London: Adam and Charles Black. 1973. 521 pp. £7·50.*

This new biographical dictionary of university teachers in the British Isles aims at including those in all disciplines except the sciences whose first university appointment was more than five years ago. It is intended to revise it biennially.

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BOOKS REVIEWED, JULY 1973

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 49 OCTOBER 1973 No. 4

ASIA AFTER VIETNAM: A SPECIAL SURVEY

UNITED STATES: IMPERIAL RECESSIONAL*

Wayne Wilcox

THE West has entangled itself in the politics and economics of Asia for four centuries, almost always in pursuit of its own interests and rarely in defence against an assertive East. The relationship began modestly with Western missionaries and merchants begging for small favours from which to make large profits, commercial and spiritual. As technology temporarily tilted the military balance in favour of Europe, the Asian societies were suborned or forcefully shocked into accommodating themselves to Western political and economic interests.

The young American Republic was much interested in Asian trade from its founding, and by the middle of the nineteenth century had become a Pacific power. By this time, Russian continental expansion had transformed the Muscovy kingdom into a Eurasian empire, Japan was well along in its 'defensive modernisation', Britain had undisputed (after 1857) control of the Indian subcontinent and its approaches and the Dutch, French and Portuguese had acquired, or were acquiring, their colonies. 'Asia', as a distinct cultural region sharing no roots with the West, continued to exist under European hegemony, but as a unit in world politics became an integral part of European competition.

United States policy towards Asia was, in its origins and throughout the succeeding years, based on the objective of unrestricted access, first for commercial and thereafter for geopolitical purposes. Washington opposed indigenous national autarky/isolationism (Japan), European 'hard-shell' imperialism (British India) and restrictive, politically imposed, trade covenants (China in the 'Open Door' era). This policy was natural to a latecomer in the imperial sweepstakes in Asia, but it was flavoured as well with the moralism of an expansive ex-colony firmly wedded to laissez-faire trade policy.

In mid-twentieth century world politics, the Americans witnessed the banishment of imperial Europe by Japanese power, but shared in the rout, at least temporarily, as had the Russians earlier. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States returned to its historic

* This article is based on a paper prepared for the Chatham House Far Eastern study group. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the US government.

policies of seeking open access in the face of what had been the closure of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and what was about to become the threat of a Bamboo Curtain. American military and economic resources were committed to 'dis-imperialism': the creation of an Asia of nations, relatively peacefully integrated into a competitive capitalist world economy and protected from superior Japanese, Chinese and Russian forces by American power.

This kind of Asia, in the then dominant American view, would provide ample opportunity for American trade and investment and would foreclose opportunities for nations hostile to the United States which might otherwise mobilise Asian resources as had the Europeans and the Japanese before them. 'Protected nationalism' would lead to a balance of power and initiative in which peaceful interests would dominate. In this kind of world, American scale and enterprise, peacefully managed, would have great influence. The strategic doctrine underlying this view was very similar to that of Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who was thought to desire a policy that would 'make the world fit for America to leave it' (militarily.)[1]

The difficulty with this view is that Asian relationships have not allowed the United States to leave under conditions that would appear to promise 'open access'. Thus, in the period between 1945 and 1970, American economic and military assistance to the countries of non-communist Asia totalled $34,278 million,[2] and despite Japan's recovery and the unilateral decision to reduce the scale of activity announced in President Nixon's Guam speech in July 1969, the end of the need for American support and protection for non-communist Asia is not in sight.

The measurement of the costs of managing Asian security include not only the value of transferred resources, but the massive costs of the American forces deployed in the region. It would be difficult to total the costs of the Korean and Vietnamese wars, the Japanese occupation, the maintenance of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, the operation of bases from Pearl Harbour to Asmara, Ethiopia, and the American strategic nuclear forces assigned to missions in Asia. Some estimates of the cost of the Vietnam war alone range as high as $20,000 million. It is perhaps enough to cite another fact. 'Since V-E Day in 1945, nearly every American killed in war has died in Asia. That fact alone compels our attention and our concern.'[3]

[1] This is well put in Christopher Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (London: Hamish Hamilton; New York: Putnam, 1972). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 321.

[2] The major recipients were India ($8,696 m), Korea ($5,080 m), Vietnam ($4,962 m), Pakistan ($4,092 m), Japan ($2,355 m), Taiwan ($2,259 m), Indonesia ($1,363 m) and the Philippines ($1,362 m). *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1972* (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp. 771–772.

[3] Richard Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace.* A Report to the Congress, May 3, 1973, p. 39.

While these costs were borne in pursuit of the theoretical benefits to be derived from open access, the *economic* calculus of costs and benefits reveals grossly unfavourable ratios. Direct American foreign investment in Asia in 1970 was only $3,968 million, or about five per cent of the total long term private investment abroad.[4] Asian nations represent only about one fifth of the export markets of American firms, and all exports account for only 4·3 per cent of the American gross national product.[5] And Japan alone accounts for more than 40 per cent of the Asian imports and exports of American foreign traders.

The traditional blessings of commerce appear to be very modest compared to the costs of maintaining commercial systems. For those who would substitute 'vital raw materials' for 'immense markets and opportunities', the picture is equally bleak. Non-communist Pacific Asia appears to be short of energy sources (except possibly Indonesia), ferrous and non-ferrous metals, coking-quality coal, U-238 and most of the other so-called strategic materials of modern industry and warfare. For those commodities like tin, jute and rare earths that are produced principally in Asia, technological substitutes and new sources provide alternatives to traditional suppliers that might be foreclosed by a rival great power.

In fact, American foreign policy in Asia was based upon politico-military rivalry with Russia and China, not economic gain, and its successes and failures were measured in diplomatic rather than commercial terms. As soon as the Sino-Soviet rivalry emerged and the possibility of United States-Soviet detente came into view, the principal past justification for American policy was undercut. As the 1973 'state of the world' report noted: 'In January 1969, America needed to change the philosophy and practice of its foreign policy. . . . After a generation, the postwar world had been transformed and demanded a fresh approach.'[6]

The global context of American Asian policy

The centrepiece of American foreign policy since 1945 has been a concern with, and an opposition to, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Too many observers, obsessed with the American obsession with communism, have failed to note the quite different issues that led to a consistent anti-Russian posture. In the early cold war, for example, the concern was with the Soviet territorial expansion begun in Eastern

[4] This figure does not include Australia and New Zealand, which for reporting purposes are grouped with the Union of South Africa. The three 'old Commonweath' countries account for $4,348 million of American investment, the lion's share of which would appear to be in South Africa. *Statistical Digest 1972*, p. 767.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 776.

[6] *Foreign Policy Report, 1973*, p. 7.

Europe that threatened Western Europe.[7] By the early 1950s, the concern had switched to the Sino-Soviet bloc's apparent strategy of bluff in Europe but wars of national liberation in the Third World.[8] By the mid-1960s, American concern had refocused on the problem of Soviet strategic parity and mutual deterrence.

Throughout this period, American foreign policy was dominated by considerations of the central balance; that is, the Soviet-American relationship. This globalism led both the Americans and the Russians into curious regional skirmishes of little intrinsic importance—Indonesian military assistance comes to mind almost as easily as the US-Pakistan relationship. Above the minutiae of specific cases, however, was and is the mutual concern with the adversary's will. Every crisis takes on the attribute of a contest of nerves.[9] That is why the Nixon-Brezhnev statement, issued in Moscow, discussed both strategic arms limitation and mutual restraint in third areas.[10]

The new American policy towards Russia, recognising mutual deterrence and the heightened risk of third area confrontations, seeks to work out areas of mutual agreement that minimise the risks of situations that would test 'nuclear will'. This may be done by establishing clear understandings, and means for implementing them, that lead to stable deterrent relationships at the least cost and the greatest security for both parties. A correlate of this policy would be an agreement for no first use of nuclear weapons against the other party's national territory.

A second area of essential negotiation involves the decoupling of regional conflicts from the central balance. This required mutual restraint on the part of the global powers, perhaps with nuclear-free zone agreements and other such self-denying ordinances. It might also require specific agreements that regional conflict would be fought under special rules of engagement such as those that would pertain to cases where Soviet and American 'proxy' forces or allies were directly involved.

A third process in the detente relationship is the diminution of conflict by developing forms of co-operation in areas of mutual interest. The Soviet-American trade relationship represents one such

[7] Revisionist historians would, of course, maintain that American policy in Europe was more concerned with non-communist—that is, Christian Democratic—governments than with the threat of Soviet expansionism to national sovereignty.

[8] In retrospect, this view appears to have seriously underestimated the nationalist versus communist struggle that followed decolonisation, and in which Soviet and Chinese doctrine and resources were perhaps marginal.

[9] For a recent example from the American evidence, see President Nixon's speech before the South Carolina legislature on February 20, 1973, in which he noted that the dialogue with China and Russia could not have taken place but for their respect for American will and determination.

[10] See *Foreign Policy Report, 1973*, pp. 14–18.

effort, just as the exchange agreements between the two governments in education and culture contribute to a lessened sense of distance and, perhaps, difference. Of these three areas of negotiation, only the third represents detente; the more important diplomatic issues attempt only to reduce the risks and costs of a continuing rivalry.

The second great strand in the American reappraisal of global policy was international economics. This was an inevitable result of policies pursued with the aim of increasing European unity, restoring the health of the Japanese economy, promoting the economic growth of Third World countries and seeking higher levels of international economic integration. In their success, these policies have produced grave problems of their own, and by their nature, they concern America and its friends rather than its adversaries.

International economic problems are easier to describe than to solve. First among them, perhaps, is the transformation of the world economy as a result of the operation of multinational corporations, cartels and consortia. A recent three-volume study of the US Tariff Commission [11] concluded that the multinationals controlled $280,000 million of assets, or more than twice the reserves of the central banking authorities of the Western world. These funds, swinging against fluid world currency rates, cannot be offset by national authorities under present conditions.

Only the naive observer imagines that international trade is freely and fully competitive. Corporations, cartels and consortia not only occupy key marketing and distribution positions within most of the countries of the West, but they also hold proprietary rights in most areas of advanced technology. The price of most manufactures, most of the time, is to a large degree controlled and even Soviet marketing of commodities in the West is handled by consortia that specify amounts and price. This makes government management of trade accounts more difficult because factor-cost and profitability are statistics which can, to a large degree, be manipulated by international business. Although American companies have not been backward in creating or joining multinational firms, such behaviour does not necessarily make American foreign economic policy easier and, indeed, probably makes it more difficult.

As more and more firms consider their markets, technology and managements to be multinational, and specialise their production to take advantage of a global market, they also become more vulnerable to policies of national governments that seek other goals; autarky,

[11] A detailed one-volume summary is available as a report of the U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, 93rd Congress, 1st session, February 1973, 'Implications of Multinational Firms for World Trade and Investment and for U.S. Trade and Labor'.

lowered unemployment rates, regional development, national control over certain industries, a particular ratio between agricultural/raw material costs and the value of their transformation. This vulnerability leads management to become more 'political' and intensifies pressures on governments that might want to follow a course contrary to the interests of the firms.

But there are also structural problems that have almost nothing to do with the multinationals, such as reserve currency arrangements and, in the short run at least, Japan. Both problems are complex but widely understood. The reserve currency problem is caused by a national currency units' dual function combined with the necessity for trading countries with larger percentages of their gross national product in trade to exhibit, on balance, a trade surplus or risk high unemployment. This puts pressures on weak trading countries, like the less developed countries, which have no convertible currency, and on the reserve currency countries, which have to run deficits to maintain the system. The structure of the relationships makes a satisfactory system of exchange rates almost impossible unless there are institutions that can control both the movement of capital and the imbalances of trade.

The special case of Japan will be discussed below, but the essence of the economic dimension of the problem of Japan is that its managers consider foreign trade at the level of the West Germans' percentage of gross national product to be necessary for national prosperity. This implies a doubling of present Japanese trade over the near term, and to maintain a sufficient rate of growth to accomplish this implies very great trade surpluses and low social-military investments.

American decision-makers must, therefore, attempt to gain control over the multinationals, or at least see the development of international institutions capable of modulating the effects of large amounts of capital-technology transfer. They must somehow disentangle the domestic and the international dollar, and they must attempt to adjust the international trading system to accommodate new entrants of the size and virtuosity of Japan. These problems might be manageable, over the short term, by a retreat from a free-trade, world market international objective, but unless the United States is going to change its overall strategic objective and risk the 1930s syndrome, it has to find ways and means to preserve systemic unity among its friends.

On the horizon, environmental and conservationist problems await, some more pressing (energy) than others (ferrous metals) but all of them inevitable in the finite resource sphere in which humanity exists. The rationing of basic resources will prove an even more challenging task than the rationing of luxuries which is the essence of the world trading system dilemma at present. And at this point, the high consumption 'leading' countries may become the supplicants of Russia

and some resource-rich Third World states. An appreciation of this problem, however, already constitutes one of the significant components in global American policy.

The third great strand in the American foreign policy review concerns the domestic character and quality of society in the United States. No society in history has experienced, or is experiencing, as rapid fundamental social change as the United States, and it tells on the tone and sense of stability which are important components of 'will' and 'determination'. Moreover, the heavy burden of American foreign policy over the past three decades, especially in Asia, has led to the collapse of a widespread national consensus that was sympathetic to governments interested in foreign commitments.

There are few American interest groups whose *raison d'être* is some aspect of Asia, or some Asian country. As the United States refocuses on Europe, Japan and the central balance, most of Asia will lack a political *pointe d'appui* in the Washington decision-process. Even if the countries of the region manage to mount a successful campaign for American support and interest, they will have to compete with very potent and increasingly vocal domestic interests. It would be incorrect to suggest that America will become an isolationist country, but it would be folly to assume that the US government will continue to mobilise resources for foreign policy tasks at the expense of pressing domestic claims.

Another part of what might be seen as the American imperial recessional is that it is accompanied by nationalist sentiment. Many observers have believed that American 'imperial' expansion was precisely that—a replay of European history out of an expressive nationalist tradition of superiority. In fact, America's global commitments were the product of a 'universalist' ideology of 'free worldism' that went exactly contrary to the historic notion of American nationalism. It seems quite possible that the end of an interventionist period in American diplomatic history will be accompanied by a rebirth of narrowly defined calculations of national interest that will be exaggerated by notions of being let down by friends and allies who were taking a 'free ride' at American expense.

These several strands of economic, strategic and domestic changes in America's world and national position set the context for American Asian policy, and it is one of greatly increased constraints on commitments and resource transfers. For that reason, detente with the Chinese is as important in Asia as a reduced risk posture is with Russia elsewhere. This calculus, in turn, mandates an adjustment of relations with the other major Pacific powers. It also counsels a reduction of interest in the smaller states of south-east Asia.

Obligations and opportunities

The past policies of the United States have cast it in the role of the global guarantor of the *status quo*, and changes in its foreign policy, therefore, have a greater indirect effect than if the recent American tradition had been one of *ad hoc* and expedient policies. The weight and importance of past obligations is different from country to country in Asia, and the analyst must differentiate between them. It follows from circumstance that the fewest obligations were assumed towards the adversary, and therefore changes in American policy can most easily be accomplished with Russia and China.

The Soviet Union in Asia. Russia was the most important Asian communist country from 1949 to 1959, the period between the victory of the Chinese communists in the civil war, and the open break between Peking and Moscow during the Khrushchev era. During that time, the Soviet Union supplied China with arms and industrial assistance, and secured for it the support of communist elites in the various Asian countries. Although there were great differences between the two powers in matters of doctrine, Asian 'direction', the terms of trade and the structure of the aid relationship, as late as 1957–1959 Russia agreed to supply China with nuclear weapons and the capacity with which to build them.

'The Spirit of Camp David' appeared to mark both the end of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the emergence of a Russo-American concern with containing a (verbally) bellicose China. This interest grew with the development of the Vietnamese war and with a growing concern in Moscow and Washington over the dangers of a nuclear confrontation on an issue more significant than, say, Cuba. At this juncture, especially after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the United States identified Peking as the greatest threat to an Asian non-communist order, and Russia identified it as the most threatening 'great contender'.

In the same period, Russia increased its presence in the region, first in India and then increasingly by normalising relations with Japan. By 1965 Soviet diplomats had no difficulty in explicitly noting that their foreign policy was directed to the threat of Maoist expansionism, and that the Russian presence in Asia was directed as much against China as against the 'world gendarme of capitalism'. This was not a wholly unwelcome development for the United States because it forced the Soviet Union to deal with, and strengthen, non-communist regimes. It also divided the domestic forces of communism in the developing countries, and left them confused and involved in factional intrigues.

As the Soviet role expanded and the Russian navy began to exercise from the Mediterranean to Vladivostok, American decision-makers (especially in the navy) noted that Russia was still the principal adver-

sary and that its success in southern Asia was, at most, a mixed blessing. At the same time, the Chinese involved themselves in the Cultural Revolution, which baffled and pleased outsiders, and from which came a much less (verbally) bellicose foreign policy stance. At that juncture, the United States found itself with the appealing opportunity of continuing the courtship with the Soviet Union while developing new relations with China. The outbreak of Sino-Soviet border hostilities made the Chinese eager for an American connection by 1969, and since the United States had obligations to neither party, it could and did pursue a flexible, expedient, policy.

Stated rather too grossly, the American policy towards the Soviet Union in Asia is to balance the Russian presence with Chinese military forces and Japanese economic power. The United States will continue to deploy its naval forces in such a way as to offset any Soviet naval displays or attempts at low-level coercive bargaining. Washington will also seek to deny the Russians a monopoly of external influence in any Asian state, although it will perhaps welcome some Soviet presence directed against the Chinese through nationalist regimes.

Such an American policy, while obvious and disagreeable to Russia, does not offer Moscow cause for great objections. Russia's Asian interests are much less important than those in Europe, and the disputes between Peking and Moscow are clearly not the product of American manoeuvre. Moreover, the Soviet Union recognise that close American-Chinese co-operation in the defence field would present Russian military planners with the worst possible contingency nightmare. The strength of the American position is in the *latent* Sino-American relationship.

The American position with Japan is also strong against the Soviet Union because of Russo-Japanese differences at a basic level. Both territorial and domestic political tensions and claims exist between the two countries, and the Japanese position is so strong in Asia that Russia lacks leverage in bargaining on any but Japanese terms, except on matters relating to raw materials.

Generally, therefore, Russia's possible major opportunities for influence in Asia are restricted. The Indonesian legacy is an unhappy one, and the Indian relationship, while very correct and extensive, is one in which Moscow lacks much directive influence. It is perhaps too early to judge Soviet opportunities in south-east Asia, but few states will want to incur Chinese wrath unnecessarily. The Soviet fleet is growing in numbers and power, but in the Indian Ocean it is far from operating bases and air cover, and it is not clear what political objectives could be attained by its deployment, especially with the US 7th fleet increasingly free of its Vietnamese and Taiwan Straits missions.

Under these conditions, it is difficult to imagine Russia making

quantum jumps in influence, presence or access in Asia. Its current policies and posture are those of a Sinophobe *status quo* power. Its pressure on China has facilitated the Sino-American rapprochement, neatly reversing the equation of the 1950s. It is, therefore, unlikely that the United States will move out of its low-profile, low-risk and offshore posture to meet modest Soviet initiatives. Russia in Asia does not at present pose any problems to the American global policy towards Moscow, nor is it necessary to accommodate the Soviet Union in Asia in order to attain central balance goals. The optimum American policy, therefore, would appear to be one of a watchful benign neglect or, if possible, arms limitation agreements covering regional forces.

The Chinese People's Republic. Peking has earned American respect even during the period of tense and difficult relations, largely as a result of the political strength, economic development and military ingenuity of the Maoist regime. One of America's goals in the Second World War was to install China as one of the Big Four: that goal has now been realised!

Although Americans and Chinese fought in the Korean war, and although the physical mobilisation of a mass army and an incredible national discipline are worrying attributes in a state that declares itself to be anti-American, most American strategists have properly remained more concerned about Russian motives and capabilities than those of China. In the Bandung period, China was amenable to a normalisation of relations, but the Sino-Soviet relationship made Secretary of State Dulles doubtful about the conditions under which Peking and Washington might resolve their several differences. After the Sino-Soviet rift became apparent, the Sino-Indian and Vietnamese wars complicated relations. It was, thus, only when an accord with China became functional for both parties—China because of Russia's hostility and America because it wanted to isolate Hanoi and end the Vietnam war—that rapprochement occurred.

The development of some official contact between Peking and Washington is too recent to analyse in terms of consequence, but some of its dimensions may be seen in embryo form. The first such attribute is that the United States will gradually shed its protector's robes in Taiwan, and the vexed question of mainland-Formosa relations will become wholly a Chinese matter.

The United States and China will move towards the establishment of quasi-diplomatic and trade relations, but most probably on a modest level with little fanfare.[12] Neither party wants too much publicity,

[12] For a useful recent statement, see A. Doak Barnett, 'U.S. Relations with China', in Henry Owen (Ed.), *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1973), pp. 133–156.

and both want to reassure the Soviet Union that the establishment of relations is not equivalent to a Sino-American anti-Russian pact. Moreover, China will want to move cautiously in expanding contacts with the United States, and it is important for Peking to keep the relationship on a small and manageable scale for the foreseeable future.

Washington will seek to conduct its relations with Peking in such a way that the Maoist legacy of the acceptance of good relations with America appeals to the chairman's successor(s). Moscow is clearly hoping for the reverse. It remains to be seen whether the Russians have given up any attempt to build future co-operation, and hence have decided to use military force to 'keep the Chinese in line', or whether they believe that the American-Chinese relationship is not firmly established. Whichever is the case, the United States will try to maintain a favoured strategic position in China during the post-Maoist transition. This implies that, all things being equal, American decision-makers will not openly and publicly pursue policies that might be embarrassing to the Chinese, or that would visibly pit the two countries against one another.

It also seems clear that the United States will not want wholly to discourage Soviet-Chinese competition in the Third World while it is withdrawing from a posture of 'forward commitment'. The division of local communist parties, and the internal balancing of external forces is likely to support nationalist regimes and foreclose any exclusive position that Russia (or China) could develop. India may be a special case because of Sino-Indian rivalry, but the West's position in the subcontinent appears to be an adequate counterfoil to Soviet ambitions.[13]

In short, American policy towards China is essentially a modest effort quietly to reduce Chinese-American tension, de-militarise the residual aspects of the Chinese civil war and develop normal relations in trade and exchange matters. This normalisation will make possible future steps which may have important military consequences in the strategic balances evolving in north-eastern Asia. It is important to have a voice in Chinese military futures both to offset the Soviet Union and to ensure that Sino-Japanese relationships are not dysfunctional to American interests. The modes of co-operation between Peking and Washington are themselves independently important because of the need to assure the Russians that the nature of the agreements does not threaten the Soviet Union. This suggests that the pattern of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations will emerge gradually, and that American policy will attempt to ensure that Sino-American detente does not compromise the more important goals of Soviet-American security

[13] For a more extended discussion, see William Barnds, 'India and America at Odds', *International Affairs*, July 1973, pp. 371–384 and the author's 'American Policy toward South Asia', *Asian Affairs*, Summer 1973, pp. 127–139.

agreements about the central balance, and Japo-American economic agreements on world trade.

Japan. Towards no country does the United States have more obligations than towards Japan, with the result that the flexibility of American foreign policy is extremely limited. In the case of both monetary policy and President Nixon's visit to China, American policy led to the self-publicised Japanese reaction of 'shock'. The major task of post-Vietnam Asian policy is, therefore, a sensitive American diplomacy that allows Japan to accommodate itself to major changes in the relationships between American and its adversaries without encouraging Tokyo to believe that it has been abandoned militarily. This will be more difficult in the 1970s because trade and monetary relations may be strained.

Strategic questions may not be very vexing over the next decade because Japanese foreign policy has followed Washington's lead on a China-first accommodation. If Sino-Japanese relations are correct and relatively calm, the two countries will share with the United States a view about Russia in Asia. The parallelism between governments should reduce *regional* tensions, and make credible the American security commitment to Japan (which would be more complicated if Peking and Washington were co-operative while Peking and Tokyo were quarrelling).

If this set of conditions emerges and appears to be relatively stable, the United States will probably reduce stationed forces and bases in Japan, and move towards a 'zero stationing cost' agreement for those that remain. This policy will be difficult because the Japanese, like the Nato Europeans, have grown accustomed to 'free' defence support. And like the Europeans, they will argue that America is much richer and can afford to do more, that they might slide into 'Finlandisation' unless the United States does its duty, that they might have to reinsure with the Soviet Union against China, and that they might be able to do more in a few years. (One Japanese scholar even suggested, with rare candour, that the United States should 'remember Pearl Harbour'.) The diplomacy is classic; what matters is the pace at which the United States proposes to move, and Japanese perspectives on Peking and Moscow.

Although military obligations will continue to pose certain bi-national problems, Japan's defence position *vis-à-vis* its proximate rivals is much more satisfactory than that of, say, Germany, and therefore the American recessional should be somewhat easier to schedule. Trade matters, however, are another question altogether. The United States is Japan's largest market and the source of almost half of Japan's extraordinary trade surplus ($9,000 million in 1971) with which Tokyo

is buying into the world's resources and manufacturing capacities. If the American balance of payments cannot bear the burden of Japanese exports ($10,000 million in 1971) because of the costs of official transfers and the lack of American import earnings from Europe and the rest of the world, the Japanese will find themselves with inelastic quotas in the United States and tariff and quota barriers in the European Economic Community. This will lead either to a trade war in the rest of the world or to rather large disruptions of the Japanese economy which would have important political consequences within the country. The problem is even more important because of Japanese plans for a further expansion of world trade.

American policy in the trade field must recognise Japan's political vulnerability, and its potential isolation from the world's great market areas. Therefore, the United States must 'front' for Japan with the European Community while attempting to reduce Japanese trade surpluses with the United States. This can perhaps be done if the Japanese increase official transfers abroad, and if the Tanaka government does indeed mobilise savings for massive social investment that would reduce the export effect of continued high rates of growth. But it is also clear that Japan must liberalise its practices concerning foreign investments and imports. It is patently outrageous for the Japanese to prohibit American computer imports while bitterly complaining about American textile import quotas.

The problems of the Japanese-American relationship are serious, but their intensity will depend largely upon the health of the American economy and the fate of trade and monetary reform. If the American balance of payments position improves, if a new more stable world monetary system is invented, and if the European Community allows the United States and Japan to increase their earnings under a regime of free trade and free capital flow, the problems may be of a long-term nature and of little serious political consequence. If, however, more international trade and monetary disorder materialises, these problems could quickly become quite severe. The question would then be: are economic quarrels incompatible with security agreements, and what are Japan's alternatives?

No analyst should feign answers to such questions since they are inherently uncertain. Much would depend upon Japan's choices, the personalities and policy biases of its government, the heat of adversarial relations with China or Russia, and the degree of sympathy between Japan and the United States in other aspects of their relations. It is perhaps enough to say that the Japanese situation poses the greatest problem, both actual and potential, that the United States faces in Asia in the 1970s. The cost of failure in accommodating Japan's interests and

stabilising its constructive role in world society would be as destructive of world order as can be imagined for any relationship outside the central balance. American decision-makers must take part in high-table discussions with the Japanese, but the Japanese themselves have to consider carefully their own entry terms and the need for equity in the balances of obligations and opportunities that their wealth and ingenuity justify.

An end to the American imperium?

For thirty years American power and wealth was committed to a particular kind of world order and was the framework around which was built a process of global conflict resolution, a world trading system and a reasonable amount of order and progress. This unique generation of a global Rome is over, having been in the first instance a product of the collapse of Europe and the remarkable concentration of capital, vitality and weaponry in the United States. The world has recovered from the world wars of the first half of the century, and the less developed countries have emerged from their Victorian cocoons. Capital, vitality and weaponry have become diffused.[14] And the imperial burden has been hard on American nerves, resources and self-images.

The international condition has also changed since 1945, with higher amounts of genuine universalism, the growth of a functional globalism in commerce and trade, and the spread of common symbols and empathetic experiences through mass communication and mass education. Technology has produced a change in the human condition that mocks frontiers, just as it has produced a growing interdependence that is both threatening and liberating. There will be no Romans to replace the Americans because the Roman empire will have become a global society with weaker states and greater choices for populations. If war can be avoided, the state will become ever more irrelevant to the human notion of loyalty.

While this kind of new world is in the process of being born, the great powers, and especially the United States, continue to bear an enormous security burden, not least in Asia. And there is nothing to suggest that the developed states of Europe, Japan and North America will find harmony once American hegemony is as devalued a commodity as the dollar. The struggle for interests may continue to overwhelm the struggle for community. American foreign policy must, however, be directed towards a reduction of security expenditures and towards the development of community precisely because of the centrality of the United States in the old world of interests and *macht*.

[14] A less brief statement of this point may be found in W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power 1957–1972* (New York: Macmillan. 1972). Reviewed in International *Affairs*, July 1973, p. 438.

The question, therefore, is not whether America is resigning as an internationalist country, but what policies a non-hegemonic America will pursue. If it chooses its Yankee trading past, and if its partners are more intent upon interest than community, the last third of the twentieth century could be as unpleasant as its first half. If the West and the Asians have learned from the immediate past, however, it could be a period in which four hundred years of antagonistic East-West relations come to a close in a truly Eurasian epoch of shared problems and opportunities.

SOUTH VIETNAM: DETENTE AND RECONCILIATION

Dennis J. Duncanson

Detente

SOUTH VIETNAMESE people have cause to feel that they are under greater pressure from the communist world now that detente is the order of the day than they ever were at the height of the cold war in the 1950s. Agitation to persuade the intellectual public of countries with open societies of the inherent wickedness of those Vietnamese who resist the communists actually increased after President Nixon's undertaking to withdraw American combat forces from Indochina; co-ordinated on principles similar to those some of us recall as the hallmark of the League against Imperialism in the 1920s and 1930s, the anti-Saigon campaigns continue today after American withdrawal is complete, no whit abated in either frequency or virulence. The broadcasts of Radios Moscow and Peking preclude the possibility that the campaigns are started otherwise than with the blessings of Kremlin and Great Within. Detente is often reckoned to have begun with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and has since moved down to control of conventional weapons; yet it evidently proved impossible for Dr. Kissinger to negotiate, on a more modest plane still, a limitation on the supply of conventional weapons to the two belligerents in Indochina—either impossible because Peking and Moscow declined, or futile because he knew in advance that they would not honour eventual undertakings, and, thanks to land frontiers and closed societies, could get away with extensive breaches of any. It is true that a limitation of a kind is written into the January ceasefire; but the relevant clause merely bans the introduction *into South Vietnam* of fresh munitions, beyond what is needed for replacement—it says nothing about introducing them into North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia, whose frontiers with South Vietnam are all entrusted by another clause in the ceasefire, irreversibly, to the charge of the communist forces. Members of the International Control Commission endeavouring, in fulfilment of duties under a third clause, to gain some idea what movement was taking place across those frontiers have paid for their foolhardiness with their lives, unmourned by any outcry. One is reminded of Chinese condemnations of Britain for bad faith in the 1830s in declining to ban the export of opium from Bengal; that measures to prevent importation alone were bound to be ineffectual

without co-operation from the suppliers was, and still is, China's complaint against us.

Seen through South Vietnamese eyes, the Nixon doctrine is a decided retreat by the United States from the Truman doctrine of 1947, for Truman committed his country to the defence of small countries threatened with takeover through *internal* forces as much as external, whereas Nixon confines the commitment to defence against external forces. Even leaving aside the question whether the North Vietnamese, by virtue of being Vietnamese, have a right—so far as international ethics is concerned—to do what they like to the South Vietnamese because they are their fellow countrymen, though organised in a separate state, the application of the Nixon doctrine to Indochina is liable to further watering-down because of uncertainty whether the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (DRV) is 'external' in relation to Laos and Cambodia, and whether ethnic minorities straddling the internal frontiers of Indochina are an 'external force' when they are enlisted in frontier bands. The Vietnamese communists have tried—with much success—to have it both ways: while preventing inclusion in the various ceasefire agreements of any definition of 'foreign troops' that could embarrass themselves, and telling their own people that the end result to be worked for will be a Federation of Indochina,[1] they have created 'national' fronts of their own in Laos (largely from ethnic minorities) and Cambodia in whose name to conduct their own operations. Under the terms of the Truman doctrine, such ambiguity and confusion made no difference to American declaratory policy; it is hardly surprising if, to the South Vietnamese, the Nixon doctrine—proclaimed specially as an explanation of future American policy in regard to their sector of the cold war—sounds like connivance in the deceptions of their assailants.

Detente is thus positive on the American side; is it on the Chinese and Russian side? Does the Brezhnev doctrine constitute any retreat from the Zhdanov doctrine of 1947? Evidence that it does is hard to detect: not only does it proclaim limited sovereignty for states contiguous to the Soviet Union which are under the rule of their own communist parties, but it cleaves to 'national liberation' coupled with 'proletarian internationalism' as earnestly as ever. The Zhdanov doctrine was not, of course, like the Truman doctrine for the previously isolationist United States, a new policy at the time: it was a reassertion,

[1] When the Indochina Communist Party was reconstituted as the Vietnam Workers' Party in 1951, this aim was an article in the Manifesto, and at the Geneva Conference three years later the Vietnamese communist commander signed the ceasefires in regard to all three 'associated states of Indochina'. Since the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and the exposure of the communist bases in Cambodia he had connived in, there has been a reversion in North Vietnamese publicity to the theme of 'solidarity of the fraternal peoples of Indochina'.

after a temporary alliance of expediency with the capitalist world against the aggressions of the fascist powers and after the suppression of the Comintern which that alliance necessitated, of the vision of world revolution, little changed in definition from its original exposition by the Bolsheviks. The Cominform of 1947 did not—for European reasons—have the worldwide scope of the Comintern; but Zhdanov's reassertion of 'national liberation' signalled to the peoples still under colonial rule that they should not for that reason suppose they had been forgotten during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. The older, Comintern, vision had been of a transfer of power in the colonies, at first to a universal Marxist-Leninist state, later on to separate parties with 'national' horizons; all programmes broached by colonial governments for progressive devolution of power to native institutions other than communist parties, notably in India, were vigorously attacked. The Zhdanov doctrine reinstated the prewar policy. President Roosevelt's anti-colonialism had appeared at times during the wartime summit conferences likely to further the Soviet cause of world revolution thus conceived; but even he, when the United Nations was being constituted, acknowledged the need for the Security Council to extend protection against subjection to monopolies of power to the peoples about to be emancipated under the Charter. The attitude of the Soviet Union towards peacekeeping under the auspices of the Security Council in most parts of the world has been, to say the least, unhelpful; in Indochina it has amounted to a veto, wholeheartedly endorsed by China, except as a way of preventing the United States from helping the South Vietnamese. The mini-UN arrangement of the International Commission of Control has been consistently thwarted by the non-co-operation of the Russian co-chairman—a partisanship for which the present leaders in Hanoi are duly grateful.[2] If detente has brought a change of heart in the Kremlin, it does not show in either word or deed.

All this is no doubt fully understood in the branches of the United States government executing the Nixon doctrine, but their hands are tied by public opinion, less sophisticated in its political analysis, and understandably swayed by the conscription and casualties military intervention has entailed. The changed attitude of Americans towards peacekeeping in general, and towards its application to Indochina in particular, is not peculiar to themselves, for it is manifest throughout what might be called—to get away from 'the West' for a moment—Christendom. For whatever sociological reasons—loss of the sense of imperial responsibility, rising prosperity and comfort at home (an 'imperialist' equivalent of 'revisionism'?), the theatricalisation of

[2] Party Secretary Le Duan, for instance, in *Some Present International Problems* (Hanoi, 1963), p. 182.

distant events on the television screen—there has taken place in our midst something very like what Frenchmen used to sting the South Vietnamese themselves a dozen years ago by dubbing '*la démobilisation des esprits*'. Naturally, South Vietnamese people are reluctant to blame themselves for the change of heart among their friends, and many of the failings (like corruption) which have so disillusioned American technical assistants—and which it is fair to note that Russian and East European technical assistants used in the 1960s to complain about in North Vietnam—are the ineptitudes and immaturities common to 'new nations'. At the same time, many among them have played their cards badly, and with tactless contempt for the public opinion holding their friends' pursestrings: they have spoilt their case with the *coups d'état*, the equivocations and squabbles (both Buddhist and Catholic), the rash strutting in front of the whirring cameras, and—perhaps more than anything else—the gratuitous affronts to France in the late 1950s, whose publicists have led the pack in hounding them ever since. Yet, during the last five or six years, South Vietnamese of most persuasions have tried hard to mend their ways. The Nixon doctrine relies on the genuineness of this renewal of national spirit among the elites to justify the January ceasefire as a 'peace with honour'—one which does not leave the common people in the lurch, in spite of the onesidedness of detente.

Truce

The terms of the truce can be summarised under three heads: (a) completion of the withdrawal of American land forces from South Vietnam and cessation of punitive air raids on North Vietnam; (b) an in-place ceasefire, on South Vietnamese territory, between the contending Vietnamese land forces; and (c) the supersession of the political provisions in the Geneva Agreement of 1954 by a new set enhancing the international status of North Vietnam and eroding that of South Vietnam. All three heads comprise gains for the communist side, which, although given credit for abating in discussion some of its initial demands against Saigon, has conceded only the surrender of a few hundred American prisoners of war in exchange. The failure of the truce to put a stop to the ground fighting has been notorious; one must note also the failure of the twelve-nation international conference at Paris in February—it hardly tried—to propose any sanction for major breaches of the truce. Consequently, the truce has brought peace to North Vietnam, where there has been no ground fighting, but not to the South, which has had to bear it all. Detente on the world stage can hardly be said to have brought relaxation of tension to South Vietnam; indeed, the people of the North have been conjured by their leaders not

to be seduced by President Nixon's efforts to bring about detente, for the very idea is 'rightist opportunism and bourgeois revisionism'.[3] The in-place ceasefire is calculated to keep up tension rather than dispel it, for the two armies are left eyeball to eyeball along an arbitrary hair's-breadth line, unrelated to topography or any discernible demarcation; but this was one of Hanoi's most intransigent demands, no doubt in order to avert the situation which arose after the communist forces withdrew from South Vietnam to North in 1954, when the whole movement in the South was threatened with collapse, had strenuous efforts not been made from Hanoi by 1959, in secret, to reconstitute it.[4]

The truce—especially after the international conference's ratification—has the effect of establishing the DRV as a permanent state; the 1954 Geneva Agreement had allotted the communists all the territory north of the 17th parallel, but subject to eventual elections in which the population throughout Vietnam would have voted on whether the regime in the North or that in the South—or some third group—should take all and thus reunify the country. Although, over the ensuing eighteen years, South Vietnam has undergone five or six *coups d'état* by anti-communist forces and five general elections or referendums from which communist candidates were excluded by *ad hoc* laws, and North Vietnam has held two general elections, in both of which *only* communist candidates were allowed by law to stand,[5] *all*-Vietnam elections never took place. The *de facto* monopoly of power by the Communist Party in the DRV therefore remained challengeable in theory until the 1973 truce. But from now on, as a result of the two-tier configuration of the ceasefire agreement, North Vietnam moves up to parity with the United States as a power not directly involved in the conflict, over the heads of the two actual contestants, one of which is the Saigon government and the other called either 'the communist command in South Vietnam' (if one is non-communist) or the 'Provisional Revolutionary Government' (if one is a communist or a sympathiser). The regime in the North has thereby become permanent, thanks to international recognition, whereas the impermanence of the regime in the South has by the same token been reaffirmed. It is to be expected that withdrawals of bilateral recognition from Saigon and transfers of it to Hanoi, already under way for two or three years, will accelerate as a result of the truce—especially by governments far away

[3] *Tuyen Huan* (Hanoi), July–August 1972.
[4] Comrade Le Duan, addressing the 19th Party Plenum, *ibid.*
[5] It may be protested that a few of the candidates have belonged to the Democratic Party (bourgeoisie) or the Socialist Party (intelligentsia); however, both these parties were founded by the Indochina Communist Party (proletariat), and *all* candidates in any case are chosen (under the electoral law) by the Fatherland Front, which is an agency of the Communist Party. The history of elections in both Vietnams is dealt with in Howard R. Penniman, *Elections in South Vietnam* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1972).

whose major consideration is their own relations with the big communist powers.

The new situation in South Vietnam indicates what might wryly be called the 'peaceful co-existence' of detente and deliberate tension. At the top echelon of the international communist movement, the Soviet Union and China are able to maintain a smiling Olympian detachment consonant with detente on the world stage. One echelon below, North Vietnam—whose dependence on the two of them for military and financial help, as great as Saigon's on the United States, means that Hanoi cannot act against their general policies—can issue its orders to its subordinates in South Vietnam but does not have to accept answerability for what they do at its bidding. At the end of the negotiations in January, under the exceptional pressure of the Christmas bombing of Tonkin, Hanoi dropped the earlier condition to a truce that the communist forces in the South should be recognised formally by the United States as the 'PRG'; any claim that such a government actually existed would have been impossible to substantiate in the absence of a seat of government, of ministries and bureaucracy, of laws and courts, or of any other attribute to identify it as a true government.[6] But this did not matter for the immediate purpose of unloading responsibility for continued fighting, already foreshadowed at the time—indeed, *enjoined*—in the daily press of Hanoi: the Saigon government bound itself to deal (through a Joint Military Commission) with the southern communist command and could no longer hold Hanoi answerable for that command's actions.

As a result of the countless breaches of the ceasefire which have occurred, and evidently in the hope of securing a ceasefire for Cambodia (disappointed), the United States agreed in a supplementary ceasefire in June to resume clearance of the mines sown in Haiphong harbour; in exchange, the communist side agreed to observe the ceasefire more closely, but only on condition that the resolution of breaches should be further devolved from the Joint Military Commission to low-level field commanders. It could be argued that there was parity in this—that Saigon too could disown, if so minded, what its field commanders arranged; but, given the sophisticated discipline and open chain of command of the Saigon forces, that would hardly be credible, whereas the Canadian incident just referred to is probably a foretaste of future communist prevarications. Consequently, one effect of the political provisions of the truce is to establish two cut-outs of responsibility between the great-power echelon of detente and the echelon of actual conflict

[6] As these lines are being written, the communist command in South Vietnam has explained its long detention of some captured Canadian truce supervisors as due to 'the very great difficulties of communication'—an explanation inconsistent with the objective existence of any 'PRG'.

on the ground. President Nguyen-van-Thieu's hesitation to underwrite these arrangements was generally condemned in the Western press as insincere; that he was obliged to sign in the end is evidence that no cut-outs operate on the anti-communist side of the conflict.

Reconciliation

The truce is not meant to be an end in itself: its political provisions point the way forward to permanent reconciliation of the contestants. The expressed intention is that the reconciliation should reflect the will of the people, and that entails elections again—elections confined, this time, to South Vietnam. The ceasefire agreement envisages the setting up of a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to which the task of holding the elections would be entrusted, under supervision by the International Control Commission. The possibilities of reconciliation offered the South Vietnamese electors are, however, subject to certain limitations which it is necessary to summarise before the 'honourability' of the Paris agreement can be judged.

There are really two questions for what would amount in practice to decision by plebiscite: (a) is South Vietnam to be united with North Vietnam? and (b) is the government of South Vietnam to be communist or non-communist, and, if the latter, with or without communist participation in some form? For the moment, only the second question is posed under the auspices of the Council (if that body is ever set up): the first question is predetermined in favour of unification, but how and when is left open until after the second question has been voted on. If this looks like delicate deference on Hanoi's part to self-determination for the South, the appearance is deceptive. That the ultimate aim of the DRV is unification has been declared so many thousands of times—and is still being repeated daily—that it could hardly be disputed even before it was written into the ceasefire; those distinguished political analysts in Europe and America who, in defiance of commonsense, have attributed the second Indochina war to 'spontaneous uprisings' have been let down, not only by the mass of documents captured from the communist forces, but by the boasts of Comrade Le Duan himelf, who, it is generally believed, had charge of the matter on the spot.[7] But the conspicuous 'voting with the feet' by the masses which took place in the South during the Tet offensive five years ago, away from advancing communist forces, led Hanoi to work for an intermediate stage in which there would be, temporarily, two Vietnamese states under the Party's control. The takeover of Tonkin after 1954 had necessitated purges of opposition in the villages by the draconian measures of the so-called 'land reform'

[7] 'Our Party was correct in advancing the revolutionary objectives for the two zones [*i.e.*, North and South Vietnam] . . . ; in the South, *we* mobilized the masses to rise up and wage a revolutionary war.' Address to the 19th Party Plenum.

but resistance to it threatened the regime's very survival. The chances are that the going would be even tougher in the South, where opponents would be better organised, and if a 'bloodbath' were called for again, as alarmists in America have predicted, that could be more prudently entrusted, not to an independent, but to a separate, authority. So the ceasefire says 'reunification' shall be achieved 'step by step'. Here again, it is not so much a matter of the communists' gradually wooing the public in the South to support them as of taking time gradually to disarm, by the blacker arts of Marxism-Leninism, the opposition they anticipate. At a suitable opportunity in the future—perhaps after the five or ten years which Hanoi leaders have suggested in the past—there might be an all-Vietnam plebiscite, with the arrangements made in the DRV by its present government, in the South under more or less open supervision; the bigger population of the North would carry the day by simple arithmetic—which is why Ngo-dinh-Diem set his face against the all-Vietnam elections prescribed in the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

One can, of course, exclude any possibility of the unification of Vietnam under non-communist rule. Obviously, the Hanoi leaders would never agree to that after the long war, even if they had been prepared to contemplate it before. But a more impelling reason is the strategic interest of China: the People's Republic could not accept an incompatible regime on a vulnerable frontier. Hanoi leaders in the past have occasionally expressed anxiety lest the South should invade them, with or without American support, and Le Duan, on the occasion referred to previously, explained the attack on the South as 'them or us'; but the lesson of China's reaction to the collapse of North Korea has never been lost on the South Vietnamese, still less on their American backers (or restrainers). Furthermore, North Vietnam, apart from eagerness to obliterate the example of an alternative regime to its own in the South, has several economic reasons for wanting possession of the South—especially as a source of food [8] and as an outlet for its centuries-old surplus of manpower, unexportable since 1954 except in the expeditionary force. The South, on the contrary, might stand to lose economically if it absorbed the North and had to pay for its food, fuel and other imports.

The word 'reconciliation' used in the ceasefire agreement might be interpreted as indicating a mutual quest for compromise. Once again, the appearance is deceptive—and not solely because the word was chosen by Hanoi, 'mobiliser' of the 'revolutionary war'. The idea of a coalition to sink differences and of 'third forces' able to bury the hatchets is attractive to well-wishers far away; but the practical possibili-

[8] The DRV has received gifts of food-grains to the extent of half a million tons a year from China and Russia, but the perpetual deficit may be made good from now on by the military occupation of Cambodia's 'bread-basket', Battambang.

ties of compromise in government are negligible. There is no model for compromise between a free-market economy and a collectivised one, between a society allowing free movement of persons with a multiplicity of news media and political parties, and a totalitarian state eliminating free choices and free movement as sinful or 'unnecessary'. All the leaders in Hanoi have declared at one time or another that, for them, compromise with 'pure Marxism-Leninism' is unthinkable. Certainly recent history offers examples in other countries of coalitions, in which communists have occupied ministerial posts beside non-communists; but difficulties over policy and over management of civil services have shortened their life. The Vietnamese communists tried to secure in the Paris agreement a position in which the elected Saigon government would surrender two-thirds of its ministerial posts—and, presumably, two-thirds of its legislative seats—for transfer in equal shares to communist nominees and to 'neutralists'. The formula was familiar from Laos, but unpromising. During the negotiations, the proposal was diluted to one for the Council of National Conciliation, whose powers would be limited to running the elections, but which was still to be in 'three equal segments'. The difficulty is that the 'neutralists' do not actually exist; suggestions that opposition members of the Saigon legislature, vociferous in their criticism of Thieu, might so act were angrily rejected by themselves, so that persons would have to be found (largely from among émigrés in France) who, though acceptable to the communists, were unrepresentative. Converse suggestions that the Communist Party, though representing an expeditionary force standing to arms a few miles away and under the high command of Hanoi, could settle down as a 'loyal opposition' in the present legislature, are too ridiculous to merit discussion.

In the belief that, in an internationally supervised election, the communists would make a poor showing at the present time, the Saigon government has tried to push on with the elections—if not through the Council, then by some other arrangement mutually acceptable. But the communist command has declined and is plainly in no hurry. It is a fair assumption that it shares the opinion of Saigon and is therefore manoeuvring for a preliminary period of consolidation. In the first place, the communists badly need a capital to lend credence to the reality claimed for the PRG; a bid, on the eve of the ceasefire, to capture Tay Ninh, lying between Saigon and the road leading from Sihanoukville and the Ho-Chi-Minh trail on Cambodian territory, was repulsed, and they appear to have been making do with the buildings on the French rubber estate at Loc Ninh. Delay in their takeover is probably of less interest for consolidating their hold over the population of the areas they occupy under the in-place ceasefire, since that is small, than of finding opportunities to wear down the Saigon authorities

and the villagers still under the government. It is in furtherance of this process, undoubtedly, that they refused to entertain the demand of Saigon, during the negotiations, that the expeditionary force from North Vietnam ought to go home if the ceasefire was really to bring peace in the South; the North Vietnamese soldiers are required on South Vietnamese soil in order to make the communist cause a convincing political factor. The chosen vehicle for this conviction must be expected to be that old and tried one, Mao Tse-tung's 'barrel of a gun'.

Survival

When one tours Saigon and the bustling villages, road and waterways of Cochinchina, there is an atmosphere of such solidity and confidence that the communists' chances of wearing down the government's evident social control seem poor, the survival of a non-communist state assured. Yet, even if a sudden disaster in South Vietnam can be ruled out, government officials themselves often tell visitors, with suprising candour, how precarious the situation might yet prove to be. The position of the defence is, from the outset, a demoralising one: waiting to be hit, with no chance of striking back at their assailants' heartland, can sorely strain the morale of soldiers and civilians alike in a conflict the rules of which lay it down that they stand only to lose as time goes on, their adversaries only to gain. The South Vietnamese army is, like the North Vietnamese army, a force of outstanding endurance—trained, equipped and war-tried; indeed, if Vietnam were one day united, and its two armies also—able to muster three million men between them—there would be no other force in mainland south-east Asia capable of withstanding them, unless everybody stopped shipments of arms to them. The militarisation of government and society to meet the demands of the war has provided an outlet for the South's surplus manpower as for the North's, and there have been temptations to shelve awkward problems arising from independence, not only at upper levels of government, but at lowlier levels of society too; the redeployment of limited financial resources from military to developmental purposes may necessitate government enforcement of unpopular measures—although one might suppose that aggrieved persons would hardly be likely to seek a preferable alternative in the Marxist-Leninists' programme.

High on the list of adjustment problems one naturally thinks first of war damage, second of the loss of invisible earnings accruing from the now-departed Americans. Of these, on the whole, the former is the lesser; its most irreparable manifestation has been the slashing, mortaring and defoliation of rubber estates, but those were a diminishing asset anyway, for world-market reasons, of more concern to capitalists in France than to South Vietnam's balance of payments. Grain production, for several years in deficit and still affected by neglect of hydraulic

work, is reported now to be in balance and will undoubtedly soon yield an exportable surplus of modest value; land reform, reducing all agricultural holdings to a three-hectare limit, has been completed, but for political motives—like land reforms everywhere—and the economic consequences remain to be seen.

In general, how to find export substitutes for foreign aid is the basic economic question influencing South Vietnam's chances of survival; there is on all hands a visible, import-based, affluence, in contrast to the standard of living in the tightly disciplined North, closer to egalitarian and culturally revolutionised People's China. Urbanisation, drawing even farmers into the little townships to live—for more far-reaching and permanent reasons than the crossfire of the war—has reached a level of well over half the population. Mechanised transport by road and canal has been brought by the war economy within the grasp of nearly everybody, enormously widening the range of even the peasant's 'commuting', and simple machinery has lightened many manual tasks; but maintenance, replacement and above all fuel oil have to be paid for in foreign exchange. Today, exports cover at best a fifth of the cost of non-military imports, the balance being met by the United States. (The value of military equipment has never been reflected in the state budget of the South any more than of the North.)

The Saigon government is not prevented from instituting stringent austerity controls over imports only by the unpopularity of a measure to curb rising affluence; the trouble is that the emoluments of the security forces are tied to a high level of imports by a special bond. Direct taxation has long ceased to yield a substantial proportion of the state revenue, and it never made more than a marginal contribution to the soldier's pay; instead, army pay has been financed from piastres which consumers paid for commodities imported under the Commercial Import Programme (the market price plus heavy customs duties, and in recent years an equally heavy austerity tax), the original purchase price being covered in dollars allocated as foreign aid. When instituted in the 1950s, this financial arrangement envisaged that the commodities to be imported would consist of capital equipment and raw materials for native manufactures, not ready-made consumer commodities; but the escalation of communist pressure, and the expansion of the security forces to meet it, necessitated increases in imports at a much faster rate than the burgeoning industries could absorb. Consumer commodities were then imported as well on a large scale, and in some cases these so competed with native products—in textiles, for example—that they bankrupted the very industries earlier infusions of aid had built up. Consumer commodities also came to be imported as an antidote to the inflation of the piastre resulting from enormously increased American piastre-spending after 1965. If the Saigon government could gradually

demobilise the security forces—although that would bring with it other economic and social problems—remedies might be found for the built-in adverse balance of payments; but there can be no demobilisation so long as North Vietnam keeps up its threats and the in-place ceasefire remains in force. The prospect of the North reducing its pressure is nil, not only for the reasons we have touched on, but also because it cannot afford to let its own forces relax if discipline and morale are to be maintained; and, of course, having beaten the Saigon government for so long with the stick of its being an American puppet, it is not likely to do anything to help it out of the predicament. South Vietnam's chief financial hope lies in the discovery of oil on the adjacent parts of the continental shelf of the South China Sea; if current investigations were to bring to light a sizeable oil-field, the balance of payments might move into surplus without American aid; but then, at the same time, the DRV would have an additional incentive for wanting to take over the South.

One of the least-sung endowments the intimate association with the United States has brought South Vietnam is the firm rooting of parliamentary democracy. The behaviour of the elected and of the press may leave much to be desired in sophistication, but then hardly a year passes nowadays without 'jostling' being resorted to even in the Mother of Parliaments. Like all south-east Asian peoples, once they are given the opportunity, the South Vietnamese electors have quickly grasped what is involved in voting; the eventual substitution in the South of North Vietnamese electoral procedures would be a blatantly retrograde step. One cannot endorse the logic of those analysts who assert that the South Vietnamese adoption of parliamentary democracy must somehow be illusory because the system is alien to their society, yet take it as natural that the North Vietnamese should be at ease with Marxism-Leninism, just as alien. On the economic front, the government pursues a policy of free enterprise little short of libertarian by the common standards of the West—less perhaps from conviction as from lack of confidence in its own managers' talents as economists; the policy necessarily has a political aspect as well, reinforced by unhappy experience under Ngo-dinh-Diem in trying to run an authoritarian style of government that was not outright totalitarian. Despite the 30 or 40,000 proved or suspected communist agents (*pace* Amnesty International) likely to remain under detention so long as the ceasefire keeps North Vietnam's regular soldiers within fifty miles of Saigon, and the occasional censoring of such newspapers as the forthright *Chinh Luan* (*Les Débats*), there is more individual freedom to be had today in South Vietnam than in most neighbouring countries—as the long-suffering newspaper editor has told at least one foreigner—and the Marxist-Leninist alternative does not offer the prospect of greater liberty.

But then, *is* ' democracy ' a formula for survival? Open societies are notoriously exposed to subversion, tyrannies more stable; it will not be the DRV which will have to give up the struggle because it is constrained to from within or by its big-power backers. Party propagandists in Hanoi have a pithy way of explaining ' reconciliation ' to cadres and lesser workers: ' *Hoa, dê tiên* ', they say—' Reconciliation is the springboard for further advance '.

NORTH VIETNAM FACES PEACE *

Jean Lacouture

THE long march of the founders of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement towards the creation of an independent and socialist state embracing the whole of Vietnam began on a spring day in 1941, when a couple of dozen outlaws, pursued both by the Chinese Kuomintang government and the French colonial power (then 'protected' by the Japanese), founded at Chingsi, on the frontier between China and Indochina, the Vietminh, the league for the independence of Vietnam. The brains of the enterprise was a militant of long standing, Nguyen Ai Quoc, not yet known under the name of Ho Chi Minh. The kernel of the new body was the Indochinese Communist Party, which had been created ten years earlier. But it was in 1941 that the Vietnamese movement acquired its own particular character, combining both a decisive impulse towards the conquest of power and a political line that combined Marxism and patriotism.

It took Ho Chi Minh and his men thirteen years to overthrow the French colonial system, which from 1949 onwards had the support of the United States. At the Geneva Conference of 1954 they secured international recognition for a communist half of Vietnam, with as its counterpart an anti-communist state in the south, which the Americans treated as a military base for resistance against the communist thrust southwards and as the point of departure for an eventual reconquest.

Ho Chi Minh and his followers had resigned themselves to this compromise under pressure from their Soviet and Chinese allies, who were seeking a detente, and also in order to avoid direct American intervention. But they regarded their attitude as purely provisional. Elections, they believed, would make reunification possible within two years, and it seemed obvious that partition was prejudicial to all the deepest aspirations for national unity; it would condemn the new state, deprived of the agricultural wealth of the South, to poverty and therefore to a struggling socialism whose rigour fell far short of 'Uncle Ho's' intentions. The desire to emerge from the political ghetto; witch-hunts in the South; the refusal by Saigon and Washington to embark on the elections envisaged at Geneva—all these factors combined to produce a conflict during which the South three times narrowly escaped being

* This article is also appearing in Dutch in *Internationale Spectator*, in French in *Politique Etrangère* and in German in *Europa-Archiv*.

overwhelmed by local guerrilla bands supported by considerable forces from the North. But formidable American intervention enabled the anti-communist forces in the South to combine and, under Nixon's air umbrella, check the revolutionary thrust and impose a fresh compromise.

For some time, even before the start of the communist offensive of Easter 1972, it had been realised in Hanoi and among the ranks of the Southern revolutionaries (Vietcong) that the great plan of combining the movement for national independence with its Marxist cadres was impracticable. Out of the vicissitudes of foreign intervention, of the Right's collaboration first with the French and then with the Americans, one truth had in fact emerged clearly—that an important sector of the national community refused to identify the desire for independence with the movement launched in 1941. The fact that the movement had been the main, the most heroic and the most effective organisation for national reconquest did not suffice, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, to give it the monopoly of patriotism.

It was on this basis that Hanoi and the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government were forced from 1971 onwards, and especially after the check to their offensive in 1972, to reorientate their strategy and henceforth take greater account of other facets of Vietnamese patriotism. Whether in the form of the tripartite government at first envisaged in Saigon, or in the form agreed to in Paris on January 27, 1973—a twofold Southern government, that of Saigon and that of the revolutionaries, pending elections—the Vietnamese revolution chose a compromise, though not without making some progress towards its objectives. The 1973 agreement in fact signifies, as compared with that of 1954, that while under the partition of nineteen years ago the revolutionaries secured a state, the provisions of the second agreement officially consolidated their influence over half of the South. Slow progress, perhaps, taking into account the enormous sacrifices suffered since 1941? That is true, and it may be supposed that the Vietnamese communists would have accomplished more had they been more flexible at times—in 1946, for instance, or after 1954. But their progress, though delusive, is none-theless perceptible, and the 1973 agreement at least marks the end of a century of foreign military intervention.

Thus the Democratic Republic of Vietnam faces a period of peace (which will take long to establish in the South) and reconstruction (which should be rapid) in a twofold spirit of tactical compromise and strategic success, though weighed down by the inevitable aftermath of war—casualties, material destruction, an economic crisis, internal debate about the choice made at the war's end and difficulties with one or other of its allies.

Everyone who has visited North Vietnam in recent years—my own last visit was in September–October 1972—has been struck both by the

extent of the destruction and the apparent indifference of the Vietnamese to it. A population inured for demographic reasons to a perpetual struggle against poverty, cadres formed to carry on an implacable revolutionary struggle against colonialism, army and people alike doomed to suffer under aerial bombardment, all these elements form a community extraordinarily united in its stoicism, overcoming its trials with astonishing fortitude lightened by a sense of humour. Anyone visiting the ravaged surroundings of Hanoi, the destroyed areas of Haiphong or the flattened centre of Nam Dinh has found there, not prostration, but pride in survival and promise of reconstruction.

But important as these moral factors are, a community is nevertheless bound to be handicapped by a destruction estimated at 45 per cent. of urban areas, 75 per cent. of industrial equipment, and 25 per cent. of agricultural means of production. Even more serious is the loss of human life. Civilian casualties were relatively small, only about 3 or 4 per cent., despite the intense bombardments of May and December 1972; but the army, in other words the younger age groups, suffered much more severely. The offensive of April–July 1972 is estimated to have cost North Vietnam 100,000 men (including Vietcong losses). This will be a terrible handicap to the country's efforts for reconstruction.

Yet without being over-naive or overestimating the qualities of the Vietnamese, one is nevertheless tempted to predict a rapid rate of recovery for the productive apparatus and towns of the North. First, because the regime has shown its capacity for mobilisation; secondly, because the people are animated by a fierce energy and a remarkable ingenuity which doubles the effectiveness of their efforts; and lastly, because Hanoi seems determined to invoke all possible sources of international aid, including aid from such capitalist countries as Japan and the United States, no less than from social-democratic countries like Sweden or, of course, from countries in the communist camp.

True, the question of Sino-Soviet relations still weighs heavily upon the policy and future of North Vietnam. But it seems likely that from now onwards Hanoi's official inter-party diplomacy will continue in peacetime to be inspired by the same principle of independence and balance that governed the policies of Ho and his followers during the war. A number of experts have tried to detect fluctuations in the North Vietnamese alignment between the Soviet Union and China since 1954. They point to pro-Chinese trends between 1954 and 1957, to a move away from Moscow in the last three years of Khrushchev's regime, and to a new rapprochement with the Russians during the American bombings of 1965–68 which made necessary the recourse to modern Russian weapons. They see a detachment from China during the Cultural Revolution, which was highly unpopular in North Vietnam, and again at the time of the American visits to Peking in 1971–72. Finally, they note that

Soviet attempts to exercise pressure towards negotiation in 1972, at the time of Podgorny's last visit to Hanoi, were viewed askance by the North Vietnamese, as was also the hospitality extended by the Soviet Union to Mr. Nixon when the terror bombings in the spring of 1972 were at their height; and they conclude that however important Soviet aid may have been in the last year of the war, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has emerged from the conflict with feelings of considerable reserve towards the Russian leaders and of somewhat less reserve *vis-à-vis* the Chinese.

The Democratic Republic's first big diplomatic operation after the fighting ended—the series of visits to a number of communist capitals by its two main leaders, Party First Secretary Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong—is quite significant. The North Vietnamese leaders dissociated their Asian visits—beginning, naturally, with Peking in June—from their visits to Europe, starting with Moscow on July 8. Asia is, of course, the obvious point of departure for them and the geopolitical sphere in which they find themselves. But it was perhaps also felt that these factors played a more definite part than before, and that in making positive contacts with Japan and Malaysia, Hanoi wished to affirm its *Asiatic* almost as much as its *communist* character—which is something new.

As far as relations with the two great powers of the communist world are concerned, one gets the impression that the visit to Peking was much more cordial this time than that to Moscow. The Agence France Presse correspondent in Hanoi reported on June 25, 1973, that leading circles in North Vietnam were not concealing their irritation at the manifestations of Soviet-American friendship, which their press passed over in complete silence. It should not, however, be concluded from this that the North Vietnamese are ranging themselves in the Chinese camp. During their visit to China of June 4–10, 1973, they and Chou En-lai certainly made several demonstrations of solidarity. But Le Duan was at pains to remind his hosts that Soviet aid had contributed to the Vietnamese 'victories' and his speeches were inspired by a spirit of sturdy independence *vis-à-vis* the fraternal countries. Describing the meeting, Alain Bouc, correspondent of *Le Monde* in Peking, ended his article by saying that 'the two sides are not close political allies, but the two states are understanding partners'—which shows clearly the nature and degree of closeness of their relations.

Hanoi strives for independence

Amid all the fluctuations imposed by circumstances on the North Vietnamese political strategists, and whatever struggles for influence there may be in Hanoi between the supposedly 'pro-Chinese' (who are possibly rather more dogmatic) and the allegedly 'pro-Soviet' (probably

rather more pragmatic), which the experts have tried in vain to classify, the only reality of North Vietnamese foreign policy is a fierce desire for independence, based on the very strong superiority complex of militants who have sustained the longest and most terrible struggle against the capitalist powers. A desire for autonomy which has remained unimpaired throughout the most cruel vicissitudes of the war is not likely to be weakened by the burdensome difficulties of the peace.

Granted that the basic problems in Hanoi are not those of reconstruction (for these, given extensive foreign aid, should be soluble within the compass of a five year plan) or of diplomacy, the prospects for which we have tried to indicate in simplified terms, we find two main challenges facing the successors of Ho Chi Minh. These are, first, the reorientation of a regime and party whose bureaucratic tendencies have been dangerously strengthened and aggravated through the trials of war and, secondly, the establishment of new relations with a South Vietnam gradually becoming detached from American influence and open to eventual reunification, even if that may take a long time.

The struggle against the Stalinist type of bureaucracy which, under cover of 'war socialism', corrupts and paralyses certain sectors of the North Vietnamese state and its productive machinery is the crucial question at the moment in Hanoi. It was the subject of an important resolution of the political bureau of the Lao Dong (the 'Workers' Party' or Communist Party in the North) dated February 20, 1973, which was explained in a long article by the First Secretary, Le Duan, published in the official daily *Nhan Dan* (March 14 and 15). 'The leadership of the party and the administration of the state must evolve rapidly in order to become adapted to the new circumstances and tasks', writes the First Secretary, taking issue with those who 'work in a bureaucratic way, dissociated from the masses and lacking in respect for the right of the people to be their own collective master', which causes 'the many weaknesses in the administration, which is not up to the level of its tasks'. Le Duan advises them to 'listen to the views of the masses even when you do not approve of them', to have a 'strong sense of self-criticism', to 'dare to recognise their mistakes and correct them', and to understand that 'economic laws are different from military laws'—which is pretty difficult after twenty-eight years of war.

The First Secretary adopts a stern tone in accusing those who have fallen into 'arbitrariness and absolutism' or again into 'anarchy' at a time when the regime must develop and strengthen itself by the alliance of 'the state's activities, placed under the direction of the party, with the great initiatives of the popular masses'. And to this end, he says, the young must take the place of the older men, who show signs of 'weakness or ignorance that may degenerate into catastrophe'.

The conclusion of Le Duan, the chief North Vietnamese leader, is: 'Our party and our people find themselves faced with new struggles which demand that we should concentrate our greatest efforts towards building a new economy, a new society, new men, in order to permit *the socialist* North *to play* in full *its historic role in relation to the new stage of the revolution in the* whole country.' This is a *definitely self-critical* pronouncement, in view of the fact that Le Duan himself has led this 'ossified' party for the past thirteen years. Will it suffice to rid North Vietnam's political and administrative apparatus of its bureaucratic faults? It is to be feared that those faults will survive the reprimand, and their uprooting will prove a very long-term job. But we can at least take note of this appeal and its tenuous sign of regeneration.

Less pressing, but of capital importance, is the problem of relations between the two Vietnams and of reunification. The fundamental character of this aim should not be forgotten, but it would be a mistake to see it as an immediate ambition justifying new military initiatives. True, the theme of Vietnamese unity is at the very centre of the revolutionary doctrine, and no one forgets that Ho's testament made it one of the two commandments of the Vietnamese patriot and Marxist, of equal importance with independence. Thus it is impossible to visualise a situation in which, as the American leaders hoped, Hanoi would 'renounce the South', any more than one could imagine Cavour renouncing Calabria or Bismarck Bavaria.

But for a whole host of reasons—the main one being that in the last ten years of war the South has shown that it existed as an entity even under an unpopular and unrepresentative government, in face of anything that might resemble an 'invasion' from the North—the Northern leaders have clearly grasped that the methods of reunifying the Vietnamese territory must be those of convergence and consensus, not of constraint. In this they follow the views of their comrades in the Provisional Republican Government, who are always very careful to recall their 'Southern' character, and whose programmes and provisional institutions well reflect this desire for at least provisional independence, which will lead to unification only as the outcome of negotiations between equals, terminating in a contract.

The fact remains that the North maintains important forces in the South (the January agreements do not forbid it, merely specifying that this question will be the subject of discussions 'between Vietnamese') and that it thus gives itself the means to pursue a policy which is not, and will not be, merely that of an outside friendly neighbour but that of an interested party, conducted with more or less moderation according to the circumstances. It must not, all the same, be forgotten that Vietnam, in the second half of the 20th century, is more united

by language, culture and history, and more economically complementary, than either Germany or Italy were a century ago. The question is whether Hanoi will be able to control its appetites and its inherent harshness and await the ripening of a natural process. If I am to believe Pham Van Dong and what he said to me in our last conversation in October 1972, Hanoi will know how to direct itself with prudence towards this fundamental objective.

In the meantime, a new kind of relationship will have to be established between the two capitals. The weakening of the American executive, the putting into effect of the Guam doctrine and the collapse of Lon Nol's regime in Cambodia may contribute to the decline of the present regime in Saigon, which, by gradually liberating its political prisoners, is opening the way to the rise of a new force and the creation of a transitional government more nearly reflecting the diversity of South Vietnamese society. Bearing these factors in mind, one can foresee that some months ahead, before the end of 1974, the problem will arise of establishing almost normal relations between the 'three Vietnams'—the North, the Southern guerrillas and the relatively democratised Saigon regime, with the two latter pursuing, somewhat better than was the case during the summer of 1973, conversations on the pacification and political normalisation of the South.

When dealing with Vietnam one has to think in the long term. The fighting has been too cruel, the losses too heavy, the resentments too implacable for war simply to be succeeded by peace. What matters is the desire for peace. Will a recent visitor to North Vietnam be regarded as naive because he believes in the existence of this spirit of peace among men who have suffered too much from war not to have conceived a horror of it, and who are too impatient to establish the international status of their country not to want to extract it from the hornets' nest of an indefinite war?

The heirs of Ho Chi Minh, deprived of the wise counsels of his experience, find it hard to curb their strategic and ideological impetuosity merely in order to ease the joints of a political and economic system whose ossification and sclerosis have been accentuated by wartime exigencies. But they are serious people, and must take account, like all the world's rulers, of the aspirations of the people. And the people have suffered terribly. They long for peace, reconstruction, normality, democratisation. Let us trust in them to induce their leaders to give them, in place of an era of heroism, an era of wisdom.

LAOS AND CAMBODIA: THE SEARCH FOR UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE

Stuart Simmonds

'WE can do nothing about geography, gentlemen,' Stalin is said to have remarked in the course of certain political negotiations with the Finns. It is indeed propinquity to forces of power and population greater than their own that lies at the root of the troubles that afflict Laos and Cambodia[1] today. Nevertheless the geographical situations of the two countries are vastly different from each other. In Laos the mountain ranges that bunch in the centre of the country, with a tail swinging down to the south, cause a centrifugal effect. The divided trans-Mekong plain, where the main centres of population lie, looks across the river to Thailand while the serrated plateaux of north and north-east Laos most readily reach out towards China and North Vietnam. The southern plateau of the Bolovens connects with South Vietnam and Cambodia through the hills of the Annamite chain. In geopolitical terms the chances of establishing lasting internal unity in Laos are thus severely restricted. By contrast, in Cambodia the mountain ranges form, in the main, northern and south-western fringes to a low-lying basin which provides easy access to Thailand to the west and South Vietnam to the east. In this case, allowing for the formidable obstacle of the Mekong, which bisects the country, the Cambodian plains make it easy for external powers, with the will to do so, to threaten the integrity of the frontiers of Cambodia and indeed to cross and clash upon its territory.

An examination of the history of Laos and Cambodia demonstrates the relevance of the geographical factors. Laos has been united only for infrequent and short periods in the eight centuries during which the Lao-Thai people have been dominant. This unity has depended upon the simultaneous existence of a strong local ruler internally and conditions of low external pressure. In terms of political development the movement from the ancient structure of 'feudal' and feuding principalities towards the nation-state, as achieved by Thailand, has been more limited in the case of Laos. Moreover the welding of the various non-Lao ethnic groups, constituting some forty per cent. of the population, has been made difficult by their physical separation. The incorporation of Laos

[1] The Khmer Republic has been official nomenclature since October 1970, but the convenient familiar term 'Cambodia' is used in this article.

by France into a Union Indochinoise was too temporary and too complex in method to encourage genuine Laotian unity. It gave impetus to a desire to link the concept of independence with that of unity as French control diminished. However, the lack of a sense of nationhood, the persistence of regionalism and ethnic particularism and the endemic lack of internal communications, together with the immediate onset of strong external pressures, made it hard for the promoters of independence, unity and indivisibility to convert concept into political and social reality. The history of Cambodia is much more one of attempted resistance to continuous external pressures from east and west. That is not to say that internecine conflict did not exist among the rulers. It did, and it was aggravated by the opportunities for the factional acquisition of power by association with Annamese or Siamese political interests. Nevertheless the geographical factors referred to, the less complex ethnic composition of the population, and perhaps even, among the elite, a sense of the past grandeur of the Khmer Empire, provided a greater feeling for national identity, upon which, in modern times, independence leaders, notably Prince Norodom Sihanouk, were able to build.

Laos under rival external pressures

The beginnings of independence for Laos took place in circumstances of great complexity and confusion involving British, French, Chinese, Thai and Vietminh interests and activities. This had repercussions within the various elite groups on the Laotian side, and many of the individuals concerned are still on the stage or in the wings today. Some, like Prince Souphanouvong, established an immediate connection with the Vietminh, which led to a breakaway from the major part of the movement during the early days of exile in Bangkok and the establishment of the Pathet Lao. His half-brother, Prince Souvannaphouma, another member of the active cadet branch of the Luang Prabang royal family, emerged as a neutralist nationalist. Others pursued a less consistent, no doubt more opportunist, course—like Phoumi Nosavan, who progressed from the radical 'Lao pen Lao' nationalists to the height of power as minister of defence, and thence to failure and exile. The conservative established leaders—the King (then Crown Prince) of Luang Prabang in the north and Prince Boun Oum, ruler of the southern principality, found that support for, and association with, the French position was a natural course for them. With independence, the leading families of officials in Vientiane and in the south began to gain in power, economic strength and influence and, sometimes in concert, often in rivalry, turned on the whole towards Thailand. It needed little imagination on the part of many Laotian politicians to fear that the Vietnamese would become the dominant factor in an Indochina from which the French would

eventually depart. Therefore a tendency emerged, despite natural suspicions about Thai attitudes, to seek an accommodation with Thailand and to establish the main lines of communication with Bangkok. When the United States began to develop a major interest in the political situation in mainland south-east Asia after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the way in to Laos for the Americans was through Thailand. Thai and American interests coincided to a considerable extent. American determination to prevent a feared communist tidal wave sweeping through south-east Asia, conceptualised as the domino theory, met a ready response from Thai governments from the early 1950s onwards. Protection of the integrity of the north-eastern Thai frontier, which for the most part followed the course of the Mekong river, was an important feature of policy. Traditionally the Thai had become accustomed to a more forward policy than that. They wished to re-establish, for their own long-term and long-distance protection, the sphere of influence across the Mekong which they had enjoyed before the appearance of the French in Indochina. This, in modern as in traditional terms, involved some direct influence upon government, introducing an element of the client-state. Lao leadership which turned an attentive ear to Bangkok was imperative for the Thai, and a Western-oriented Laos was an attractive proposition to the United States. Neutrality was not enough for the Thai, in fact it was positively dangerous because a neutral government in Laos would include attitudes, and almost certainly a component of members, sympathetic to the Vietminh and later to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. To the Americans, especially in the Dulles era, there was an element of immorality in a neutral stance.

It followed that Laotian governments which enjoyed American support were headed by ministers who were acceptable to the Thai. Such were the governments of Katay Don Sasorith (November 1954–March 1956), Phoui Sananikone (1950–51 and 1958–59), Kou Abhay and Somsanith (1960) and Boun Oum (December 1960–July 1962). From 1960 until 1964 General Phoumi Nosavan was the dominant figure in Lao politics and Laos came near to rule by the army and police. He enjoyed the strongest support from Thailand, though the State Department became disillusioned with him during the prolonged Geneva conference on Laos in 1961–62.

Thus one of the polar positions in the Laotian political scene was established as a result of United States and Thai influence. The opposite pole derives from the Pathet Lao, led by Prince Souphanouvong, which, giving up its early hopes of influence in the Mekong valley centres of population, retired to the hills of the north-east and established itself with Vietminh support from 1950.

After the deep thrusts into Laos by the Vietminh in 1953, the Pathet

Lao found itself a factor in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina. Small and ineffective as it was but for Vietminh support, it was given regroupment areas within the territory of the kingdom pending its re-integration into Laotian political life. Thus for nearly twenty years the Pathet Lao has been a significant factor in Lao independence politics. Only for very short periods has it been able to operate before the public as a political party. The only electoral test, in the 1958 supplementary elections, demonstrated that the Pathet Lao's political wing commanded strong voting power but the divisive effect on the non-leftist vote caused by multiple candidates does not provide a basis for sound judgment. For the most part the Pathet Lao has been relegated to remote areas of low population within the defence orbit of the North Vietnamese. Negotiations with the royal government on the question of the re-integration of Pathet Lao's political and military wings have been attempted on many occasions. Twice, in 1956–58 and again, at the behest of the Geneva conference, in 1962–63, these came near to success. Failure was due, according to viewpoint, to sabotage by American (and Thai) supported right-wing forces, which threatened even the personal safety of Pathet Loa leaders, or to the intransigent Pathet Lao demands in the negotiations and its dangerously pro-communist position after Geneva in 1962.

The architect of attempted *rapprochement* has been the present prime minister, Prince Souvannaphouma. He held the view that reconciliation was possible on the basis of the primary commitment of both parties to Lao national interests. Externally this would have involved a neutral policy of avoiding contact with the immediate pressure points of Thailand and North Vietnam. Such a point of view might seem rashly simplistic in a statesman as tactically adept as Prince Souvannaphouma, but it struck a chord in the minds of the Lao people who, welcoming as they are to foreigners, do possess some traditionally based xenophobic feelings towards their immediate neighbours. For years Prince Souvannaphouma played down the association of Laos with the war in Vietnam, but detachment became impossible as escalation took place from 1964.

As a neutralist Prince Souvannaphouma commanded no significant independent forces despite the temporary existence of a neutralist faction after the 1962 Geneva settlement. By the time he received army support he was already committed, albeit with reluctance, to a working relationship with the United States and its allies. Accepted *faute de mieux* by the Americans and with extreme reluctance by the Thai government, Souvannaphouma's administration was not recognised by the Pathet Lao on the grounds of unconstitutionality. In fact, however, the Pathet Lao has negotiated with the royal government under Souvannaphouma and, after the ceasefire agreement of February 21, 1973, negotiations to form a coalition government were again begun. By August many obstacles still remained. They were of a familiar kind. The royal army objected

to the neutralisation of the royal capital of Luang Prabang and the administrative capital of Vientiane, which was to be secured by the stationing of Pathet Lao military and police units equivalent in size to the royal army garrisons. The functions of a National Political Coalition Council, to be set up alongside a Provisional Government, had still to be agreed; so had the date of elections for a new National Assembly, which had originally been proposed for January 1, 1976. The polarisation of forces and the relatively increased strength of the Pathet Lao, certainly in terms of land area denied to royal government administration, was reflected in the range of ministerial posts offered to the Pathet Lao. These included: foreign affairs, economy and plans, public works, religious affairs and information. Prince Souphanouvong, as senior deputy prime minister, would be the natural successor to Prince Souvannaphouma, now over seventy years of age, if he decided to retire.

Assuming an agreement [2] and freedom for the Pathet Lao to organise an electoral campaign, this situation might well lead to a new National Assembly of strongly leftist tendency. If the sequence of events runs true to type, there will be an attempt, backed by the army and police, to restrict the activities of the Pathet Lao. This, the third in the series, would need to be an extremely well-planned operation because it would be unlikely to receive great-power support now or in the immediate future.[3] Success would depend on local support and that in turn would depend on a strong popular swing away from the Pathet Lao, which could only happen if it engaged in activities clearly seen to be undesirable by the urban populations. There is a strong possibility that the Pathet Lao, though debarred from operating as a political party, may have clandestinely built up hidden strength in the towns over the years. If this is so, an attempted swing to the right might produce a popular uprising which would lead to a government totally dominated by the Pathet Lao and its close supporters.

A better hope for Laos would lie in the successful creation of a coalition government which would concentrate on military demobilisation and reconstruction—in other words, a further attempt to carry out the original conception of Souvannaphouma. Acceptance of development aid from multiple sources and without political interference will be essential to rebuild the damaged economy. This was never really viable in terms of a modern state at the best of times. Another pressing pro-

[2] An agreement was announced as this journal went to press.

[3] The hopelessly botched effort, on August 20, 1973, of the former air force general, Thao Ma, can hardly be considered in the category referred to. It is significant that support was at once denied by the United States. Although Thao Ma was an associate of General Phoumi Nosavan and the operation appears to have been mounted from Thailand, there is no present evidence of Thai governmental participation or approval. The possibility exists that desperate and extreme groups may have decided to act in the face of known disapproval of their governments.

blem is the relief and resettlement of several hundred thousand refugees who have fled to the Mekong valley towns, particularly the Vientiane region, from areas subjected to intensive bombing over almost a decade. Co-operation of this order would require almost superhuman efforts to sink personal, group and regional differences in a determination to put national needs first. There would have to be moderation in the expression and implementation of views and policies based on widely different political philosophies.

The question remains as to the extent to which external pressures in Laos will be reduced. The local ceasefire seems to have been implemented with considerable success but, while the war in Vietnam continues, North Vietnam will be unlikely to remove the presence of its unacknowledged forces in Laos. Even though the series of seasonal campaigns from 1964 to 1972 showed the impossibility, in the Laotian terrain, of maintaining permanent pressure by land forces on the northeast region by western-based troops and vice-versa, the North Vietnamese will need to provide security for their frontier and maintain the supply routes along the flanks of the Annamite chain.

In the changing circumstances it is not easy to see how Thailand will achieve its minimum security aim of maintaining some positive influence across the Mekong. The acceptance of a Lao government with a strong pro-communist element will not be palatable. No doubt Thailand would be suited by a partition of Laos into the Mekong valley and the rest, reflecting the present military situation, or a more sophisticated cantonal arrangement which would be possible in terms of the geography of the country. Although such arrangements could in theory keep rival external interests apart, they would not be acceptable to the Laotians least of all to the Pathet Lao. It would mean turning the clock back on political development in Laos. Although Laos has not achieved unity, the idea remains as a goal to be attained as a mark of true independence. Paradoxically, the reunification of Vietnam, whatever the fate of the south, might mitigate the pressures on Laos for a time by inducing a more relaxed attitude on the part of North Vietnam, which might in turn affect Thai policies. In the long term much depends on the views held by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the future of Indochina as a whole.

The failure of Sihanouk's concept of neutrality

The recent history of Cambodia has been epitomised in the name and personality of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, king from 1941 to 1955 then head of state until 1970. His claim to fame rests on the remarkable achievement of maintaining a successful policy of neutrality for an astonishingly long period in the post-colonial era. The French occupation

sheltered Cambodia from Vietnamese and Thai pressures which had been more acute than was the case with Laos. In Cambodia an uneasy Thai-Viet interregnum had existed over a much truncated territory. In the east the Vietnamese had established themselves in areas claimed by Cambodia. In the west the Thai had occupied provinces which were restored to Cambodia by France, temporarily ceded to Thailand during the Second World War and returned to Cambodia once more as part of the peace settlement. This history and the record of fighting over Cambodian territory that preceded it explain the deep obsession with frontier guarantees that has affected Cambodian attitudes in recent times.

The success of Norodom Sihanouk in the middle period of his political life has obscured the difficulties he had to face in the early period. These existed not only with the colonial power but also with Cambodian rivals. Again, as in the case of Laos, prominent political personalities of the present day emerged at this time. Notable among them are Son Ngoc Thanh, part-Vietnamese leader of the anti-Japanese and then anti-French Free Khmer Movement which has received support both from Thailand and South Vietnam; Yem Sambaur, former Democratic party leader and prime minister; and Penn Nouth, an early prime minister. The Vietminh also operated in Cambodia in the postwar period. The Geneva conference of 1954 gave international recognition to the independence of Cambodia which Norodom Sihanouk had negotiated in the previous year after a series of typically dramatic moves. The Khmer resistance, an appendage of the Vietminh, was not given status in Cambodia as a result of the 1954 conference.

Norodom Sihanouk's policy of neutrality implied non-commitment to either side in the evolving struggle in Vietnam but not withdrawal from the international scene. It was worked out in an atmosphere of tension and suspicion as far as the immediate neighbours, Thailand and South Vietnam, were concerned. Although the Thai claims pressed at this time were more or less symbolic, the threat seemed a real one to Cambodia, which saw Thailand also as a supporter of dissident political movements. There was more substance in the conflict of interests with South Vietnam over border territory, including off-shore islands and the Khmer minority in South Vietnam. Norodom Sihanouk remained suspicious of the intentions of the North Vietnamese despite reassurances given at the Bandung conference in 1955. However, he approached them even to the extent of trying, unsuccessfully at that time, to obtain written guarantees of Cambodian territorial integrity in the event of a re-united communist Vietnam.

Although trying to avoid a foreign military presence in Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk accepted development aid from the United States and France, from West Germany, Australia and Japan and from China, the Soviet Union and other communist countries. This was consistent

with his concept of neutrality, which necessitated an improvement of Cambodia's economic position. Progress in the economic field was also required to support Norodom Sihanouk's internal position.

While dismissing as ludicrous the idea that he could hold communist views and insisting on the non-communist nature of the independence he was trying to build for his country, Norodom Sihanouk was drawn inexorably towards the communist side. This was partly a matter of policy as he became convinced that he would one day have to face a united communist Vietnam. This led him to establish relations not only with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front of Vietnam but also with China, in the hope that the future dominant power in the east Asian region (in his view) would mitigate the pressures that might arise from a future communist neighbour.

Norodom Sihanouk's policies infuriated both his neighbours, Thailand and South Vietnam, allies of the United States in Seato, because they saw Cambodia as a trojan horse. The United States was also deeply disturbed, particularly as Cambodian help to the Vietcong in terms of sanctuary and supply became more marked. Norodom Sihanouk, always ready to grasp the nettle, himself refused United States aid in 1963 and then chose an opportunity to break off diplomatic relations.

Despite his general popularity, organised through his political following, the Sangkum or Popular Socialist Community, Norodom Sihanouk ran into opposition from the elite over his policies of nationalisation, and the country moved deeper into economic crisis, not least because of the non-acceptance of American aid, which could not be wholly replaced from other sources. Although diplomatic relations with the United States were resumed in 1969, the end of Norodom Sihanouk's attempt to preserve peace and create prosperity was approaching. The use of north-eastern border territory by North Vietnamese troops was increasing as a result of the escalation of the war, and the policy of President Nixon to withdraw American forces from Vietnam served only to multiply the danger for Cambodia. To offset the possibility of an attack on Saigon by North Vietnam during this difficult period, Cambodian territory was invaded by the United States and South Vietnam in April–May, 1970. Meanwhile the strength of the pro-communist Khmer Rouge was steadily developing and Norodom Sihanouk was also assailed by the growing anti-communist tendencies of rivals both within and outside the government.

Norodom Sihanouk's removal from power in March 1970 brought in his royal rival, Prince Sirik Matak, his former associate, General Lon Nol, together with Yem Sambaur, and Son Ngoc Thanh at the head of a force of anti-communist guerrillas. The takeover was marred by bloody riots against the North Vietnamese mission in Phnom Penh, extending to the Vietnamese civilian minority in Cambodia.

Although lip-service was paid to neutrality, a considerable shift in foreign policy attitudes took place. Diplomatic relations were established with Thailand and South Vietnam and the United States provided intensive military support. American air bombing, continued until August 15, 1973, caused greater damage and loss of life in Cambodia than the longer bombing campaign had done in Laos. Bombing was not confined to hill areas, and the more intensive agriculture and more concentrated population in Cambodia inevitably suffered greater destruction. The new Cambodian government broke off diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China, and Norodom Sihanouk established a government-in-exile in Peking known as the National United Front of Kampuchea.

As the long-drawn-out war in Laos appeared to be drifting to an end, the contrast with Cambodia was extreme. As one looks at the development of independence in Cambodia it is ironic to observe that the greater success of Prince Norodom Sihanouk led to a more spectacular disaster. Yet the circumstances were almost wholly out of his control. Cambodia is just too near South Vietnam to have survived intact the pressures resulting from the relative success of the American policy of 'Vietnamisation' followed sharply by the withdrawal of American forces. Both these developments have inevitably brought in their train a spilling over of the war into Cambodia. That war has not gone well for the new government, whose army is for the most part badly equipped and under-trained. It has to face the Khmer Rouge, which has been well stiffened by the North Vietnamese. The paradox mentioned in connection with Laos—that reunification in Vietnam, however distant it might be, would reduce external pressures—has less force in the case of Cambodia which lies too near the centre of Vietnamese conflict. If the war in Cambodia is nearing its end, this can only be through a victory of the Khmer Rouge. Would Norodom Sihanouk then return as head of state? He puts the matter plainly in the closing pages of his recent publication where he implies that the 'progressive' wing of the movement, involving younger Marxist leaders, has grown greatly in strength. He appears to see his role as that of a useful and effective figurehead and, in so far as that is possible, a mediator between communists and non-communists.[4]

In a communist Indochina the policy already advanced by Norodom Sihanouk of close relations with China in order to offset unwelcome Vietnamese political pressures might be a useful one for Cambodia to follow. It is reasonable to suppose that China might find it convenient to act as an arbiter, in a modern version of its traditional role, among communist or neutral states along its southern border. It might not want to see disturbances arising from expansionist ambitions developing

[4] Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, *My War with the C.I.A.* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).

in, say, Vietnam. A scene of this kind implies a movement towards neutralism on the part of the Thai. If an association was formed between Thailand and China, then Cambodia and Laos would find themselves the smallest states in an area of detente with nothing much to sell for their safety.[5]

However, the most likely probability is a continuing struggle for the communisation of the states of Indochina, with Thailand standing outside the ring. While still enjoying American support, Thailand may be required to adopt a low posture, doing the best it can to ensure internal security and accepting arrangements on its eastern borders which may not be to its liking. To engage in war on its own part to maintain a direct influence in Laos and Cambodia, as in former times, would be vastly more unwelcome.

Indochina lies no longer on the route from India to China—it is now part of a Pacific Ocean complex where a multiplicity of interests exist and develop. In this scene the United States is a powerful force and Japan will have an augmented role to play as its interests in south-east Asia develop. The Soviet Union, though avoiding deep involvement, has expressed its interest in a security pact in relation to south-east Asia. Soviet ideas would no doubt run counter to those of China and might well fail to develop for a variety of reasons. But many states in south-east Asia pay close attention to the possibility of political solutions. Only in a situation of mild international tension, stopping short of war, can small states like Laos and Cambodia find room to manoeuvre. By war they have already been brought near to destruction.

[5] Arguments of this type are further developed in Michael Leifer, *Cambodia: the search for security* (New York: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1968). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1968, p. 596.

JAPAN: ECONOMIC GIANT'S *QUIET DIPLOMACY*

A. M. Halpern

THE settlement of the Indochina war in 1973 is much less clean than the similar settlement in 1954. Within Indochina, the earlier settlement left a situation which the local states could abide by for a period of years. The current settlement contains no such promise. Of more importance from the point of view of Japan is the difference in the total context of international relations within which the settlement is taking place. The 1954 settlement left international alliance systems much as they had been up to then. The subsequent impact of peace in Asia on alliance systems, significant as it was, became manifest gradually, and depended on a variety of other causes. The 1973 settlement was preceded by profound changes in the foreign policies of the major powers. The newly emerging constellation of relationships between these powers served as a condition for a settlement being reached.

Japan's position in south-east Asia is neither that of a regional state nor that of an extra-regional state, but something of both. By reason of economic involvement, and to some degree by reason of emotional identification, Japan's interest in the welfare of other Asian countries resembles that of the regional states in a more intimate fashion than does the interest of truly extra-regional powers. 'Peace and stability in Asia'—a phrase used so often by the Japanese that it begins to sound like nothing more than conventional politeness—must in fact be a positive goal of Japan's policy. In the mouths of extra-regional powers, the same phrase now conveys little more than the hope that the cost of involvement in Asian affairs will decrease while the benefits remain. On the other hand, even more than in the past, Japan is the exceptional Asian country. It is the one advanced industrial country and, as other Asians are acutely aware, has an enormous appetite for materials. There is no escape from the exploitative aspect of Japan's Asian relations. Further, for many years Japan was in close alliance with another extra-regional power, the United States, and co-ordinated its approach to Asian problems with that of its senior partner.

The mixed regional and extra-regional features of Japan's position raised few difficulties in 1954. At that time, with its sovereignty recently

restored, Japan was dependent on and supported by the United States. It was newly embarked on a programme of reparations which would be the vehicle for rehabilitating its Asian relations. Under these circumstances, the end of armed conflict in Indochina was an advantage with few drawbacks, and these of minor consequence. The premises of policy—restoration of economic and political relations within the limits set by the deference to American demands—were sufficiently clear. Japanese progressives resented the policy, attacked it for its exclusion of relations with Asian communist countries, and criticised it as morally untenable, not conducive to real peace but potentially provocative of disaster. On the government level, however, the making of immediate decisions involved no serious complications.

The situation in 1973 is far different. The Japanese presence in Asia, whether measured in terms of physical visibility, economic relations (trade, investment, economic aid) or frequency of political contacts, has increased enormously. Japanese trade with south-east Asia has grown continuously in absolute terms, though it has declined in proportion to the growth of Japan's total trade. Japan's exports to south-east Asia are cited as reaching approximately $5·8 billion in 1971 and $6·3 billion in 1972, while Japan's imports from south-east Asia for those years are cited as $3·4 billion and $4·2 billion respectively. In percentage terms, south-east Asia a decade ago absorbed approximately one third of Japan's exports, but this percentage has decreased considerably, to 25·4 per cent in 1970, 24·0 per cent in 1971, and 22·1 per cent in 1972. The ratio of imports from south-east Asia to Japan's total imports has increased in recent years, from 16·0 in 1970 to 17·3 in 1971 and 17·8 in 1972. Australia's importance in Japan's trade, especially as a supplier, has also grown, Japan's exports being approximately $720 million in 1971, $729 million in 1972; while imports from Australia were $1·75 billion in 1971, $2·2 billion in 1972.[1] It is expected that these trends of absolute growth and proportionate decline will continue.

Apart from absolute amounts, Japan's trade with several Asian countries is seriously out of balance, running roughly 2:1 in Japan's favour with South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Further, Japan is the largest single trading partner of most south-east Asian countries, claiming between one-third and one-half of several south-east Asian markets. Besides Australia, Indonesia has now become a net exporter to Japan, with its $1·2 billion of exports in 1972 being almost double the amount of its imports from Japan. In addition there is the obscure question of the extent of Japanese investment in the area, which carries the

[1] Different figures are cited by different sources. The dollar figures used here are those cited by the United States-Japan Trade Council, Washington, D.C. The Council includes in south-east Asia the Ryukyus, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and India, but not Australia.

implication of economic dominance as well as special profits. The amounts involved are difficult to determine, but there is no doubt that in some countries, such as Thailand, local feelings about Japanese economic dominance are extremely strong.[2]

Japanese interest in south-east Asia is obviously strongly coloured by these economic facts but has other, earlier, sources as well. The assertion that a special Asian empathy or facility of mutual understanding exists between Asians is doubtless specious; few south-east Asians take it seriously, and less is heard of it from the Japanese as their contacts with various other Asians increase. But the 1940s' slogan 'Asia for the Asians' was not without some sincerity. Japanese occupation of the area during the Second World War produced some degree of experience with the realities of the area and some sense of commitment to its affairs. Relations with the area may not be demonstrably crucial, in the light of abstract reason, to Japan's welfare. Other aspects of foreign relations, at any given time, clearly take priority over those with the lesser Asian nations. But Japan has an ongoing concern with the area which, fortified by the material stakes it has now acquired, is likely to prove more durable and more inclusive than that of any other extra-regional power except possibly China. This concern is symbolised by Prime Minister Tanaka's plan to visit south-east Asia in implementation of his programme of summit diplomacy. The visit will follow his trips to the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. South-east Asia has a lower rank than these others on his schedule, but following the precedents set by three former prime ministers—Kishi, Ikeda and Sato—Tanaka will not omit it.

The coming of peace in Indochina was greeted by the Japanese as a turning-point for Japan's foreign policy. Nothing that has happened since or promises to happen soon as yet justifies that appraisal. Instead it appears on the surface that Japan's Asia policy will be more of the same with a slight expansion of the area of opportunity. Hongay coal could now be added to Japan's imports. Concurrently with the drift toward an Indochina settlement, normalisation of Japan's relations with China and the incipient thawing out of the long-frozen state of affairs in divided Korea gave promise of a similar expansion of opportunity. Japan's contacts with China and North Korea have indeed increased, without apparent damage to its economic relations with Taiwan and South Korea.

These developments, however, do not as yet constitute a turning-point if one means by that the occasion for a major re-orientation of

[2] Selig S. Harrison notes that official figures show Japanese equity investment in Asia as $720 million, but that by calculating various forms of non-equity investment one might reach a total somewhere between $2·5 billion and $7 billion. *Washington Post*, February 25, 1973.

relationships or the adoption of striking new initiatives. In November 1972 the Japanese ambassadors to the south-east Asian countries gathered in Tokyo for their annual conference with the Foreign Minister. They came evidently in the expectation of receiving new and different guidelines, and they were disappointed. As reported in the Japanese press, Foreign Minister Ohira told them that many important changes had occurred in the world situation, that the new situation was undoubtedly pregnant with a multiplicity of developments, and that pending a full study of what shape these developments might assume Japan was prepared to carry on business as usual. The world situation has indeed changed. There have indeed been changes in local situations in Asia. The pattern of Japan's foreign relations in 1973 is very different from what it was before July 1971. The difficulty with these changes is not that the Japanese have failed to notice them and study their implications, but that the new problems and possibilities that have arisen are inherently ambiguous.

The advent of peace in Indochina illustrates the mixed impact of events. Emotional revulsion against the war had been as deep and as genuine in Japan as anywhere. Emotional identification with a suffering Asian underdog supplied a special flavour. The Japanese government nevertheless placed as few obstacles in the way of American operations as was politically feasible, recognising the binding effect of its Security Treaty with the United States. Together with revulsion, there was a widely held judgment in Japan that the American adventure in Vietnam was foolishly conceived and clumsily executed. The end of direct American military involvement in Vietnam largely removed the issue as a cause of tension with the United States. If other issues have created even more disputes, they are at least disputes which arise from the reciprocal dealings between the two countries rather than from the actions of one in which the other is implicated only reluctantly. On the other hand, Japan has lost the income it formerly got from American purchases related to the war, and so have some of Japan's customers—Thailand and South Korea.

In view of its relations with the United States, Japan had refrained from recognising North Vietnam. Recognition was obviously indicated as the war faded out. The first open Japanese moves occurred in February 1972, but the process was delayed by concern for the state of American negotiations with the North and by Japan's previous recognition of the legitimacy of the Saigon government. Saigon objections became unlikely as other countries—Canada, for example—extended recognition to the North. But Japan's negotiations have been protracted because of a North Vietnamese condition that Japan should first assign some dignified status to the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South. The difficulties promise to be resolved, in

all probability through the discovery of some legalistic formula through which Japan can accede to Hanoi's wishes.

A similar situation exists in Japan's relations with Korea. Since the North-South joint communiqué of July 4, 1972, Japan has been disposed to respond to overtures from Pyongyang and restrained by commitments to Seoul. Trade with North Korea has risen and the interchange of visits is markedly more frequent. At the same time Japan has continued to support the diplomatic positions of Seoul, while clearly encouraging changes in those positions which may expedite normalisation.

A common factor in the two situations is the Japanese inclination to concede. In the abstract, it would appear that Hanoi and Pyongyang have as much or more to gain by cultivating Japan's favour as Japan has by cultivating theirs. In practice, it is the weaker bargainer who assumes the ostensibly superior posture. Japan would prefer to enter a multilateral arrangement for economic assistance to North Vietnam, but easily yielded to Hanoi's preference for bilateral channels.

In search of a better image

In its already established Asian connections, too, Japan's actual economic weight contrasts with its anxiety about its acceptability in Asian eyes. The conspicuous incident in this context was the Thai movement to boycott Japanese goods in November 1972. The incident was taken most seriously by the Japanese, albeit with an underlying feeling that the Thais did not sufficiently recognise the benefits that accrued to themselves from Japanese enterprise. It was the Japanese who undertook to rectify the situation. Some preliminary moves have been made to increase Thai equity in joint ventures and to support, for example, the improvement of the Thai telephone system without requiring that Japanese equipment be purchased.

The incident stimulated a study by the semi-official Japan External Trade Recovery Organisation (JETRO) of attitudes toward Japan in Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong. The results were far from reassuring, especially in Thailand. There ensued much discussion, which took two directions. The main line of thought concentrated on the 'image' problem. The concept of the 'ugly Japanese' was much in the focus of attention. Discussion along this line defined the problem as one of public relations and recommended appropriate changes in the behaviour of individuals. The other, less prominent, line of thought stressed the need for better understanding of Asian countries. This discussion defined the problem in terms of the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the host countries. It tended to produce recommendations for the substantive modification of Japanese methods of conducting

business, which would result in host countries obtaining a more equitable share of the benefits.

It appears that these two lines of thought failed to meet. People who defined the problem in different ways seem not to have confronted one another. One indication of the frame of mind of business circles may be found in a discussion meeting convened by JETRO. The rapporteur at the meeting noted that the image of the United States in Asian countries was considerably more favourable than Japan's. The advantage, he felt, must be attributed to the superiority of American public relations techniques. In the normal way of things, the large political factor in American relations with the area would be expected to create a sense of subordination among Asians and should be resented. The largely economic Japanese presence, he reasoned, should be appreciated as of benefit to the host country. He seemed not to be aware of the propensity in ex-colonial countries to perceive a foreign economic presence as exploitative and derogatory to national independence.

The difference in the two ways of reading the Asian response to Japan apparently reflects the difference in the two levels of Japanese contact with the lesser countries—the private and the official levels. The existence of a difference has been masked by the Japanese use of the term 'economic diplomacy' to describe the main thrust of their foreign policy. Sensitivity to the attitudes of others apparently is more frequently found on the official level than on the private. Since the Japanese government usually appears in the role of facilitating private enterprise, such sensitivity as exists is likely to escape notice. Whether individual Japanese businessmen mend their ways or not matters less than whether or not the method of conducting business is changed. One such change now envisaged is Japanese financial support for the semi-finishing of raw materials (bauxite, petroleum) in Indonesia. Even if such projects should multiply, the structural difficulty which arises from Japan's demands for raw materials may be ameliorated but cannot be completely overcome. What appears, with reason, to the Japanese as a relationship of interdependence appears, with equal reason, to some of its partners as one-sided dependency.

In the same general area, Japan shows more signs of altering its economic aid practices than its business practices to the benefit of recipients. The subject has been of concern in Japan for some years. The declared goals have been to reduce proportionately the hard loans made through the Export-Import Bank and increase the soft loans made by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund; to accept internationally recommended programme goals, such as official aid in amounts up to one per cent of gross national product; to shift emphasis from tied to untied aid; and to favour participation in multilateral arrangements,

including the Asian Development Bank. Japan's record is not a source of self-congratulation, though few other countries are in a position to point the finger of shame. Bureaucratic vested interests have played their role in impeding developments. Recent events described above have stimulated further discussion. At least on the rhetorical level, there is now widespread agreement that Japan should tackle seriously the problem of the 'quality of aid' and preferential trade measures for the less developed countries. How effective this consensus will be in modifying actual practice remains to be seen.

In regard to contact and communication in the political sphere, Japan's approach to south-east Asia (omitting Taiwan and South Korea) has been benevolent but passive. Its participation in the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) illustrates its style. The organisation was formed at the initiative of South Korea in 1966. Japan gave the project support, without which it might have had birth difficulties, but set conditions which ensured that it would not assume an ideological, anti-Chinese character and that it would have no military aspect. ASPAC served as a forum, but little more. As the Vietnam war neared its end, and particularly after the accession to power of the Whitlam government in Australia, ASPAC no longer appeared suitable for the situation. It could not be expanded to include North Vietnam, and the membership of Taiwan had become a drawback in the eyes of countries which had restored or wished to restore relations with China. After the withdrawal of Malaysia and Australia the organisation withered away.

The Japanese dealt no blows to the dying ASPAC, nor did they resist its demise, but they have some regret over its passing. It had been somewhat, though not very, constructive from their point of view, and they show some desire for a replacement. The need for a substitute organisation with the same or a larger membership does not appear pressing to the south-east Asian countries. Their interest, and that of Australia, focuses on strengthening ASEAN, one of whose purposes is to promote the concept of a neutralised south-east Asia. Japan is not a candidate for membership in ASEAN. It supports the ASEAN concept and ASEAN's main goals and hopes to establish some sort of collateral relationship.

In sum, Japan has behaved and continues to behave as a *status quo* power in relation to Asia. South-east Asia has not been at any time since the Second World War an area of the highest priority for Japan's policy, but it has never been far from the centre of concern. The basic guideline of Japan's Asia policy has been that it has no necessary quarrels in the area. Such quarrels as it has become involved in either originated as corollaries of its alliance with the United States (with China, North Korea and North Vietnam) or resulted from local negative reactions to the magnitude of Japanese economic involvement in the

area. Over the past decade, economic relations have been dominant. These have been conducted primarily by private interest groups and facilitated by government agencies. Only since the mid-1960s has Japan taken the initiative towards amplifying international political contacts.

Peace in the area has always seemed desirable to Japan. But the kind of peace that is on the horizon after the Vietnam war leaves it facing some ambiguous situations. An immediate problem is the liquidation of existing quarrels. The turnaround of American policy towards China since 1971 facilitated the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations, which in turn led to negotiations (as yet not completed) designed to regularise procedures in regard to a number of practical contacts between the two countries—in the areas of transportation, communications, trade, fisheries, etc. The quality of future Sino-Japanese relations of a broader scope remains obscure. In regard to North Vietnam and North Korea, Japan's problem is to develop normal relations without violating its commitments to Saigon and Seoul. The problem is the delicacy of the situation rather than of Japan's intent. Here, as in relations with south-east Asian countries, the Japanese approach is accommodation to the demands and initiatives of the other side. Its behaviour does not indicate an active desire to dominate the area or to dictate the actions of the regional states, but rather to enhance its own acceptability in the eyes of its partners. Nevertheless, as the regional states are quite aware, Japan controls tremendous leverage in regional affairs, which it chooses for the present not to employ. Just how it proposes to live up to the acknowledged responsibilities of prosperity and power remains unpredictable.

The realignment of international forces which underlay the Indochina settlement conditions the future of Japan's role in the world and in Asia. The initial trauma caused by the turnabout of the United States China policy in 1971 has now been absorbed. The sense of being cut adrift from an alliance system within which Japan had been reasonably comfortable soon passed. A year after Kissinger's first visit to Peking, the Japanese mood was buoyant. It seemed that an autonomous Japan was being courted simultaneously by three great powers and could itself determine what favours to bestow on which suitor. Still another year later, in 1973, the mood is more sober.

The multipolar power game

Except for the obvious fact that there are no longer two fixed alliance systems in conflict with each other, not much is certain about the shape of international relations. As the United States, the Soviet Union, and China work out their relations among themselves, their respective relations with Japan, and their approaches to the lesser Asian countries, the Japanese appear to be more disposed to observe the pro-

cess than to try to influence it, to divine the future rather than to attempt to dictate it.

Especially in regard to great power approaches to Asia, something depends on whether one sees the emerging situation as 'multipolar' or as 'non-hegemonic'. Neither term is excessively lucid, but extreme definitions are possible. An extreme interpretation of multipolarity in relation to major power roles in Asia would envisage the powers as engaged in a many-sided competition for influence, each pursuing its individual interest but ready to enter a variety of combinations with or against others. A similar interpretation of non-hegemony (the term adopted in the Nixon-Chou and Chou-Tanaka joint communiqués in 1972) would envisage all the powers as equally uninterested, hence mutually tolerant of one another's activities. Japan's problem is to determine at what point in the wide range between these extremes reality will settle—or, for that matter, whether the situation may not remain indeterminate for some time to come.

The Japanese show little desire to enter the multipolar power game. Current Japanese press discussion describes the situation as 'tripolar' so consistently as to leave one convinced that nonparticipation is a deeply, if tacitly, accepted premise of all responsible thinking on the subject. For a time the idea that Japan should adopt a posture of 'equidistance' in relation to the three powers had some vogue, but ended by leaving few convinced of its adequacy. More recently a *pro tempore* consensus seems to be taking shape.[3] Some of the elements in this consensus can be described as follows.

There is a good deal of scepticism as to whether the world situation can be meaningfully grasped in terms of poles. Especially on the left, the disregard of lesser countries implied in the concept of multipolarity seems unacceptable. If there is a polar structure, Japan does not figure as a major factor in it except in terms comparable to those in which the European Community figures. Within such a polar structure as exists, the game being played is a game of containment and counter-containment among the three major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Neither China nor the Soviet Union regards Japan as a possible ally important in its own right, but each sees some possibility of using Japan (in combination with the United States) to help contain the other. The United States is viewed as more

[3] While I have taken account of developments in Japan's relations with other countries, official statements, somewhat cryptic press citations of the views of 'sources in the Foreign Ministry', and the like, I rely heavily on a recent survey of the views of 'learned persons' conducted by the Tokyo Colloquium for *Yomiuri Shinbun* and published in *Yomiuri*, June 27, 1973. There is a good deal of reciprocal feedback between the learned persons surveyed and government personnel. A consensus of centrist opinion, when one exists, often corresponds closely to government thinking. The survey is more fully described in an Appendix to this paper.

Machiavellian than the others. While it, too, no longer regards Japan as a truly important ally, it regards Japan as of at least residual importance. The United States, for one thing, looks to Japan to take over some of its burdens in Asia as well as being a factor in limiting the influence of other powers.

The United States remains the most important of the great powers in Japan's foreign relations, but the relationship is foreseen as gradually attenuating. While the United States-Japan Security Treaty is expected to remain in effect, the level of American forces based in Japan is expected to decline. The probability of the dissolution of the treaty in the late 1970s is seen as high. There is virtually no expectation of a Japanese alignment with either China or the Soviet Union, but some feeling that the alternative to alliance is some form of nonalignment or general improvement of relations with all countries. There is a growing tendency to compromise on territorial issues if this will help smooth relations with the Soviet Union and China.

Asia in general is seen as quiescent. If there are to be military conflicts, they are more likely to arise from non-rational causes than from competition for material goods and to be settled by political intervention rather than fought to an end. The major powers' approach to Asia is not for the present seen as provocative. Chinese initiatives aimed at building up influence in the area had been expected, but for the present have not materialised. There may be some effort by the Soviet Union and China to contest each other's influence but not necessarily Japan's influence in Asia. Declining American interest in Asia does not necessarily imply difficulties with Japan, though concepts of the role Japan should play may differ.

The forecasts outlined above look towards the non-hegemonic rather than the multipolar type of Asian situation. Japan's major concern is regarded as improving its posture in economic relations with Asia to the benefit of the lesser countries. Forecasts of this kind are of course subject to change at short notice. If the present outlook turns out to be valid, Japan's present pattern of relations with Asia should be as tenable as any visible alternative. Isolation in world affairs might be injurious to Japan's self-esteem though not to its material interests. Assuming a continued low level of the major powers' concern with Asia, Japan should be able to cope with problems which arise between it and the lesser countries by dealing directly with them. (Whether they, individually or collectively, can cope with Japan is another question.)

Barring changes in the approaches to Asia of the major powers, there are few credible sources of external pressure for change in Japan's policies. There remains the possibility of pressures from inside Japan. The internal political situation is on the verge of change. Conservative

dominance in the Diet as it has existed for almost two decades is near an end. There could well be a period in which no single party or even any probable coalition can attain a majority. Such a development would not necessarily affect foreign policy. The decision-making apparatus in that area is relatively autonomous, and internal politics would be likely to concentrate on domestic issues.

The other possible stimulus to change in foreign policy is that nebulous phenomenon known as Japanese nationalism. Japan's Asian relations may satisfy the unsentimental men who now manage matters without answering to more idealistic aspirations. For many Japanese there is something ignoble about measuring success in purely material terms. The term 'Japan Incorporated' makes them wince, and the term 'economic animal' sets their teeth on edge. The search for a more noble mission can lead in two opposed directions simultaneously. The idea of Japanese leadership of Asia has an equal appeal to those who feel called to devote themselves to Asia's welfare and those who believe the way to do it is to have Japan make all the decisions. Rational men may accept the limits of the real world and count 'international isolation' as a necessary and negligible cost. There are others who are justifiably proud of Japan's accomplishments and irritated at not receiving from others the respect they accord themselves.

Japan's Asia policy seems vague to many Japanese because no one has formulated it as a set of logically consistent principles. The logic of the policy—a pragmatic logic—is more apparent to an outside observer. Perhaps one thing Japan needs at this point is a spokesman with the ability to articulate a persuasive philosophical justification of muddling through.

APPENDIX

The data below are condensed and reorganised from the survey materials published in *Yomiuri,* June 27, 1973. A questionnaire was submitted to 168 learned persons, classified as 62 from academic circles. 26 critics (commentators), 13 from press circles, 12 from the business world, 19 labour leaders, 16 from government circles, and 20 from the Self-Defence Forces (mostly high-ranking uniformed officers). All the categories queried are heterogeneous, and some individuals could as easily have been included in some other category. I have combined the responses of academics and labour leaders (total 81) into a category which I take to reflect a range of political positions from Centre to Left (C–L) and the critics, press, business and government categories (total 67) into a category which I take to represent the Centre to Right (C–R) range, leaving the SDF (20) as a separate category.

Respondents were asked to choose one or in some cases two of a

multiple choice of replies to questionnaire items. Not all replied to all questions. The figures given below show the number of replies received to questions I have selected as relevant to this paper. I have rephrased the questions and regrouped the responses where this seemed to simplify the results without distortion.

Q. The most probable structure of world politics in the future (2 choices)

A. (1) Bipolar: US and SU dominant
(2) Tripolar: US, SU and China dominant
(3) 4 poles, including Japan
(4) 5 poles, including Japan and EC
(5) Not definable by power relations among the poles alone

Results:

	C-L	C-R	SDF	Total
(1)	15	26	9	50
(2)	32	18	9	59
(3)	6	9	0	15
(4)	42	31	8	81
(5)	57	37	13	107
total replies	152	121	39	312

Q. Future direction of China's Asia policy

A. (1) Use relations with Japan and US to contain Soviet Union
(2) Cultivate small and middle Asian nations
(3) Other (priority on relations with Japan; on relations with US; seek rapprochement with SU; priority on domestic affairs)

Results:

	C-L	C-R	SDF	Total
(1)	64	53	19	136
(2)	9	6	0	15
(3)	8	7	0	15
total replies	81	66	19	166

Q. Future direction of Soviet Asia policy

A. (1) Promote Asian collective security system
(2) Use relations with Japan and US to contain China

(3) Influence Asian nations to contain China
(4) Other (priority on relations with US; on relations with Japan; improve relations with China; priority on domestic affairs)

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	15	10	1	26
(2)	47	40	8	95
(3)	13	11	9	33
(4)	6	5	1	12
total replies	81	66	19	166

Q. Future direction of US Asia policy

A. (1) Priority on relations with Japan
(2) Priority on relations with China
(3) Use relations with China and Japan to contain SU
(4) Use Japan, China and SU to contain one another
(5) Shift attention to Europe
(6) No major change in present policy

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	2	8	2	12
(2)	5	0	0	5
(3)	19	21	5	45
(4)	25	12	4	41
(5)	9	4	0	13
(6)	20	22	8	50
total replies	80	67	19	166

Q. American defence of and aid to allies (2 choices)

A. (1) Will carry out treaty obligations
(2) Will be reluctant to carry out defence obligations under treaties
(3) Will decrease military interest, continue economic aid
(4) Will decrease even economic aid
(5) Will demand Japan's taking over of obligations
(6) Will stress regional collective security systems

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	22	37	16	75
(2)	17	7	0	24
(3)	18	14	5	37
(4)	22	11	0	33
(5)	53	40	6	99
(6)	20	15	10	45
total replies	152	124	37	313

Q. Preference on future of US-Japan security treaty

A. (1) Retain as is
(2) Modify (retrench bases, improve prior consultation)
(3) Revise or dissolve

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	1	6	3	10
(2)	27	39	16	82
(3)	53	21	0	74
total replies	81	66	19	166

Q. Preference regarding Japan's foreign policy

A. (1) Priority on relations with US
(2) Priority on relations with China*
(3) Equidistant diplomacy towards US, China and SU
(4) Stress relations with Asian nations
(5) Friendly relations with all nations
(6) Positive activities at the UN
(*Note that the choice of priority on relations with the SU was not offered.)

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	25	37	18	80
(2)	2	1	0	3
(3)	11	8	0	19
(4)	10	5	0	15
(5)	28	12	1	41
(6)	5	2	0	7
total replies	81	65	19	165

Q. Preference regarding Northern Territories

A. (1) No peace treaty with SU without complete reversion (including Southern Kuriles)
(2) Peace treaty with reversion of Habomai-Shikotan, negotiate on Southern Kuriles thereafter
(3) Subordinate Southern Kuriles to other considerations (e.g., safe fishing agreement, compensation, friendly relations)
(4) Soviet position is right or doesn't matter

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	10	26	15	51
(2)	36	20	2	58
(3)	33	19	2	54
(4)	1	0	0	1
total replies	80	65	19	164

Q. Preference regarding Senkaku Islands

A. (1) No peace treaty with China unless Japan's possession recognised
(2) Expedite peace treaty, negotiate thereafter
(3) Subordinate to other considerations (e.g., concession on oil interests, friendly relations)
(4) Chinese position is right, or doesn't matter

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	7	8	4	19
(2)	26	16	1	43
(3)	43	38	12	93
(4)	2	2	0	4
total replies	78	64	17	159

Q. Possible sources of war in Asia in next decade (2 choices)

A. (1) Ideology
(2) Nationalism, religion, or race
(3) Arms race, territory, natural resources
(4) Trade
(5) Poverty

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	20	19	16	55
(2)	85	67	16	168
(3)	26	23	2	51
(4)	1	0	0	1
(5)	28	15	4	47
total replies	160	124	38	322

Q. Preference on Japan's economic co-operation policy

A. (1) Must meet international goals on quantity and quality of aid
(2) Preferential trade measures more effective help to developing nations
(3) Present situation adequate in view of Japan's internal conditions

Results:

	C–L	C–R	SDF	Total
(1)	40	39	13	92
(2)	24	12	1	37
(3)	15	14	4	33
total replies	79	65	18	162

THE ASEAN STATES: NO COMMON OUTLOOK

Michael Leifer

ALTHOUGH ministers and officials from the five members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) [1] consult among themselves with some regularity and also concert declarations of intent, they have demonstrated only a limited sense of common political purpose in regional matters.[2] They do possess regional concerns in common which centre to some extent on the absence of a viable settlement in South Vietnam and in the other states of Indochina and which derive, more fundamentally, from a common awareness of changes in the structure of the regional power balance combined with an acute sense of uncertainty about the likely nature of any succeeding regional order. Despite such an awareness there has not been any substantive and corporate ASEAN response to the changing balance of external influences bearing on south-east Asia. This is in part a result of individual weakness writ large within the association. It is also because the common goal of security has at least as many interpretations as there are members of ASEAN, and in consequence common positions have been characterised by broad formulae which lack precision and which reveal striking differences of interest and policy.

This much was evident in the way in which the foreign ministers of the ASEAN states, meeting in November 1971 outside the formal auspices of the association, endorsed collectively a Malaysian proposal for the neutralisation of south-east Asia. This proposal had been framed in the context of the changing balance of extra-regional influences and had been represented as a vehicle which would serve to promote an alternative and acceptable regional order. The endorsement took the form of a declaration ' to secure the recognition of and respect for South-East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality ', which suggested a somewhat different set of concepts from that of neutralisation as advocated by the Malaysian government. Although the members of ASEAN have persevered with this diluted commitment in principle, a prolonged process of official and ministerial consultation and debate has failed to produce an agreed and precise definition of neutralisation, let

[1] Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

[2] For an assessment of the performance of ASEAN, see Peter Lyon, ' ASEAN and the future of Regionalism ' in Lau Teck Soon (Ed.), *New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia* (Singapore: 1973).

alone a practical programme for its implementation. Indeed, it has become only too evident that the concept has assumed the quality of a political chameleon in that it appears in a different hue according to the interests of the particular south-east Asian government concerned.

Although the Vietnam settlement was of great interest to the five ASEAN states, which held a special meeting in Kuala Lumpur in February 1973 to consider its implications, their individual approaches to the question of regional order had crystallised in advance of the Paris agreement and were not altered significantly by this accord. In so far as the Malaysian neutralisation scheme was designed specifically to deal with the changing balance of influences bearing on south-east Asia (and presumed some kind of peace settlement for Vietnam) it is possible to gauge the content of the differing regional outlooks of the ASEAN states by considering their mixed responses to this proposal. This is not the place to consider the actual merits and demerits of Malaysia's neutralisation policy, although one might take note of the apt comment that: 'By and large, the more likely neutralisation is to work, the less the need for it.' [3] More relevant to this discussion is the motive and purpose of the Malaysian government in advancing the proposal.

Malaysia's neutralisation policy

Malaysia's initiative was made possible, above all, by the nature of its political association with Indonesia, which since the end of Confrontation in August 1966 has been transformed from a state of bitter antagonism to that of a *de facto* alliance relationship. The assurance of a politically benevolent Indonesia, together with an interposing shelter from the dangers of Indochina provided by a friendly Thailand, produced an awareness of a greater menace from internal rather than external threat and prompted an initiative geared primarily to the political integration of a restive plural society. The principal external focus of Malaysia's proposal has been the Chinese People's Republic, with which informal but high-level contacts were established from May 1971 and with which it is also intended to establish diplomatic relations. The underlying purpose is to place dealings with China on a sound intergovernmental footing and also—it is hoped—to demonstrate to the alienated among the large overseas Chinese community of Malaysia and to the insurgent and predominantly ethnic Chinese Malayan Communist Party that the legitimacy of the government in Kuala Lumpur is recognised and approved in Peking. To this end, foreign policy has an evident domestic function and to serve it Malaysia has withdrawn from the anti-communist Asia and Pacific Council (which includes Taiwan) and has also established diplomatic ties with Hanoi and Pyongyang.

[3] Phillip Darby, 'Stability Mechanisms in South-East Asia. II Balance of Power and Neutralisation', *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 215.

Malaysia's policy has not been affected to any substantial degree by the Vietnam settlement, except to the extent that other members of ASEAN have been confirmed in their previous apprehensions and have been reinforced in their initial scepticism of the practicability and relevance of the neutralisation scheme. Malaysia's more immediate goal of opening diplomatic links with Peking has received the acquiescent approval of its ASEAN partners but appears to await the concoction of an appropriate political formula which will assure the government in Kuala Lumpur that China's support for wars of national liberation represents only formal deference to the canons of Maoist orthodoxy.

Malaysia's use of foreign policy to serve a domestic political purpose has been regarded with less than sympathy in both Indonesia and Singapore. And although both states are willing to pay lip service to the principle of neutralisation, they prefer to delay the opening of a Chinese embassy. The Indonesians, for example, have been approached directly by the Chinese government with a request to 'normalise' their diplomatic relations, which have been suspended since October 1967. However, the military leadership of the country, which has come increasingly to control the making of foreign policy in Jakarta, has been most reluctant to agree to such a course. Indonesia's generals possess a deep suspicion of the economic activities of overseas Chinese within the country (even if they have also been the beneficiaries of them) and are afraid that a Chinese government with diplomatic agents in Jakarta and Singapore would be in a position to exercise undue influence through economic means. Concern over the question of Chinese intentions in south-east Asia was one of the factors which made possible the long-delayed visit by the Prime Minister of Singapore to Indonesia in May 1973. And in the joint communiqué issued at the end of that visit, the two heads of government agreed that the establishment or normalisation of relations with the People's Republic of China 'should take into account the domestic situation in their respective countries'.

Apart from Indonesia's apprehensions at the prospect of China's subversive intent, there is a sense of reluctance to deal directly with Peking in any way which might indicate that it has a claim to participate in the shaping of regional order within south-east Asia: a claim implied in the original terms of the Malaysian neutralisation proposal. It is interesting to note that the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, received a cool response in Jakarta in February 1973 when he advocated the formation of a new regional association of Asia-wide dimensions to include the participation of China. Indonesia's opposition to the extension of China's political influence is matched by a determination to resist any Soviet inroads. Its positions on the international status of the Straits of Malacca and on Brezhnev's collective security proposal for Asia are closely linked. In this context, although the Indonesia govern-

ment is opposed in principle to all foreign military presences within south-east Asia, it has shown sympathetic forbearance to the five-power Commonwealth force, incorporating a British military presence in Singapore, because of a belief that it precludes the establishment there of any Soviet naval presence.

Although Indonesia and Malaysia have maintained an exceedingly close political relationship, their conceptions of regional order in the wake of a Vietnam settlement are quite different and have been indicated by their approaches to the question of neutralisation. Malaysia, as a small state, conscious of its unequal if cordial relationship with Indonesia, has advocated a system of neutralisation founded on intra-regional accord and extra-regional guarantee by the major powers. Indonesia, given its size, population and sense of national destiny, looks on the region of south-east Asia with a more proprietary regard; its strategic horizons are seen to extend ' to the eastern border of India and to the southern borders of China and Japan '.[4] Its objection to the Malaysian neutralisation proposal has arisen from the implicit acknowledgment in its original form that the guarantor powers would possess policing rights in the region which would directly cut across the purpose of Indonesian regional policy —to exclude the influence of the major powers and to promote ASEAN as the logical political vehicle for ordering the relationships of the states of south-east Asia.

So far neither Malaysian nor Indonesian purpose is much advanced. Neutralisation remains not much more than a talking-point, while ASEAN includes only five of the ten states of south-east Asia and, if expanded to include, say, North Vietnam, could well experience far greater threats to its limited degree of internal cohesion. In practice, North Vietnam's membership would seem less than likely for the time being. A somewhat strained diplomatic relationship has been maintained between Hanoi and Jakarta, governed in part by an Indonesian belief that Vietnamese communist success in South Vietnam would assist the spread of subversion within the region. It was not just a desire for status and a willingness to please its economic benefactor, the United States, which prompted the Indonesian government to despatch a team to participate in the International Supervisory and Control Commission charged with policing the ceasefire in South Vietnam.

Although Indonesia has indicated concern at the imperfect nature of the Vietnam settlement and its consequences for the whole of Indo-china, its regional outlook has been more directly governed by the prospect of the intrusion of extra-regional powers in the wake of the change in direction of American policy in Asia which made such a settlement possible. Indeed, Indonesian purpose, as exemplified in its

[4] Adam Malik, reported in *Indonesia Raja*, August 18, 1971.

stand over the international status of the Straits of Malacca, has been to give notice that a power vacuum in south-east Asia is not in the making. It is by contrast the government of Singapore which appears to have been more obsessed, in the public utterances of its senior ministers, with the direct impact of the Vietnam settlement *per se*.

Singapore, for reasons of its own, appears to have reached an accord of a kind with Indonesia both on the matter of neutralisation—which it opposes in its Malaysian version—and on that of diplomatic relations with China, which it wishes to postpone for as long as possible because of continuing concern about the sense of local political identity of its predominantly overseas Chinese population. Singapore, as a conspicuously overseas Chinese state in a region where the economic role of such Chinese is resented and where their political loyalties are suspect, is conscious of its vulnerable geopolitical position. Its government is anxious, above all, to prevent the emergence of a regional order shaped by any local dominance, which means, in effect, an Indonesian hegemony or some form of Indonesian-Malaysian condominium. In consequence, Singapore is opposed to the Malaysian neutralisation proposal, despite the implications of a great power guarantee, and favours instead the creation of a balanced multiple involvement of extra-regional powers in south-east Asia which will neutralise each other and any threat to Singapore which might be posed by a dominant local power. Although Singapore's long-term interests in this matter are fundamentally different from those of Indonesia, it has been only too willing to join Indonesia in questioning Malaysia's neutralisation scheme whose original form has been interpreted as likely to promote the vulnerability of the island-state.

The public utterances of the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan-yew, have been coloured by the prospect of a united Vietnam and also of a communist-dominated Indochina. And on the face of it, it is because of such apprehensions about the extension of communist control that he has advocated publicly the retention of an American military presence in Thailand. It would seem, however, that Lee Kuan-yew has more than one purpose in mind in advocating what, in fact, the United States has been engaged in doing. Thus, while one would not wish to doubt his sense of concern about the consequences of communist success in Indochina, his advocacy has a wider regional application and relates also to Singapore's conception of neutralisation. In March 1973, for example, while on a visit to the United States, he put forward the idea that it would be necessary to find a new equilibrium in south-east Asia to replace the one maintained by Western domination since the end of the Second World War. He argued: 'The new equilibrium must allow the four major world powers equal access and fair competition for economic and political interests. Until this equilibrium is established, Southeast Asia's security and stability can only be provided by an

American presence in the region.' This notion of equilibrium is designed, in effect, to cater for both the possible overall changes in the regional balance which may follow the current course of American policy in Asia, and for any adverse consequences of communist success in Indochina facilitated by such a policy.

The American bases in Thailand and the Philippines

It would seem, however, that for the immediate future, and irrespective of the entreaties of Mr. Lee, some form of American military presence will be retained within south-east Asia. Indeed, American military involvement continued after the ceasefire agreements for South Vietnam and Laos in the form of bombing operations in the latter country and in Cambodia (until halted by congressional pressure on August 15), where it played a critical role in sustaining the enfeebled and factious government of Lon Nol. An American military presence has been retained in the Philippines, where it has ceased to be a source of genuine controversy in the controlled political climate which has enveloped the country since the imposition of martial law in September 1972.

Although the Philippine Foreign Minister, Carlos Romulo, has claimed publicly that American military bases are eroding the integrity of Philippine sovereignty and that the restoration of base areas would assist the government's land reform programme, such a declaratory statement does not represent any substantive commitment on the part of President Marcos, who has gone on record as saying that an American presence is still needed in south-east Asia.[5] American servicemen in the Philippines have been reduced to approximately 15,000 from almost double that number at the peak of the Vietnam war and it is the intention of the United States government to reduce further its military complement and base facilities. Contrary, however, to the matching direction of American policy and declared Philippine intent, there is the constraint placed on the Marcos administration by the employment provided by the American presence which provides approximately US $135 million annually in revenue. The degree of economic dependence between the Philippines and the United States serves as a major obstacle to any governmental exploitation, contrived or otherwise, of nationalist issues, especially at a time when Muslim rebellion in the south of the country diverts resources needed urgently for improved economic performance.

Despite the economic realities which sustain the alliance with the United States, the Philippine government has openly supported the neutralisation idea, in part because of the uncertainty of relations with the United States and also because of a recognition that in time some

[5] Quoted in *SEATO Record*, April 1973, p. 1.

kind of regular diplomatic contact will have to be established with China. In addition, it costs nothing to endorse an ideal and diluted scheme which is far from practical realisation and which does not bear directly on the external security of the Philippines. Given a sense of maritime insulation because of China's current inability to project conventional military power at a distance, the prime concern of the Marcos government is less with the consequences of the Vietnam settlement than with problems of internal security. These appear to have been aggravated by elements to the South rather than by any to the North. In the circumstances, Philippine support for neutralisation resembles earlier exercises in regional diplomacy in that national achievement is envisaged as a means of embellishing the political position of the President. The current aim is to secure agreement to make Manila the venue for a so-called Asian forum, which the five states of ASEAN agreed in principle to convene at the association's ministerial meeting in Thailand in April 1973.

Of the five ASEAN states it is Thailand, because of geopolitical circumstances, which feels most exposed in the wake of the fragile Vietnam settlement. In consequence, it has been least inclined to endorse the idea of neutralisation in any of its variant forms. The military government of Thailand geared itself for future contingencies in November 1971, after the entry of China into the United Nations, through what can only be described as a coup against the parliamentary constitution. Subsequently it has entered into discussions with both Hanoi and Peking. However, despite an evident willingness to test the intention of its current political adversaries, it has not demonstrated any sign of a shift in basic priorities or a disposition to foreclose on any options, especially in relation to its alliance with the United States. It is of interest to note that Marshall Green, while American Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, described Thailand as the core country of south-east Asia and affirmed that the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation was the sole irreplaceable treaty commitment for its defence.[6]

The United States military presence in Thailand has increased substantially since the Vietnam ceasefire in January 1973 and American military withdrawal from South Vietnam. The United States Air Command has been moved from Saigon to Nakhon Phanom in north-east Thailand, which, together with six other air bases in the country (in principle, sovereign Thai bases), have been used for aerial bombing in Laos and Cambodia and also for aerial reconnaissance over Vietnam. In the event of a substantial reduction in the scale of ground fighting in Indochina (optimistically foreshadowed by the second Vietnam settle-

[6] *SEATO Record*, February 1973, p. 1.

ment in Paris in June 1973), the United States is expected to retain only two bases. The Thai government, for its part, has not indicated any desire to sever this military connection despite public questioning of its policy by the former foreign minister. Thanat Khoman.[7] Indeed, the Thais see no real prospect for neutralisation and are concerned to sustain access to countervailing power, however uncertain, while trying to discover whether a viable political relationship can be worked out with China, which might serve to place constraints on the ambitions of the Vietnamese communists in Indochina.

The limitations of ASEAN

For the anti-communist governments which make up ASEAN, the overriding significance of the Vietnam settlement in both its phases is that it confirms for them the long-term direction of American policy in Asia. Given the differing perceptions of interest and threat which exist among the five governments, the response to this realisation has been mixed and as one might expect that the greatest sense of genuine alarm about the consequences for external security of the Vietnam settlement has been expressed by Thailand, which regards itself as situated precariously on the ill-defined sidelines of conflict in Indochina.

Within ASEAN as a quasi-corporate entity, there has been much agreement in principle but little purposive action by a group of states which have proclaimed that the peace and stability of the region should be the responsibility of all south-east Asian countries but have been able to do little more than recommend greater attention to their internal conditions to promote this end. ASEAN in concert has been distinguished by resolutions rather than by resolve, with some more pious than others. Agreement, in principle, has been reached on the expansion of the association and on the convening of a conference of all south-east Asian states, but there is a general, if unstated, recognition that the association has neither the sense of common interest nor the resources to shape the future pattern of regional order. In this respect the Vietnam settlement has not had a substantial impact on ASEAN to the extent of making it a more cohesive body. On the contrary, the Vietnam settlement and what it signifies in terms of a changing balance of external influences has served to highlight widely differing notions of interest and to confirm a conventional precedence of state over regional identity.

[7] On August 24, the United States announced plans to withdraw 3,550 troops and more than 100 military aircraft from Thailand in the first phase of force reductions. However, Thailand's Prime Minister, Thanom Kittikachorn, pointed out that the withdrawal may take years to complete and that its speed and extent must depend on the security requirements of Thailand and the rest of south-east Asia. *International Herald Tribune*, August 30, 1973.

RUSSIA AND INDOCHINA IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

J. L. S. Girling

WHAT are Soviet interests in Indochina? How do they fit into the world-wide pattern of great power relations? And what, in turn, are effects of recent developments in Indochina, whether 'autonomous' or responsive to activities from outside, both on the great powers individually and on the emerging 'multi-polar' balance? Now it may be felt that the formulation of these questions gives undue weight to a particular view of international affairs. Indeed, Soviet writers object to the concept of 'balance of power' because it fails to take account of what they see as the over-riding struggle between two systems, socialism and capitalism. The clash of two systems is of course most evident in Indochina, with civil war or strife in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Yet class or ideological conflict cannot on its own explain the immediate complexities, if not the underlying issues, of the diplomacy of the post-cold war era. To understand the latter, both concepts are needed. For the purpose of this article I have therefore considered ideology, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, as part of the 'balance'.

South-east Asia in itself is not of major interest to the Soviet Union (in this it is very different from South Asia) apart from two aspects: first, Soviet solidarity with North Vietnam and the effect this has on the continuing political-military struggles in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, although this is counter-balanced, to some extent, by the desire not to jeopardise constructive relations in other fields with the United States. And, second, the area considered as an arena of rivalry with China and the United States.[1]

To the Soviet Union, Indochina signifies a number of not always compatible elements: a socialist state attacked by the leader of imperialism; national liberation movements in various stages of growth; friendly relations with governments of countries with different social systems; an opportunity to reduce American power and prestige, but within a global framework of peaceful co-existence; a similar opportunity

[1] See also the author's 'Soviet Attitudes Towards South-East Asia', *The World Today*, May 1973; and 'A Neutral Southeast Asia?', *Australian Outlook*, August 1973.

to reduce Chinese influence, within a framework of confrontation; and finally the belief that the American military withdrawal from Indochina will create a ' vacuum ' in south-east Asia—a vacuum that will be filled by China unless suitable measures to establish countervailing Soviet influence are adopted. That China takes a similar view of the American withdrawal—in this case the danger being that Russia will fill the vacuum—is no reason to discount either the belief or the intensity with which it is held. The ' vacuum theory ', just as assiduously promoted by Lee Kuan Yew nowadays as it was assiduously promoted by Dulles, Kennedy and Johnson in the past, is cousin to the ' domino theory ', which takes little or no account of specific national features or the staying power of individual regimes, but assumes a universal disintegration once the initial push has been made. However, the vacuum theory is more symptomatic of the states of mind of its promoters than it is of the minds of states (or statesmen) in the area it purports to describe.

In concrete terms, Soviet policy towards Indochina varies from support of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (and thus rejection of the claims of the Saigon administration) to what has long been a ' dual ' position in Laos: recognition of Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of (since 1964) a rightist-dominated government in Vientiane and at the same time political and ideological support for Souvanna Phouma's former coalition partners, who were later forced into opposition, the left-wing Pathet Lao. Moscow has also attempted to maintain a similar duality with regard to Cambodia, an attempt that is failing with the breakdown of the Lon Nol regime. Thus the Soviet Union, with other East European countries (except for Yugoslavia and Romania, which recognise Prince Sihanouk), maintains an embassy in Phnom Penh but also encourages the ' patriotic ' Cambodians (without referring in this context to Sihanouk) in their ' liberation struggle '. Terminology provides a useful guide. While the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam seeks to uphold the Paris agreements in spite of the ' repressive acts ' of the ' Saigon administration,' in Laos the Vientiane government currently negotiates with the Patriotic Front of Laos (the political arm of the Pathet Lao movement), and in Cambodia the ' patriots ' fight bloody battles against the ' Phnom Penh forces '.

It is something of an irony, however understandable, that the Soviet Union takes the strongest ideological line in South Vietnam, where the Thieu regime has most chance of survival, and the most accommodating stance in Cambodia, where the recognised government, shaken by military reverses, riven by factionalism and undermined by widespread popular discontent, is clearly on the way out.

The reasons for the former position—Soviet solidarity with the Vietnamese revolutionaries—are ideological and traditional, practical and contemporary-political. Traditionally they stem from support of the

Vietminh and recognition of Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the first Indochina war against the French. On this issue, which lies at the heart of the present close Soviet relations with Hanoi, there can be no compromise. In practical terms, moreover, there is no advantage in alienating North Vietnam by Soviet recognition of the existing reality of two governments in the South, either because Saigon will eventually collapse or else, if it survives, because it is bound to continue to lean on the United States. Thus even though the Soviet Union has long had an interest in a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam (both to prevent the war in Vietnam from directly involving the super-powers in conflict and in furtherance of its world-wide policy of detente) it is not peace at any price. Just as the Soviet Union needs Hanoi's goodwill (and so cannot move too far against Hanoi's interests) because this is an important element in the balance of power with China and America, so North Vietnam needs Soviet support in preserving its independence from its great neighbour, China, and as a safeguard against the possibilities of renewed intervention by the United States.

The reason for the anomalous Soviet position on Cambodia, on the other hand, is Moscow's resentment at Prince Sihanouk's decision to establish his Royal Government of National Unity of Cambodia in Peking, and thus allow the Chinese to pose at one and the same time as patrons of liberation (with the aim of overthrowing the 'feudal-bourgeois' ruling clique in Phnom Penh), of anti-imperialism (against American intervention) and of legitimacy (support for the rightful Head of State ousted by a handful of 'traitors'). For a time the Soviet leaders hoped to follow a middle course, neither recognising Sihanouk nor implicitly supporting a government that depended on American military and economic aid. However, any hopes placed on a 'third force' foundered on the realities of Cambodian politics: the wasteful squandering by the traditional elite of the goodwill that had been created among the youth and intellectuals as well as among professional men and administrators by the overthrow in 1970 of what had become an incapable and stifling, if not unduly repressive, regime. Yet in a matter of months after the fall of Sihanouk, corruption, incompetence, arbitrary and oppressive rule alienated those who were formerly the most enthusiastic supporters of the new order. As if this was not enough, the successors to Prince Sihanouk, besides suffering from a devastating war (for which they were only in part responsible), began to fall out among themselves.

According to the Americans' view of their client's situation, in President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress in May 1973, 'the crucial ingredient in Cambodia remains political instability'. Leading non-communist groups and personalities, at times, have been openly at

odds. 'This only serves to undercut morale, jeopardize the security situation, and prevent the establishment of an effective base from which to negotiate with the enemy if the enemy ever chooses to do so.'[2] As the Nixon administration has often pointed out, the rapidly deteriorating military position in Cambodia threatens the viability of the Saigon regime. In a final effort to shore up Phnom Penh, and perhaps to bring to an end the doubtful experiment of a 'third force'[3] the United States government put pressure on Lon Nol to bring back Sirik Matak, In Tam and Cheng Heng (Head of State from 1970 to 1972) in a 'Supreme Political Council'. Meanwhile the Americans not only intensified their bombing so as to keep the insurgents at bay but also urged the Cambodian leadership to settle for a compromise peace with the National United Front, which the latter scornfully refused.

Cambodia's crucial role

It is evident that the Soviet posture in this area is not so much one of taking the initiative, but of reacting to the moves and policies of others. (At the risk of trespassing in other fields, it is important to present these other activities in some detail.) Soviet interest in Cambodia clearly lies in the fact that it is crucial to the continuance of the *status quo,* postulated by the January and June 1973 agreements on Vietnam and by the February and July agreements on Laos, and which all parties expected would be extended to Cambodia.[4] Of course there are differences of interpretation. While Washington emphasises the present situation of *status quo* ('ceasefire in place'), Moscow and Peking look forward instead to the goal of political change (through the formation of the tripartite National Council of Reconciliation and Concord) sanctioned by the Paris agreements, although in the circumstances this is problematic. Yet it would undoubtedly suit the Nixon administration to see the present kind of compromise, which leaves the Thieu regime in a materially strong position in South Vietnam, and which preserves a buffer of sorts for Thailand in Laos, also realised in Cambodia by the formation of a coalition of 'reasonable' members of both sides, perhaps under the nominal leadership of Prince Sihanouk. The Nixon Doctrine for Indochina would then have been attained:

[2] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace* (Washington, D.C., May 3, 1973), p. 28.

[3] Marcel Barang, 'Le Cambodge en retard d'une paix', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1973; Wilfred Burchett, 'Au Cambodge', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1972. But see also the commentary in *Izvestia*, August 12, 1973, supporting the struggle of the National United Front of Cambodia.

[4] 'High diplomatic sources' at the Paris talks reported that Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had reached an understanding that the ceasefire in Vietnam would be extended to Laos and Cambodia as well: Henry Kamm, *International Herald Tribune*, January 26, 1973.

provisional stability, right-wing forces on the defensive but still strongly entrenched, and a real possibility that they can consolidate their power (this has occurred with other apparently fragile regimes in the Third World) thanks to continuing American military and economic assistance.

It is this objective that the probable collapse of the Phnom Penh regime puts in jeopardy. Indeed, the White House statement issued after the Congressional ban on American bombing in Cambodia had taken effect (on August 15, 1973) contends that this action ' has eliminated an important incentive for a negotiated settlement in Cambodia, has weakened the security of Cambodia's neighbours in south-east Asia and has eroded the structure of peace in Indochina. . . '[5] But the fundamental question is this: with President Nixon weakened by ever-stronger Congressional opposition to the American role in Cambodia, by the utter weariness of the American public with any further ' responsibility ' for Indochina, and by the paralysing repercussions of the Watergate scandals, can he *now* exert the international ' leverage ', used so successfully in the past, to stave off defeat for his Indochina policy?

Basically there are two possibilities. First of all, Nixon can offer considerable inducements to both the Soviet and Chinese leaders, as he did during the Vietnam peace negotiations in 1972, in return for which Peking and Moscow could separately be expected to urge the moderation of Vietnamese and Cambodian revolutionary demands. But if Nixon, from a seriously undermined ' position of strength ', is unable to produce a satisfactory *quid pro quo* for Moscow or Peking, or the latter are unable or unwilling to press the Cambodian insurgents to adopt a compromise, then the American President can either accept the reality of the situation (eroding his hopes for an anti-communist Indochina) or, in a desperate gamble, throw everything back into the melting pot. This would mean authorising South Vietnam (and perhaps Thailand) to intervene, no doubt by indirect means, in Cambodia. Their opponents would then be faced with the prospect of either accepting a *fait accompli* or, if they rejected it, of starting a wider war. Now the risk this would present to Nixon's historic attempt to reshape the structure of great power relations—to move from ' an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation '—would be a formidable one and for this reason surely an unacceptable one. But Nixon sets great store by toughness and unpredictability. Such a move, disastrous as it may be to international co-operation, cannot be ruled out.

What is the evidence for either of these suppositions? Consider, first, the question of ' leverage '. The fact that both China and Russia had more to gain from co-operation with the United States than from

[5] *The Times*, August 16, 1973.

confrontation (for the sake of supporting the maximum demands of an ally) put the Nixon administration in a favourable position to negotiate a 'reasonable' compromise in Vietnam: that is, the military-political situation in the South was 'frozen' at a point which still reflects the impact of American intervention. (Gaining by the recognition of the PRG as an alternative government and with North Vietnamese troops tacitly permitted to protect it, the Vietnamese revolutionaries yielded on their demands for the prior establishment of a coalition government and the exclusion of President Thieu.) The Soviet leaders, for their parts view the Vietnam settlement as an element of what they believe is a world-wide trend. In an article entitled 'Soviet-American Co-operation Serves Peace', the foreign affairs journal *New Times* reported in June 1973: 'Now American troops have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, and with this one of the most serious obstacles to the normalisation of relations between the United States and the USSR has been removed'.[6] *Pravda* brought the point home in its editorial on the visit of an important party-government delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, headed by Le Duan, First Secretary of the party, and Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister, in July 1973. The editorial noted that the visit, as a result of which the Soviet Union greatly extended its assistance for 'peaceful economic development', was in accordance with the circumstances of global detente and peaceful co-existence.[7]

The convergence of interests of the great powers in a Vietnam settlement still affects the operation of the international balance. For what makes up the overall 'balance' are the interlinked domestic and external interests, needs and capacities of the powers. For example, in the Soviet Union the political future of the leaders largely depends on their ability to bring about substantial material improvement. This can be achieved partly by internal economic and administrative reforms, partly by limiting (by mutual agreement with the United States) expenditure on strategic weapons, partly by benefiting from economic and technological arrangements with the United States, West Germany and Japan. Hence the importance of a peaceful international environment. But the 'new Soviet course' both acts on and reflects, as all foreign policies do, an internal balance of forces. That Mr Brezhnev seeks to safeguard himself against potential opposition to his policy of international co-operation—particularly by ideologically 'conservative' elements in the party, military and security organs—by tightening internal

[6] Editorial, *New Times* No. 24, June 1973.
[7] *Pravda*, July 19, 1973, on the joint communiqué of July 16, 1973. See also the commentary by P. Demchenko, *Pravda*, July 22, 1973. B. Dmitriev, in an article entitled 'Washington and the Lessons of Vietnam', *New Times* No. 15, April 1973, explicitly referred to 'broad areas' where Soviet and American political and economic interests coincide.

security is depressingly evident. In China too, and probably to an even greater extent, ideological hostility to Chairman Mao's *rapprochement* with the United States (one of the motives for Lin Piao's attempted coup) had to be overcome. For the over-riding need, as seen by the leaders in Peking, was to remove all obstacles in the way of concentrating Chinese efforts against the 'main enemy', the Soviet Union.

Even in the United States, President Nixon is alarmed lest his historic foreign policy objective—inaugurating an era of co-operation based on 'stability' throughout the world—be impaired by Congressional revulsion both against American intervention in Indochina and against the machinations of the White House staff as revealed by Watergate. However, it seems most unlikely that Nixon's successor (whether before or after 1976) will substantially modify the President's chosen course of constructive relations with the great powers. What is probable, if Nixon sees out his term of office, is that his hand will be weakened precisely in the execution of those policies most disliked by his opponents: the bolstering of right-wing governments in Indochina, which has necessitated so many covert operations, including the use of mercenaries or 'volunteers', as well as the current threats of renewed bombing to maintain the 'incentive', as Nixon puts it, for the other side to desist from upsetting the presidential grand design.

To the extent that the Soviet Union has shown 'restraint' by restricting delivery of sophisticated weapons to the North Vietnamese, as Dr. Kissinger has observed,[8] American leverage still has some effect. But the danger to the President's design for the containment of communism in Indochina [9] is not so much from a full-scale invasion by the North Vietnamese (in which Soviet arms shipments would obviously play an important part) as from the sapping by indigenous resistance forces of regimes that have until now only been able to maintain themselves in power by means of massive American support. Deprived of that support, the Souvanna Phouma government (if not some of its powerful critics more to the right) seeks to avoid further confrontation by agreeing to negotiate with the Pathet Lao on equal terms. But the Lon Nol government is in no position to follow suit. Its reluctant overtures, first of all after the January 1973 ceasefire in Vietnam, and later, as a result of further American pressure (since a negotiated settlement would obviate the need for the unpopular bombing campaign) in July, have been adamantly rejected both by Prince Sihanouk and by the

[8] White House briefing, May 12, 1973. Kissinger, reporting on his talks with Soviet leaders, said they had been helpful on Vietnam. 'It is correct to say' that the Soviet Union 'recognizes its responsibilities' as a signatory at the Paris peace conference. *International Herald Tribune*, May 14, 1973.

[9] The 'design' is a means (but an important one) to the end of preserving the world-wide US system of alliances: i.e. maintaining the confidence of allies by demonstrating the will and the capacity to carry out US commitments.

leaders of the 'internal resistance' in Cambodia.[10] In this respect it is significant that the Chinese government, which had previously invited Dr. Kissinger and Senator Mansfield (the Senate majority leader who has long been sympathetic to Prince Sihanouk) to visit Peking in August 1973, no doubt to discuss the outlines of a compromise in Cambodia, is reported to have withdrawn these invitations.[11]

If in these changed circumstances American leverage is no longer what it was, what is the likelihood that the President will call on his south-east Asian allies, in the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, to take on the burden of maintaining the *status quo*? As of mid-August 1973, the signs are ambiguous. While the PRG claims that ten thousand South Vietnamese 'volunteers' have already been infiltrated into Cambodia, Saigon spokesmen variously indicate that they are considering the possibility of sending troops into Cambodia if Phnom Penh should fall to the enemy, that there are no plans to intervene in Cambodia (although the presence of North Vietnamese troops gives Saigon a pretext), and that so far Phnom Penh has not requested any such assistance.

As for the insurgents, it seems likely that they will postpone a direct offensive that could provoke intervention by Saigon (the latter, too, has an interest in not over-extending its military strength). Instead, the 'liberation' army (both Sihanoukists and 'Khmers rouges') can be expected gradually to increase the pressure, particularly on isolated garrison towns still precariously held by Phnom Penh, with the aim either of inducing an uprising by disillusioned officers and officials against the Lon Nol regime, for the purpose of making peace, or else of obliging leaders like Sirik Matak and In Tam to recognise that there is no alternative to the return of Prince Sihanouk, and to realise that by seeking accommodation before it is too late something may still be salvaged from the wreckage. If either of these insurgent aims are achieved Prince Sihanouk would feel himself vindicated. His legitimacy as Head of State would be acknowledged even though power (as he is the first to admit) would be in the hands of the resistance.[12]

This situation should be quite acceptable to the Soviet Union. The coming to power in Cambodia of leaders of the internal resistance would help to turn the scales in the rest of Indochina. North Vietnam, after all, has been the historic inspirer of resistance movements in Indochina since the days of the Vietminh struggle against the French.[13] And if the 'Khmers rouges', the Pathet Lao and the PRG of South Vietnam look to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as their patron (though

[10] For instance, by Prince Sihanouk on July 21, by Penn Nouth on August 15, and by Khieu Samphan, speaking for the 'internal resistance', on June 24, 1973.

[11] *The Guardian*, August 16, 1973.

[12] Norodom Sihanouk, *L'Indochine vue de Pékin: Entretiens avec Jean Lacouture* (Paris: Editions du Seuil. 1972), pp. 157–9.

[13] See the author's 'The Resistance in Cambodia', *Asian Survey*, July 1972.

with a certain ambiguity: as nationalists striving to assert their autonomy and as revolutionaries conscious of their solidarity in a common cause) so North Vietnam, too, looks to the Soviet Union.

Unlike the Chinese [14] and the Americans, the Soviet leaders need have no anxiety about the effect of the dynamism of a reunited Vietnam on its weaker neighbours, since Soviet concern for the rest of south-east Asia is limited. Russia, which has neither been over-committed to an unstable area (as America has) nor is striving for greater security in the region (as China, uneasily aware both of Japanese economic and Soviet strategic superiority, certainly is), can afford not to take risky initiatives but instead to await the outcome with reasonable confidence.

[14] It is widely held that China would prefer the existence of four independent states in Indochina to a situation in which the area is 'dominated by Hanoi and possibly susceptible to Moscow': Ronald Koven, quoting US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Sullivan, *International Herald Tribune*, January 30, 1973. Prince Sihanouk (*L'Indochine vue de Pékin*, p. 162) also reports that the Chinese ideal is to have neutral and independent neighbours, who are not satellites of China, America, Russia or Japan.

CHINA AND THE CHINESE THREAT SYSTEM

Arthur Huck

AFTER two decades of worrying about a Chinese threat which proved to be of little substance, Western analysts should perhaps turn their attention to a different question: how do the Chinese see themselves as threatened and what dangers lurk in that formulation?

'Threat systems', in Kenneth Boulding's aphorism, 'are the basis of politics as exchange systems are the basis of economics.'[1] Boulding, it is true, was not writing primarily about international political systems but he does regard the international system as an unstable extension of the phenomenon:

> While a one-sided threat system is internally stable, threat systems in themselves develop instability because of the fact that they become, not one-sided but bi-lateral. The proposition, 'If you do not do good to me, I will do bad to you,' becomes 'If you do bad to me I will do bad to you.' It is hard to keep a monopolistic threat system intact, and, against one threat system, another threat system tends to be aroused. Threat systems, therefore, constantly decline into war systems or deterrence systems which seem to have inherent instability in them.[2]

This brings out an important aspect of the logic of threat statements which, although in one way elementary, is often overlooked; it stresses their *conditional* nature. The concept of a 'threat' is not a simple one, however familiar it appears. The ordinary notion of someone threatening someone else is intelligible enough but it cannot be described in two words. In a bargaining situation if A threatens B then, in a simple case, he is saying, 'If you do such and such (harmful to my interests) then I will do such and such (harmful to yours)'; or 'If you do not do such and such (which I want) then I will do such and such (harmful to you)'. For B to be impressed he has to be convinced that A means what he says and could carry out his threat; he must be convinced of A's resolution and his capacity to carry it out. If he does not believe A really means it or does not believe he could do it even if he wanted to, then we have not a typical threat situation but a case of bluffing.[3] The truth about

[1] Quoted in Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (London: Macmillan. 1973), p. 31.
[2] Kenneth E. Boulding, *Beyond Economics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1968), p. 106.
[3] See Arthur Huck, 'Threats and Dangers', *The Melbourne Journal of Politics*, No. 2, 1969, pp. 24–28 and George Kent, *The Effects of Threats* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 1967).

any threat situation cannot be discovered simply by looking at it; more or less elaborate sets of conditional statements have to be investigated. Moreover, because 'threat' appears to *name* something, there is a tendency to assume that there must be something there, observable, to be named. But if threats are something directly observable how can there be such conflict of opinion about them? Is it that only certain people are wide enough awake to see them? Are some deliberately blind? Are some more expert than others in observing them? Are some deceiving themselves or deliberately deceiving others?

To say, on the contrary, that threat statements are not about simple observables at all but are conditional or hypothetical statements is not to say that they are unimportant or of no interest, but that arguments about them cannot be settled by simple appeals to the evidence. Threats do not stare you in the face, even in the simplest cases. To stress the conditional nature of threat statements may seem to be hammering the obvious but it is most important when the notion of threats is extended from A and B (two people in a bargaining situation) to country A and B, and country C, D and E. To see a country as a threat is not to make a simple observation but to assume a number of highly important things about what it could do and what it might do. Armaments in themselves do not constitute a threat. A threat has not been defined until a number of conditions can be ascertained—not only who is threatening to do what to whom, but with what degree of serious intent and with what credible expectation of being able to carry it out. The air of fantasy which so often surrounds discussions of military threats is often due to the failure to ask such questions with any degree of precision, or to ask them at all. A dose of strategic analysis and a whiff of rationality will not, however, dispose of the problem of assessing national threats. The highly elliptical nature of all statements about any country, China, Russia, America, Japan, wanting or threatening anything—as if 'China', 'Russia', 'America', 'Japan' were the names of individuals—begs a number of questions about leadership and popular support which cry out for investigation. And the very use of these terms raises questions of national image, national stereotype and national identity which have little to do with the rational calculation of probabilities.

All this having been said, it does appear to be the case that we have recently witnessed an important change in the Chinese threat system. This is not to say that Chinese foreign policy has dramatically reversed itself, although dramatised episodes like the Nixon visit have tended to give that impression; it is rather that a number of long-term reassessments have finally produced a much starker picture than we had before. A succinct statement of the new vision has been given by E. F. Hill, the

Chairman of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), who faithfully reproduces the Peking line.

> . . . The Soviet Union is truly an imperialist power. Its domination of certain Eastern European countries is a colonial domination—the economy of these countries is tailored to suit the economy of the Soviet Union. This is precisely what all imperialisms do. When a colony or a semi-colony threatens to break away from an imperialist power, that power takes action to prevent the breakaway. So the Soviet Union militarily occupied Czechoslovakia and maintains its military occupation. It maintains troops in Poland, Hungary, East Germany. . . . It has recently reaffirmed its 'right' to take military action at the 'request' of the government of a friendly power; it maintains puppet governments for that very purpose. If the government of such a country proves reluctant to 'request' soviet assistance, then the soviet authorities change the government as they did in Czechoslovakia. This sort of thing is characteristic of imperialism. . . .
>
> Its navies and spy ships prowl the seas all over the world in typical imperialist fashion. Why does a peace-loving country, as soviet leaders claim the Soviet Union is, need to have submarines, destroyers, cruisers, in every port of the world? Why do her admirals speak of the great naval strength of the Soviet Union? One can only answer—it is because soviet imperialism has global interests: like all other imperialisms it seeks to exploit and dominate the world. . . .
>
> The talk about peace and security by the Soviet Union is only talk under the cover of which it steps up its armament build-up. Declarations and agreements about nuclear arms have not stopped the Soviet Union nor the U.S.A. from increasing their nuclear arsenals nor from conducting big tests of nuclear weapons.
>
> Talks about collective security are a cover for knocking up aggressive pacts. So in Asia the soviet proposal for collective security has its foundation in the Soviet-Indian alliance, an alliance for aggression. . . .
>
> It is accepted that the superpowers each seek world wide domination. They join together and they divide in their drive for world domination. The soviet revisionists took up the task in which the open imperialists had failed. The soviet revisionists, in the name of socialism and communism, attacked people's China and made military attacks upon her and prepared for more military attacks. To carry this out it needed extensive and intensive ideological preparation in the names of communism and socialism. This is one aspect of the question. But why attack people's China? There are various reasons: the soviet revisionists have betrayed socialism; anyone and particularly any country that upholds socialism as China and Albania do, earns their particular enmity . . . then there is the simple question of seizing people's China and Albania (along with ordinary capitalist countries) for exploitation just as the czars did and attempted to carry further. But it is all justified in the name of communism and the Chinese are accused of being anti-communist.
>
> The soviet revisionists maintain one million and more troops on the sino-soviet border to try to carry out the dream of destroying people's China. Its destruction means that a truly socialist country is destroyed thus setting the world cause of socialism back, and at the

> same time, the resources of people's China come under imperialist exploitation. . . .[4]

Despite this grim foreshadowing the article concludes optimistically that 'none of this, however, is succeeding'. Hill usually presents the current Chinese line in a very pure form; it can be argued with a fair degree of confidence that it is from a threat picture very like this that China's current diplomatic line flows.

No claim to be a super-power

The People's Republic of China has of course been concerned from the beginning to gain general recognition and viability as a modern nation-state. There was a short period during the Cultural Revolution when Chou En-lai admittedly lost control of the situation, or at least of the bureaucratic machinery of foreign affairs, and Chinese foreign policy was reduced to a series of revolutionary and xenophobic gestures. Against this should be set the sheer continuity of Chou's controlling influence on foreign affairs; for nearly thirty years, in and out of power, with a very durable team of colleagues, Chou has guided the party in its practical dealings with foreign representatives and governments. His success in obtaining general acceptability for the People's Republic has come after a protracted struggle and is still not quite complete, but in the past two years progress has been rapid.

The general line governing this process is naturally held to be 'Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line' or 'Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line in foreign affairs'. To translate this into our own language, the policy is legitimate, forward-looking and unequivocally recommended. It would, however, be a mistake to reduce 'revolutionary' to a mere term of approval. The Chinese do see China as a revolutionary society with its face set against the resurgence of bourgeois values. And the emergence of new nation states, including the People's Republic, is seen as part of a world revolutionary process in which the old power structure of the world is upset if not totally destroyed.

At the same time Chinese spokesmen have insisted that it is not prepared to play power politics as that game has generally been understood. Does this insistence have any reality? China, it is asserted, realistically enough, is not a super-power and furthermore never will be a super-power. This last statement could be interpreted to mean that China intends never to behave like a super-power. China is described as still an economically backward country as well as a developing country and is sometimes said to belong to the Third World. It is also described as one of a (rather small) number of socialist states. The

[4] E. F. Hill, 'The Soviet Union is an Imperialist Power', *Hsinhua News Bulletin*, July 31, 1973, reprinted from *Vanguard*, July 26, 1973.

restoration of capitalism is alleged to have made the Soviet Union a social-imperialist country. With the United States, the other great imperialist power, it forms the group of the two super-powers. Between them and the socialist countries there are said to be two intermediate zones. The Asian, African and Latin American countries are said to be in the first and the major capitalist countries are said to be in the second. Generally the world situation is said to be favouring the intermediate countries and the socialist countries. The super-powers are described as torn by rivalry and internal contradictions, constantly thwarted in their designs by the emergence of new forces in the world.

Chinese policy could be said to be based on three antis, to use a Chinese idiom: anti-imperialism, anti-hegemonism and anti-equilibrism, that is to say, a basic distrust of all the traditional European formulae for achieving peace through power arrangements. China is described as consistently opposed to both super-powers in their struggle for world domination; it is opposed to the imperialism of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the imperialism of the United States in south-east Asia. Equally it is opposed to the attempt by any country to establish a hegemonic position, to stake out areas of controlling influence. And as a professed supporter of revolution in the first intermediate zone it is opposed to the post-colonial *status quo*.

In principle then China is a non-imperial, non-hegemonic power and a destabilising one. Its ideal world would consist of nation-states big and small but equal, following the five principles of peaceful co-existence. It is held to be consistent with this that China should be able to provide some aid to developing countries and military aid to countries and people 'fighting against aggression'. The limitations of the Chinese economy naturally put a limit to the amount of material aid which is possible but have no such effect on the amount of political and moral support.

This theoretical framework has been built up over a number of years ever since open polemics with the Soviet Union began. With each passing year the comparative brevity of the 'honeymoon period' of Sino-Soviet relations becomes more obvious [5]; the split has already taken on a possibly spurious air of historical inevitability. The emphasis on the Soviet Union as the chief threat, however, is undoubtedly a new development.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia does appear to have had a very marked effect on the Chinese leaders. The Brezhnev doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' for countries in the Soviet bloc certainly did

[5] See John Gittings, 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute in Historical Perspective', the introduction to his *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1968). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 563.

nothing to reduce Chinese apprehensions.[6] By 1971 Chinese cadres were busy studying a little-read work of Chairman Mao's, 'On Policy', which was clearly used to justify a new version of united front tactics. This inner-party directive is dated December 25, 1940, and discusses the problems of the anti-Japanese struggle. In it Mao's tactics for dealing with imperialism are frankly discussed. He wrote:

> The Communist Party opposes all imperialism, but we make a distinction between Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not doing so now, between German and Italian imperialism which are allies of Japan and have recognised 'Manchukuo' and British and U.S. imperialism which are opposed to Japan, and between the Britain and the United States of yesterday which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined China's resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today which have abandoned this policy and are now in favour of China's resistance. Our tactics are guided by one and the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one.[7]

Articles in *Red Flag* clearly spelt out the current version of 'Chairman Mao's strategic plan': with the aim of isolating the main enemy tactical alliances with lesser enemies were not only permissible but desirable. Implicit in this is a reassessment of the American imperialist threat which the Vietnam settlement, or rather non-settlement, would seem to justify. (However the Vietnam wars are assessed they can hardly be interpreted as an American victory.) In this reassessment the new Japan also has to be considered: 'Japanese rearmament' becomes a non-issue and Tanaka quickly follows Nixon to Peking.

Such a presentation is undoubtedly too simple and pays no attention to the internal factional disagreements which almost certainly accompanied the reassessment. But it is not too simple for the theoreticians of the Soviet Union. In a characteristic article, I. Alexeyev, for example, analyses 'Anti-Sovietism in Peking's Strategy'.[8] This denounces the theory of intermediate zones as an anti-Marxist scheme designed to support the hegemonic designs of China. It insists that inside China an explanatory campaign has been mounted to designate the Soviet Union as the chief enemy. China is attacked for rebuffing any Soviet disarmament initiatives and trying to obstruct any detente and for pursuing a splitting line in the socialist community.

> In China, all the mass media are geared for brainwashing the population in the spirit of anti-Sovietism. In 1972, two central newspapers

[6] See J. D. Armstrong, 'Peking's Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Change', *Current Scene*, June 1973, Vol. XI, No. 6, p. 3.

[7] Mao Tse-tung, 'On Policy', *Selected Works*, Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 1965), pp. 443–444.

[8] I. Alexeyev, 'Anti-Sovietism in Peking's Strategy', *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 7, 1973.

alone—*Jenmin Jihpao* and *Kuang ming Jihpao*—carried 505 articles containing attacks on the Soviet Union, while the 12 issues of *Hung Chi* carried 31 similar articles. The three publications contained more than 100 anti-Soviet articles from January to March of this year.[9]

Mao and his 'entourage' are accused of revealing anti-Soviet tendencies long before 1949 and systematically carrying out slanderous anti-Soviet propaganda in Yenan. The method and content of the propaganda of the Peking leaders is described as very similar to that of the Kuomintang. Reference is also made to the hostile attacks on the Soviet Union in the central, and especially the local, Chinese press in 1957. Finally,

> There must be good reason for recent reports in the Hong Kong press to the effect that Peking intends to seek a rapprochement with the Taiwan clique precisely on their common anti-Soviet platform. The Hong Kong newspapers noted that Chinese officials have been studying the anti-Soviet theses in Chiang Kai-shek's book *Soviet Russia in China*. In this respect it was explained to them that just as cooperation between the CPC and the Kuomintang was possible in the 1930's in face of Japanese aggression, so today cooperation between them is possible in face of the 'threat' coming from the USSR.[10]

Official Soviet statements on relations with China usually conclude by saying that the Soviet Union desires peaceful relations with China but that any improvement in the situation is dependent on a change in the Chinese line. Chinese spokesmen show no inclination to change the line; if anything it is hardening.

To repeat, none of these threat statements should be taken as fact; they are a shorthand of possibilities. They could, however, have dangerous implications. If *both* sides became convinced that the other was really the primary enemy, miscalculations of relative strengths could encourage disastrous military solutions. One implication, however, does not seem justified. It is often assumed, in the light of what has been happening, that China has become converted to power politics in the sense of favouring balance-of-power arrangements. This really does not seem to follow, if it involves an expectation that China is likely to favour new alliance systems or even regional security arrangements. The only sense in which China might be said to favour balance-of-power theory is, ironically, the classical one. As Geoffrey Blainey reminds us, the main virtue of a balance of power in the eyes of those who originally practised it—the Metternichs and Castlereaghs—was not that it was primarily a formula for peace: 'it was a formula for national independence. . . . In essence a balance of power was simply a formula designed to prevent the rise of a nation to world dominance.'[11] There might be occasions when it would be necessary to wage war in order to preserve it, a conclusion with which Mao might, unhappily, agree.

[9] Alexeyev, p. 23.
[10] Alexeyev, p. 25.
[11] Blainey, pp. 111–112.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Annual Register. World Events in 1972. Edited by Ivison Macadam assisted by Muriel Grindrod and Ann Boas. *London: Longman. 1973. 565 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £7·95.*

THIS addition to the oldest periodical publication in the United Kingdom is the last to be edited by Sir Ivison Macadam, whose twenty-five years of office do not fall far short of those of the first editor, Edmund Burke. The year 1972, as he remarks in the Preface, was one in which 'cherished Conservative dogmas had to be abandoned and pragmatic solutions adopted instead'. In the international monetary sphere a new system was in the building, and the super-powers were being forced into agonising reappraisals by their obstreperous former protégés in Asia; in Europe more constructive achievements—not unlinked with the general uncertainty of world politics—included the conclusion of the Basic Treaty governing relations of the two Germanies, and the enlargement of the European Economic Community. It was another year of frustrations in the Middle East. The narrative chapters of the volume, dealing tersely and expertly with the history of individual countries, together give a well-rounded view which is supported by the chapters on the activities of international organisations, and the usual highly competent analysis of international economic developments and the economy of the United Kingdom.

There is much else of value, for the new volume embodies the many features and varied improvements lovingly dovetailed into the traditional pattern of the *Register* by the editorial team during the last twenty-five years. It was in 1947, after the death of Dr. M. Epstein (editor, 1922-1946), that an advisory board was appointed (for the first time) under the chairmanship of a new editor, with representatives from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Arts Council of Great Britain, the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Royal Historical Society, and the English Association. Although these bodies were in no way responsible for facts and opinions in the volume, they had much to contribute through their representatives, and the Chatham House expertise in particular was available through the editor himself and a succession of assistant editors,

Hugh Latimer, Margaret Cleeve and Muriel Grindrod. And the ghosts of Edmund Burke and Robert Dodsley were never far away.

The present editor and his predecessors have remained loyal to Burke's original felicitous plan of 1758 for an up-to-date reference book of contemporary events, so that innovations have to be consistent with the continuity of the pattern over long historical periods. It is impossible to praise too highly the positive achievements of Macadam's editorship, the high level of accuracy, the admirable lay-out, the extraordinary promptitude of publication (six months only in the press), the building-up of the team of specialist contributors from twenty-six in 1947 to over seventy today, and the skill in stimulating the flow of suggestions both from the advisory board and from the annual working dinner given by the publishers to the contributors. Even more striking perhaps is the success with which many innovations of substance have been squared with tradition.

In the political history sections, which occupy the first 374 pages of this volume, British history is still placed first (where it has been since the major replanning of 1863) and is still the longest single section, although reduced in length to about half the 1947 allocation. This priority recognises its claims to prominence in an English publication and the absence of any similar survey elsewhere: it is not a measure of Britain's global importance. To it have been added since 1947 separate sections on Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the last lengthened this year to deal with tragic events. Part II in 1947 dealt with 'The British Commonwealth of Nations' (discarding the outmoded term 'Imperial History') and in 1970 this finally disappeared as a separate grouping: it now seemed more realistic to place Canada and the African Commonwealth countries under the relevant continental headings. The most striking innovation resulted, however, from the recognition that national history was ill-suited for the description of inter-state and international relations. These are now covered by important separate chapters, dealing this year with East-West negotiations, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and international defence, regional, economic, and political organisations.

A section on 'Religion' has appeared annually since 1958. If the editor has felt unable to follow Burke and to entertain (with 'matters of a lighter nature, but pleasing even by their levity'), he has at least given the annual history of the British entertainment industry ('The Arts'). Useful diagrams and maps have been appearing since 1947, with photographs of leading world figures since 1958. Occasional essays on topics (such as genetic development, progress in archaeology, student unrest) which do not readily fit the annual accounts, have added further variety and interest.

But the unique character of the publication is in the adding each year of a highly professional contemporary record to an ever-lengthening chain of over 200 previous volumes, while retaining the basic plan and the high and sober standards of the first editor. 'Even at our first setting out', wrote Burke in the Preface to his second volume, 'we employed none of the customary arts to excite attention, and seduce judgment; and on the present occasion these arts would prove as ineffectual, as they would have then been low and illiberal.' So conceived, the present volume will surely serve as the best of models to the new editorial team that has taken charge.

W. N. MEDLICOTT

The Aberystwyth Papers International Politics 1919–1969. Edited by Brian Porter. Foreword by H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh. *London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 390 pp. Index. £5·50.*

Transnational Relations and World Politics. Edited by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972. 428 pp. Bibliog. Index. Hardback: £7·50; Paperback: £2·50.*

Regional Integration: Theory and Research. Edited by Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 427 pp. Bibliog. Index. Hardback: £6·00; Paperback: £2·40.*

THE three books under review are good examples of how collections of papers, brought together in a particular spirit for a specific purpose, can often retain more lasting value in book form than many purpose-built books themselves.

Several of the chapters in *The Aberystwyth Papers* were originally presented to a conference held at the University of Wales in 1969 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the oldest University Chair of International Relations in the world, the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth. Each member of the team of eminent contributors was asked to analyse the evolution of a particular aspect of international affairs over the fifty-year period since the Treaty of Versailles. Among the most stimulating essays, this reviewer would mention Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's on 'Changes in Diplomacy since Versailles', Michael Howard's on 'Changes in the Use of Force, 1919–1969', Alastair Buchan's on 'Technology and World Politics', F. H. Hinsley's on 'The Impact of Nationalism' and Geoffrey Goodwin's on 'Economics and International Politics'. The ideological, legal, institutional, moral and developmental aspects of international affairs are also ably covered by Hugh Seton-Watson, C. A. W. Manning, Inis Claude, Herbert Butterfield and Barbara Ward respectively, and there are two characteristically lively surveys of the evolving theories of international politics and strategy by Hedley Bull and Arthur Lee Burns.

It is a little curious that William Olson, in his useful introductory account of the growth of international relations as an academic discipline, asserts that a scholar entering this field 'probably will find himself in a Department of Political Science': this is, of course, still true in the United States, but in Britain the discipline of international relations has long—for better or for worse—enjoyed an autonomous status, as the fascinating accounts of the fifty-year history of the Aberystwyth Department, contributed to this book with due pride by the present staff, amply testify.

This symposium, excellently edited by Brian Porter, will provide rich material for students of international affairs, and also for readers interested in the academic politics of this branch of the 'policy sciences'. The sections on the history of the Aberystwyth Department make enthralling reading: but was it really seemly to reveal, from the College archives, the names of the candidates for the Chair whom E. H. Carr defeated in 1936, one of whom is still living?

The other two symposia under review originated as special numbers of the admirable quarterly review *International Organization.* They illustrate both the wide and exciting scope of the present-day study of international

institutions, which at one time threatened to become the dullest branch of international studies, and also the way in which a special number of a learned journal, well planned and well edited, can become a good book of lasting value.

The concept of 'transnational relations' in the title of the Keohane/Nye volume refers to a multitudinous variety of cross-frontier relations other than those of the traditional inter-state kind. The existence of these phenomena has long been recognised—it is many years since Arnold Wolfers urged us to discard the traditional 'billiard-ball' model of relations between states—but this volume makes the first systematic attempt at classifying them and assessing their varying kinds and degrees of significance for the international system as a whole.

The book offers a useful combination of case studies and attempts at a general theory. In the former category, there are essays on such international actors as the Ford Foundation, the Roman Catholic Church, multinational firms, and revolutionary movements, and a particularly illuminating study (by Lawrence Krause) of the politics of international financial flows. In the more theoretical category of articles, headed 'Transnational Relations: the Nature of the Beast', the discussions by Edward Morse and Robert Gilpin of the political aspects of international economic relations and the economic aspects of international politics, are especially perceptive. Karl Kaiser also elaborates on a line of argument he has advanced in earlier writings, that the growth of transnational processes poses unprecedented problems for the democratic control of foreign policy in modern states.

Part of the answer to this problem may lie in extending the political answerability of institutions which attempt to regulate the economic policies pursued within particular regions of the world system. The symposium edited by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold—this time a book resulting from a conference *and* a special number of *International Organization*—offers a systematic review of the state of research on regional integration, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in Western Europe. The volume begins with a long essay by Ernst Haas, one of the doyens of this branch of theorising, which draws up a valuable balance sheet of the successes and shortcomings of integration theory in analysing and predicting the actual course of events. Some of the other contributions are designed to suggest directions which future research might take, and will particularly interest the social scientists who will carry it on. However, there are many things in the book—particularly in the concluding section by Stuart Scheingold—which underline the relevance of theory to practice. When Scheingold discusses the inadequacy of the social policies so far promoted by the European Community, or the impact of the Community on international relations as a whole, what he says will be of direct value to those concerned with the nuts and bolts of 'making Europe', as well as to scribblers in ivory towers and think-tanks.

ROGER MORGAN

The Bases of International Order. Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning. Ed. by Alan James. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1973. 218 pp. Illus. Index. £3·50.*

Nationalism and the International System. By F. H. Hinsley. *London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton. 1973. 192 pp. Bibliog. Index. ('Twentieth Century Studies', No. 5. Ed. Donald Tyerman.) £3·00.*

The Bases of International Order, essays in honour of C. A. W. Manning, written by eight of his former colleagues and edited by Alan James, does full justice to the flavour of Manning's thought by concentrating upon the poorly understood concept of 'order'. As Michael Banks points out in his exegesis of Manning's own exposition in *The Nature of International Society,*[1] this concept was central in Manning's highly individual position between utopianism and realism; it was not discussed in a separate chapter nor included in the index—presumably because it was too central to warrant doing so.

The individual contributors authoritatively discuss several important facets of international relations in relation to 'international order': F. S. Northedge, change; Peter Lyon, new states; Alan James, law; Martin Wight, the balance of power; Hedley Bull, war; Geoffrey Stern, morality; Geoffrey Goodwin, international institutions; and Michael Banks, contemporary international theory. Undoubtedly, as Banks points out, Charles Manning may be regarded as a precursor of the systems analysts, although he did not join the mainstream of transatlantic theorising but developed his own, idiosyncratic style of analysis, combining broad philosophising with examples and analogies drawn from history. The red thread going right across all the essays is the assertion that an international order does exist, however hard it may be to define, that it has to be accommodated to change and that it has a close relationship not only with stability but also with justice.

Despite their greatly varying individual styles ranging from Martin Wight's history of ideas to Michael Banks's reference to contemporary international theory, all the contributors manage to write in Manning's spirit—they discuss what they deem to be important even if this frequently does not lend itself to great precision. Although some empirical material can now be more usefully organised with the aid of the 'models' evolved by the contemporary theorists, the Manning 'school', if it may be so termed, retains its validity as a necessary bridge between the realms of values and of philosophy and that of actual politics.

In *Nationalism and the International System,* F. H. Hinsley discusses the impact of nationalism on the international order—one of the important topics merely touched upon in the previous volume by Geoffrey Stern who quotes—and questions—Mazzini's well-known remark that nationalism buttresses rather than subverts the international order. Hinsley, however, prefers the more precise but also less comprehensive concept of 'peace' to 'order'. He starts with an authoritative survey of the historical origins of modern nationalism. The main elements of his analysis are found in the close connection between nationalism and the growth in the powers of the modern territorial state, the shift of emphasis from cultural to political nationalism, the clash between the two concepts, and the dichotomy between nationalism and, first, liberalism, then socialism, culminating in the harnessing of nationalism to race by the Nazis and to a state pursuing an ideology by the Bolsheviks. The author proceeds with an analysis of the modern international system based upon his important earlier volume *Power and*

[1] New York: Wiley; London: George Bell. 1962. Reviewed in *International Affairs,* July 1962, p. 374.

the Pursuit of Peace.[2] The conclusion, consisting of one long chapter, brings the two themes together. Hinsley realistically rejects the likelihood of the unification of states, whether on some old or on any new patterns; he expects the balance of power to become disturbed through technological innovation, but does not despair of states reforming their behaviour and avoiding resort to war. The re-establishment of the 19th-century concert in the much more complex contemporary environment, though possible, would nevertheless be much more difficult since it must extend to all the issues of the turbulent Third World. The balance of power, however, is much less unstable in the nuclear age.

J. FRANKEL

International Disputes: Case Histories 1945–1970. By M. D. Donelan and M. J. Grieve assisted by P. C. Fielder and H. R. Warning. *London: Europa Publications for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. 1973. 286 pp. Index. £3·75.*

THIS book, sponsored by the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, is the third of a series sponsored by that Institute. The other two were *International Disputes: The Legal Aspects*, the report of a study group under the chairmanship of Sir Humphrey Waldock, published first in 1966 and enlarged and republished in 1972 [1], and *International Disputes: The Political Aspects*, by Professor F. S. Northedge and Mr. M. D. Donelan (1971).[2] The previous volumes did not concentrate on individual disputes, save by way of example, but rather on the characteristics of international disputes and the different methods of solving them. In the case of the Northedge-Donelan study, however, the facts concerning fifty disputes since the end of the Second World War were assembled, and it is these disputes which have now been subjected to a more detailed analysis by Mr. Donelan and Miss Grieve. The disputes concerned range from major international crises like Suez (1956) and Cuban missiles (1962) through continuing conflicts extending beyond the notion of 'dispute' in the ordinary sense, such as Vietnam (1954–69) and South Africa (1960–70), to conflicts of relatively low intensity such as the first 'cod war' (1958–62) and even to the disturbances in Hong Kong in 1967.

In the Preface the authors are engagingly humble about the limitations of a work of this kind—that it is superficial and not particularly readable. At the end of the account of each dispute, however, the reader is provided with references to fuller works, but even these have been kept within very modest limits. The accounts of the disputes are strictly factual and as far as possible impartial.

The most interesting part of the work consists of the Introduction where the authors attempt to formulate some more or less general conclusions. They say, for instance, that 'the study of the state and the world of states belong together' (p. 2), with the consequence that 'a book such as the present one on international disputes necessarily contains some whose focus was within states as much as some whose focus lay between them' (p. 3). This may be so, but this reviewer was left in some doubt as to what exactly

[2] London: Cambridge University Press. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1964, p. 82.

[1] Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1973, p. 99.

[2] Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1972, p. 77.

an ' international dispute ' is. To be fair to the authors, however, this work should be read alongside the other two volumes referred to above.

D. H. N. JOHNSON

The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization. By Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson et al. *New Haven, Conn., London: Yale University Press. 1973. 497 pp. Index. £6·50.*

MOST of this book consists of substantial case studies of the decision-making process in eight economic and social agencies which have a world-wide scope: Harold K. Jacobson on the International Telecommunications Union, which deals with such a sensitive area that now, as in the mid-19th century, states are reluctant to give it strong independent powers; Robert W. Cox on the International Labour Organisation, which is termed a ' limited monarchy ' (p. 102) after the leading but restricted role played by its executive head; James P. Sewell on the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, in which reference is made to an observation of Lord Balfour that during the days of the League Britain and the Dominions ' *never voted together . . . except when opposing intellectual co-operation* ' (p. 142); Jacobson again on the World Health Organisation, the low political key of which is attributed to the fact that governmental representatives are predominantly professionals in the health field; Lawrence Scheinman on the International Atomic Energy Authority, which is thought to be in a transitional condition on account of apprehension that it might become the instrument of an East-West atomic condominium; Susan Strange on the International Monetary Fund, ' the only really rich international organization ' (p. 266); Gerard and Victoria Curzon on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which seems to have insulated itself from the non-economic conflicts that divide its members; and Joseph S. Nye on the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the acronym for which is sometimes expanded to ' Under No Condition Take Any Decisions ', underlining the point that it ' was designed primarily for the exercise of influence by some members against others ' (p. 334) rather than for the execution of specific tasks.

Each of these studies is a valuable piece of work in its own right. However, they are also meant to provide a collective contribution to knowledge, as the main object of the book is to develop general propositions about the sources and means of influence in international institutions. Towards this end Professors Cox and Jacobson established (and here reproduce) a suggestive framework for the whole inquiry, met their collaborators on a number of occasions, to a very large (and remarkable) extent persuaded all of them to make their analyses along the same lines, and have drawn the various findings together in a lengthy conclusion. Thus this book is that fairly rare phenomenon, an allegedly comparative work that really tries to make meaningful comparisons. But while the chosen institutions have enough in common to encourage their comparison, they also differ significantly in both their internal arrangements and the external influences to which they are subject. In consequence any general observations about them tend either to require qualification or subdivision to an extent which robs them of their generality, or to be the sort of statement which is indistinguishable from that which could well be produced by intuitive thinking. We are told, for example, that the representatives of key

states (which usually turn out to be the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France) are always influential; that, except for such representatives, long association with the institution is the attribute most widely shared by influential individuals; that the extent to which representatives (and an institution's bureaucracy) can exercise a relatively independent influence varies disproportionately with the importance for the member states of the issue with which the institution deals; and that individual actors are motivated by a mixture of personal and public considerations. Of course it is entirely right that inquiries should be made regarding the justification for views of this kind and admirable that they should be undertaken with the rigour which marks this book. But some will feel that, at this level, they have not learnt a great deal from the book, and will see it as not much more than the sum of its very worthwhile parts.

ALAN JAMES

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Crises and Sequences in Political Development. By Leonard Binder et al. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1971. 326 pp. Index. (Studies in Political Development 7.) £3·75.*

WHAT the authors of this collection of essays seem to have in mind is nothing less than to expound a philosophy of history adequate enough to explain and predict the processes of politics on a world scale, particularly those promoting the assimilation of underdeveloped regions of the world to the developed ones. They implicitly reject traditional methods of inquiry which have rested content with the mere extraction of historical patterns and trends, and concentrate instead on the refinement of existing concepts and the elaboration of novel ones which they consider more helpful in achieving their goals.

Though one must admire the authors for their courage in these endeavours and sympathise with their general objectives, far-flung aspirations of this sort—especially where they have the stamp of approval of the community of political scientists in the United States—when pushed too hard and too far are apt to turn sour, leaving behind them monuments of pretence. The present work has not altogether avoided these pitfalls. This is implicitly admitted by one of the contributors, Sidney Verba, who, in summing up (p. 295 *et seq.*), is left in some doubt as to the basic purpose of the exercise and certainly not much wiser at the end of it.

What one misses most in this collection of essays is the discipline of structured debate which, through the tensions it engenders, should have released some useful lessons and provided fresh insights. These might then have constituted the guidelines along which to organise the material available here. Instead, the procedure chosen was that of a freewheeling discussion, with its inevitable overlaps and parallels, without any firm conclusions emerging at any point. No doubt the editors intended the present volume as no more than a discussion of problems forming part of a wider, continuous discussion, but the present reviewer is bound to question the value of this method.

As regards language and presentation, the spluttering jargon and the veritable passion for neologisms which add nothing to intellectual compre-

hension (*i.e.*, 'eufunctional' in place of positive) have tended to push out powers of spontaneous expression in the name of scientific method. The preference for noun-adjectives produces stylistic gaffes, such as 'commitment evocation' and 'achievement performance', which are difficult to condone. Longwindedness, revealed in the persistently felt need for circuitous explanatory clauses, abounds. The overall effect of these malpractices is to produce a language so obscure that it can only be compared with what in communist Eastern Europe is called *Parteichinesisch.*

As to substance, many of the concepts treated here at considerable length are not new. 'Differentiation' and 'legitimacy', for instance, of which so much is being made in the present volume, were employed at least as far back as Herbert Spencer and Max Weber respectively towards the turn of the century and in the 1920s. This does not preclude a renewed concern with them, but it would have contributed to the better understanding of them in the sense in which the contributors use them if some historical perspective had been provided. The most disappointing aspect of this collection is that the authors are at their best where they are prepared to reap the benefit of conventional wisdom, rather than to strain towards achieving some breakthrough. Thus, Myron Weiner, in a paper on 'Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process', makes some excellent points in examining the phenomenon of large-scale participation in the political processes of the peasantry, but fails absolutely in making any headway in the field of theory. Joseph Lapalombra's two wordy contributions on 'Penetration: A Crisis of Governmental Capacity' and 'Distribution: A Crisis of Resource Management' contain some odd terminology but manage to raise a few interesting points whenever he treads on well-explored empirical territory, witness, for instance on page 242, the delightful phenomenon of 'amoral familism'. Many of Leonard Binder's conventional observations in his opening essay on 'Crisis of Political Development' are shrewd, but rather too many are of the trivial sort. Hard as he may try, he nowhere succeeds in separating political process from political institution. Lucian Pye's contributions on 'Identity and the Political Culture' and 'The Legitimacy Crisis' contain some embarrassing tautologies and circular arguments (see, for instance, p. 106), but he ought to be given credit for admitting—somewhat resignedly, but very much to the point—that 'there is probably no substitute for deep familiarity with existing conditions' (p. 102). He must know, since—like all the other contributors to this volume—he first gained deserved academic fame in the field of empirical inquiry.

Where do we go from here? Taking up Lucian Pye's point, one would suggest that long before anything quite as ambitious as the present task can be undertaken with any fair chance of success, theoretical and empirical research must be brought back into equilibrium, and the present academic vogue in the field of political science in the United States, which enshrines the former and deprecates the latter, must be halted before further, and possibly irreparable, damage is done.

F. PARKINSON

Modern Revolutions: an introduction to the analysis of a political phenomenon. By John Dunn. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1972. 346 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £1·40. $4.95.*

New Theories of Revolution: A commentary on the views of Frantz Fanon, Régis Debray and Herbert Marcuse. By Jack Woddis. *London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1972. 415 pp. Index. £4·50.*

THE first book is an historical analysis of revolutions in the 20th century; the second is an ideological assessment of contemporary revolutionary theories. Mr. Dunn's approach is academic in the proper sense, critical and objective. After discussing in the introduction the difficulties of analysing modern revolutions, he chooses eight revolutionary case studies and tries to demonstrate his points. Though he modestly calls his book an introduction to the analysis of revolutions, it is pretty sophisticated. His treatment of revolutions in Mexico, Turkey, Algeria and Vietnam is most pertinent, that of China and Cuba most stimulating, while that of Russia and Yugoslavia perhaps the most thought-provoking. After a meticulous analysis Mr. Dunn's conclusion is that:

> Lenin made the Russian Revolution. No one else would have quite had the nerve. But, as might be expected from a revolution dependent on the daring of one man, it was not a very Marxist revolution which he made. The dictatorship of a party over a backward country had provided a political elite like many other political elites, autocratic, ruthless, supremely dishonest. It has certainly had great achievements to its credit, but it still displays in the light of the Marxian heritage what Lenin himself identified in 1922 as our main deficiencies: lack of culture and that we really do not know how to rule.

The striking paradox of the revolution in Yugoslavia is that only its exclusion from the international, revolutionary fold made the Yugoslav communists revolutionary innovators; and the corporate economic control of units of production by their workers may become a *point de départ* for other communist revolutions or established regimes.

Mr. Woddis evaluates three contemporary theorists, Fanon, Debray and Marcuse, within the continental settings on which they base their theories and to which they propose to apply them. He finds Fanon and his anti-colonial struggle in Africa noble, but his theories confused and politically inadequate. Similarly, Debray and his ideas on revolution in Latin America are dogmatic, arrogant, hostile to the communist parties, and Debray himself is considered an 'intellectual outsider' with a lack of understanding of the working-class movement. However, an unequivocal condemnation is reserved only for Marcuse, possibly because his revolutionary ideas have found such a strong echo in Western Europe. Marcuse 'who by his theories concerning the working class . . . undermines the trust and confidence of non-working-class strata in the revolutionary role of the workers and weakens, too, the confidence of the working class itself. Objectively, therefore, whatever may be his motives, Marcuse does a disservice to the anti-capitalist cause for which he claims to be a spokesman'.

J. F. N. BRADLEY

Departmental Decision Making. By Nils Ørvik et al. *Oslo, Bergen, Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget. 1972. 162 pp. Bibliog. Index. $8.00.*

The Management of Government. By John Garrett. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1972. 303 pp. Index. £0·60.*

THESE two books represent different approaches to the study of decision-making in modern government, one concerned with testing the adequacy

of existing descriptive theories in this field and the other concerned with the problems of applying modern techniques to improve governmental decision-making. Ørvik's book represents a small step forward in our understanding of decision processes, Garrett's book is a good survey of management techniques.

The framework for Ørvik's analysis of foreign policy-making in Norway is clearly influenced by Snyder's writings, by Frankel and more generally by organisation theory. In particular, an attempt is made to explain how an actor's definition of the situation is shaped by the characteristics of the organisation structure, of its members and of its communication/information system. Studies were made by a team of researchers in other ministries involved in the foreign policy-making process as well as in the Foreign Ministry. The results are tentative, a report on work in progress. They do, however, support other research findings about the importance of the middle level as strategically located for exerting influence within the organisation and about the effects on an organisation's structure and processes of its environment. Thus, the Foreign Ministry was characterised by high flexibility and informality in its internal processes (compare Defence) and by the relative independence of decision-makers at division level.

Garrett's book is a survey of the reforms under way in British government departments after the Plowden report (1961) and the Fulton report (1968). The discussions on structure, accountability, efficiency audit and personnel management are competent and informed, and are tied together by the author's major theme that planning becomes all too easily superimposed upon existing decision processes unless it is allied to basic managerial reforms to secure attention to results and to programme areas. There is a particularly good discussion of PESC (Planning Expenditure Survey) and of some of the political and organisational problems posed by PPBS (Planning Programme Budgeting System). The lesson is that formal and abstract planning models offer too little guidance in the face of the problems of organisational change and development.

The reviewer's studies of planning in Western Germany incline him towards, first, a political view of planning, which sees its major problems as those of conflict resolution and consensus-building both within and outside the government machine. Criteria of selectivity are essential if problems of information overload and consensus-building are not to drown the effort. Secondly, a broader view of planning is required which asks the big question —just what is the steering capacity of the political system over its social and economic environment?

K. H. F. Dyson

Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics: A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups. By Werner J. Feld. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1972. 284 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs.) £7·00.*

The last few years have seen a sharp growth of academic and governmental interest in the political implications of the activities of non-governmental organisations across state boundaries. International companies, 'the multinational enterprise', have been the subject of successive symposia and studies. The range of other potentially or actually influential non-governmental organisations, churches, trade unions, international pressure

groups, party internationals, and so on have only recently begun to attract detailed study.

In his preface Professor Feld promises the reader 'to examine all major categories of non-governmental forces in a systematic manner' (p. v.), although in view of 'the varying availability of materials and space considerations' he adopts 'an eclectic approach' to the field. There follow a brief introductory chapter, surveying some of the conceptual questions raised, six descriptive chapters and a 'Summary and Tentative Conclusions'. The balance of the work reflects the imbalance of available material and the extent of Professor Feld's dependence on secondary sources. Half of the book is devoted to the activities of multinational companies and their implications for governments, closely following well-known studies by Perlmutter, Dunning, Behrmann and others, as well as the author's own *Transnational Business Collaboration among Common Market Countries.*[1] A fourth chapter discusses the activities of trade unions, a fifth the 'traditional' non-governmental organisations, and a sixth, the least satisfactory, groups, parties, churches, radical student movements, foundations, and national liberation movements under the heading 'miscellaneous transnational political groups'.

The outcome is a disappointing book, which shows more signs of eclecticism than of system. It does not provide a significant contribution to the field, either in terms of theory or conceptualisation or in terms of presenting new evidence. As an introduction to the field for the interested reader, it suffers from a certain looseness of definition and analysis. It has, however, a useful bibliography, a number of valuable tables, and a considerable amount of information drawn together from various sources. The reader looking for a work of reference would therefore find this useful; if he is looking for intellectual stimulation, however, he would be better advised to turn to *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,[2] on which, among other sources, Professor Feld relies.

WILLIAM J. L. WALLACE

Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich. By Paul Alpert. *New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1973. 269 pp. Map endpapers. Index. £4·95.*

Not much Time for the Third World. By Erhard Eppler. Trans. by Gerard Finan. *London: Oswald Wolff. 1972. 143 pp. Bibliog. Paperback: £1·00.*

THESE books both attempt wide-ranging surveys of the development situation. Paul Alpert, the more optimistic of the two, sets out to trace the background of the problems facing developing countries, examine possible contributions to their solution and draw some conclusions from specific examples of development in different countries. Erhard Eppler, who was the Federal German minister responsible for economic co-operation, has written a brief survey intended to arouse public interest in development policy.

The basis of the problem of the developing countries is that while the particular form that development takes is a domestic problem, the means

1 New York: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1970.
2 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972. Reviewed on p. 626.

of achieving it must come from international sources. Alpert believes that 'only if development is basically a national undertaking can it enjoy the active support of the people' (p. 23). Without this support it is not likely to succeed. Development policies must be pursued within the framework of the world economy, involving relations with other countries and with international bodies. Even though considerable external contributions are forthcoming, domestic factors will determine how far these can be successfully utilised. Alpert illustrates this phenomenon with contrasting examples. He chooses Algeria, Ivory Coast and Tanzania from Africa; Cuba and Mexico from Latin America; and China, Iran and South Korea from Asia. From the broad spectrum of objectives and methods which these concrete examples provide he concludes that 'it would be impossible to devise a single policy or method which could take into account such divergent conditions' (p. 240). The lesson of experience is that development is feasible under capitalism, national socialism and revolutionary socialism or in a host of mutations and deviants of all three. The common requirements are the mobilisation of sufficient resources for development in terms of human, material and land resources, and their effective utilisation in productive investments. It comes to the same thing, argues Alpert, whether the criteria for these investments 'could be determined either by the prospects for future profit, or by the directives of a national plan' (p. 241). A world strategy for economic development depending on 'close co-operation and co-ordination of efforts from developed and developing countries, rich and poor, Socialist and Capitalist' (p. 243) is necessary and possible provided that 'mankind pursues a reasonable course and avoids suicide by nuclear war' (p. 243). In Paul Alpert's view, the most widely accepted 'reasonable course' is through the targets set for the First and Second Development Decades.

RICHARD BAILEY

Towards a New World Economy. Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth European Conference of the Society for International Development, The Hague, October 1971. By Louis Baeck et al. Introduced by Jan Tinbergen. *Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press. 1972. 442 pp.*

International Trade Policy. By David Robertson. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 79 pp. Bibliog. (Macmillan Studies in Economics.) £0·60.*

THE SID volume summarises some of the best recent thinking on the international division of labour. It presents, moreover, a stimulating confrontation between rigorous economists of the stature of Jan Tinbergen and Hollis Chenery and informed critics intent on bringing out the political implications of this phenomenon.

Tinbergen succinctly introduces the issues and summarises recent work carried out at the Netherlands Economic Institute. He has been constructing a model of what would be the best world-wide division of labour among industries, throwing up interesting counter-intuitive proposals for industries like computers. He finishes by considering some of the wider social and political issues which are raised by such a strictly rational approach—such as aid, regional, environmental and retraining.

Chenery and M. Hughes look in greater detail at the extent to which a division of labour already exists in the world economy. They examine the traditional pattern of industrial exports at various stages of development,

and the characteristics of the principal industrial exporters like Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel and Portugal. Their conclusions are not comforting for complacent rich importers, since the semi-industrialised economies now have significant comparative advantages in a wide range of products. They are developing a wave of new industries which will be uncontainable by existing tariff levels.

Two further authors (J. De Bandt and Mrs. 't Hooft) consider what international specialisation would mean to two specific sectors, textiles and agriculture. In textiles, for instance, this could lead to two-thirds of the markets in developed countries being taken over by less developed countries' production, and the impact of this on employment, wage reductions, etc., are assessed.

The second half of the book is dominated by two powerful pieces by Robin Murray and Sandro Sideri which stress the hierarchical structure behind the international division of labour and consider the dependency relationships which this entails. Both try to analyse the impact that multinational companies are having on all this, arguing that their centralised decision-making will only serve to strengthen these tendencies. Murray's piece is particularly densely argued and massively documented, and is not only a key contribution to the study of multinationals but serves as a fascinating counterpoint to the high quality proceedings which have gone before. All in all, this is a valuable volume.

Robertson's book is a brief introduction to the economics of international trade policy. It is designed as a textbook aimed at second and third year undergraduates. It deals with the theory of tariffs, non-tariff distortions of trade, regional trade groupings, trade and the Third World. It is written clearly and contains an adequately selected bibliography.

LOUIS TURNER

Revue Française de Science Politique. Vol. XXII, Numéro 6, Decembre 1972. Les Conflits Petroliers 1970–1971. *Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1972. 139 pp.*

Oil and World Power: A Geographical Interpretation. 2nd ed. By Peter R. Odell. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972. 178 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Pelican Geography and Environmental Studies. Editor: Peter Hall.) £0·50.*

THE year 1970 saw the start of OPEC's ' decade of attack '—and no one can deny the success of the initial onslaught. This issue of *Revue Française de Science Politique* sets out to describe the events of 1970–71 in their full historical and global context—from a basically French (and anti-imperialist) stance. This is useful, since it means that relationships like the Franco-Algerian one get the full treatment which Anglo-Saxon authors tend to deny them.

The Algerian case (ably summarised by Nicole Grimaud) is particularly important since Libya's drive for higher prices in this period may well have been impossible without Algeria's simultaneous confrontation with the French. The Algerians have, in fact, been among the most militant of all OPEC countries on the issues of prices, taxation and ownership, despite the formally close relationship on energy matters established with France in 1962. The story of the disruption of this special arrangement between

producer and consumer governments should serve as a warning to all those advocating such bilateral deals as a way of ensuring continuity of oil and gas supplies.

Other articles see the crisis through the eyes of Iran (Louis-Jean Duclos), Libya (Hubert Breton) and Latin America (Pierre Gilhodes). These are useful, if not outstanding, summaries, but they are preceded by two papers which put these two years in a full historical context. Jean-Jacques Berreby traces the earlier days of producer government militancy, while Taki Rifaï gives an excellent analysis of the industry's structure. Above all, he explains the way oil prices have been artificially fixed and he makes the very real point that attacks on ' American imperialism ' are attacks on the monopolistic power of the companies which, he argues, has been the key factor in keeping prices stable over the years. Destroy the companies and there is no guarantee that an OPEC cartel will be able to maintain them so well.

Peter Odell's book is the second edition[1] of an extremely useful and cheap introduction to the industry. He is primarily dealing with its geography, though that does not mean he ignores the company structures. He gives the usual look at European and North American policies and patterns of supply, but also gives close attention to areas which often get neglected—the Japanese, Russian and Third World markets. He includes a number of maps and charts showing global flows of oil and gas, the routes of pipelines, the production areas in the Middle East and North Africa, etc. He includes a good selected bibliography for students wanting to go deeper into the field.

LOUIS TURNER

The World in Depression 1929–1939. By Charles P. Kindleberger. *London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 1973. 336 pp. Bibliog. Index. (History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century, vol. 4). £4·00.*

THERE are few good general books on the world depression of the 1930s and virtually none of them has been written since 1945. A reflective economic history of the period is a considerable undertaking. The author must show the unique experience of all countries but reduce them to manageable categories (food producers, raw material producers, capital exporters, capital importers, self-sufficient food importers, ' liberal ' societies, illiberal societies, etc). He must chart the changing structure of the world economy but forget neither the importance of individuals (like Strong, Norman, Moreau, Roosevelt and Hitler) nor the chronology of events (' Black Tuesday ', the Harley-Smoot tariff, the Kredit Anstaldt, the Hoover Moratorium, the Macmillan Reports, the London Conference, etc). Professor Kindleberger has done all this in a book of some 300 pages and done it very well.

He has two central positions. First, the real world is not symmetrical and often behaves unlike international trade theory would lead us to expect. And it particularly did so in the 1920s and 1930s when few of the expected trade-offs and benefits occurred. For example, a combination of government policies, unfortunate timing and consumer illusions substantially reduced the expansionary effects of falling primary product prices on industrial countries. The cessation of overseas lending was not inflationary for erstwhile capital exporters. Nor were tariffs for importers. Hence

[1] 1st ed. 1970.

retaliation, like competitive currency depreciation, reduced total income. Secondly, Professor Kindleberger does not believe the depression was caused by a series of historical accidents. But his claim of causation is too complex to admit any single cause explanation. As we would expect, he criticises Friedman and Schwartz heavily for finding the sole root of the collapse somewhere in the American money supply. His extended time series analysis suggests that the Wall Street crash was important, that real rather than monetary factors determined the decline of lending and that the American economy was deflated by the British cessation of gold payments.

This is a difficult book. The publisher's name suggests a wide sale, but it is a book for the undergraduate to read nearer the end than the beginning of his studies. Its style is very compressed and it assumes not only a grasp of economic theory (which is reasonable) but a great deal of factual information about the period. Its thumbnail sketches of particular economies for example are dangerously terse for the uninitiated. Part of this criticism will be met when its companion volumes are published, but if it is really the fourth chronological volume on the 20th century, then Professor Kindleberger has been forced to assume much and compress more about great events for the sake of lesser happenings. It is well documented and contains an excellent bibliography in several languages.

DUDLEY BAINES

LAW

Studies in International Law. By F. A. Mann. *Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press. 1973. 717 pp. Index £7·00.*

LAWYERS familiar with Dr. Mann's writings will welcome the publication of *Studies in International Law*, the central theme of which is the interrelationship and interdependence of international and municipal law. The dimensions of Dr. Mann's total contribution to international and conflicts legal studies over the years have been extraordinary. Although the author is primarily a busy practising solicitor, this volume, consisting of twenty-one articles previously published in a variety of English and American legal journals since 1942, encompasses less than half of his total output. Nor does this take account of *The Legal Aspect of Money*, now in its third edition.[1]

The present work is no mere collection of essays, albeit that each of these is readily obtainable elsewhere. Convenience apart, the work deserves to stand in its own right. International and municipal law are represented as 'branches of the same tree' (p. 239), each branch contributing to the solution of the other's problems. Emphasis is placed upon a wide variety of municipal law subjects—jurisdiction, international delinquencies before municipal courts, the foreign act of state doctrine and prerogative rights, the role of judiciary and executive in foreign affairs, the enforcement of treaties before English courts, state contracts and their proper law, etc. There are two articles on the legal status of Germany, though surely these could have been rewritten as one?

One-fifth of the book is devoted to a single monograph on jurisdiction, previously delivered as a series of lectures at the Hague. This is something

[1] Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971.

of a contemporary classic and is the only recent study of its kind in English. Thoughtful, scholarly and provocative, the essay must have proved of inestimable value to students of international law and the conflict of laws over the years. Typically, Dr. Mann rigorously analyses private and public law analogies and all the key questions. Consideration is also given to the practical aspects, in particular American anti-trust legislation and monetary and fiscal jurisdiction. The author's interest in the conflict of laws and comparative law is reflected in three articles on the proper law of contracts concluded by and with states and other international persons, one of which is new, and in the pioneering article ' Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations '. His main thesis is that the rapid growth of state commercial and industrial activities in both international and domestic fields necessitates a revision of traditional legal thought, which has conceived of a rigid dichotomy between international and private law. Dr. Mann favours the view, somewhat academically unfashionable in the conflict of laws sphere, that the parties to a contract, whether international or private persons or both, should be free on the whole to choose the system of law to govern it. Treaties may thus be subject to commercialisation and contracts to internationalisation. Mention should also be made of the articles on the foreign act of state doctrine. These stress the immediate control of the relevant conflicts rules, rather than the sacrosanctity of act of state conceptions, subject to the ultimate primacy of international law (rather than public policy) as a vitiating feature. More recent articles on recognition by other writers, making substantially the same points, must have benefited greatly from these essays.

In reproducing articles written as long as thirty years ago, Dr. Mann has clearly been faced with an editing problem. The law, contributions generally and his own views have not stood still. In the event he has decided to leave well alone, relying on Einstein's maxim ' death alone can save one '. Probably this was right, though one cannot help feeling that some updating would not have been the intractable problem the author supposes. But for the most part the *Studies* still stand as authoritative, persuasive and forward-looking contributions which are a delight to read and reread. To make a special plea: this reviewer would relish Mann on the logical and legal bases of the conflict of laws.

CLIFFORD HALL

Asian States and the Development of Universal International Law. Ed. by R. P. **Anand.** *Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas. 1972. 245 pp. Index.*

New States and International Law. By R. P. Anand. *Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas. 1972. 119 pp. Index. Rs. 22.*

THE first book contains papers presented at a seminar held at the Indian School of International Studies in November 1967; the second consists of lectures delivered by Dr. Anand at five Indian universities in 1970. As their titles show, the books are complementary. The fifteen seminar papers are grouped under four headings of which only two bear directly on Asian states. Under the heading of the Asian contribution to the development of international law, four of the five papers concentrate on India, with a brief historical survey of Indian concepts and reception of international law (Nagendra Singh) and a summary of Indian court decisions since 1947 (S. K.

Agarwala). There is sharp criticism of the Indian attitude to the Gulf of Aqaba and Tiran dispute, in which India declared the Gulf to be an 'inland sea', so espousing the Arab cause (K. P. Misra). Under the heading of regional international law of the Asian states, there are but the briefest references to Asian institutions, and China and Japan escape with only passing mention. Many of the papers are too short to contribute more than material for discussion, which was their purpose, rather than to sustain a book.

The second book is a passionate political pamphlet. Making effective use of the historical work of Professor C. H. Alexandrowicz, the author demolishes the picture of Europe as the home and creator of international law. He goes on to demonstrate that some of the traditional rules of international law—on diplomatic protection or the expropriation of alien property—were instruments of imperialist expansion and to show the demands for change and the needs of economic development. His general argument is convincing but he does not tell us even on what lines or how international law should be changed; he insists that the new states do not wholly reject contemporary international law, but we are not told what they are ready to retain. Further, there are too many quotations from other writers—at points the text becomes nearly an anthology—and the reader would like to hear more of the constructive thought of Dr. Anand.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

Community Law through the Cases. By Neil Elles assisted by J. H. Vallatt. Foreword by Lord Wilberforce. *London: Stevens; New York: Matthew Bender. 1973. 411 pp. Index. £7·50.*

Supplement to Judicial Remedies in the European Communities. A Case Book. By L. J. Brinkhorst and H. G. Schermers. *Deventer: Kluwer; London: Stevens. 1972. 183 pp. Index. Fl. 24.50.*

THE object of the first work is 'to provide a guide to the case law of the European Economic Communities for the busy practitioner, the eager student and the general reader'. While none but a really omnivorous general reader is likely to tackle it, there can be no doubt of its value to the other two. It sets out the texts of the EEC and ECSC Treaties article by article, and at appropriate points provides summaries of court decisions relating to them. The decisions are those of the Communities Court and of the national courts of the EEC countries, and *Blackburn* v. *Attorney General* is included, in which the Court of Appeal in London held in 1971 that the signing of the EEC Treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom did not impair the sovereignty of Parliament. Each case is set out with the point decided, the factual background, the *ratio decidendi*, and cross-references to other treaty provisions and EEC regulations. The book is well indexed. It will be a most useful work of reference, handy and clearly presented.

The second volume is a supplement to the work already well known, which is also a case book on the EEC and was published in 1969. Differently organised from *Community Law through the Cases*, decisions being set out under various rubrics of substantive law and procedure rather than particular treaty articles, the supplement brings the work up to July 1972.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

New Directions in the Law of the Sea. Documents. Ed. by S. Houston Lay, Robin Churchill and Myron Nordquist. *Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana; London: The British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 1973. Volume I. 504 pp. Volume II. 911 pp. Bibliog. Vols. I and II: £15·00.*

Of this collection of documents, the editors say that 'it is hoped that they will form a convenient and useful handbook as they contain all of the basic documents relating to the Law of the Sea. Secondly, they are intended to provide documentary information relevant to the present debate on the Law of the Sea and its future development'. There is little doubt that these purposes are amply fulfilled. Comparison with another volume of documents, *The International Law of the Ocean Development*,[1] shows that the present work, though admittedly in two volumes, has the advantage both in amplitude of coverage and likely durability of documents selected.

There are no substantial uses of the sea and sea-bed which are not covered, and straits, fisheries, pirate broadcasting, high seas navigation, and military uses, are all more fully treated than in the earlier volume. Further, the documents selected are not ephemeral, such as proposals for conferences, but are basic in that they comprise texts of all the major intergovernmental agreements, and of characteristic and contemporary national legislation on the sea and sea-bed. Ten appendices, totalling 138 pages, contain valuable reference materials on the law of the sea, including lists of maritime widths and limits claimed, world petroleum statistics, and a list of intergovernmental organisations concerned with the law of the sea.

J. E. S. Fawcett

WESTERN EUROPE

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. Series IA, Vol. V. European and Security Questions 1928. Ed. by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert. *London: H.M.S.O. 1973. 928 pp. £10·75.*

The present volume of the series *Documents on British Foreign Policy* contains four chapters dealing mainly with the triangular relations of Britain, France and Germany on security and reparations questions from April to December 1928, the negotiations leading up to the signature of the Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war in Paris on August 27, 1928, and the attempts to resolve the deadlock over disarmament in the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations which culminated in the unsuccessful Anglo-French naval compromise of June–July 1928 and opened the way to the naval agreement reached by Ramsay MacDonald when he visited Washington in the following year. The arrangement of the documents themselves follows the now well-established form of printing dispatches from British diplomatic representatives abroad together with instructions to missions abroad from the Foreign Office in London and correspondence between them.

In Chapter I we are plunged into the details of the talks, mainly at the

[1] Shigeru Oda, *The International Law of the Ocean Development*: Basic Documents. (Leyden: Sijthoff. 1972.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 266.

League's headquarters in Geneva, between Britain, France and Germany for the evacuation of Allied forces from the second stage of the occupation of the Rhineland. The British, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, wrote in June 1928, were 'tired of the occupation and I myself should be glad to see it terminated as early as possible' (No. 73). Can it be wondered at that the Germans inferred that it would only be a matter of time before the fetters of Versailles fell? They hardly needed to be struck off. In Chapter II warnings of Germany's resurgence begin to appear in the dispatches: Selby minuted in August (No. 135) that 'whatever was done the purpose of placing our relations with Germany on a footing of real friendship and confidence never seemed to be achieved'. It hardly needed the frictions and irritations between the victors of Versailles, recorded here in Chapters III and IV, to convince Germany, years before the Nazi accession to power in 1933, that it was pushing against an open door.

F. S. NORTHEDGE

The Management of Britain's External Relations. Ed. by Robert Boardman and A. J. R. Groom. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 362 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

THIS book consists of an introduction and postscript by the editors on the study of Britain's external relations and comparative perspectives in the management of them, together with three main sections (each containing four or five essays) on FCO management and personnel, the 'central machinery' of external relations (political, economic and defence), and the 'social and political environment'. This last section contains essays on Parliament and the parties, the role of interest groups, state management of 'private' foreign policy (especially missionary societies and trade unions), and the news media. Each chapter throughout the book has its own list of sources and there is a general bibliography at the end.

The book was no doubt carefully planned, but remains an agglomeration of essays, disparate in value, disproportionate one with another, and put together in a curious order. The reader's task would have been easier had there been a progression from the general (Part C) to the particular (Part A) rather than vice versa, and the essays about the FCO would have meant more to the non-specialist reader (for whom the book is intended) and have been more closely geared to the rest had they followed the chapters on the general setting and governmental machinery within which the FCO has to operate.

In particular there could have been more systematic discussion on some important points. Is the FCO outdated as a separate government organisation when so much of our external relations is economic or technical in character? (This question is raised incidentally at the end of Peter Byrd's essay on trade and commerce—it should surely be answered in the negative but deserves further discussion.) Do not the functional departments of the FCO involve too much duplication with other government departments? And what is the function of a planning department in the formation and execution of foreign policy? (This question is treated better in incidental paragraphs of Dr. Larner's and Professor Nailor's essays than in Professor O'Leary's heavy chapter on 'Policy formulation and planning'.)

Of the various contributions, those by Peter Byrd (trade) and Andrzej Krassowski (aid) provide much useful historical information and state well

various interdepartmental problems. That on news media by Philip Elliott and Peter Golding is the least well focused and the most remarkable for density of jargon. The chapter on the British diplomat by A. N. Oppenheim and Ian Smart is the subtlest piece of analysis in the book, and Dr. Larner provides much information on the organisation of the FCO in a necessarily impersonal manner. Probably the non-specialist would learn more about its working methods from a good novel, if such existed (Harold Nicolson's *Public Faces* is still a good source).

The book is already out of date in two respects: it was printed before Britain's final accession to the EEC, and there is virtually no mention of environmental problems on an international scale and what governmental machinery exists to deal with them.

DUNCAN WILSON

Decision by default: Peacetime conscription and British defence 1919–39. By Peter Dennis. *London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972. 243 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

THERE may be a grain of truth in the jibe that British generals have tended to wish to fight the next war with the methods of the last. But it is certainly incorrect to suppose that their political masters have generally had such an inclination. On the contrary, they have on occasion been rather too determined that military history should not be allowed to repeat itself.

The present book is a survey of the hostile attitudes of the majority of British politicians towards conscription in peacetime and all that that was assumed to imply in terms of being prepared to send an expeditionary force to serve as cannon fodder on the Western front. Mr. Dennis of the Royal Military College of Canada shows that until the spring of 1939 all three political parties, supported by the bulk of the press, refused to contemplate even the possibility of a repetition of the horrors of 1916–17; and it is not without significance that the two most doctrinaire opponents of the idea in the National Government of the 1930s were Neville Chamberlain and John Simon, both of whom 'had good cause to avoid further entanglements with conscription, which had brought about their resignation in 1916' (p. 24).

Mr. Dennis wisely concentrates his attention on the period after March 1935, when Hitler announced the re-introduction of German conscription. He shows that by the beginning of 1937 the supporters of a serious continental commitment, led by Duff Cooper, were gaining ground. But Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, fought a skilful rearguard action until he replaced Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister in May 1937. Thereafter Duff Cooper was replaced as Secretary of State for War by Leslie Hore-Belisha, a disciple of the fanatical anti-conscriptionist Basil Liddell Hart, and accordingly the doctrine of limited liability was endorsed.

Not until the spring of 1939, after Prague had fallen and the reckless guarantees of Poland, Romania and Greece had been given, was Chamberlain persuaded to reconsider his position on conscription in peacetime. Even at that stage he was markedly reluctant to do so, using the plausible argument that equipment and training facilities were inadequate to make proper use of large numbers of conscripts and pleading, rather uncharacteristically, that the TUC might not like the idea. But in the end he acknow-

ledged that the French needed some reassurance that Great Britain's 'guarantees' in Eastern Europe meant more than a willingness to fight to the last Frenchman. As Mr. Dennis points out: 'A diplomacy of symbolism now demanded symbolic action' (p. 205).

Mr. Dennis's work is the first connected account of these developments to be made available since the thirty year rule. He has made good use of Cabinet Office and Foreign Office material. He might, on the other hand, have spared a little more time to study the War Office and Treasury documents; and he could certainly have examined a far wider selection of private papers. He ought also to have been able to make the Labour Party's approach seem a little less one-dimensional. This book, then, is by no means definitive but it is likely for some years to be of considerable value to students of Great Britain's external and defence policies in the interwar period.

DAVID CARLTON

Christian Democracy in France. By R. E. M. Irving. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1973. 308 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

REFORMIST-MINDED Christian Democrats have never had much of a chance in France, what with the anti-clericalist heritage of the Revolution and the divisive party systems of the Third and Fourth Republics. After the experiences of the Second World War, the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) emerged with considerable impact, taking nearly a quarter of the vote in the elections of 1945 and becoming a lynch-pin in the coalition building of the next thirteen years. But squeezed between left and right, support diminished as power became more remote. Now even the name is no longer used.

Dr. Irving argues that the party failed to profit from moments which *might* have given it a key position in a new block. He cites 1945, when reconciliation with Blum could have been possible; the middle 1950s, when a Mendésist coalition might have emerged; and a decade later when Deferre sought a federation left-of-centre. But MRP became a victim of its own priorities. Enthusiasm for Europe blinded it in the middle 1950s to the weakness of the parliamentary regime, while the need for an Algerian solution prevented it from realising in the early years of the Fifth Republic how little it had in common with the Gaullist administration in which it was taking part.

The recent French elections—taking place just as the book was published—give further weight to this gloomy thesis. Old Christian Democrats like Schumann and Pleven were unseated, and those who remained outside the coalition did no better, so that the reformers, with six per cent. of the vote on the second ballot, have even less grounds for hoping to hold a balance in the future.

Perhaps the book is mistitled. If the remains of a once-great party now seem to have a future only as a ginger group to the Gaullists (p. 270), are there comparisons to be made with Italy and Germany, and is Christian Democracy in any sense a useful term in understanding the now dominant group in French politics? Within the French context, however, Dr. Irving examines the rise and fall of Christian Democracy in impressive detail, covering the intellectual origins of the movement, the postwar problems of economic and social policy, the contradictory positions on colonial

questions, and the area for which the party is best known, foreign affairs. Minor criticisms could be made of his methods—interview information twenty years after the event may be dubious—and organisation: electoral information, for example, is scattered in footnotes throughout the book. These are slight points against a carefully researched account of a key development in French politics which has received little attention in English.

ROGER SCEATS

Twentieth-Century Germany: From Bismarck to Brandt. By A. J. Ryder. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 656 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £10·00.*

IT is easy to see why the last eighty to a hundred years of German history attract historians; they divide conveniently into four periods, all replete with drama and tragic irony; the elements of continuity and discontinuity tax to the full the historian's powers of narrative and analysis. On the whole, Dr. Ryder has successfully met the test; his judgments are mainly sound and clothed in lucid, readable prose. All the necessary apparatus of scholarship is in these pages, though this reviewer would like to have seen additional maps to enable readers to follow the course of the two world wars in Europe.

Dr. Ryder is at his best in dealing with pre-1918 Germany and Weimar, though many would dispute his verdict that, in forcing German Republicans to accept Versailles, 'the Allies had practically forced them to sign the death-warrant of German democracy' (p. 205). Many will continue to feel that the death-warrant was implicit in the Ebert-Groener telephone call of November 9, 1918, which arrested the Revolution in mid-course some six months before the treaty was imposed. While Dr. Ryder otherwise writes convincingly, as well as sympathetically, about the Republic, his interpretation of Nazism is less impressive. He refers to 'the social equality which the Nazis practised as well as preached' (p. 288) and describes them on page 354 as being 'in their own sense egalitarians'. These are dubious statements and incompatible with the *Fuehrerprinzip*, which extended all down the line from Hitler himself. The whole Nazi concept of race and state was elitist and hierarchical. What they did practise, as well as preach, was *Volksgemeinschaft*, which Dr. Ryder equates with 'the classless society' (p. 308). But such a society would have been much too similar to the Marxist utopia for Nazi stomachs. *Volksgemeinschaft* was the comradely co-operation of all, each in his proper station, for the common good, which is something entirely different, especially as the Nazis decided what was the common good. It proved to be Dr. Goebbels's equality under the bombs.

Chapter 10 on Hitler's war is the least satisfactory part of this book. Although Dr. Ryder seems to have consulted many of the numerous authorities who have drawn attention to the insufficiency of the German economic base and the gross underestimate of Soviet potential, he still concludes: 'Even in retrospect it can hardly be said that Hitler was wrong to attack Russia from a strictly military point of view' (p. 409). This judgment seems to derive from failure to grasp that, once Hitler's initial assault by *Blitzkrieg* methods in the summer and autumn of 1941 had run out, he had from then on a war on his hands that he could not win. That he came as near to success as he did in 1941 was in large measure due to Stalin's obstinate refusal to take even elementary military precautions. Not only

does Dr. Ryder reject this view, but he does not even seem to regard Stalingrad as decisive; instead he gives pride of place to Kursk (July 1943), after which 'the Germans knew, even if Hitler would not admit, that they had lost the war' (p. 412). This is not an interpretation to which any recent historian of the Russian war could subscribe. Similarly, Dr. Ryder seems unaware that recent research has made short work of the alibi that, because of the coup in Yugoslavia, 'the starting date of Barbarossa had to be put back by five weeks' (p. 410). Finally, one can understand Dr. Ryder's disapproval of the bombing of civilian targets in Germany, but what is one to make of his comment that 'it would have been more to the point to bomb the concentration camps' (p. 437)? It is to be hoped that Dr. Ryder will revise Chapter 10 to bring it up to the high standard of the rest of his book.

R. CECIL

Arms, Autarky and Aggression: A Study in German Foreign Policy, 1933–1939. By William Carr. Preface by A. Goodwin. *London: Edward Arnold. 1972. 136 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Foundations of Modern History, Gen. Ed.: A. Goodwin.) Paperback: £0·95.*

WILLIAM CARR'S short book on German foreign policy from 1933 to 1939 is a useful addition to the well-known series, 'Foundations of Modern History', and as such it is interpretative in scope. His central theme is the relationship between Hitler's long-term foreign policy aims, the striving after *Lebensraum* in the East, and the capability of the economy to support the increased levels of rearmament necessary to prepare Germany for the various stages along that path and for the European conflict that was bound to arise at some time or other. Hitler, like so many of his generation, had also learnt the 'lessons of history' taught by the First World War, so that under the Nazis the key word for Germany's economic and rearmament policies was 'autarky'. Designed to avoid dependence upon outside sources for supplies of food and essential raw materials as a means of countering any future blockade of Germany, the policy could never be entirely implemented, while from 1939–40 some of those 'outside' sources of supply became only too available to Germany.

The author concentrates his analysis on the peace-time years of preparation, and draws out the consequent stresses and strains imposed upon the relatively weak German economy by the accelerated rate of economic and military rearmament that became such a necessary corollary to the patterns imposed on German foreign policy by Hitler. These patterns were based upon the premise that at all times and whatever the cost Germany had to go 'forward', or be overtaken, in the race for supremacy in Europe. So far as Hitler was concerned, it was a question of making the German economy fit the tasks he had in mind for Germany rather than relating foreign policy objectives to the capabilities of the German economy. Hence the conflicts that arose between Schacht, von Blomberg and Göring. Nevertheless, economic factors could not be ignored and the author makes the point that while in 1936 Hitler was thinking of Germany being in a state of military preparedness by 1940–41, difficulties in the execution of the Four Year Plan caused him to think in terms of 1942–43 at the meeting on November 5, 1937. Yet after Munich, with clear evidence of an acceleration of Britain's own rearmament, Hitler again talks of 1940–41 as

being the optimum date for Germany to act 'before it is too late'. These were by no means hard and fixed 'timetables' as such, but indications of the pace at which Hitler felt European affairs were moving and the optimum periods when he felt that the balance of opportunity might then tend to move against Germany.

In his introduction Professor Goodwin states that this book is 'a lucid and helpful guide to the present state of historical scholarship on the contentious issues raised by the outbreak of the Second World War'. Although the book is a good introduction for those new to the subject, who require an indication of the various points of controversy in the story that still exercise historians, not all the 'contentious issues' are covered, nor could they be in a book of this size and scope. Carr has approached the subject of the origins of the Second World War from the German or Hitler angle, instead of from an 'international' viewpoint. In itself this is interesting since it shows the degree to which A. J. P. Taylor's interpretation of Hitler's actions, motives and policies has prompted further discussion and re-examination of this important subject. However, for a careful analysis of the motives behind British, French, Italian and Russian policy the student will have to look elsewhere. This is especially important so far as British policy is concerned, otherwise the impression will be gained that the only reason Britain 'backed down' at Munich was because Hitler was able to play the game of 'bluff' better (p. 97). Given the fundamental emphasis of this study, it is surprising that the author fails to mention China in connection with the army's own efforts to secure sources of raw material vital for rearmament. In connection with the general theme of Carr's study the HAPRO agreements of April 1936 are significant for two reasons: they showed that a policy of pure and simple autarky was impossible, given the economic basis and nature of the modern army; and secondly, these agreements conformed to the pattern of 'barter' arrangements that dominated Germany's trading practices in the world at that time, a point that Carr brings out in other connections.

Nevertheless, this is a useful and stimulating book, which should prove to be of great value to students and teachers alike. Used judiciously and in connection with other books and articles (of which more could perhaps have been mentioned in the useful bibliographical essay), this book will repay careful study.

JOHN P. FOX

Austria 1918–1972. By Elisabeth Barker. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 306 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·95.*

IN February 1938, Oliver Harvey, Eden's principal private secretary, wrote in his diary: '*Anschluss* is probably inevitable, and to stop it from outside is impossible and indefensible.' No wonder that when the German army actually marched into Austria on March 12, most people in Europe seemed only too ready to bow to what seemed an irreversible verdict of history with, as Elisabeth Barker aptly puts it, 'little more than a nostalgic sigh and raised eyebrows over Hitler's uncivilised manners' (p. 116). After all, the Austrians themselves, to judge by the near-hysterical crowds in Vienna and elsewhere, were treating it as such, and even glorying in it. Miss Barker's authoritative study, based on original research in British and Austrian archives and on personal experience of Austria before and since the

war, is an attempt to explain why everybody, including the Austrians themselves, have so consistently been so wrong about Austria.

The book analyses Austria's fearful predicament before the war when the country had to live through the trauma of a lost empire in conditions of continual social strife and financial instability. The experience of actually living within Hitler's Third Reich cured the Austrians of the illusion that the *Anschluss* would spell the end of all their troubles. But in 1945 Austria was an occupied country with distinctly unfavourable prospects, and those who once again thought poorly of its chances could be excused for doing so. But the Austrians were lucky too. As Miss Barker shows, the Russians slipped up over the drafting of the control agreement in 1946. Article 6 made a distinction between constitutional laws which needed Allied approval and others which did not. By the time the Russians had realised that this offered the Austrians an important loophole, the Austrian parliament had nationalised a large part of the country's industry, shipping, banking and insurance and thus saved it from being confiscated by the Russians as German property. Moreover, by insisting on the new Austrian unions being strongly centralised in the probable hope of obtaining indirect control over them through the communists, the Russian authorities gave the Austrian non-communists a perfect instrument with which to resist later communist attempts at subversion in 1947 and 1950.

In general, the Russians seem to have been half-hearted about the attempts at a communist takeover. Miss Barker suggests that the weakness of the Austrian Communist Party might have helped to make Stalin even more than usually cautious. By 1954–55 Stalin's successors were ready for a deal with the Western powers, perhaps in the hope that a neutralised Austria would act as a bait for the future neutralisation of Germany. Miss Barker also suggests that the Russians might have been anxious to get on better terms with Yugoslavia. But even though the general outlook was clearly favourable for Austria, a lot could still have gone wrong if the Austrians had not lobbied so persistently not only in Moscow but in the Western capitals as well. This lobbying, as Miss Barker shows, probably made some difference to the final four-power agreement in May 1955.

In the final part of her book, the author analyses Austria's foreign policies. She also provides a clear and detailed account of Austria's unique system of 'social partnership' between the unions, the employers and the government which at least partly explains Austria's own mini *Wirtschaftswunder* since 1955. The fact that, thanks to the Russians, the trade union federation is so powerful is a help because it ensures that bargains are kept by the unions. The final chapter on Austria in the 1970s is an admirably concise and lucid survey of the country's achievements (it had the highest growth rate in the world after Japan in 1972) as well as its problems (high suicide and alcoholism rate, relatively low standard of housing, etc.). Altogether this is an excellent book to put in the hands of a student, businessman or journalist interested in Austria. One small point: the Yugoslav politicians Trumbić and Supilo were not called Anton and František (p. 5) but Ante and Franjo.

K. F. Cviic

The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators 1922–1945. By Anthony Rhodes. *London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton. 1973. 383pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

WAS the role of the Vatican during the period of the European dictatorships and the Second World War beneficial to the world and consonant with its exalted religious and moral claims? The conclusion to Mr. Rhodes's book shows the drift and purpose of his argument.

> Whatever may be thought of the relative merits of the Catholic Church and the various national and 'free' Churches, it must be admitted that the size and doctrinal unity of the former body alone suffice to make it a far more potent factor for the world's good or evil than any of the smaller and less disciplined Christian bodies. Nor will many Christians be found to deny that the influence of Catholicism is on the whole an influence for good. In spite of certain shortcomings and blemishes, it is an institution of such unique value that without it the civilised world would be immeasurably poorer (p. 358).

There are flaws in the style and logic of this verdict of a kind which occur occasionally in the work under review, especially where the author allows his own strong moral convictions to surface. These are balanced by his ability to make excellent use of colourful incident and anecdote to advance his narrative and analysis, or to re-create the atmosphere of the times about which he is writing. An example is the description of the strange life led by the hundred Allied diplomats confined to Vatican territory during the war: 'The French Ambassador indulged his hobby of taking cinematographic films; while Mr. Osbourne passed his spare time fishing in a small pond in the Vatican garden and organising an exhibition of 600 photographs of his dogs . . .' (pp. 252–254).

Mr. Rhodes's eye for illustrative detail makes his book extremely readable: a feat all the more impressive because of the very complex range of diplomatic issues and activities which he covers in a comparatively short volume. Starting with the election of Pius XI in 1922, he discusses the first reactions of the Roman Catholic Church to fascism, the origins and effect of the Italian Concordat of 1929, the attitude of the Papacy and the Italian bishops to the Abyssinian war, the challenge to Vatican diplomacy of persecution in Russia and Mexico, the Spanish civil war, and the tortuous and fascinating course of the Vatican's growing rift with Nazi Germany. The frequent weaknesses and vacillations of papal policy are fully exposed, but Mr. Rhodes is also at pains to demonstrate the immense strains placed on the Pontiffs by the staggering range of their responsibilities and the tumult of demands made on them for their support of particular national policies. Very rightly, he balances incidents of the Papacy's hesitation and 'appeasement' with instances of its courageous and outspoken moral leadership—notably with regard to the publication of Pius XI's *Mit brennender Sorge* (pp. 195–210).

As the facts become better known—and Mr. Rhodes makes shrewd use of the growing range of published diplomatic material—the controversy over the role of the Vatican between the two world wars tends more and more to resolve itself into a moral judgment about the character and policies of Pius XII. In the end, Mr. Rhodes leaves the reader to make this judgment himself. Constructively, however, he offers some all too brief suggestions on ways in which the Vatican's diplomatic service could be reformed to enable it to perform its functions both more efficiently and more in keeping with its essentially religious mission.

GEORGE BULL

Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist 'Second Round', 1944–1945. By John O. Iatrides. Foreword by William Hardy McNeill. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 340 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·75.*

Professor Iatrides describes his book as a by-product of a research project on United States policy in postwar Greece, culminating in the Truman Doctrine. Its subject-matter is the documentary background to the month-long fighting in Athens which broke out on December 4, 1944, when an attempted communist revolution was suppressed by British troops. The book introduces much new American material, notably the papers of Mr. Lincoln MacVeagh, who was his country's ambassador in Greece at the time. But it seems a pity that the author did not complete his research project before writing, because the main interest in the American side of the story is the process by which United States policy contrived to make an exact about-turn between December 1944, when it condemned British intervention, and March 1947, when President Truman announced American intervention in the same cause.

Throughout the period covered by the book, the anonymous memo-writers of the Department of State were urging opposition to British policies in terms not easily distinguishable from those employed by the revolutionaries. A typical report by the Department's Adviser on Political Relations complained that 'the British had been showing a distinct tendency to view Greek affairs as their private preserve and intended to bring the king back' (p. 86). MacVeagh himself was widely regarded by the British on the spot as a weak, 'intellectual' neutralist, briefly notorious for his refusal to allow British troops to draw water from the well in his garden after their supplies from the tap had been cut off by the guerrillas. The passages here freely quoted from MacVeagh do little to remove this impression. He did not like what the British were doing and he wanted to dissociate himself and his country: 'American policy tends to be confused with British and we are rapidly incurring the same dislike, suspicion and distrust' (p. 309). It was doubtless galling for an American with such views to have to stand by doing nothing. 'Let it be known that the United States is running the job', MacVeagh wrote to Roosevelt in early 1944 (p. 119). But his proposed solution for the Greek imbroglio was only an international commission, a device which was tried several times later and proved a predictably dismal failure.

Professor Iatrides is fair and very thorough in presenting the evidence. He does not deal with the incidents of the fighting; his concern is with the diplomacy behind the scenes. If there is a surprise in the long bibliography, it is the omission of several Greek writers on the 'December events', such as Kalantzes and Petzopoulos. The book is beautifully produced, as we have come to expect from the Princeton University Press.

Kenneth Matthews

Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945–1964. By George S. Harris. *Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. 1972. 263 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. (AEI-Hoover policy studies.) $4.50.*

The Turks. By David Hotham. *London: John Murray. 1972. 220 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

DR. HARRIS brings to his important study of Turkish-American relations during the postwar period his experience on assignment to the US Embassy in Ankara between 1957 and 1962 besides several years as an academic political scientist. This dual background has enabled him to produce a fascinating account of American-Turkish relations since the Second World War which examines the subject from the inside without at any point becoming an apology for American policy.

His book is arranged logically and historically. It opens by outlining the conditions in which the American-Turkish alliance emerged after the war—the threat to Turkey's integrity posed by Stalin's demands for territorial concessions combined with Britain's contemporary inability to resume its traditional role in the area. In discussing the extension of Marshall Aid to Turkey and its assumption of full Nato membership in 1952, Dr. Harris makes the important point that the demand for membership came from the Turkish rather than the American side and that the decision was made with virtually no dissenting Turkish voices.

It is against this background that Dr. Harris traces the development of the alliance during the 1950s. He describes the establishment of American air and radar bases in Turkey and the growth of aid and other economic links. The failures as well as the successes of American assistance programmes are outlined and analysed. He continues by discussing the events which strained the alliance during the 1960s. The realignment of Turkey's domestic political forces after 1961 (notably the rise of a vociferous left-wing group which challenged the earlier orthodoxies of Turkish foreign policy), the softening of Soviet attitudes, American-Turkish clashes over Cyprus and a new concern by the United States for the cost of its overseas commitments all helped to produce changes in the relationship between the two countries which Dr. Harris examines dispassionately. In a final chapter he considers the future of the alliance in the light of its past, concluding that while Turkey's links with the West are unlikely to disappear, the focus of its attention will probably shift from America to the other states of the Nato alliance.

Readers whose principal interest is the domestic impact of Turkey's overseas alignments may well regret Dr. Harris's failure to provide more than passing references to the role of private American capital in Turkey's present economic development, since this represents an important item in the charge of 'neo-colonialism' with which the Turkish left assails the United States. As it is, this is the only noticeable lacuna in an otherwise comprehensive and thoughtful study.

Like George Harris, David Hotham writes as a man with practical experience of Turkish politics (in his case, as Ankara correspondent of *The Times* during the early 1960s) but his book is frankly introductory. It aims to present newcomers to the subject with a panoramic picture of modern Turkish life—political, economic and social. Faced with this task, Mr. Hotham was admittedly obliged to paint with a broad brush, but the sort of generalisations about national character which result are often pointless and confusing. To give a brief but balanced picture of the modern Turkish economy is certainly difficult, but to say, as he does, that 'real economic progress has been almost nullified by the population increase'

(p. 69) is simply untrue. He is always entertaining but occasionally unreliable.

WILLIAM HALE

Great Power Politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy. A Study of Norway's Foreign Relations, November 1940–February 1948. By Nils Morten Udgaard. Foreword by John Sanness. *Oslo, Bergen, Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget. 1973. 319 pp. Bibliog. Index. Nkr 58.00.*

'THE image of Norway that remains with us is that of a small state in a series of narrowly circumscribed decision-making situations', writes Professor John Sannes in his Foreword to this book. The image is not narrowly conceived: the author paints it with a broad brush on the canvas of British, American and Russian interests as they appeared, disappeared and reappeared again from November 1940 to February 1948.

Britain took Norway for granted, and its policy towards Norway was dictated by this assumption, and not, in the first place, by the realisation that 'in 1944 she had over-extended herself by trying to influence political developments all over Europe' (p. 111). The British government knew that if it came to a great crisis with the Russians or anybody else, Norway would turn instinctively towards Britain and the Atlantic.

Looking back on the events of the immediate postwar period, what is so astonishing is that the Norwegian Labour Party looked upon Britain as much more of an imperialist power than the Soviet Union. 'The general war-time mood of comradeship-in-arms led most people to be less sceptical about the Soviet system, which some saw as an embryonic democracy which had received the tacit support of a majority of the Russians during the war' (pp. 92–93). Among the factors that contributed to this attitude was British propaganda which helped to build up the reputation of the Red Army. And Trygve Lie, then the foreign minister, did not get on with Ernest Bevin (p. 147). They were much too alike for that. He much preferred Eden, who often allowed Lie to win a game of tennis with him.

Three facts are brought out in this book which deserve to be underlined. The fact is that Norway took longer to conquer than any other West European nation (pp. 185–186). The conclusion must be that if national defence had been more efficient—which it would have been but for the pacifist wing of the Labour Party—Norway would have held out much longer, which perhaps might have caused postponement of the invasion of the Low Countries.

The second is that the government deliberately kept from the people the knowledge that East-West relations were rapidly deteriorating. This they did by discussing foreign affairs in the Storting only very infrequently, and then in secret session. It is indeed astonishing that in one of the most open societies in the world, foreign affairs should be regarded as a closely guarded state secret. The third is that the Norwegians, like the Czechoslovaks up to 1948, thought they had a special mission to act as bridge-builders between East and West (Chapter 12). One is reminded of what the late Jan Masaryk said about bridge-building during the war. Czechoslovakia, he said, did not want to build any bridges. 'What happens to a bridge?', he asked. 'Men march all over it, and horses drop things on it.'

THOMAS BARMAN

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Social Change in the Soviet Union: Russia's Path toward an Industrial Society. Ed. by Boris Meissner. Foreword by George Brinkley. Trans. by Donald P. Kommers. *Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press. 1972. 247 pp. Index. £4·55. $9.95.*

The Soviet Intelligentsia. An essay on the social structure and roles of Soviet intellectuals during the 1960s. By L. G. Churchward. *London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1973. 204 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

In their respective ways both Meissner and Churchward are noted for their perspicacity as interpreters of Soviet society. One may therefore be forgiven for considering simultaneously two books disparate in character (the former an anthology, the latter a single protracted study) but by authors who themselves invite comparison. Professor Meissner, Director of the Institute for Eastern Law at the University of Cologne, is a proponent of the 'totalitarian' school, while Lloyd Churchward is an Australian Marxist whose first book, *Contemporary Soviet Government*,[1] argued against viewing Soviet society through 'totalitarian' lenses. Yet their conclusions on the direction of social change are surprisingly similar: that Soviet society has reached a crossroads in its development and that its fate will be decided by the outcome of what Meissner calls 'the struggle' between, and what Churchward terms 'the interdependence' of, the technocrats of modern industrial society and the Party *apparat* or bureaucracy. They disagree, however, over the degree of polarisation and influence of these two groups.

Meissner has assembled five essays by four German professors based on papers originally delivered at the first sociological conference held by the German Society for East European Affairs a decade ago. The updated essays are: 'Social Change in Russia prior to the October Revolution', by Professor Ruffmann; 'Social Change in Bolshevik Russia' and 'Soviet Society under Khrushchev's Successors', by Professor Meissner; 'Educational Policy and Social Structure in the Soviet Union', by Professor Anweiler; and 'The Sociological Impact of Soviet Economic Policy', by Professor Thalheim. These are all thought-provoking contributions, but it is Meissner who provides the heart of the book with his challenging analysis of Soviet social change. He sums up the present situation as distinguished by the efforts of 'progressive social forces to liberate Soviet society from the tutelage of the party and the totalitarian state and, thus, to build a more open society from within and without' (p. 141). If the 'progressives' lose, 'Russian national communism could easily adapt to fascist characteristics' (p. 142). Still, one thing seems certain: 'the fate of Russia will be shaped decisively by those groups who today, within the framework of an industrial society based on achievement, are fulfilling the role of a genuine leadership stratum' (p. 142).

The value of Churchward's book is that it is the first study in English of contemporary Soviet intellectuals, albeit one in breadth rather than in depth. His themes include recruitment, training, social structure, life-styles, social roles, political influence and future prospects of the intellectuals. Although he admits his evaluations are personal, he is soberly realistic in maintaining that 'most Soviet intellectuals seem to accept the socialist system and are prepared to work within the communist political system,

[1] New York: American Elsevier; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1968.

to observe its rules and to respect its restraints. They are generally willing and often very anxious to assist in the improvement and further development of their social and political system' (p. 128). According to Churchward, antagonisms are not as sharp as Meissner implies, and evolution is more likely than revolution. It is also an oversimplification of a very complex social and political phenomenon to attempt to classify intellectuals into two groups, the conformists and the dissenters. Churchward's prognosis on change is that 'as the Party encourages and directs the scientific and technological revolution, the interdependence of the intellectual establishment and the *apparat* is likely to increase. . . . The Party *apparat* will perhaps be forced to withdraw even more from the ideological dominance of science and intellectual activity, but if this happens it will be replaced by a more traditional bureaucratic system in which ministries and government departments will decide policy on the basis of their own experts and advisers' (p. 149).

The value of both books is enhanced by their extensive notes and source references and, in Churchward, by four appendices.

JAMES RIORDAN

The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis 1964–1972. By W. W. Kulski. *Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1973. 526 pp. Bibliog. Index. $17.50. Paperback: $5.95.*

PROFESSOR KULSKI'S massive book is intended to acquaint the reader with Soviet views, rather than with Western interpretations of these views. With this aim in mind he has relied almost entirely on Soviet sources, quoting them at first hand. The author starts off by surveying the problems confronting Soviet specialists in international affairs. He examines the way in which they view the communist sphere of influence and the outside world. Later chapters in the book deal with the future interests of the Soviet Union, the problems of nuclear war, wars of national liberation and Soviet disarmament proposals. He then goes on to discuss the Third World and analyses Soviet ideology. Special emphasis is put on the influences of nationalism in Soviet foreign policy. The last chapter of the book brings the reader up to 1971 and the first half of 1972. In particular, Professor Kulski examines the new American policy towards China at this point.

It is claimed that the large number of quotations from primary Soviet sources 'offers a guarantee that the Soviet viewpoint has not been distorted'. This is surely a little naive in its intent, since in the preface to the book Professor Kulski states categorically that he is showing how Soviet leaders overlook ideological considerations in favour of protecting Soviet national interests. Thus he lays bare his final hypothesis before embarking upon the details recorded in the course of his book. So much depends on the selection made of Soviet primary sources. The general narrative is rather long-winded and tends to run to platitudes such as 'As usual, the move by one great power will cause a readjustment in the policies of the other powers' (p. 464). Cumbersome jargon also creeps in ('the pentagonal image').

The value of this work lies mainly in the final chapter. The analysis of the background to President Nixon's initiative in China is well displayed, as are the intricacies of the Sino-Indian debate.

R. W. PETHYBRIDGE

Eastern Europe in the 1970s. Edited by Sylva Sinanian, Istvan Deak and Peter C. Ludz. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1972. London: Pall Mall. 1973. 260 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government. Published under the joint sponsorship of the Center for Continuing Education and The Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University.) £6·25.*

In December 1971, New York's Columbia University arranged a three-day conference on 'New Perspectives in understanding East Central Europe', attended by some three hundred scholars. The present volume reproduces Professor Seton Watson's introductory address, 'Is there an East Central Europe?', and some of the papers delivered at the conference, leaving out —obviously for reasons of space—others, so that some of the subjects under discussion seem lost altogether. The material presented in the book is nevertheless rich both in variety and in documentation, drawing attention to many hitherto neglected aspects of communist rule in the area between Western Germany and the Soviet Union. Even a rather hair-splitting controversy on the non-subject of communist 'legitimacy of power' produced quite a lot of food for further thought. While the main speaker, Professor Alfred Meyer, detected among the people in communist-dominated countries 'a certain pride in their own frugal life, indeed an attitude of moral righteousness about it', Professor G. L. Kline laid more stress on the fact that the young East Europeans still view Western regimes as 'offering broader personal freedoms, greater privacy, and a better chance to pursue one's work'.

There were searching discussions on the genesis of the present situation in East Central Europe: the indigenous fascist movements in these countries in the interwar period were examined and Soviet war aims in 1943 analysed. Professor Vojtech Mastny's heavily documented introductory paper on this subject denied that the Russians considered that spheres of influence had to be created in postwar Europe. Other speakers disagreed with this interpretation, but something approaching unanimity was achieved on the view that in contrast to the Western powers, who were primarily interested in winning the war, the Russians had always uppermost in their minds the aim of winning the peace on their terms, which meant pushing as far West as possible.

A discussion on national questions in Eastern Europe led right into present problems. It showed that the communist regimes had not managed to overcome satisfactorily the old antagonism between several nationalities inhabiting the same state or settle the legitimate claims of national minorities. Rich and varied as these discussions were, the subject would justify a fuller treatment. Many aspects, like the Jewish question, were hardly touched upon. A discussion on the state of Comecon in 1971 led to a consideration of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, which was vigorously defended by Professor Richard Loewenthal, and opposed by Harry Schwartz of *The New York Times* as coming 'pretty close to unconditional capitulation'. Most of the aspects of *Ostpolitik*, including the increasingly important role played by the German Democratic Republic, were thoroughly examined, but a certain imbalance cannot be overlooked: the question of settlements between the Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary was not broached at all.

On the whole the volume is an impressive manifestation of serious

scholarship, opening a plethora of new vistas and proving that research on East European problems is more than a mere offshoot of Soviet studies.

J. W. BRUEGEL

Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe. By Paul Lendvai. *London: Macdonald. 1971. 393 pp. Index. £3·50.*

AT the outbreak of the Second World War the population of Poland was 35 million, of which over 3,400,000 were Jews. Romania had a Jewish minority of over 850,000 and Hungary one of over 400,000. Both Romania and Hungary fought on the side of Nazi Germany and until 1943 the Romanians engaged in their own kind of Final Solution, which resulted in the extermination of hundreds of thousands of Romanian and Soviet Jews. Yet today there are still over 100,000 Jews in Romania and some 70,000 in Hungary. However, in Poland, there live today only between 5,000 and 8,000 Jews compared with 30,000 in Western Germany.

At the outbreak of the Six Day War on June 12, 1967, there were still some 25,000 Jews in Poland. But as a result of the most widespread and virulent antisemitic campaign in Polish history, which combined the lessons of the Nuremberg Laws and the Spanish *limpieza de sangre* practices after the expulsion of the Jews in 1492, Poland has now become as *Judenfrei* as Spain or Portugal, although it still has some way to go to achieve the condition of Saudi Arabia. How this was achieved is brilliantly described by Paul Lendvai, even though he is not a Polish Jew and his knowledge of Polish-Jewish relations during the ten centuries of Polish-Jewish history does not appear to go far enough.

Although the 'anti-Zionist' campaign in Poland rightly forms the central and major part of Mr. Lendvai's book, the parts dealing with the antisemitic campaign in Czechoslovakia, and the absence of such campaigns in Hungary and Romania, are equally instructive. The result is that *Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe*, despite the author's journalistic treatment of the subject, must be regarded as an indispensable reference book on the 'anti-Zionist' campaign in the People's Democracies during the years 1967–70.

The book has, however, its limitations. In Part One, 'Communism and the Jews', Mr. Lendvai attempts to explain and trace the development of the new antisemitism and how it has become an integral part of the ideology of Soviet communism. But his journalistic treatment of what is one of the most significant developments in the intellectual history of Europe is quite inadequate. Furthermore, many of his generalisations on the role of Jews in the history of Eastern Europe will be accepted only by the minority of his readers who, like himself, regard Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg as authorities on Jewish history. To blame Moscow for Polish antisemitism, as Mr. Lendvai does, is to demonstrate a striking lack of understanding of Polish-Jewish relations since the 19th century and a lack of knowledge of what happened during the years of the Final Solution. And to comprehend how it has come about that the rulers of the Soviet Union have made antisemitism an integral part of their Marxist-Leninist *Weltanschauung*, one must be able to see beyond the crimes of the Stalinist era. The final break between the Soviet ideology and the ideology of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the crucial point of antisemitism is of the same nature as the

break between the early Christian Church, once it had been taken over by Judaeophobic Greeks and Levantines, and its Judaeo-Christian founders.

In Poland this break has led to the creation of a state of mutual understanding and tolerance between the communist regime and the Catholic hierarchy led by Cardinal Wyszynski. Mr. Lendvai's failure to deal at all with the role of the Polish Catholic Church in preparing the ground for the expulsion of the Jewish remnant in 1967–70 epitomises the narrowness of his approach to the subject of antisemitism in Eastern Europe.

R. AINSZTEIN

Eyewitness: The Autobiography of Gomulka's Interpreter. By Erwin Weit. Trans. by Mary Schofield. *London: André Deutsch. 1973. 224 pp. Index. £2·95.*

THIS book is not so much an autobiography as a collection of inside information which Mr. Weit was able to gather while working as a simultaneous translator from Polish into German and from German into Polish at many top-level political meetings of communist leaders. Born in Vienna in 1928, he fled to Poland with his parents after the German takeover of Austria. Orphaned during the German occupation of Poland, he escaped the gas chambers and was liberated by Soviet forces in 1945. He joined the Polish Workers' Party, became a journalist, but in 1954 started to work as an interpreter. In February 1969 he left Warsaw for Vienna with Gomulka's permission.

Either Mr. Weit was able to take with him at least some transcripts of his translations, or he must have an extraordinary memory, because his book is full of verbatim statements attributed to many prominent members of the communist hierarchy. The most documented chapters of his book concern the Polish-East German summit meetings of 1958 and 1963, the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin in 1967, and the Warsaw meeting in August 1968 of five communist overlords at which the ultimatum to Alexander Dubcek was prepared.

In a chapter dealing with the Polish church-state relations Mr. Weit tells the story of how party officials had tried to accuse Cardinal Wyszynski and thirty-five other Polish bishops of unpatriotic behaviour because in November 1965 they had invited West German bishops to attend the religious celebrations of the 1,000th anniversary of the coming of Christianity to Poland. Though the Polish bishops asked their German brethren to recognise the Oder-Neisse frontier, they were denounced by the party machine for betraying their country's national interests. But a faulty translation of the bishops' letter was used in this campaign and when Cardinal Wyszynski affirmed from the pulpit that the translation contained ' lies ', Gomulka ordered an inquiry in which Mr. Weit served as an independent expert. After he had discovered over 200 errors, distortions and omissions, the party called off its attacks, but all the foreign bishops who had planned to be present at the August 1966 celebrations in Czestochowa were denied visas.

Mr. Weit's book contains two revelations which, if true, would be sensational. First, he alleges that Boleslaw Bierut, first secretary of the Polish party's Central Committee, who led the Polish delegation to the 20th Soviet party congress in February 1956, committed suicide after Nikita Khrushchev had refused to receive him for several days (p. 37). Officially

Bierut died in Moscow on March 12 of heart failure. Another revelation is more striking. Mr. Weit writes that Khrushchev—who in his memorable 'secret' speech of February 25 condemned Stalin's brutal methods of ruling —wanted also to tell the truth about Katyn, but 'Gomulka opposed him' (p. 74). Here at least Mr. Weit's chronology is wrong. Gomulka was restored to membership of the Polish party on August 4, 1956, and re-elected first secretary on October 21 of the same year.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MIDDLE EAST

My Country. The Story of Modern Israel. By Abba Eban. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 304 pp. Illus Index. £3·75.*

THIS well-produced and richly illustrated book deals with the first twenty-five years of Israel's existence. It presents the story, as experienced by Israel, and—in the words of the author—is what he would like the reader 'not only to know, but to feel' (p. 7). Within this framework, it gives a careful description of the facts, and in addition conveys 'the sharp fluctuations of mood between anguish and relief' which characterised this period. Accordingly those parts of the book are most impressive where the author can draw on his own personal experience. There is a moving description of May 14, 1948, the day when the National Council took the historic step of proclaiming the establishment of the State, and when Israel 'experienced the joy of birth and the fear of death in a single taste' (p. 12). Similarly striking are the memories of the agonising weeks which preceded the outbreak of the fighting in June 1967. Other sections, such as those dealing with mass immigration and absorption, or economic crisis and consolidation, are less personal.

It is natural that the author feels least free to let his thoughts flow in the sphere of Arab-Israel relations. His official position makes it impossible to depart from the policy of the government. He therefore limits himself on the whole to restating known arguments, including the thesis that the problem of the refugees was ultimately created by the Arabs themselves, because they defied the recommendations of the United Nations regarding partition and took up arms to prevent their implementation. Nevertheless he stresses Israel's willingness to co-operate in any regional or international project to solve the problem. There is, however, no hint that Israel might have a special responsibility in this matter, except possibly the following sentence which refers to the exodus of 1948: 'In Israel itself there was no general sentiment of guilt, but the public conscience was ill at ease' (p. 100). A conscience ill at ease may be a small voice. But it can become a powerful force; and if one day this should happen, it could transform the present situation.

Concerning the Holy Places of Christendom and Islam, Mr. Eban reaffirms that Israel does not claim exclusive jurisdiction or unilateral responsibility. This statement will be acceptable to many. But the accompanying claim that never before in history had such an offer been made, and that all previous regimes, including the British, had insisted on managing and safeguarding the Sanctuaries themselves (p. 246), can hardly

be maintained. It does no justice to Lord Balfour's persistent efforts to secure an international agreement on the issue of jurisdiction, and it ignores the fact that the draft of the Mandate, as submitted by Britain to the Council of the League, provided expressly for entrusting Holy Places, religious buildings and sites 'to the *permanent control* of suitable (international) religious bodies'.

In the last chapter the author raises some fundamental issues of a spiritual nature. He points out that the relationship between Jews and Arabs is a major theme of modern Hebrew literature, and says: 'What concerns these writers is not political attitudes towards Arabs, but Israel's moral relationship towards itself. They seem to be arguing for a constructive humility . . . for a more modest national style in relations with Arabs inside Israel and beyond' (p. 296). He concludes the book with a series of questions, of which the following is the first: 'Will the tolerant, humane, empirical theme in Israel thought triumph over tendencies of extreme nationalist fervour?' Much may depend on the answer to this question.

WALTER ZANDER

The Moshav in Israel: A Case Study of Institution-Building for Agricultural Development. By Maxwell I. Klayman. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1970. 371 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £7·75.*

Immigration and Social Change. Agricultural Settlement of New Immigrants in Israel. By Dov Weintraub and associates. *Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press; Manchester: Manchester University Press. (Distributed in USA by Humanities Press Inc.). 1971. 278 pp. Maps. Index. £3·00.*

Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav. By Elaine Baldwin. Foreword by Max Gluckman. *Manchester; Manchester University Press. 1972. 240 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·60.*

THERE is no shortage of material on the social and economic development of Israel, and the volume of the field research and subsequent discussion reflects mainly the accessibility, an unusual feature in the Middle East, of this remarkable society. These three studies treat agricultural settlement as organised through the institution of the *Moshav*, through which it was intended to establish a '*Gemeinschaft*' society—a family of families.

The most comprehensive of the three is *The Moshav in Israel* by Maxwell I. Klayman, which provides a summary of the history of agricultural settlement in Israel, as well as an overall view of the regional organisation and institutional setting of the *moshav* settlements. For those requiring a general introduction to the subject the book would provide valuable preliminary reading and it also comments in an interesting way on the problems of exporting the institution to larger countries in Asia and South America. Some attention is given to complex details, such as the controversies surrounding farm inheritance.

The other two studies are much more specific in their treatment, and deal with detailed case studies. Both show evidence of new research, which has been set in the already well-documented background to Israeli agricultural development in the 20th century. The approach of Dov Weintraub and his fellow sociologist contributors is to make a comparative study of fifteen villages over a period of several years and to analyse and compare

the features of solidarity and disintegration in these villages. There is a very useful treatment of evidence on the disposition to change, on differential development as well as on the effects of modernisation on the structure of kinship. The work is illustrated with a number of helpful maps, which display effectively the spread and intensity in time and space of the various types of rural settlement. Unfortunately the maps lack a source. The diagrams are less helpful in some cases, and that on page 121 would more correctly compare the features displayed if it had been compiled on a log scale. ' Data ' appears for ' date ' on the same page, and the book would benefit from a glossary of the many terms familiar only to specialists in Israel and the Middle East. The study is well balanced, however, paying attention to the adjustment of farming methods to the physical character of a farm, as well as recognising the problems of extending such methods. There is a wealth of detailed information about such matters as the origin of settlers and their subsequent achievements and aspirations, and it is especially interesting in its attempt to cope with the very real problems of defining the dynamic aspects of the changes brought about by the creation of the *moshav* settlements as well as the impact of this institution on the later settlers.

Weintraub and his colleagues realised that in their treatment they had sacrificed depth for breadth, and had deprived the reader of ' a live picture of . . . villages as they really are ' (p. 237). They have also deprived us of the readability which comes with a well-presented case study of a single *moshav*, in that the most easily digested of the three books is that by Elaine Baldwin, which is a case study of one *moshav*, Kfar Hefer. She outlines briefly the forty-year history of this community, and then presents in valuable detail its day-to-day politics, conflicting interests and emerging problems. The quality of the observation reflects the competence of the author's work in the field. In presentation, however, there are some lapses. Despite the awareness of the place of the developing institution in its social and economic setting, there is no recognition of the problems of displacement of the indigenous community and its predictable antipathy to the changes. Also the presentation of tabulated data and cross referencing is sometimes poor. For example Table 6 (p. 30) is probably unnecessary in that only 4 figures out of 39 indicate significant differences, and the information could have been presented as powerfully and as economically in a sentence. Table 4 is referred to in error on page 29 instead of Table 5, while in the section on the economic and social relationships there is much that is misleading through the absence of constant prices. Reference is made on page 19 and on page 32 to changes in the value of the Israeli pound, and an inflationary situation is implicit during the study period, but no recognition is made of this situation. However, the importance of the book is in its account of the processes which have led to the creation and continuation of this co-operative experiment; and in its awareness of the pockets of co-operation which continue to grow within the formally defined overall co-operative, so that despite the mechanisms of the overall institution, the pressures of a genetic character are being expressed in different ways by succeeding generations on account of their new demographic and sociological inheritance.

J. A. ALLAN

Syria Under the Ba'th 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis. By Itamar Rabinovich. Foreword by Malcolm H. Kerr. *Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press; Chichester: Wiley. 1973. 276 pp. Bibliog. Index. (The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. The Monograph Series.) Illus. £6·00.*

THERE can be few readers, outside the surely very restricted circle who follow Syrian politics with intensive and sustained attention, who will get much out of this book. The trouble lies both in the subject chosen and in its treatment. Dr. Rabinovich regards the three years from the overthrow in March 1963 of the 'separatist' regime (which had broken up the UAR eighteen months earlier) by a conspiracy of Ba'thist politicians and a rather mysterious 'military committee' to the coup in February 1966 by a more socially radical and pro-Soviet faction within the Ba'th as forming a significant whole that can illustrate themes of general importance in contemporary Arab history. He may be right, but the strong impression remaining is that far too much about Syrian events and personalities during these years is still obscure. Deprived, as an Israeli, of any personal contact with his subject, the author has toiled industriously over memoirs, manifestos, newspaper files and radio monitoring reports, as well as going through some Syrian Ba'th records captured in 1967. Perhaps inevitably, the result is a dry, sometimes turgid, and often inconsequential-seeming survey, in which, as Dr. Rabinovich frankly admits, many questions cannot yet be answered. The appendices include a lengthy excerpt from a statement of the theoretical objectives of the Syrian Ba'th in power which it is useful to have in translation; there is a biographical index, and full lists of the nine Syrian cabinets that held office during this period. There is, however, no index to the numerous photographs that illustrate the text.

J. S. F. PARKER

La Naissance et la Reconnaisance de la République Algérienne. By Abdelmadjid Belkherroubi. Preface by Georges Abi-Saab. *Brussels: Emile Bruylant. 1972. 176 pp. Bibliog. Bel. frs. 371.*

DR. BELKHERROUBI'S book deals with the legal status of Algeria under French rule, during the war of independence, and its position as an independent state after the Evian Accords. In the first part he points out the widely agreed view that, although France professed to regard Algeria as part of metropolitan France, its inhabitants were not all treated as French citizens. Discrimination against the Arab population is illustrated by a survey of central and local institutions. The Governor General's post, which might have reconciled the two elements, 'fut toujours tenu par des personnalités qui portaient une sympathie particulière a la minorité d'origine européenne' (p. 27).

In the second part of the book the author deals with the period of the insurrection where, he says, 'la politique algérienne de la France s'est caracterisée . . . par l'hesitation entre diverses solutions toutes plus ou moins marquées par l'attachement au passé (p. 36). He discusses the nature of the Algerian war as a civil conflict and concludes that it differed from other colonial wars in which France and Great Britain were involved because the provisional government of the Algerian republic was constituted and recognised by a number of states 'alors que son assise territoriale était sinon totalement inexistante du moins infime' (p. 69). A discussion of the

Evian agreements, which occupies the major part of the book, is a useful, if somewhat arid, survey of the legal issues. It might have been a richer, if a more controversial one, had the author allowed himself to develop discussion of other cases and other opinions more fully.

ANN WILLIAMS

AFRICA

Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa. By Anthony S. Mathews. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1972. 318 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·75.*

THIS is a most useful book, particularly for those who are concerned to know the details of South African repressive legislation and the manner in which it operates. Professor Mathews, who is Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Natal in Durban, has contributed a valuable study of the ways in which the South African government has assumed power over the political freedom of the individual through parliamentary means; and of the extent to which the courts have either been excluded from protecting the individual or have voluntarily assisted in the process through self-denial of the opportunity to intervene on his behalf. As such, the book's title is a little misleading. It is, of course, concerned with law, order and the *curtailment* of liberty in South Africa. Few informed readers could have expected anything else; but few could have expected so painstaking and exhaustive a study, expressed with calculated detachment and scrupulous attention to the *minutiae* of each unappetising provision in a mass of unpalatable laws.

It is worth noting that the book, though published abroad, was printed in South Africa. It has therefore had to pass the scrutiny of those concerned with the censorship laws (dealt with, in all their formidable detail, in the book). There is no way of knowing how this may have inhibited Professor Mathews in his writing of the book; but it does mean that it is freely accessible in South Africa, and—what is more important—that it may be brought into the country by those who acquire it abroad. Anyone contemplating a visit to South Africa would be well advised to do this. Indeed it ought to be required reading for all who need reminding of the extent to which they could be subjected to harassment (or, for that matter, indefinite detention) at the merest whim of an elective minister or a low-level police officer, neither of them, as Professor Mathews shows, accountable for their acts to the courts.

Despite his own moderation (even conservatism), Professor Mathews is frequently driven to use words like draconian to describe the powers of repression granted by legislation, and exercised in the—intended—absence of any restraint. But, in each of the instances in which he does so, this is the result of a careful examination of the provisions and the judgments of the courts on them.

The most important part of the book, then, is that which is contained in Part II on 'South African Internal Security Legislation'. This occupies some two-thirds of the book, and is taken up with the exposition of some forty or so relevant statutes, each of which is described, weighed and

scrutinised before its full implications and its actual impact are made clear. Throughout, Professor Mathews is as concerned to show the inroads which have been made on personal liberty through procedural devices (such as the frequent shifting of the onus of proof onto the accused) as he is to describe the content of blanket provisions which allow even the most innocent activity to be deemed 'communism', 'terrorism', 'sabotage' and the like.

It is one of the ironies of the South African legal situation that much of the material which forms the subject of this section of the book is *non-racial*, in that it applies to white and non-white alike. It is true that there is a small part of the book which deals with crimes and restraints which are applicable to Africans only, but on the whole Professor Mathews avoids any attempt to describe apartheid and the array of restrictive measures that *it* involves. In one sense, this is understandable: it would have involved a volume twice or three times the size to go into all that is contained in the racial legislation; and, anyway, Professor Mathews is principally concerned with purely political crimes and their relation to security (in the sense of legislation stated to be for the purpose of maintaining the security of the state).

In practice, the book is frequently concerned with security in another sense—the deprivation of the personal security which an individual is entitled to expect in his personal life. Here, the apartheid laws are relevant. They are also important in another sense. Professor Mathews is wont to base his criticisms of the political laws on the extent to which they have diverged from 'common law' freedoms, as found either in the Roman Dutch law or the Anglo-American tradition. It is surely somewhat unrealistic to appeal to criteria of this kind in relation to a state where—to take a single example—more than eighty per cent of the population is deprived of the right to freehold ownership of immovable property on grounds of race.

The first and last sections of the book are less satisfactory. The former attempts to establish, in contemporary terms, the meaning which ought to be attached to the phrase 'the rule of law'. Here, Professor Mathews, in laying the foundation for the criteria by which he is later to invite judgment of specific legislation, makes considerable use of modern American legal theorists and the material which has been provided over a considerable period by the International Commission of Jurists. Yet, after all is said and done, one has the feeling that he is really trying to have his Dicey and eat him.

The final section of the book is entitled 'Freedom, Order and the Democratic Society'. As Professor Mathews says in his introduction, this is a field which is 'outside the normal compass of legal research'; and it would have been better had he left it there. However much one admires his attempt to provide a coherent definition of the place of law in a liberal democracy, one is left somewhat incredulous at his assumption that South Africa is such—or could be without the full participation of the black majority in the political process which Professor Mathews seems to regard as a matter of small importance.

One last point: a good deal of space is given to comparing South African and American legislation and judicial decisions in such fields as the suppression of communism and internal security. While it is true that South Africa comes out badly from a comparison with even the worst excesses of the McCarthy period, one wonders whether a more relevant set of

comparisons might not have been made with material drawn from autocratic and oligarchic regimes, whose ethos is surely nearer to that of South Africa.

NEVILLE RUBIN

Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice: Essays in E. African Legal History. By H. F. Morris and James S. Read. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1972. 369 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

THAT the positivist interpretation of international law which dominated European relations with African societies in the late 19th century was followed in the British African dependencies by the adoption of indirect rule may well in due course be seen more clearly than it is at present to redound to the credit of British administrators as humanitarians, if not as far-sighted visionaries. African nations are still too close to the colonial period to see indirect rule as very much more than a stultifying form of paternalism. This collection of essays by H. F. Morris and James S. Read should nevertheless help students of African history to understand rather more precisely the elusive character of this very British, late 19th-century concept.

The opening chapter attempts very successfully to outline the growth and variety of indirect rule in the three East African territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. But it is the second chapter, describing the evolution of European attitudes towards African states, which demonstrates how easily a situation such as that in Leopold's Congo, or in German South-West Africa, might have developed. Step by step the partition of Africa and the assumption of control of the external relations of African states were transformed into annexation and total European sovereignty, which denied the validity even of agreements if the European signatory thought fit to alter them.

In such circumstances the public school bully might well have become the prototype of the British administrative officer in Africa since his power was absolute. That he did not do so, and why he did not, emerges with particular clarity from the authors' investigation of the disputes which arose over the administration of law in East Africa. Instead of a generalised assessment of indirect rule they have isolated the one area which demonstrates with utter clarity the merits and demerits of the concept.

Although there was marked disagreement over the powers of the chiefs' courts administering customary law, even the critics of that law, who scathingly maintained that the juxtaposition of the terms 'law' and 'custom' was in itself clear indication of the woolliness of the concept, admitted that lack of resources made the courts a necessary if temporary evil. It was the courts presided over by administrative officers which aroused the keenest dispute. Not, it is true, at the beginning of the century, when the judiciary and the administration were pioneering, side by side, the pacification of a vast new country, but between the two world wars, when for many indirect rule took on a mystique which raised it beyond criticism.

Yet, if the administrative officers played down or were even genuinely unconscious of their enjoyment of the projection of public-school *mores* into adult life, the authors make it clear that these men sincerely believed that the simple, all-embracing system of school government, embroidered with an awareness of local practice and prejudice, was best suited to the

administration of African territories and was likely to cause the least disruption of African lives. Equally sincere were the judicial officers who were innately suspicious of a system where the law-makers were the law enforcement officers and the judges too, and they saw no incongruity in introducing English law and procedure into an entirely different society because English law guaranteed fair treatment.

That in the years following the Second World War the views of the law officers triumphed and that indirect rule fell into disrepute when educated Africans accused the British administrators of attempting to hold back their development was not surprising, although few would have anticipated such a change in the 1930s. What the authors of this book have succeeded so well in doing is to present the case for and against indirect rule through the medium of specialist investigations of certain aspects of legal practice. The form of the book leads to a certain amount of repetition, both of ideas and of information, but it helps the writers to avoid the type of generalisations which only confuse the understanding of a complex and at times emotional concept. It might still be argued that the basic error of the proponents of indirect rule was to confuse administration with politics, but that in its many variants indirect rule did provide in East Africa a useful form of local government until such a time as there emerged men of education capable of thinking in terms of the nation-state.

KENNETH INGHAM

Swaziland. The Dynamics of Political Modernization. By Christian P. Potholm. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1973. 183 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·60.*

ACCORDING to Lord Hailey, Swaziland was the least reputable and the most neglected of British dependencies. Mr. Potholm quotes a High Commissioner of the 1920s as saying: ' We might confine ourselves to doing as little as possible in the way of administration ' (p. 16), and such a policy was not always unacceptable to African traditional authorities.

It would be unfair to lay all the blame for Swaziland's hibernation on British inertia. Action taken in the 1870s by the Paramount Chief Mbandzeni in selling off wholesale overlapping concessions ' two, three and even four deep ' to Europeans on the principle that they would have taken them anyhow, so ' why should we not eat before we die? ' (p. 10), did not even have the effect of opening up the country to commercial and industrial prosperity. However, backwaters are liable to flooding and in about 1950 Britain's conscience was stirred to provide substantial sums for health, irrigation and industrial projects, and later, in about 1959, to encourage the first steps towards representative government.

The greater part of this book is taken up with the manoeuvrings of various parties for political power. Broadly, the traditional authorities were lined up with the European settlers against the native politicians, whom the British administration tended to regard as the rulers of the future. The politicians dissipated their energies by quarrels among themselves, absences abroad for fund-raising, and at home even got themselves accused of ' bigmanism ' (p. 56).

There have been other powerful centralised monarchies in Africa, but few have been able to withstand the dynamics of political modernisation. The present Ngwenyama was chosen by the Dlamini family council to

succeed in 1900, when he was only 5 months old and was formally installed as Sobhuza II in 1921. By 1960, therefore, when the winds of change were blowing strongly, he had added considerable political experience to the prestige of his kingly office. The Morse Economic Survey, the Cowen Report, the OAU constitutional experts and the administration were all, in varying degrees, ranged against him. In six years, by Fabian tactics, he out-generalled them all. In 1963 the Resident Commissioner, Sir Brian Marwick, a man with a long and intimate knowledge of Swaziland, doubted Sobhuza's ability to speak for the whole nation. His response was to organise a plebiscite in which 102 per cent. of the voting population took part and over 100 per cent., including the Europeans, voted in his favour (p. 103).

Detailed political manoeuvre is complicated and, in retrospect, not very thrilling. Mr. Potholm has a clear and easy style and is refreshingly objective in picking his way through intrigues and wrangles; his book is concise and readable. In his last chapter he allows himself to speculate on the future. Sobhuza II is no longer young and the rules of succession to the Ngwenyamaship chancy. However Mr. Potholm is prepared to lay odds that if there is a potentially explosive area in Africa south of the Zambesi, it is not in Swaziland.

JAMES MURRAY

Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright. By Eshmael Mlambo. *London: Hurst. 1972. 333 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·95.*

MR. MLAMBO finds the ignorance of British officials about Rhodesia 'amazing. Their information about what the Africans think is based on what they are told by "liberal" Europeans from Rhodesia. Very little interest, if any, is shown in talking to the Africans themselves.' Liberals in southern Africa would endorse this. Given this wilful narrowing of vision, and given the difficulty that unofficial observers have of crossing the social gulf that divides them from sources of African opinion (and the gulf is maintained by many of the African side as well), Mr. Mlambo's book is a very great contribution to the small store of information and intelligent argument which can help to ease the Rhodesian deadlock. He continues the story of white settler occupation of an African region begun so ably by Mr. Stanlake Samkange in his *Origins of Rhodesia.*[1] Both for its detailed record of events since the 1890s and the illuminating view it provides of African attitudes, the book should be required reading in Whitehall.

From sheafs of newspaper clippings of the words of correspondents and politicians a consensus of white Rhodesian opinion can be built up. But how is one to credit Mr. Mlambo's analysis of African opinion when (*pace* ANC, ZAPU and ZANU polemicists) he can provide so little supporting evidence? Happily, one of his most strongly emphasised arguments—that the mass of his black fellow-countrymen oppose settler rule and support the nationalist leaders—has been borne out by the report of the Pearce Commission. Here at last British officialdom (and the press in a few laudable instances) actually addressed itself to the Africans, whose guardian it had so long and fruitlessly claimed to be. The result we all know. Yet this powerful evidence that mass opposition to minority rule is genuine and not

1 London: Heinemann.

the work of ubiquitous 'intimidators' has not been properly circulated: one hopes this book will be.

Half of *Struggle for a Birthright* deals with the Africans. The other half, interwoven with it, first covers fully the early constitutional processes, land apportionment and pressure groups. Then follows an outstanding analysis of African education, vital for its relevance to the present plurality of Rhodesian society. While credit is given where it is due, it is clearly shown that the process of educational development was 'one of inadequate concessions usually made for selfish motives', that progress was mainly due to the Africans themselves and to the otherwise far from acceptable Todd administration.

If the facts about education made unsuitable propaganda, they were made to fit. Whitehead's figure, still claimed today, that 86·6 per cent. of school-age Africans were at school, is shown to have been slightly less than double the true figure, and known to be so by the authorities by 1962. Indeed, the discrepancy between the £103 spent annually on each European child and £9 on each African child reflects the Rhodesian Front's attitudes to both and shows up the unreality of British settlement proposals for huge expenditures on African education to be administered by the Rhodesian Front government.

The hard lesson learned by the Africans, as also through their experience of land and employment policies, is that 'only with the vote can the Rhodesian Africans influence the policies that govern them'. This, rather than the nationalist trappings of 'majority rule', is their preoccupation, as this book and the Pearce Report both show so clearly. The chapters on the internationalisation of the problem, the Rhodesian Front government and Britain's role reveal the failure of the whites, intentional or otherwise, to encompass this central fact.

The book does not, however, explore either the mass preoccupations of the whites—remarkable for their intensity and fantasy elements—or the possible African share of responsibility for the situation. Perhaps these can only be assessed after power has been transferred to the Africans, who, we are told, 'will certainly rule Zimbabwe in Smith's natural lifetime'.

Mr. Mlambo's excellent book can contribute to that transfer by influencing our actions with respect to his people's lost birthright. He himself claims only that his suggestions for a solution may be 'a starting point, in order to avoid a racial holocaust in southern Africa and possibly in much of the world'.

RANDOLPH VIGNE

Cameroun: An African Federation. By Neville Rubin. London: *Pall Mall. 1971. 259 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Pall Mall Library of African Affairs. Gen. Ed.: Colin Legum.) £3·00.*

DR. RUBIN, lecturer in African law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, completed this book before Cameroun was turned into a unitary state. But his book remains a valuable guide to an African country which, although it includes former British Southern Cameroons, is relatively little known to the English-speaking world.

Concentrating on legal and political developments, this study shows how the 'Federation' was in fact always a unitary state for most purposes, with the President (Ahmadou Ahidjo) holding sweeping powers to rule by decree

in most domains in both East (ex-French) and West (ex-British) Cameroun. Chapters 6 and 7 describe how the unique union of those two territories was effected in theory and practice. The enforcement of one-party rule over the whole state, and of francophone African administration in West Cameroon, is also traced. The backgrounds in both East and West are given in historical sections, very sketchy and at times inaccurate for the earlier period, fuller for later ones and especially for the period of party politics in British Southern Cameroons before and after the 1961 referendum.

The ground is competently covered, though there are tiresome little mistakes such as the mis-spelling of Dr. Aujoulat's name and the reference to the pre-1939 *Union Camerounaise* as being in Douala (it was in Paris with some contacts in Douala). But, regrettably, the account makes flat reading. The politicians' manoeuvres are described, but the background of ordinary African life is not filled in. Glimpses of that ordinary life, of trade, farming, town life, grassroots political action, etc., would have added meat to Dr. Rubin's study. As it is, it gives little help towards envisaging everyday life in what is, despite a very heavy-handed government, a lively little African state.

There is, however, a useful chapter on the economy (Chapter 8), showing some of the facts behind the statistics of 'growth': a serious rich-poor gap increased by the high pay of civil servants as well as of many expatriates, a resulting increase in the drift to cities like Douala and Yaoundé, and continued low rural incomes. Dr. Rubin could have added, however, that these problems are common to the whole of Africa.

This book has inadequacies but its apparently cool reception in Camerounian official circles reflects on them rather than on the book, which is particularly useful for students of modern African law and politics. The spelling 'Cameroun', incidentally, is the French one, which is officially, and fairly generally, rejected in favour of 'Cameroon' in English.

JONATHAN DERRICK

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Mysore Villages Revisited. By T. Scarlett Epstein. Foreword by O. H. K. Spate. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 273 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

PROFESSOR EPSTEIN'S book, to which a brief review cannot hope to do justice, ought to be read by anybody involved in the development of agrarian communities in Asia. It would seem worthwhile also to make it available, in a cheap paperback edition, to those responsible—at the centre, state government and district level—for change in the villages of India.

Unlike the colonial administrators of the past, today even the most devoted development experts rarely have more than a year's leave of absence from government service or academic duty. Few return to the scene of their successes or their crimes of omission and commission. The reader owes Scarlett Epstein a good deal of gratitude for her decision to have a second look at the two villages, a few miles apart, in Mysore, which had been the

subject of her first major field investigation some fifteen years previously.[1] Before her, Margaret Haswell had studied economic change over a period of time in five villages in the State of Madras (Tamil Nadu),[2] but she was compelled to compare her own observations with those recorded by Professor Gilbert Slater at the end of the First World War and by Professor Parekunnel Thomas before the outbreak of the Second World War. Scarlett Epstein has had the good fortune to observe herself the change of the two villages from subsistence to market-orientated communities.

In the face of the latest incidence of drought in Central India, the reader needs no reminder of the fact that without controlled irrigation no combination of technical devices is likely to yield more than short-lived satisfaction. The differences between farming under irrigation, leaving the social fabric largely unimpaired, and economic diversification, propelled by lack of water and leading to social mobility, make fascinating reading; all the more so, since Mrs. Epstein supports her analysis of the wet and the dry village in the plain of Mysore with case studies of representative members of these two communities. Having an outstanding record in the spheres of economics and anthropology, the author is particularly qualified to study both farming and society in the two villages of her choice. The reactions to the ready supply of water and to the lack of it respectively differ greatly: the value of wet and dry land used to vary between three or four to one; it now varies a great deal more. In the social area, the hereditary patron-client relations between the cultivators' caste and their low-caste functionaries have not yet been impaired greatly in the wet farming village. Against this, the members of the community which lacks water have had to seek economic opportunities elsewhere. As a result, traditional social ties have been weakened; at the same time political awareness has grown. As elsewhere on the Indian subcontinent, the 'package programme' of technical innovations has led to growing economic differentiation. At the same time, traditional family patterns have tended to give way to nuclear or 'share families, an adaptation of the conventional joint family to new economic circumstances' (p. 207). Caste has remained 'very much a living social institution' (p. 191), although some low castes through the process of 'Sankritisation' try to 'translate their economic success into social recognition' (p. 199). All the same, even today members of the scheduled communities do not dare draw water from the well used by castes.

When Mrs. Epstein turns from 'Yesterday' and 'Today' to 'Tomorrow', she tends to leave out of account such possible developments as improvements in transport, communications and marketing and changes in prices and price relations of farm products and inputs. However, even if 'there can be no guarantee that all the relevant variables are present' (p. 233), the author's cautious suggestions, designed to turn India's *homo hierarchicus* into *homo aequalis*, deserve to be read with care. She is rightly troubled most by the plight of the landless labourers, most of whom belong to scheduled communities. She is also right in putting economic diversification ahead of egalitarian legislation, if this is not implemented, as is mostly the case. Particular attention ought to be paid to the author's call for a system of tax rates progressively increasing above a standard size of holding,

[1] *Economic Development and Social Change in South India* (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1962). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1962, p. 556.
[2] *Economics of Development in Village India* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1967).

coupled with employment of landless labourers outside agriculture. One may add that the opportunities for employment in urban areas will be limited for some time to come, but a huge amount of work on projects of rural infra-structure needs to be tackled with urgency. Taxes locally raised and locally spent could make a considerable contribution to socio-economic development, as Mrs. Epstein envisages it.

W. KLATT

Pakistan's Foreign Policy. An Historical Analysis. By S. M. Burke. *London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 432 pp. Biblioq. Index. £6·30.*

MR. BURKE'S career was passed in the Pakistani diplomatic service, from which he has now graduated to the American academic service. As a participant in the events he describes he ought to have fresh light to throw on a subject which has already, especially in terms of Pakistan's relations with India, been repeatedly and laboriously studied. He does indeed add a few minor details from information of his own. But he tells us nothing of what it would really be instructive to learn, the workings of the official mind in Pakistan, the ways in which decisions have been arrived at by its ruling groups of landlords, bureaucrats, immigrant businessmen, the reasons why the country has always been committed to hazardous adventures abroad instead of to social reconstruction at home. No analysis of political forces and motives come into this book. It starts with the conventional axioms about Hindus and Muslims being two altogether different species, and is confined throughout within this narrow horizon.

Despite the author's professions of objectivity, it is not surprising to discover that in his, as in all other Pakistani works, Pakistan is invariably right, India invariably wrong. It can, however, be said that the book is a good one of its class. Mr. Burke writes well and lucidly; he is a skilled advocate, if seldom a convincing one; he makes full use of the published literature, press files as well as books and official documents. As a rule also his tone is fairly restrained; an occasional relapse shows up by contrast, as on page 205 when he accuses Afghanistan of 'spewing out vile propaganda by all possible means'—a charge to which his own government has been singularly open. Altogether there could hardly be an abler justification of the foreign policies of Pakistan's rulers, and, incidentally, of a good deal of America's 'defence of the free world'.

The book is constructed in three parts, of which the first is concerned with the 'non-aligned' years, to 1953. It begins with an exhaustive treatment of the Kashmir dispute, with all weaknesses in the Indian case fully developed, and the usual silence as to what good it could have done the Kashmiri peasantry to be transferred to Pakistani rule. Relations with the communist countries, and with the West, are surveyed in turn; also with other Muslim countries, fraternity with which has played a big part in official talk, if not much otherwise. Even during those early years unprogressive Pakistan was, predictably, feeling the pull of cold-war America, and drifting towards the alliance and the flow of American military aid, whose mischievous results some American writers, like W. J. Barnds, have lately been recognising. Part III shows Pakistan embarking on 'bilateralism' by enlisting China as another friend. It was now time for the gamble of the Kashmir war of 1965, but this ended in failure, or at least in stalemate, soon followed by the fall of Ayub.

Under its next military boss, Pakistan, having failed to coerce India, turned its army loose instead against its own 'brethren' of East Bengal. Mr. Burke has added a Postscript on this calamitous conclusion. He frankly admits that West Pakistan failed all along to treat its eastern partner as it ought to have done. Logically he should admit the wrongness from start to finish of a foreign policy dictated exclusively by the interests of West Pakistan, or what its ruling clique chose to consider national interests, which could only jeopardise the security of the eastern wing, while imposing further burdens on it.

V. G. KIERNAN

Fire in the Lake. The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. By Frances Fitzgerald. *London: Macmillan. 1972. 491 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

Fire in the Lake won lavish, unreserved acclaim from book reviewers in the United States and Britain, was described by more than one of these as the best book about the Vietnam war, and its author, Frances Fitzgerald, was lionised on both sides of the Atlantic. Nor is it difficult to discern the reason why. Unlike so many of her compatriots, Miss Fitzgerald writes English with a true feeling for literary style and the use of words. The book is well written and, from the purely literary viewpoint, a pleasure to read.

As a commentary on the tragic developments in Vietnam, however, *Fire in the Lake* is far from praiseworthy. It is sloppily researched—if, indeed, this verb is applicable to the looking up of information in so slapdash a fashion as to get personal names, place names, Vietnamese words, dates, and much else wrong. It is also inaccurate, pretentious, and politically biased. This is a harsh judgment, but every word of it can be fully substantiated.

On page 249, for example, Miss Fitzgerald states that General Nguyen Khanh was a Northerner by birth yet, on the same page, tells how his mother kept a bar for French soldiers in Dalat, which is in South Vietnam. The details given of the general's career are taken from Robert Shaplen's *The Lost Revolution: Vietnam, 1945–1965,*[1] which reveals (p. 228) that the general was born at Tra Vinh—this, too, is in South Vietnam—and was educated in Cambodia and Saigon. She then writes that Khanh became an officer in the 'French commanded *gardes mobiles*', on this occasion citing a reference on page 228 of Shaplen's book. Shaplen's reference, on page 229, not page 228, states that Khanh was 'a top officer in one of the French directed mobile groups', the famous military *groupes mobiles* of the first Indochina war. The *gardes mobiles* are French police units, normally used to quell civil disorders, which never served in Asia. Again Dr. Phan Khac Suu, whose name is incorrectly spelled on pages 257, 326, and 335, is said to be 'in his nineties'. Shaplen describes him as 'elderly', and ill health had certainly made him look older than his years, but he was born in 1905 and was only 59 at the time of which Miss Fitzgerald writes. She had simply not taken the trouble to find out. Such sloppiness runs throughout the whole book.

[1] London: André Deutsch. 1966. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1967, p. 185.

Miss Fitzgerald repeatedly seeks to demonstrate her expertise by citing Vietnamese, a language she wrongly alleges has five tones, and almost all her citations are wrong. *Tu Do* (p. 383) does not mean 'independence'—that is *Doc Lap*—but 'free'. The *Vinh Hoa Dao* is meaningless and does not exist; what is presumably meant is the *Vien Hoa Dao*, and so on ad nauseam. Although the book lays claim to detailed knowledge of drug smuggling through Saigon's airport—knowledge plainly demanding the most difficult, precise, and even dangerous research—the correct spelling of the airport's name, displayed in block capitals at its approaches, proved beyond Miss Fitzgerald's capacity to discover, for she has spelled it wrongly, and not even consistently, throughout.

On the basis of a very brief, and quite inadequate, personal experience of Vietnam, and of the most cursory research restricted to Western language sources, Frances Fitzgerald has written a book which purports to provide a mature, informed, and objective judgment on the Vietnam war. Ostensibly academic—there are copious footnotes, a bibliography, and an index—the book reverts again and again to meretricious journalistic devices to achieve an apparent authenticity. 'At least one American admitted', 'one village lawyer said', and similar phrases are used to introduce opinions, but no identification is provided so that confirmation or refutation of the alleged opinions is impossible.

A single reading of *Fire in the Lake* provided this reviewer, a specialist Vietnamese scholar, with several tightly written pages of factual errors alone. In addition, the argumentation is throughout unfairly slanted in favour of the Communist side and against the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency emerges as a principal villain—this is possibly significant since Miss Fitzgerald's late father was for many years a professional CIA officer, and his old friend George Carver is several times singled out for personal attack.

For all its faults, this is not the worst book ever written about the Vietnam war. What is alarming, though, is the fact that professional book reviewers in two continents, wholly unqualified to assess so specialised a work as this, should have blandly informed their readers that it is the best. Miss Fitzgerald may well prove to have acquired much fame and money undeservedly because of the demand for 'instant judgment, however incompetent' on the part of the press and television.

P. J. HONEY

Viewpoint on Indonesia. A Geographical Study. By G. J. Missen. *London: Nelson. 1973. 359 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £2·25.*

UNDER the subheading of 'a geographical study', the author of this work has undertaken an inquiry into the history of economic change in Indonesia which focuses on the record and prospects of development. Much of the volume is taken up with a clear derivative account of the economic experience of Indonesia under Dutch rule. And the legacy of this period, in which resources were utilised primarily for the export trade and not for the promotion of local manufactures, is evaluated to great effect. The record of economic decline in the post-independence period up to the political rise of President Suharto is then examined in less detail and the book concludes

with a cogent if relatively brief analysis of the country's current developmental problems.

Although much of this work consists of careful paraphrase, it is of interest because of its consistent focus and also because of the author's sense of political economy, which he demonstrates particularly in the concluding section. He points out quite sensibly that the claim to legitimacy of the present administration in Indonesia demands visible economic performance. In this context, the question is posed whether it will be possible to increase production so that capital resources may be transferred to economically viable and labour-absorbing enterprises without a return to political instability. The ensuing analysis produces a pessimistic conclusion, given expectations of increased population growth and the continuing transfer from rural to congested urban areas of an involutionary pattern of economic life established during the Dutch period. Apart from the prospect of Indonesia becoming increasingly dependent on an international capitalist system extracting its oil and minerals, the author suggests that such local development as takes place, irrespective of the source of capital, is likely to by-pass and isolate the involuted urban bazaar economy to produce growing discontent among an increasing mass of underemployed. These conclusions are presented in a somewhat tentative form, but the implication is quite clear that Indonesia is seen to be governed by an administration which is obliged politically to embark on an economic course which could well undermine its *raison d'être.*

MICHAEL LEIFER

China. A Handbook. Edited by Yuan-li Wu. *Newton Abbot: David & Charles. 1973. 915 pp. Maps. Tables. £13·75.*

THIS massive book—nearly a thousand pages—is intended for the general reader who wants to be thoroughly informed about China today. It is not just a work of reference, although it contains a great many facts and figures, official and otherwise. It is an attempt to summarise American knowledge of the People's Republic as it was during the first two decades of its existence, particularly the last five or six years. Political, economic, social and cultural life are covered in detail in thirty different articles, supplemented by twenty-eight tables and a handful of milestone documents.

One cannot deny that a book like this has its uses. During the brief spell it has been on my shelves, it has come in handy as a source of information on such diverse subjects as crop distribution, oil resources, trade unionism, national income, nuclear development, banking, and the place in the constitution of the National People's Congress. These are all highly topical questions, and no other single book could produce good summaries of the known facts on such a variety of subjects.

The writers are all authorities in their fields; J. L. Buck, for instance, who contributed the piece on land and agricultural resources, is the Grand Old Man of Chinese agricultural studies. His work in China before the war is standard reference for anyone doing research on farming in China today. K. P. Wang, author of the article on natural resources, and John S. Aird, who has written the two on population, are both experts in their fields, though not everyone agrees with their views. Both of them put their estimates (of Chinese mineral production on the one hand and Chinese population on the other) rather on the high side; K. P. Wang's figure for

oil production in 1970 (p. 73) is substantially up on Chou En-lai's (as given to Edgar Snow.) But some personal idiosyncrasies are almost inevitable in a book which, because of the nature of the material, is very dependent on estimates. It is always made quite clear which are the estimates and which are official figures, and there are some very useful tables summarising the estimates made by different Western observers.

This is not a volume of original research; most of the figures and tables have already been published elsewhere. The economic pieces draw heavily on the two US Congress Joint Economic Committee reports published in 1967 and 1972, and in some cases the authors are the same. The personal element in the book is subdued, as is right in a semi-reference book, and there is not much airing of theories. The political pieces are factual, in so far as they can be, and contain useful descriptions of how the system works and analyses of membership of the various elite groups. The two on internal politics, by Joyce Kallgren and Thomas J. Weiss respectively, both successfully put today's unresolved problems of leadership into perspective, expressing what is probably the consensus of Western opinion on Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution and the place of the military after 1968. All the articles have plainly benefited from the intensive work that has been done in the academic world since the Cultural Revolution, and the economic ones have profited from the information official American sources have divulged.

The bibliographies are useful but the chapter on sources of information has one very serious omission; it fails to mention the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part III, which carries the broadcasts from all Chinese provincial radio stations and is indispensable to serious China-watching. The American equivalent gets only cursory mention. This chapter is otherwise comprehensive, though it gives no value judgments. The section on documents is much less adequate; it includes ten important but still not fully representative items, with insufficient snippets from Lin Piao's article on People's War and the 1966 Eleventh Party Plenum communiqué. One sympathises with the editor's space problems, but the best solution would have been to leave documents out altogether and reduce the enormous price.

COLINA MACDOUGALL

Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution. By Stanley Karnow. Introd. by John K. Fairbank. *New York: Viking. 1972. London: Macmillan. 1973. 592 pp. Illus. Index. £6·50.*

STANLEY KARNOW, Far Eastern correspondent of *The Washington Post* since 1965, has written a long and important book, of which the substantial centre is a detailed history of the Cultural Revolution from 1965 to 1969. This is based mainly on the material available to professional China-watchers in Hong Kong, including wall newspapers, pamphlets and interviews with refugees from the mainland. Mr. Karnow also visited Peking in March 1972, and spent 1970–71 as a research fellow at Harvard, where he worked at the East Asian Research Center.

A great merit of his book is to put the Cultural Revolution in historical perspective. He treats it as the most important episode in a continuous struggle. On the one side was Mao, the romantic protagonist of permanent revolution, anxious not to let the 'Yenan spirit' of self-reliance and participation be stifled by the growing bureaucracy of a modern state; on the other side were those opponents, long led by Liu Shao-chi, who aimed

at the rapid development of China as a great power, led by a well-organised Communist Party rather than by a charismatic but wayward visionary. Mr. Karnow traces the conflict back to Mao's decision in favour of quick collectivisation in 1955, and explains convincingly the alternating stages of two steps forward and one back (sometimes one forward and two back) which led via the Eighth Party Congress, the Great Leap Forward, the confrontation with P'eng Teh-Luai, the Sino-Soviet clash and the economic disasters of the early 1960s to Mao's decision to mobilise the 'masses' against his political opponents and launch the 'Cultural Revolution'. (Incidentally, the author sees the 'Hundred Flowers' movement of 1957, not as a serious attempt by Mao to secure the support of China's intellectuals, but as a deliberate ploy undertaken to give him an excuse to embark on more radical 'rectification' policies.) The account of the various radical actions and party and army reactions during the Cultural Revolution itself is convincing, and gives as clear a picture as possible of a highly confused situation; various generals defended their mountain-tops in war-lord style against Red Guards, local alliances changed rapidly, and casualties (as Mao and Chou subsequently admitted) were high.

The last chapters of the book are devoted to an account of China's return to comparative normality from 1968–72, and of its new foreign policy of 'joining the world'. This resulted from a number of external pressures and opportunities (particularly in relation to the Soviet Union) which had been operating for some time. Mr. Karnow perhaps pays insufficient attention to the effect of such pressures on Chinese internal history in previous years, but there is some subtle speculation about the interaction between internal and foreign policy in the autumn of 1965 when, according to Mr. Karnow, Mao decided to use the People's Liberation Army primarily for internal purposes, while his Chief of Staff pressed for concentration against what appeared to be a serious American threat from the south.

In his concluding chapter, Mr. Karnow offers some interesting thoughts on the results of the Cultural Revolution, emphasising that one of its legacies may be local and personal vendettas which could long bedevil Chinese internal politics. While 'the only predictable feature of China under the Communists has been its unpredictability', he concludes that on the whole it is the 'prose of stable administration' which has now ousted the 'poetry of revolution'. Yet although Mao the visionary may be disillusioned, even the partial attainment of his goals has given China a stature and sense of national identity which it has long lacked.

Duncan Wilson

The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941. By Gerald E. Bunker. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972. 327 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £6·75.*

Mr. Bunker has provided a useful, detailed guide through the jungle of unofficial parleys between Japanese and Chinese during the first four years of the war between them. The 'peace conspiracy' of which he writes included Japanese who regretted the hostilities which had arisen with China and looked to the benefits of a negotiated settlement; Chinese who recognised the damage, both material and spiritual, which had been done to China by the war, and who saw the best solution as being to open channels of communication with Japan; and, less importantly, foreigners

and foreign governments which were ready to play the part of intermediary. Mr. Bunker gives a coherent account of this many-sided but abortive peace movement.

The subtitle is rather baffling since it is not immediately apparent what China war Wang Ching-wei is fighting. I assume that 'Japan's China war' is meant. Not unexpectedly the book provides a portrait of Wang as the central character as seen through Japanese eyes. Although Mr. Bunker's views will not be accepted by many Chinese, he has plenty of interesting observations to make, for example, in his description of Wang's role in Chinese politics as being

> to present the peace-loving and accommodating face of the Kuomintang toward Japan. In the same way, other leading figures in the Chinese government specialised in relations with one or another of the countries with which China had to deal: Sun Fo with the Soviet Union; T. V. Sung with the United States. Although these specialists would naturally come forward in turn like carved figures on a cuckoo clock as China turned from one power to another for support, nevertheless, there was no reason to doubt the basic devotion of each to the interests of China and the Kuomintang regime. The existence of these various 'area specialists' gave Chinese foreign policy flexibility (p. 87).

Perhaps it is useful to be reminded that China, until 1949, was a country of many faces, and that Wang has to be judged by that criterion. Asking himself whether Wang was a traitor or a patriot, Bunker concludes: 'Wang was no Petain or Quisling; he did not love the Japanese; he was not hostile to the institutions of his country; he sought nothing for himself but the honor of saving his country' (p. 285).

Mr. Bunker is unfortunate in going into print so soon after J. H. Boyle's *China and Japan at War, 1937–45.*[1] He explains that Mr. Boyle's thesis reached him too late to assist him in the research for his own volume (p. 292). Consequently the material in the two books has a close resemblance, and many of the same themes recur. Boyle's book is longer and more space is devoted to the years before 1937 and the years after 1941. In the case of Bunker, more of an attempt has been made to use Western language sources, such as newspapers and foreign collections of documents. For this reason it has been possible for him to contribute much that is new on the attitudes of the powers to the drama in China. He has also reproduced a fascinating series of photographs. It is impossible for this reviewer to do other than recommend both studies to the reader, but he hastens to add that he could do without another study of the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei for some years to come.

I. H. NISH

Japan and the Atlantic World. Edited by Curt Gasteyger. *Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House for The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Paris. 1972. 88 pp. (The Atlantic Papers, No. 3.)*

Japan and East Asia. The New International Order. By Donald C. Hellmann. *London: Pall Mall. 1972. 243 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

BOTH these books address the problems raised by Japan's re-emergence as a major source of influence in the world. Each has a regional bias. One

[1] Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 304.

discusses Japan's relations with the North Atlantic countries; the other deals with Japan in Asia.

The collection of papers edited by Curt Gasteyger may be divided into two groups. The three written by Masataka Kosaka, Robert E. Ward and Zbigniew Brzezinski cover the well-trodden ground of Japan's role in the world. This does not mean that they have nothing new to say. Professor Kosaka offers an intelligent description of the problems as seen from inside Japan. Robert Ward discusses the Japanese-American relationship and makes the important point that the European Economic Community should pay attention to its lessons when managing its own expanding economic relationship with Japan; a point taken up by Klaus Terfloth in his paper on 'Brussels and Tokyo'. Professor Brzezinski treats us to the familiar geometrical games which have now become the conventional view of international relations. Both he and Kosaka reject the option of Japanese neutrality for various reasons. But they do not ask whether it has any meaning in a world in which the traditional alliance patterns are dissolving.

The second group of papers includes the two by Terfloth and Sir John Figgess. They deal with the relatively unexplored relationship between Western Europe and Japan. Figgess writes from a background of profound knowledge of Japan and makes, perhaps, the most penetrating assessment of Japan's foreign policy in the whole book (p. 62). Mr. Terfloth's contribution is written from the standpoint of an official in the EEC and contains some useful information.

Curt Gasteyger's wise introductory chapter pulls the various strands together. On balance he reaches 'safe' conclusions about the role and forms of power in international relations, and the problems of Japan's adjustment to them. However, when he discusses 'Doubtful Power Concepts' (pp. 12–13) he hints at the possibility of unexpected and unconventional developments.

Professor Hellmann's stimulating and well-written book betrays no such doubts. He states his point of departure unequivocally on the second page. He sees peace in Asia as 'ultimately a function of a "power balance"', involving the super-powers, China and Japan. Since he takes a pessimistic view of the prospects for peace, he assumes that Japan will not be able to participate fully or for long in regional politics without expanding its military power. He has a more open mind as to whether that power will be nuclear or not.

The author envisages an east and south-east Asian international subsystem in which China and Japan will become the chief contestants. His assessment of China's basic policy orientation—'Peking's challenge to both super-powers, its ambitious weapons program, and the revolutionary cast of its foreign policy' (p. 24)—makes the outlook in that region gloomy indeed. This is all the more so because he doubts Japan's skill and flexibility in managing its relations in a fluid international situation. This becomes more serious because the domestic political environment makes Japanese policy basically reactive.

As the book progresses the rather dogmatic tone of the early chapters gives way to a more scholarly approach. There are some excellent chapters on the domestic background to Japan's foreign policy and on Japan's economic relations with east and south-east Asia, which includes a warning against the fallacious view that economic prosperity must bring with it political stability.

There are, however, three weaknesses in Professor Hellmann's book. First, it was not his fault that it was written before Mr. Tanaka's visit to Peking and the subsequent developments. They raise new questions about both Chinese and Japanese intentions. They might have induced him to moderate his assessment of China. That leads to the second criticism. The bibliography includes a number of works on international relations and current affairs, as well as many on Japan. Yet there is no mention of any substantial book in either English or Japanese which deals with China. This must increase one's reserve about his judgment when China is concerned. Finally, by taking an uncompromising stand on the theoretical assumptions of *Realpolitik*, the author puts himself into an intellectual straitjacket. His horizons are narrowed, he may overstress the importance of south-east Asia in Japanese policy, and he excludes the possibility that the interplay of the international environment with the domestic situation may lead to a response from Japan which eschews some of the traditional instruments of power.

WOLF MENDL

Pacific Horizons: A Regional Role for New Zealand. Ed. by Mary Boyd. *Wellington: Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. 1972. 106 pp. Index. (Papers read at the 1971 Conference of the Institute.) $NZ 2.00.*

New Zealand in the Pacific. Ed. by B. M. Brown. *Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration. 1970. 125 pp. Index.*

South Pacific Commission: An Analysis after Twenty-five Years. By T. R. Smith. Forewords by Fred Betham and Sir Guy Powles. *Wellington: Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. 1972. 248 pp. Illus. Index. $NZ 7.50.*

New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951–1971. By Richard Kennaway. *Wellington: Hicks Smith. 1972. London: Methuen. 1973. 166 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·20.*

IT is scarcely a decade since the only major works on New Zealand external affairs were those written by F. L. W. Wood and B. K. Gordon or edited by T. C. Larkin. The situation has changed much in recent years, and these four volumes are further evidence of the rapid expansion in production. *Pacific Horizons* consists of papers read at the annual conference of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in 1971. The theme was originally selected to fit in with South Pacific year, an idea intended to stimulate New Zealand interest in the South Pacific islands. It was a public education exercise, and the fact that it was thought necessary is itself a commentary, perhaps, on New Zealanders' attitudes and policies to their smaller neighbours. The quality of these papers is high, as might be expected from contributors such as Keith Jackson (on a South Pacific Council), Alan Watt (on the interests of the great powers in the Pacific Basin), David McIntyre (on the interests of the middle powers) and Alexander MacLeod (on New Zealand's role). The collection is rounded off by an excellent introduction from Mary Boyd, and a well-organised index. A symposium to be recommended.

New Zealand in the Pacific comprises papers read at the 1969 convention of the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration reviewing New

Zealand's external policies and problems after the British decision in 1968 to withdraw military forces from south-east Asia. The introduction by B. M. Brown sets out the background and, in effect, is a digest of much of what follows. Keith Jackson reappears to give a sensible account of New Zealand's role in the Pacific area with some reference to recent history, and other papers deal with trade prospects, international co-operation for aid to the developing territories in the area, New Zealand's responsibilities and the Pacific islanders in urban environments. The paper on political developments affecting New Zealand in the Pacific Ocean concludes with a description of New Zealand's present international position that is worth quoting for its succinct lucidity: 'We are now, I suppose we could say, a bi-racial Commonwealth country, of predominantly Western culture, located in the South Pacific and on the fringes of Asia, closely linked by sentiment, tradition and economic interest with the Atlantic Community, and with growing security and other ties with the countries of Asia' (p. 51).

T. R. Smith's study is a history of the first twenty-five years of the South Pacific Commission founded in 1947, and is the most substantial of the volumes under review. It would require a genius to make a full-length account of the commission really fascinating, and much of this history is inevitably heavy-going, but the author, who was the commission's secretary-general 1958–63, has done a competent and useful job, producing a well-researched and maturely presented authoritative analysis for which the burden of two forewords was quite unnecessary.

Richard Kennaway's account of New Zealand foreign policy 1951–71 is, surprisingly, the first single author history of recent New Zealand foreign policy as a whole. It is a pot-boiler of the admissible kind, based frankly on more detailed monographs by other scholars, and evidently intended mainly for students of New Zealand history and politics. It is fair and balanced and has an up-to-date select bibliography. Nothing to get excited about, but welcome as a handy, and not too taxing, introduction to the history of recent New Zealand foreign policy.

TREVOR REESE

NORTH AMERICA

The United States in World Affairs 1970. By William P. Lineberry. *New York: Simon and Schuster for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1972. 359 pp. Index. $9.95.*

THE resumption of publication by the Council on Foreign Relations of its series *The United States in World Affairs* is to be welcomed, and this survey of 1970 is highly appropriate. As the preface indicates, it is not intended to be a chronological account of the daily developments in American diplomacy but rather 'one individual's view of the broad trends occupying the attention of the American public and its policy-makers and of the complex interplay of events at home and abroad that helped to shape them' (p. 5). In this respect the author is successful, providing a more stimulating and critical, if perhaps less detailed, account than previous studies in the series. As Lineberry readily admits, 1970 offered more than its share of puzzling, even contradictory, phenomena, and the broad significance of the end of the decade is encapsulated neatly in an initial contrast between the strong note

of confidence struck by President Kennedy in his Inaugural Address in 1961, with its interventionist overtones that later came to haunt many liberal Democrats, and the cautious appraisal of America's mission in the next decade outlined by President Nixon at the beginning of 1970.

Lineberry outlines the pattern of events responsible for this change of mood, indicating also that while most of the old problems that had dogged the 1960s—tension in Soviet-American relations, the arms issue, the Middle East conflict and, inevitably, Vietnam—remained unresolved, new problems and developments loomed on the horizon. These included initiatives by the Federal Republic of Germany to normalise its relations with the communist states of Eastern Europe, the election in Chile of a Marxist President, a new tide of protectionism at home, and a sudden upsurge of international terrorism. Through his 'Nixon doctrine', set out in a document which was long in rhetoric but also specific in its emphasis on the sharing of responsibilities and new forms of partnership and participation in which the United States would play less of an initiating or innovating role, President Nixon seemed to seek a new and lower posture for his country in world affairs. But particular events dictated otherwise. In 1970, the United States still found time to involve itself in a short-lived invasion of communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, in a major peace initiative in the Middle East, in efforts to reform the United Nations and the international monetary system, and in reappraising its relations with Latin America and the black states of Africa.

Overall, Lineberry does a thorough job of illuminating the dilemmas of the President. Nixon was anxious to demonstrate his foreign policy expertise, seeking a lower military commitment abroad and an emphasis on negotiation (especially with the leaders of communist nations), and manufacturing an overall change in the substance and machinery of American foreign policy. But he was faced with a situation in which immediate pressures often required traditional contrary responses and with a domestic political environment of growing demands to consider national security and domestic priorities together rather than separately, and with a sceptical Congress seeking an increased say in any new approaches to a new era.

JOHN D. LEES

Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest. By Hadley Arkes. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 395 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. £6·25.*

THE title of this book may be misconstrued. It is not simply a study of the methods used by the Economic Co-operation Administration, as the word 'bureaucracy' might imply, but much more a series of reflections on the link between the substance of foreign policy and the process of administration 'at one of those moments in which a nation is given a chance to articulate something of its own character . . .' (p. 172). The debate surrounding the Marshall Plan in 1947–48 is an interesting subject well worth a volume of this size, but Dr. Arkes, who undertook the basic research in 1965–66, has been tempted to pack so much of his own personal development since that date into its pages, that some readers may fail to disentangle an appreciation of American attitudes to foreign affairs after the war from the very considerable philosophical discussion in which he has embedded it. Perhaps the approach which Dr. Arkes has followed says more about a

current intellectual need to 'witness' against positivism than about the potential of the subject which he has chosen.

Dr. Arkes argues that Congress, in facing the problem of administering the Marshall Plan, started a chain of inquiry which raised some of the most fundamental questions of national interest. He analyses the legislation itself in order to illustrate the hierarchy of values which the plan represented, and sets out to find some standards which can be applied in testing the performance of the Economic Co-operation Administration. For this purpose he devises a series of hypothetical 'operating presumptions' on the basis of the more explicit statements used in the debate, and from this list he separates a number of primary or secondary commitments or independent and dependent values (pp. 218–222). He thinks that these policy strands seem to support the hypothesis that the legislation placed a higher value on making Europe independent of 'extraordinary outside assistance' than on furthering the self-serving interests of American groups.

But the book is much less convincing in testing such a hypothesis. Chapters 12, 13 and 14, which ought to contain the principal evidence on the manner in which the 'operating presumptions' were turned into practice, give few glimpses of the 'bureaucrats' at work. Dr. Arkes limits himself to published ECA reports and congressional evidence, and makes no use of the records of the administration, except those of the Bureau of the Budget.

The selfconscious inspiration behind the book is Weber's notion of rational legality. The debate on the Marshall Plan is used to illustrate the character of the American legal order, the regime of authority. Dr. Arkes thinks that there was something in the American system of government itself which compelled Congress to abandon a more unilateral approach to the problems of European recovery after the war. His interests lie in the field of moral philosophy, not administrative history.

A greater interest in the actual operations of the ECA would have led him away from this theoretical concern, and perhaps brought him to give the reader a more 'historical account'. The book reveals the richness of congressional hearings for evidence of American political attitudes, and the sources he quotes show how much more waits to be derived from the debates on the Marshall Plan, particularly on the 'lessons' drawn from wartime administration and on the question of European integration. Although Dr. Arkes's method may disappoint the historian, his reading lists are a valuable contribution to an understanding of the crucial changes effected in international affairs from 1947 to 1952.

J. M. LEE

The Myth of Liberation: East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 1941. By Bennett Kovrig. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. 360 pp. Bibliog. Index. $11.50. £5·20.*

As Bennett Kovrig points out in his well-documented work, 'The history of East-Central Europe is marked by the flux and reflux of great empires on its periphery' (p. 286). While adjacent Tsarist Russia always had a great interest in the area, the more remote United States restricted itself in the 19th century to occasional enthusiasm for liberal movements, particularly in 1848. After the First World War, with pressure from East-Central European immigrants, Woodrow Wilson made a vain attempt at the almost impossible task of

implementing his famous principles. He was also very conscious, of course, of the desirability of setting up a *cordon sanitaire* against the spread of the Bolshevik Revolution, and therefore connived at the creation of governments which were neither ethnically self-determined nor democratic. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was presented with the opportunity of extending its socialism from one country to several neighbouring states. Still essentially wedded to Wilsonian ideals, the United States made a series of overlapping responses which Kovrig carefully records. First, at the series of conferences culminating in Yalta, there was the attempt at co-operative liberation. Next, with the onset of the cold war, came containment. Too negative for many opponents of communism, containment was largely replaced by the more positive concept of 'rollback'. Then, with the realisation that the United States was powerless to intervene in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, American policy moved towards the 'bridge-building' and detente of the 1960s.

Although he makes 'no grand prescription for future policies towards East-Central Europe' (p. x), Kovrig does conclude that: 'For the foreseeable future, the basic premise of containment, however unpalatable, retains its validity: change will likely come about only through the internal transformation of the Soviet system. But that flawed and often inhuman system has demonstrated a capacity for endurance and resistance to change . . .' (p. 296). Fundamentally then, Kovrig accepts the conceptual framework of the cold war period. But he is perceptive enough to detect its limitations. For example, he believes that the assumption that 'spheres of influence were a discredited and outdated European concept . . . rang somewhat hollow in the light of Washington's unaltered insistence on the inviolability of an American sphere of interest in the Western hemisphere' (p. 289). In such a perspective, he could quite properly have pointed out the irony of the sponsorship at the United Nations of the resolution most critical of Soviet intervention in Hungary by the delegate of the United States' unsavoury client, Batista's Cuba. Similarly, he might have made more than a passing reference to American intervention in the Dominican Republic, not to mention other cases outside the Western hemisphere such as Lebanon and Vietnam. Nevertheless although at work on a subject about which he has powerful personal feelings as well as ideological commitment, his scholarship is conscientious enough to present information which could be used by somebody of the opposite persuasion, for example, on Radio Free Europe. For the moment, therefore, from the Western point of view at least, this commendable book will remain, in the Namierite sense referred to in the preface, definitive 'until superseded by something better' (p. x).

PAUL DUKES

Civil Strife in Latin America: A Legal History of U.S. Involvement. By William Everett Kane. Foreword by William D. Rogers. *Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1972. 240 pp. Index. $10.00.*

THIS book originated in the work of the study panel on the international law of civil war of the American Society of International Law. The aim of the study panel was to clarify 'current patterns of state practice bearing on the relevance of law to civil-war types of situations and to illuminate the policy problems that arise when a particular conflict exhibits an interplay

of domestic violence and external participation' (Foreword, p. vii). A number of the panel papers have already been published as *The International Law of Civil War*, edited by Richard A. Falk.[1] The present study was recommended for independent publication as a contribution to the scholarly literature of international law.

The book is, therefore, an historical synthesis, making use (sometimes in an appropriately unexpected way) of a good range of secondary materials. Its author, who is himself engaged in the practice of law, writes well and with the air of one setting out a case. The case is, broadly speaking, that the United States has persistently violated the norms of international law by intervention in Latin American states; that this intervention has been a bipartisan activity in which Democrats have sinned as much as Republicans; and that it derives from the history of the development of strategic doctrines in the United States and their acceptance by civilian leaders. 'It is contended', he writes, 'that since the 1890's non-intervention has not been compatible with dominant American strategic doctrine. The American commitment to non-intervention resulted from an atypical absence of any external threat between the two world wars, when strategy took a back seat to other political considerations' (pp. 7–8).

The case is in many respects a strong one. Early American expansion in the Caribbean (say, 1898–1918) was undeniably strongly motivated by strategic considerations. The concern for sea power, the need for an advanced naval base against European aggression (then not as ridiculous as the possibility seems now), pushed official circles into plans and actions well over the notional line of international propriety. However, although Mr. Kane is certainly right to discount the importance of financial and economic involvements between the United States and Latin America at that period, his absence of comment on them thereafter is disappointing. The 1920–40 period is treated in terms of treaties; the postwar in terms of 'national-security management'. There is much here worth reading, especially perhaps the pertinent conclusion (among others) that 'the major interventions of the last twenty years have been directed more at the conditions that in popular conception favor communist advances than they have at established communist regimes' (p. 224). No resolution of the policy-makers' dilemma between intervention and non-intervention seems to be in sight.

PETER CALVERT

In Search of Roosevelt. By Rexford G. Tugwell. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972; London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 313 pp. Index. £6·50.*

MOST of the essays in this volume have been published before, some of them over twenty years ago. In general, therefore, they are not the distant recollections of a distinguished participant in the great events of long ago. Brought together in revised form in a single volume they make a worthwhile contribution to our continuing attempt to understand the mind and personality of a man who, in Tugwell's image, has thrown a long shadow across 20th-century history.

Tugwell skilfully portrays FDR's character, showing him to be a

[1] Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins Press. 1971.

'professional office seeker' (p. 52) but at the same time a man fully endowed with a sense of social justice. Unlike some recent historians, Tugwell, an unrepentant although disappointed New Dealer, has no doubts about Roosevelt's progressivism. In fact he finds him rooted in the progressive past so securely that he was able to resist the blandishments of Moley, Tugwell and Berle, the major proponents of the Van Hise school of 'concentration and control' (p. 92). FDR responded to concepts of planning, but was always concerned with ends rather than means; for intellectual as well as for political reasons he would always measure systems by their immediate and visible results. Nevertheless, in Tugwell's view, although Roosevelt rejected dialectical stereotypes he did try to change, however incompletely, the general direction of American development and to shift it towards controlled rather than liberated *laissez-faire*.

In a number of interesting and perceptive essays Tugwell discusses the attitudes of Roosevelt, the presidential candidate, before the election of 1932, and contrasts the freedom of the candidate's flirtations over policy positions with the president-elect's greater caution during the presidential transition. In the last two well-known but still important essays he shows how, in the White House, the 'experimental' Roosevelt frequently found himself in conflict with the 'compromising' Roosevelt.

The student of foreign affairs will be here reminded of the complexity of the issues confronting any president, and although there is little direct discussion of foreign policy the reader will gain considerable insight into the mind of an ambitious, well-intentioned and self-confident man. There is also evidence, however tangential, to support the view that the Roosevelt Administration was, in its foreign policy attitudes, consistently Eurocentric, despite the superficial implications of the war debt and stabilisation issues of 1932–33.

D. K. ADAMS

LATIN AMERICA

The Chilean Road to Socialism: Proceedings of an ODEPLAN-IDS Round Table, March, 1972. Ed. by J. Ann Zammit with Gabriel Palma. *Brighton: University of Sussex Institute of Development Studies. 1973. 461 pp. Bibliog. £4·50; Paperback: £2·50.*

The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950–1970: Public Policy, Political Institutions and Social Change. By Robert R. Kaufman. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972. 321 pp. Index. £6·00.*

Allende's Chile. Edited by Kenneth Medhurst. *London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon. 1972. Published in association with Government and Opposition. 202 pp. Index. £2·25.*

IN so many ways dissimilar, the Chilean and Cuban revolutions share one common feature—an immediate and sharp increase in the number of books devoted to explaining what happened and why. The almost inevitable fate of such books is to be overtaken by events, though this is hardly the fault of the authors. For a clear and thoughtful account of the possibilities of the transition to socialism in Chile, of the hopes of the government, of the difficulties of the process as they seemed in early 1972, it is difficult to

imagine a more adequate guide than the conference proceedings skilfully edited by Ann Zammit.

The Institute of Development Studies at Sussex and the Chilean Planning Office brought together a group of foreign and national experts to write papers and engage in discussion. The resulting book is naturally uneven. Ann Zammit's summaries of the discussions are always well done, and the content of the debate was obviously very stimulating; the papers are sometimes disappointing, and rather superficial. The strengths of the volume lie in the discussions of the economic aspects of the first year of Allende's government, especially on the key fronts of agrarian reform (excellent papers and debate) and copper nationalisation. The weakest sections are the vague and inconclusive wanderings around the admittedly complicated problems of socialist consciousness and worker commitment. There is relatively little on politics, on parties, on trade unions (apart from an interesting section on worker participation) and on social structure. But some important economic policy statements of the government, as well as background papers on other countries, are reprinted as an added bonus to the volume.

What general impressions emerge from the book? Foremost perhaps is the tremendous difficulty of constructing socialism democratically when the government does not have a majority in congress; even changes in the tax system are denied to the administration. The emphasis that the government places on working class power and participation remains a theoretical desire rather than a policy being implemented. ' It is necessary to develop workers' consciousness ', writes Oscar Garréton (p. 67). This seems to assume that workers either have very little political or class consciousness, or, as one North American thinks, ' bourgeois ' consciousness. How the government proposes to create a situation of permanent revolutionary mobilisation in an open multi-party system where the opposition enjoys a majority and when the economy is far from sound does not emerge from the papers or discussion.

The foreign participants pointed very frequently to the likely constraints on the government's economic policy, especially in the external sector. Government spokesmen exhibited more optimism, some of which can now be seen to be very misplaced. ' The government was not expecting a sustained rise in prices ' (p. 91). But this was a public debate and the government spokesmen can hardly be blamed for trying to convince the participants of the need for a Chilean road to socialism. As a record and evaluation of the progress along that road in 1972, as seen by a large number of people, this is an invaluable document.

Robert Kaufman's book is really about politicians' perceptions of the need for a land reform law, in the light of overall political considerations. There is a great deal in the book about the mechanics of ' reform mongering ', which is neither particularly interesting nor, at least it seems to me, strictly relevant to the theme. Yet there is a lot of useful information in the book, many good ideas, and, at last, an examination of the right as well as the left in Chilean politics.

In attempting to cover so much ground there are some odd omissions and interpretations in the book. Catholic Action and the *Instituto de Educación Rural*, both important in early attempts by the right to organise the peasantry, scarcely appear. It is surely not the case that peasant unions include as many *afuerinos* as *inquilinos*. The author accepts the inflated membership figures of the CNC at their face value. He is too ready to accept

Landsberger's thesis of the essentially economic oriented nature of Chilean trade unions.

Political infighting and bargaining is an essential element of the Chilean legislative system and Kaufman deals expertly with this aspect of land reform. The way the right came to accept the need for some sort of reform is a crucial element in the story. The Chilean agrarian system is extremely complicated and can be treated in many different ways at many different levels. Though the peasantry itself makes few appearances, the book is a useful contribution to the legislative and party aspects of the reform process.

Kenneth Medhurst's collection of articles lacks the sense of urgency and involvement that characterises Ann Zammit's volume, though it too has a good piece on agrarian reform and a very over-optimistic article on the economy. But unlike the Zammit volume it pays attention to the institutional and constitutional aspects of the transition to socialism (or at least to 1976). Joan Garcés is worth reading, despite his opaque style, because of his influence as one of Allende's political advisers. The other articles deal with opposition to Allende, with anti-parliamentary groups since the 1920s, and with the political prerequisites of a successful transition to socialism. There is a great deal of this sort of material around in Spanish, but relatively little in English, so it makes a useful addition to the literature on the problems and prospects of the Popular Unity government.

ALAN ANGELL

Inflation and Economic Development in Brazil, 1946–1963. By Raouf Kahil. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1973. 357 pp. Index. £11·00.*

The Revolution That Never Was: Northeast Brazil 1955–1964. By Joseph A. Page. *New York: Grossman. 1972. 273 pp. Index. $12.50.*

Freedom to Starve. By Paul Gallet. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972. 249 pp. (The Penguin Latin American Library; Gen. Ed: Richard Gott.) £0·50.*

DR. RAOUF KAHIL'S book is a splendidly researched and meticulously painstaking demolition of the more extreme structuralist arguments on the causation of Brazil's inflation between 1945 and 1963. It is a book that has been greatly needed, as the more extreme structuralists, lost in the beauty of their theory's political implications, tend to ignore the importance of bread-and-butter issues, such as budget deficits, credit expansion and wage policies, in determining the rate of inflation.

The book begins with a general background survey which is not free from some minor inaccuracies and gives evidence of having been written in haste. The reader should not be put off, however; the strength of this book lies in the second part, in the careful analysis of the structuralist case in the light of the observed facts in the fields of agriculture, industry, capital supply and the external sector. The third part is a blow-by-blow account of the four phases through which inflation passed during the period under review: 1945–48, 1948–54, 1954–58 and 1959–63. The conclusions deserve reading and rereading; they amount to proof that, though at the time under consideration there were certainly elements in the Brazilian economic structure that were conducive to inflation (such as backward agriculture, a low propensity to save, an entrepreneurial tendency towards speculative investment, an inadequate infrastructure, a mainly unskilled labour force,

and an unhealthy dependence on a few export items) none of these considerations played a significant role in the evolution of the price level from 1946 to 1963. The inflation was, on the contrary, caused by government policies directed at seeking popularity among the urban workers and also conciliating certain powerful economic forces, which led to the budget credit and wage policies already referred to. The case must be regarded as proved.

A few minor criticisms of the editing: it seems a pity to misspell the Serra dos Oragãos and São Salvador da Bahia in quick succession, and to hide, both in the text and the index, the dynamic persona of Brazil's present finance minister under the anonymity of Netto, A.D. But apart from these minor points the book is well written and well produced; Dr. Kahil and the OUP deserve the warmest congratulations for their work.

The book by Joseph Page on the abortive radical movements in the North-East in 1955–64 is a most successful and unusual amalgam of the journalistic and the scholarly. The book is written in a most welcome conversational style, with an immediacy and concern that make for a very poignant story.

The author visited the North-East six times between 1963 and 1971, and in 1964 had the honour of being arrested and imprisoned there (see his Appendix: ' Notes from a Recife Jail '). He himself is acquainted with many of the principal actors in the drama and has followed their words and acts with meticulous care. Possibly the most interesting part of the book is the account—which is so closely documented that its veracity cannot be doubted—given of the struggle between the change-seeking elements in the North-East, led by the Sudene staff, and the United States aid authorities who, faced by the conflict between the humanitarian attitudes of the Alliance for Progress and the hard strategic considerations that gave it birth, opted without question for the latter and determined to oppose the radical movements in the fear that, if successful, they would take Brazil out of the Western alliance.

All who are interested in Brazil, particularly in the North-East, should read this book. Mr. Page is totally *engagé*; his sense of narrative is excellent, and the desperation of the apparently hopeless struggle between some of the poorest people in the New World and some of the most cynical and heartless governing classes anywhere has never been better expressed.

' Paul Gallet ' is the pseudonym of a French priest who worked in Brazil from 1962 to 1969, most of the time in what appears from internal evidence to be São Luís, Maranhão. This moving book, first published in France in a shorter form,[1] is a collection of his letters and diary entries through this period.

The theme running through the book is Père Gallet's growing conviction that the inhuman conditions of life in his area are due not to innate poverty but to exploitation; what else can explain such desperate misery in a fertile countryside such as he describes? For some readers his indignation will run too far; inhuman conditions of life are not found only in colonial-type economies and it is—to the non-Marxist, at any rate—rather far-fetched to blame Portuguese, British and United States colonialism in turn for the Brazilian governing class's lack of a social conscience.

One final word: it is a pity that more attention was not given to ensuring that the frequent Portuguese names, words and phrases were spelt correctly.

JOHN BROOKS

[1] *El Padre* (Paris: Editions ouvrières. 1967).

Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development. Ed. by Jon H. Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 438 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·50.*

Brazil in the Sixties. Ed. by Riordan Roett. *Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 1972. 434 pp. Index. $15.00.*

THE current Brazilian boom is also producing a boom in the number of books published on Brazil. These two volumes both contain a large number of articles and chapters on various aspects of Brazilian political and economic development. The volume edited by Roett is a more coherent production and contains especially useful chapters by the editor himself on the military, by Douglas Chalmers on political groups, and by David Goodman on Industrial Development in the Northeast. The Praeger volume varies from excessively general and extremely short chapters to very detailed studies. It will be of more use to the expert on Brazil. The Roett volume is a good general introduction.

ALAN ANGELL

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The War History from Dunkirk to Alamein, based on the War Cabinet papers of 1940 to 1942. By Roger Parkinson. *London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon. 1973. 539 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

MR. PARKINSON has now completed the second volume of his history of the Second World War, of which the first covered the period from Munich to Dunkirk.[1] The new volume is an improvement, although some of the general critical points then made still apply. The approach is still narrative and the author does not stand back from his writing to assess the significance of the events he describes. The detail is impressive but, partly for this reason, the narrative flags from time to time. The author tells us that he weighed up carefully the two ways in which the book could have been written. He could either have treated events topic by topic, or chronologically in almost day by day fashion. He chose the latter, while recognising the additional strain imposed on the reader by having to follow a number of threads simultaneously. He suggests that this strain perhaps conveys a better idea of the daily stresses which the Cabinet had to endure.

Certainly, there is a danger in isolating particular topics and treating them separately. We are lured into believing that those involved could isolate them too, whereas reality was always much more complicated and interrelated. On the other hand, if it is the task of the historian to trace the formation and operation of policy concerning particular problems, then a sense of continuity is imperative and some degree of isolation inevitable. Mr. Parkinson can rightly take the credit for being the first to marry official documents with private memoirs and diaries in a full-scale study of the war. Yet, for all his evident industry, it remains the raw material of a history

1 *Peace for our Time* (London: Hart-Davis. 1971). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1972, p. 625.

rather than a volume which illumines the making of policy in depth or exposes individuals or issues to sustained analysis. It remains, like the earlier volume, the 'inside story', though this subtitle is dropped. The perspective is that of the Cabinet room and the great set pieces of the war. Apart from the occasional newspaper headline, few other people or other issues make an appearance.

These years were, of course, grim. The storey goes from the beaches of Dunkirk, through the Battle of Britain to Barbarossa and the desert war. There was little consolation to be gained for the Allies in any theatre of the war. Parkinson's coverage is thorough and sound. We trace again the pitiful story of Singapore and the struggles in North Africa. Only at the very end is there any hope: the end of the beginning. Mr. Parkinson therefore still has a long way to go himself. As the pressure begins to ease on the Allies, it would be pleasant if he relaxed the pressure of his narrative and gave us more rounded and sustained pictures of the men who had nothing but blood, toil, tears, and sweat.

KEITH ROBBINS

Alex. The Life of Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis. By Nigel Nicolson. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1973. 346 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·95.*

THE good fairies at the christening of Field Marshal the Earl Alexander of Tunis endowed him with many of the qualities necessary for an outstanding military commander—including the right name. Many, but not all. It is the particular virtue of Nigel Nicolson's admirable biography of Alexander that he holds qualities and limitations in a correct balance. This was not an easy task. No previous account of Alexander has been as shrewd and as sane, and no further account is now required. The Field Marshal was essentially an enigma, and those very attributes of charm and detachment which led his colleagues and subordinates to love and respect him tended also to make them magnify his capacity. But Mr. Nicolson is a man not easily taken in. He himself served under Alexander in North Africa and Italy, and he has the 'finger tip feel' of how things are done in war. More importantly, Harold Nicolson's son has inherited those intuitions without which no biographer can feel his way into the depths of a personality.

If there is a centre line running through this perceptive account of Alexander's military career, it is that for the Field Marshal this career was, in a curious way, parenthetic to what he really wanted from life. A patrician from the Ulster ascendancy, he was permanently *je m'en foutiste*. One of the most enigmatic facts about Alexander is that for this very fine fighting soldier war was not, in the deepest sense, 'for real'. The observant wife of another considerable Field Marshal once remarked to me that the truth about Alex was that everything in life had come too easily to him: he had never had to struggle. He could rise above every situation—Dunkirk, the Burma retreat—but his perennial problem as a military commander was the extent to which he was prepared to descend into the rough realities of command. He lacked a final ruthlessness—lacked, perhaps, that streak of the cad in his character without which the great captains would have been less eminent. Beside Napoleon, beside Grant or Montgomery or even Eisenhower, he appears inhibited by an ultimate lack of concern. All those

men had sweated their way to the top and been hardened in the process: Alexander floated, and the iron never entered his soul. Mr. Nicolson brings all this out very well.

There is no doubt that as a fighting soldier he was superb. Mr. Nicolson's description of his service with the Guards in the First World War, his immediate postwar service in the mercenary world on the eastern frontiers of Germany, and his later years as an efficient medium-grade officer on the north-west frontier of India makes this plain. The doubts arise, and will persist, when one seeks to assess Alexander's performance on the highest level of command. And here one key may be found in the fact that even a hagiographer could not call Alexander an educated soldier in the sense of the word used by John Terraine in his well-known biography,' *Douglas Haig, the Educated Soldier.*[1] Alexander acquitted himself with distinction in the front line: but when the battle was over he failed to apply himself with immense concentration to the study of war. A comparison with the dedicated professionalism of Montgomery is instructive.

The truth is nearly but not quite exposed when Mr. Nicolson describes him as England's Eisenhower. This gets very near to the marrow of the matter. Alexander had all Ike's capacity for synthesising allies, for keeping things cool when the temperature was running hot at the summit, for being 'little friend of all the world '. His performance in the Mediterranean amply supports this view. But there is little in Mr. Nicolson's book to suggest—largely, one feels, because he found nothing to suggest it—that at the highest level Alexander was mentally or temperamentally equipped to originate decisively those master-strokes which are the signature of a great captain. We know what we mean by a ' Rommel battle ' or a ' Montgomery battle '. What does an ' Alexander battle ' imply? Mr. Nicolson leaves uncertain—and it is also uncertain whether the long-awaited official history of the Italian campaign will resolve the question—how far Alexander himself or his Chief of Staff, John Harding, was responsible for the final, classic break-through at Cassino and the ultimate and beautiful victory in the Italian north.

The great virtue of Mr. Nicolson's book is that he is unabashed about a man whose charisma seduced so many people—notably his Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. It is a pity, therefore, that he has not put into a true focus the campaign which, after Dunkirk, fixed Alexander in Churchill's mind as the general who could do no wrong. This was the retreat from Burma in 1942. Wavell forced into Alexander's mind the notion that Rangoon should be held to the last. When Alex arrived he implemented this disastrous idea against the advice of all those senior officers on the spot who knew the truth. (It is an interesting speculation as to whether, in similar circumstances, Montgomery would instantly have decided that Wavell and Whitehall were wrong, and exercised his own initiative.) Alexander nearly lost the Burma Army in consequence. Mr. Nicolson's account does small justice to Sir Thomas Hutton, whom Alexander replaced, who had struggled with the realities before he arrived and saw that the newcomer was heading for catastrophe. However, this is a minor gloss on a brilliant description of a rare bird in the aviary of the British High Command.

RONALD LEWIN

[1] London: Hutchinson. 1963.

Iain Macleod. By Nigel Fisher. Introduction by Lord Boyle of Handswortl *London: André Deutsch. 1973. 352 pp. Index. Illus. £3·95.*

If Iain Macleod had not died tragically within a few days of the Conservativ victory in 1970, he might well have established himself as a great Chancello of the Exchequer. He could certainly have brought to Mr. Heath's Cabine a welcome—and conspicuously absent—sensitivity to the affairs of th Third World. It was this sympathy with the rapidly changing situation i the developing countries that made Macleod, in the words of Lord Boyle i his introduction to this biography, one of the two or three greatest Colonia Secretaries (p. 20). He held that office for only two years, from 1959 t 1961, but they were crucial years. The Hola Camp episode, the Devli Report on Nyasaland and the worsening political situation in the Federatio of Rhodesia and Nyasaland made necessary a rapid acceleration in the polic of decolonisation. As Mr. Fisher states, ' Theoretically Government polic remained unaltered, but the change of timing was so radical that it amounte in practice to a change of policy ' (p. 142). Macleod, hitherto not greatl interested in colonial affairs, not only saw what needed to be done, bu deeply and passionately believed that it was right.

Those of us who had the opportunity to watch him closely during thi period could not fail to be impressed by this fervent sense of purpose. Th late Lord Salisbury's mischievous description of Macleod as ' too clever b half ', which Mr. Fisher describes as a direct and vicious attack upon th man as well as upon his policies (p. 171), did Macleod a lot of damage. I would have done less if more people had realised how totally out of toucl with reality Lord Salisbury was.

Nigel Fisher was a close friend of Macleod, and shared his approach t colonial questions (himself serving later as a junior Colonial Office minister) He has written a sympathetic biography and, particularly in the chapter dealing with Macleod's days at the Colonial Office, one reflecting a dee understanding of the issues. At the same time, he has achieved a remark able measure of objectivity. For example, he records frankly the disappoint ment felt by those Conservatives with liberal views on Commonwealtl questions at Macleod's half-hearted attitude to the imposition of sanction on Rhodesia after UDI. He does not, however, explain why Macleod reacte as he did. It would be interesting to know whether his flair in ' colonial matters needed to be fed by direct involvement in policy-making. There i no doubt that he understood the paramount importance of race in th political development of Africa, and recognised therefore the sterility of th Rhodesian Federal Government's arguments for keeping the Federation i being. It is far less clear whether he thought through the implications o this—far less clear, in short, whether for this highly intellectual statesma the racial question was a matter of instinct or of intellectual analysis.

Many questions about Macleod remain. Nigel Fisher's excellent bool does not provide all the answers, but it is essential reading for anyon trying to find them.

W. P. Kirkman

Australian Diplomat. Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt. *London: Angus & Robert son in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs 1973. 329 pp. Illus. Index. £4·25.*

This highly informative, concise and frank account by a former senio member of the Australian Diplomatic Service differs from the usual run-of-

the-mill memoirs by diplomats in several ways. One is that the author, the son of Scottish parents born in Australia, only entered the Service when he was 36, after having acquired a good deal of experience in other walks of life. As a student in English and Philosophy at Sydney University he won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford where he read PPE. With the help of a special Scholarship for Graduates he spent six months at Heidelberg, which widened his political insight and cultural horizon. Back in Australia he was first an education officer for a tobacco company, then an Associate to a Supreme Court Judge in Sydney. Later he qualified as a barrister and also earned experience and money as a temporary lecturer on philosophy and as a journalist.

When in 1937 the author entered the Department of External Affairs in Canberra—and this marks another unusual aspect of his career—the Department was only two years old; during the next twenty-five years he experienced its evolution from infancy to maturity. In 1937 Australia had only one ' diplomatic mission ' abroad, the High Commissioner's Office in London. In 1962 when Sir Alan left the Service, it possessed some forty-four diplomatic and consular offices abroad and their number has since increased. Looking back, Sir Alan emphasises the growing pains as well as the successes of the Service and with a sense of humour describes his generation of officials as ' in a very real sense a " guinea pig " generation on which administrative experiments were carried out which were not always appreciated by the patients on the operating table ' (p. viii).

A few years ago Sir Alan published a lucid account of *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938–65*.[1] In his new book he gives us his personal story from the inside. These years covered three interspersed periods of service in Canberra, five years at the legation and later embassy at Washington (1940–45), three years as Head of Mission in Moscow (April 1947–February 1950), two years in leading positions in south-east Asia at a time of political unrest in Malaya and Singapore (1954–56). Finally Sir Alan served as ambassador in two former enemy countries, Japan (1956–59) and West Germany (1960–62). After his retirement he was for six years Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.

Whereas in Britain the post of Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office marks the crowning achievement of a diplomatic career, in Australia the position is different. Alan Watt was Secretary, Department for External Affairs, for four years (1950–54) and then again occupied leading positions abroad. As Secretary at Canberra he worked under two Ministers, first, briefly under Percy Spender, father of the Colombo Plan and a major force behind the ANZUS Treaty, and then for some years under R. G. Casey, who had known the author since his Oxford days. In retrospect Sir Alan regards his relationship with Casey as a stroke of ' great good fortune ' (p. 168). He seems to have co-operated equally well with the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, who during Casey's frequent absences abroad was also in charge of External Affairs. On the other hand Watt did not see eye to eye with Dr. H. V. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs from 1941–49. Sir Alan denies that his difficulties with Evatt, of whose methods of operation he was often critical, were affected by Evatt's Labour affiliations, but the fact remains that he readjusted himself with much greater ease to non-Labour Ministers. Yet, looking back, he

[1] London: Cambridge University Press. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1968, p. 161.

does not deny their weaknesses either. He speaks with high praise of Casey's early work as the first Australian Minister in Washington, managing before Pearl Harbour to develop a favourable climate of American opinion towards Australia. Later, as Minister of External Affairs, Casey became convinced that in future Australia had to pay much more attention to the political, economic and military situation in south-east Asia. Partly together with Watt, he travelled much in that area and also expanded Australia's diplomatic representation there.[2]

There are positive comments on the work of Malcolm Macdonald as British High Commissioner for south-east Asia and on the attitude of Sir Gerald Templer, British High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya in the early 1950s, whom Watt found 'receptive and appreciative of Australian contributions to the British effort' (p. 229). On the other hand, as 'a free-born Australian', Sir Alan confesses that he 'found the imperial-colonial atmosphere of Singapore and Malaya and the Borneo territories unpleasant and irritating. The constant attitude of "father knows best"; of treating the local population as children; of playing up to the unjustified pretensions of Sultans; of senior and junior British staff treating High Commissioner or Governor as the Queen herself'—all this seemed to him 'a form of rather unsuccessful play-acting' (pp. 229–230). Sir Alan, however, redresses the balance by being no less critical of his fellow-Australians, some of whom he feels have little understanding of foreign mentalities.

At the end of his rewarding story Sir Alan complains that he had met many Australians who still think that the life of a diplomat 'consists primarily in attending cocktail parties dressed in striped pants'. One of the aims of writing the Memoirs was to correct this misconception. He insists that diplomatic life, 'so far at least as the senior ranks of the Service are concerned . . . involves constant hard work, an unusual measure of adaptability, sound judgment based upon wide experience, a deep sense of public responsibilities and exceptional difficulties in bringing up a family' (p. 315). Sir Alan's book provides ample evidence for this thesis.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Bidwell's Guide to Government Ministers. Vol. 1. The Major Powers and Western Europe 1900–1971. Compiled and edited by Robin Bidwell. *London, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass. 1973. 297 pp. £9·00.*

The compiler of this fascinating reference book says he was constantly frustrated in his own research work by references to unnamed ministers of finance, foreign affairs, war and so on. Students of international history will now benefit from the immense amount of work he has put into this guide, which needs to be carefully examined in order to appreciate its full worth. From this first volume one can, for example, find out without difficulty who was foreign minister and minister of war in all European countries, the United States and Japan on any date between 1900 and 1971. Subsequent volumes will deal with the rest of the world.

[2] It is instructive to compare Sir Alan's account of their first joint visit to south-east Asia in July and August 1951 (pp. 186–190) with Lord Casey's diary notes, now available in *Australian Foreign Minister. The Diaries of R. G. Casey 1951–60*, ed. T. R. Millar (London: Collins. 1972). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1973, p. 159.

World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1973. *Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell; New York: Humanities Press; London: Paul Elek. 1973. 510 pp. Index. Sw. Kr. 75.00. $16.50. £7·50.*

This fourth annual survey of world armaments and disarmament deals with the events of 1972, the year in which the Salt I agreements were signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in that year the number of nuclear warheads deployed on operational strategic weapons increased in both countries and the militarisation of the whole world continued unabated.

The survey follows the pattern of previous years and the different sections are supported by statistics, bibliographies, texts of documents and a chronology. Special topics covered are security in Europe through disarmament, the prohibition of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons and UN peacekeeping forces.

The Almanac of World Military Power. 2nd ed. By T. N. Dupuy and Wendell Blanchard. *London: Arthur Barker. 1973. 373 pp. Maps. £8·40.*

In this country we are so well served by the moderately priced publications of the International Institute for Strategic Studies that this almanac is scarcely needed. Nevertheless, in it there is collected a great deal of useful information which, with the exception of the maps, is clearly presented.

African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1972–1973. Volume 5. Edited by Colin Legum. *London: Rex Collings; New York: Africana Publishing Corporation. 1973. 1160 pp. Maps. Indices. £12·50.*

The value of a reference book such as this increases with each new volume published especially when, as in this case, it appears with commendable promptness. A distinguished list of contributors have written essays for Part 1 on current issues. Part 2 is a country-by-country review of 1972 and Part 3 contains documents for the year. It is particularly useful to find there texts of the resolutions of sessions of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity which are always difficult to obtain.

The Far East and Australasia 1973. A Survey and Directory of Asia and the Pacific. *London: Europa. 1973. 1343 pp. Maps. £10·50.*

The new edition of this survey and directory contains a vast amount of useful information which has been up-dated to include, for example, the signing of the Vietnam peace agreements in January 1973. It would be advisable to check the bibliographies before the next edition as they contain many inaccuracies and inconsistencies.

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CORRECTION

On page 422 of the July 1973 issue of *International Affairs*, line 33 should read 'the refugee movements, both with their sons and daughters, and the. . . .'

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